[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 249 (Thursday, December 26, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68014-68026]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-32759]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
for Stockpile Stewardship and Management
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of
Decision for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, the
program through which DOE carries out its statutory responsibility for
the United States nuclear weapons program. This Record of Decision is
based on the information and analysis contained in the Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management (DOE/EIS-0236) and other factors, including
the mission responsibilities of the Department, and comments received
on the Draft and Final PEIS. DOE's decisions will continue the ongoing
Office of Defense Programs missions at eight DOE sites, making
appropriate adjustments consistent with post-Cold War national security
policies. Selected facilities for enhanced experimental capability will
be constructed and operated; manufacturing capability at existing
weapons industrial plants will be maintained; however, manufacturing
capacity will be appropriately downsized; plutonium pit component
manufacturing capability will be reestablished.
More specifically, for Stockpile Stewardship, the Department has
[[Page 68015]]
decided to: (1) Construct and operate the National Ignition Facility at
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; (2) construct and operate
the Contained Firing Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; and (3) construct and operate the Atlas Facility at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory. Additionally, the Department has decided to
transfer a small amount of plutonium-242 material from the Savannah
River Site to the Los Alamos National Laboratory to support stockpile
stewardship activities.
With respect to Stockpile Management, the Department has decided
to: (1) Downsize weapons assembly/disassembly capacity at the Pantex
Plant; (2) downsize high explosive component fabrication capacity at
the Pantex Plant; (3) downsize weapons secondary and case component
fabrication capacity at the Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation;
(4) downsize weapons nonnuclear component fabrication capacity at the
Kansas City Plant; and (5) reestablish pit fabrication capability, with
a small capacity, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, or this Record of
Decision, please call 800-776-2765, or write to: Jay Rose, Director,
Reconfiguration Group, Office of Technical and Environmental Support,
DP-45, United States Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, D.C. 20585.
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program maintains an
Internet Home Page at http://web.fie.com/fedix/doeoor.html. This can
also be accessed by modem by dialing toll-free (800) 783-3349 or (301)
258-0953 in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
For information on the DOE's National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, United States Department of Energy,
1000 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Since the inception of nuclear weapons in the 1940s, DOE and its
predecessor agencies have been responsible for the stewardship and
management of the nation's stockpile. Through the system of national
laboratories and industrial facilities known collectively as the
Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex), DOE has provided the nation with
nuclear weapons and ensured that those weapons remain safe and
reliable. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS analyzes the
potential consequences to human health and the environment if certain
changes to the Complex are implemented to support DOE's Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program.
The term ``stockpile stewardship'' refers to core competencies in
activities associated with research, design, development, and testing
of nuclear weapons, and the assessment and certification of their
safety and reliability under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Historically, these activities have been performed at the three DOE
weapons laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and Sandia
National Laboratories in New Mexico and California) and the Nevada Test
Site. The term ``stockpile management'' refers to core competencies in
activities associated with the production, maintenance, surveillance,
and disassembly of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. Historically,
these activities have been performed at the DOE nuclear weapons
industrial facilities (currently, the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, the
Kansas City Plant in Missouri, the Pantex Plant in Texas and the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina).
In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world's
political regimes, the emphasis of the United States nuclear weapons
program has shifted dramatically from developing and producing new-
design weapons to dismantlement and maintenance of a smaller enduring
stockpile. In accordance with national security policy, including the
terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START) Treaties, the
nuclear weapons stockpile is being significantly reduced. The United
States is no longer producing new-design nuclear weapons, and DOE has
closed or consolidated some of its former weapons industrial
facilities. Additionally, in 1992, the United States declared a
moratorium on underground nuclear testing. President Clinton extended
this moratorium and decided, in August 1995, to pursue a ``zero-yield''
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that he signed in September 1996.
