97-33439. CUC International Inc.; HFS Incorporated; Analysis To Aid Public Comment  

  • [Federal Register Volume 62, Number 246 (Tuesday, December 23, 1997)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 67074-67076]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 97-33439]
    
    
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    FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
    
    [File No. 971-0087]
    
    
    CUC International Inc.; HFS Incorporated; Analysis To Aid Public 
    Comment
    
    AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.
    
    ACTION: Proposed consent agreement.
    
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    SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged 
    violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or 
    practices or unfair methods of competition. The attached Analysis to 
    Aid Public Comment describes both the allegations in the draft 
    complaint that accompanies the consent agreement and the terms of the 
    consent order--embodied in the consent agreement--that would settle 
    these allegations.
    
    DATES: Comments must be received on or before February 23, 1998.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to: FTC/Office of the Secretary, 
    Room 159, 6th St. and Pa. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20580.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    William Baer, Federal Trade Commission, 6th & Pennsylvania Ave., NW, H-
    374, Washington, DC 20580. (202) 326-2932. Jacqueline K. Mendel, 
    Federal Trade Commission, 6th & Pennsylvania Ave., NW, S-2308, 
    Washington, DC 20580. (202) 326-2603.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to Section 6(f) of the Federal 
    Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721, 15 U.S.C. 46, and Section 2.34 of 
    the Commission's Rules of Practice (16 CFR 2.34), notice is hereby 
    given that the about-captioned consent agreement containing a consent 
    order to cease and desist, having been filed with and accepted, subject 
    to final approval, by the Commission, has been placed on the public 
    record for a period of sixty (60) days. The following Analysis to Aid 
    Public Comment describes the terms of the consent agreement, and the 
    allegations in the accompanying complaint. An electronic copy of the 
    full text of the consent agreement package can be obtained from the 
    Commission Actions section of the FTC Home Page (for December 17, 
    1997), on the World Wide Web, at ``http://www.ftc.gov/os/
    actions97.htm.'' A paper copy can be obtained from the FTC Public 
    Reference Room, Room H-130, Sixth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 
    Washington, D.C. 20580, either in person or by calling (202) 326-3627. 
    Public comment is invited. Such comments or views will be considered by 
    the Commission and will be available for inspection and copying at its
    
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    principal office in accordance with Section 4.9(b)(6)(ii) of the 
    Commission's Rules of Practice (16 CFR 4.9(b)(6)(ii)).
    
    Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment
    
        The Federal Trade Commission (``Commission'') has accepted, subject 
    to final approval, an agreement containing a proposed Consent Order 
    from CUC International Inc. (``CUC'') and HFS Incorporated (``HFS'') 
    (collectively, ``the Parties'') under which the Parties would be 
    required to divest Interval International Inc. (``Interval''), one of 
    two worldwide full-service timeshare exchange service companies, to 
    Interval Acquisition Corporation (``IAC''). IAC is controlled by a 
    venture capital firm, Willis Stein & Partners, L.P., and includes 
    Interval's current management. The buying group also includes Marriott 
    Ownership Resorts, Inc., a subsidiary of Marriott International, Inc., 
    Hyatt Vacation Ownership Resorts, Inc., and Carlson Companies, Inc. If 
    the sale of Interval is not made to the Willis Stein buying group, the 
    Parties are required to divest Resort Condominiums International, Inc. 
    (``RCI''), the other worldwide full-service timeshare exchange service 
    company, currently owned by HFS. The agreement is designed to remedy 
    the anticompetitive efforts resulting from CUC's acquisition of HFS.
        The proposed Consent Order has been placed on the public record for 
    sixty (60) days for reception of comments by interested persons. Public 
    comment is invited regarding all aspects of the agreement including the 
    proposed divestiture of Interval to IAC. Comments received during this 
    period will become part of the public record. After sixty (60) days, 
    the Commission will again review the agreement and the comments 
    received and will decide whether it should withdraw from the agreement 
    or make final the agreement's proposed Order. If the Commission decides 
    after the public comment period that IAC is not an acceptable acquirer, 
    the Parties have 120 days to divest either Interval or RCI to another 
    Commission-approved buyer.
        The proposed complaint alleges that the proposed acquisition, if 
    consummated, would constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton 
    Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as 
    amended, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 45, in the market for the worldwide sale of 
    timeshare exchanges services.
        The relevant market in which to analyze the effects of the proposed 
    transaction is the sale of timeshare exchange services on a worldwide 
    basis. An important benefit of timeshare ownership (also known as 
    vacation ownership) is the right to exchange the use of that unit for 
    another comparable unit at a different resort property (or at the same 
    resort for another time period). The owner of a particular resort unit 
    relies on the timeshare exchange company to provide the exchange 
    properties and to process the exchange. Exchange companies grade and 
    rate time periods as well as property quality.
        CUC's acquisition of HFS will result in a virtual monopoly in the 
    market for full-service timeshare exchanges. As a result, timeshare 
    resort developers and owners would not have the same exchange 
    opportunities if they did not use the services of the merged company. 
    Therefore, after the acquisition, CUC would have the ability to 
    increase prices for the sale of timeshare exchange services to both 
    groups of customers, as well as decrease the level of services 
    provided.
        Further, timely entry in the market for the sale of timeshare 
    exchange services on the scale necessary to offset the competitive harm 
    resulting from the combination of CUC and HFS is highly unlikely 
    because there are significant network externalities that lead to high 
    entry barriers. Like telephones, fax machines and automated teller 
    machines, membership in a timeshare exchange requires other people with 
    whom to interact. The owner of an interest in a timeshare resort would 
    have no reason to join a timeshare exchange that had no other members. 
    And the more members (i.e., potential exchange partners) that belong to 
    an exchange, the more attractive the exchange becomes to other 
    potential market participants. Attaining the critical mass required to 
    be a viable competitor would take many years because timeshare 
    developers consider joining a timeshare exchange only if it includes 
    other quality resorts. Timeshare owners, in turn, want to affiliate 
    with exchanges that give them the broadest timeshare vacation choices. 
    Thus, a new timeshare exchange would not enter effectively unless it 
    could provide consumers a level of timeshare vacation choices 
    comparable to those offered by RCI or Interval.
        Developing a timeshare exchange comparable to RCI and Interval 
    would be a difficult endeavor. First, most resorts sign exclusive, 
    multi-year contracts with one timeshare exchange. The lengthy terms of 
    these contracts effectively prevent new entrants from securing a 
    sufficient base of resorts to become competitive. Second, individual 
    resorts would be reluctant to leave the established exchanges and 
    affiliate with a new exchange that did not offer a catalog of 
    opportunities comparable to that of the existing exchanges. Timeshare 
    exchange affiliation is an important sales tool for timeshare resort 
    developers, who must offer an array of exchange opportunities that is 
    competitive with those offered by other developers. Finally, there are 
    significant supply side economies of scale associated with the 
    sophisticated computer systems necessary to operate the exchanges.
        No significant efficiencies would result from the merger of RCI and 
    Interval. Although consumers might receive some marginal benefit from 
    dealing with an exchange with additional properties listed, that 
    benefit does not outweigh the substantial loss of competition between 
    the two exchanges. Customers did not perceive any additional benefit 
    from the merger of the two exchanges. Moreover, the fact that Interval 
    is a strong competitor even though it is smaller than RCI suggests that 
    both firms have already achieved the requisite network externalities 
    and that a merger would not provide any significant incremental 
    benefit.
        The proposed Consent Order would remedy the alleged violations by 
    replacing the lost competition that would result from the acquisition. 
    Under the proposed Consent Order, the Parties are required to divest 
    Interval to IAC within ten days CUC's acquisition of HFS. In the event 
    that the Parties do not satisfy that requirement, they must divest RCI, 
    the larger timeshare exchange service, within six months of signing the 
    consent agreement. The Commission may appoint a trustee to divest RCI 
    if the Parties do not do so. In the event that the Commission decides 
    to reject IAC as the acquirer of Interval when making the order final 
    after the public comment period, the Parties must rescind the 
    divestiture to IAC, and would have 120 days to divest either Interval 
    or RCI to a Commission-approved acquirer.
        The Commission has not required a hold separate agreement in this 
    case because: (1) The proposed Order contemplates a short divestiture 
    time period and (2) the Order contains crown jewel provisions that 
    would substitute a larger asset package if the Parties fail to 
    accomplish the divestiture required under the Order.
        Under the provisions of the proposed Order, the Parties are 
    required to provide the Commission with a report of compliance with the 
    divestiture provisions of the Order within thirty (30) days following 
    the date this Order becomes final, and every thirty (30) days
    
    [[Page 67076]]
    
    thereafter until the required divestiture is completed.
        The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the 
    proposed Order, and it is not intended to constitute interpretation of 
    the agreement and proposed Order or to modify in any way their terms.
    Donald S. Clark,
    Secretary.
    [FR Doc. 97-33439 Filed 12-22-97; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6750-01-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
12/23/1997
Department:
Federal Trade Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Action:
Proposed consent agreement.
Document Number:
97-33439
Dates:
Comments must be received on or before February 23, 1998.
Pages:
67074-67076 (3 pages)
Docket Numbers:
File No. 971-0087
PDF File:
97-33439.pdf