Even with these significant changes, however, DOE's
responsibilities for the nuclear weapons stockpile continue. The
President and Congress have directed DOE to maintain the core
intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear
weapons and to maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring
nuclear weapons stockpile. In response to this direction, DOE has
developed a science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
to provide a single, highly integrated technical program for
maintaining core competencies and ensuring the continued safety and
reliability of the stockpile. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program has evolved from programs that served this mission over
previous decades.
With no new-design nuclear weapons production, DOE expects existing
weapons to remain in the stockpile well into the next century. This
means that the weapons will age beyond original expectations. Because
underground nuclear testing will no longer be available, alternative
means must be developed in order to assess and certify the weapons'
continued safety and reliability. To meet these new challenges, DOE's
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has been developed to
increase understanding of the basic phenomena associated with nuclear
weapons, to provide better predictive understanding of the safety and
reliability of weapons, and to ensure a strong scientific and technical
basis for future United States nuclear weapons policy objectives.
DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations for implementing the procedural
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR
Parts 1500-1508) and the Department of Energy regulations implementing
NEPA (10 CFR Part 1021). In making this Record of Decision for the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, the Department considered
the analysis from the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(PEIS) for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (DOE/EIS-
0236), issued in November 1996, along with other factors such as DOE
statutory mission requirements, national security policy, cost,
schedule, and technical risks. Additional technical descriptions and
assessments of cost, schedule and technical risk are found in the
Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives (DOE/AL, July 1996), the
Stockpile Management Preferred Alternatives Report (DOE/AL, July 1996),
and the Technology Basis and Site Comparison Evaluation for the
National Ignition Facility (DOE/OAK, September 1996).
[[Page 68016]]
In February 1996, DOE published the Draft PEIS for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management, which evaluated the siting, construction,
and operation of proposed stockpile stewardship facilities and the
siting, construction, and operation of facilities proposed for
stockpile management at eight alternative sites within the Complex. The
60-day public comment period for the Draft PEIS began on March 8, 1996,
and ended on May 7, 1996.
During the comment period, public meetings were held in Los Alamos,
Albuquerque and Santa Fe, New Mexico; North Las Vegas, Nevada; Oak
Ridge, Tennessee; Kansas City, Missouri; Livermore, California;
Washington, D.C.; Amarillo, Texas; and North Augusta, South Carolina.
In response to requests from the public, five of the public meetings
were joint meetings to obtain comments on both the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS and the Department's Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft PEIS, which were
being prepared concurrently. Two of the joint meetings (Amarillo and
North Augusta) also addressed issues associated with another EIS then
in preparation, the Site-Wide Draft Environmental Impact Statement for
the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of
Nuclear Weapon Components. In addition, the public was encouraged to
provide comments via mail, fax, electronic bulletin board (Internet),
and telephone (toll-free 800 number).
Volume IV of the Final PEIS, the Comment Response Document,
describes the public comment process in detail, presents comment
summaries and responses, and provides copies of all comments received.
The PEIS includes a classified appendix that provides additional
information about weapons physics as it relates to the proposed actions
for enhanced experimental capability, the stewardship need for
plutonium-242 and its transfer to a weapons laboratory, and a number of
the classified appendices to unclassified documents summarized or
referenced in the PEIS. Applicable regulations provide that
Environmental Impact Statements which address classified proposals may
be restricted from public dissemination; consistent with the
regulations, however, the Department has organized the PEIS so that
classified information is segregated in order that the unclassified
portions can be made available to the public [40 CFR 1507.3; 10 CFR
1021.340(a)].
For the National Ignition Facility, Contained Firing Facility, and
the Atlas Facility, the PEIS included project specific environmental
analyses (Appendices I, J and K of the PEIS) to address the detailed
environmental impacts associated with siting, construction and
operation. Based upon this Record of Decision, the Department intends
to proceed with the construction and operation of these three
facilities with no further National Environmental Policy Act reviews.
Proposed Actions
Broadly stated, all of the existing basic capabilities of the
Complex continue to be required both technically and by national
security policy objectives established by the President and Congress.
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS concentrates on three
major proposed actions that result from the national security policy
constraints placed on the Program. The three major proposed actions
are: (1) Providing enhanced experimental capability; (2) rightsizing
the industrial base; and (3) reestablishing manufacturing capability
and a small capacity for plutonium pit components (the pit is the
central core of a nuclear weapon containing plutonium and/or highly
enriched uranium that is surrounded by a layer of high explosive).
Additionally, the Department considered the transfer of a small amount
of plutonium-242 from the Savannah River Site to Los Alamos National
Laboratory or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in support of
stockpile stewardship activities.
1. Proposed Action (1)--Providing Enhanced Experimental Capability for
Stockpile Stewardship
Historically, nuclear testing provided the Department with an
unambiguous high confidence in the safety and reliability of weapons in
the stockpile. As described in Chapters 2 and 3 of the PEIS, without
underground nuclear testing, DOE must rely on experimental and
computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to assess
and predict the consequences of problems that may occur in an aging
stockpile.
DOE concluded that other approaches to stockpile stewardship would
not ensure nuclear weapon safety and reliability, and that such
approaches are therefore not reasonable. In addition, DOE concluded
that only the three facilities discussed below are sufficiently well
understood that they could be proposed and evaluated in detail in the
PEIS (see Section 3.1.2 of the PEIS, and the sections below entitled,
``Next Generation Experimental Facilities for Stockpile Stewardship,''
and ``Other Considerations.'')
DOE has considered that there are differing opinions on the
technical merit of DOE's proposed actions with regard to enhanced
experimental capability. Nuclear weapons design information, including
the complex physics of nuclear weapon explosions, is generally
classified for reasons of national security and nonproliferation. Even
if this information were unclassified, the physics problems remain
extremely complex; hence, the reason why nuclear testing was so
important to the past program. Both the classification of information
and technical complexity of the issues form natural barriers to public
communication. The technical complexity, alone, engenders significant
debate among qualified experts, especially in the area of high energy
density physics.
The PEIS attempts to explain the weapon physics issues in an
unclassified, comprehensible manner regarding its relation to mission
purpose and need (Chapter 2), proposed actions and alternatives
(Section 3.3), and project-specific technical detail (Volume III). In
the absence of nuclear testing, there are two basic alternatives: (1)
Rely on existing facilities, as described by the No Action alternative,
as sources of experimental data; and (2) pursue the enhanced capability
of the proposed facilities to provide the sources of experimental data
needed.
The nuclear weapons phenomena involved in enhanced experimental
capability can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) Physics of
nuclear weapons primaries (the primary contains the main high explosive
and the plutonium pit); (2) physics of nuclear weapons secondaries (the
secondary contains highly enriched uranium, lithium deuteride and other
materials to produce a thermonuclear explosion); and (3) weapons
effects (the effects of radiation on nuclear weapons and military
systems). Because there are no proposed actions in the PEIS for new
facilities designed primarily for weapons effects testing, this issue
is not discussed further in this Record of Decision. The physics of
nuclear weapons primaries and secondaries are described below, as well
as alternatives that are assessed in the PEIS. More detail on the
physics of nuclear weapons can be found in Section 2.4.1, 3.3, and
Appendices I and K of the PEIS.
[[Page 68017]]
1.A. Physics of Nuclear Weapons Primaries
With respect to the physics phenomena from the implosion of the
primary, experimental facilities provide physics and computational
model validation, material behavior information, improved understanding
of the implosion and the ability to assess the effects of defects.
Proposed new facilities and site alternatives considered, along with
the existing facilities which are part of the No Action alternative,
are discussed below.
1.A.1 Alternatives. 1.A.1.1 No Action. The principal diagnostic
tools DOE currently uses to study initiation of nuclear weapons
primaries are hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments (see Section
3.3 of the PEIS). Under the No Action alternative, DOE would continue
to use the hydrodynamic and dynamic testing facilities currently
available at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Nevada Test Site (NTS), including
the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility currently
under construction at LANL (see Section 1.6.2 of the PEIS).
1.A.1.2 Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the Contained
Firing Facility (CFF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
Under this alternative, the capabilities of the CFF would be added to
the existing facilities at LLNL used to study the physics of primaries.
Specifically, the CFF would be an addition to the existing Flash X-Ray
Facility (FXR) at LLNL Site 300, Building 801. The facility would
provide an enclosed blast chamber to contain debris from high explosive
experiments that support the stockpile stewardship program. The
containment enclosure would reduce the environmental, safety, and
health impacts of current outdoor testing. The enclosure would also
improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing by better
controlling experimental conditions. Because the CFF is an upgrade to
an existing facility, sites other than Building 801, at LLNL, would
have significant technical disadvantages, and were not evaluated in
detail.
1.A.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 1.A.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors. The CFF addition to the existing FXR Facility would cost about
$50 million to construct and take about two years to complete. The CFF
would improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing.
Improving diagnostic capability to understand weapon primary behavior
is crucial to DOE's ability to continue to certify the safety and
reliability of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
1.A.2.2 Environmental Factors. DOE prepared a Project Specific
Analysis (Appendix J of the PEIS) to address the environmental impacts
associated with construction and operation of the CFF. Because the
proposal for the CFF involves modification to the existing FXR
Facility, construction impacts would be negligible. Very little land
would be disturbed (less than 1 acre) and the construction activities
would largely involve internal modifications to the existing facility.
Impacts associated with operation would also be negligible. The CFF
enclosure would reduce gaseous and particulate air emissions from
explosives testing, reduce the generation of solid low-level
radioactive waste, reduce testing noise, and improve the safety of
testing by controlling fragment dispersion. The CFF would not utilize
any significant quantities of natural resources, and would not cause
any significant socioeconomic impacts at LLNL. LLNL has adequate
existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of
wastes that would be generated by the CFF. Impacts to human health from
CFF operation are expected to be within regulatory limits, and
extremely small.
1.A.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally
preferable alternative is to construct and operate the CFF as an
addition to FXR, at LLNL. Although this alternative would require
construction and additional land utilization, the impacts associated
with the construction and operation of this facility are minor and
offset by the environmental benefits of the CFF. The CFF would contain
releases to the atmosphere from the conventional high explosive
detonations presently being conducted uncontained at the FXR Facility,
which would continue operation under the No Action alternative.
1.A.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to proceed with the
construction and operation of the CFF at Site 300, Building 801, at
LLNL. This action is consistent with existing operations at Site 300
and LLNL land-use plans and policies.
Mitigation. The mitigation measures appropriate to the CFF
construction and operation will be formalized in a CFF Mitigation
Action Plan. The plan will be issued by the DOE and monitored for
compliance by its representatives during construction and operation of
the CFF. Construction and operation of the CFF are not expected to
incur environmental impacts other than those associated with a
temporary construction lay-down area. Dust suppression and storm water
runoff mitigation technologies will be applied to reduce these impacts
to insignificance. A preconstruction survey monitoring for endangered
species will be conducted no more than 60 days prior to construction
start-up.
1.B. Physics of Nuclear Weapons Secondaries
The energy released by the fission of the nuclear weapons primary
activates the secondary assembly, creating a thermonuclear (fusion)
explosion. However, the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries deals
with the interaction of many dynamic physics processes, including
hydrodynamics, thermodynamics, fission, and fusion. Experimental
facilities provide improved understanding of thermonuclear ignition,
secondary physics and computational model validation, and material
behavior information. These facilities will also be useful for
investigating other physics phenomena related to the nuclear weapon
primary and weapons effects (see Appendices I and K of the PEIS).
1.B.1 Alternatives. 1.B.1.1 No Action. The No Action alternative
would limit DOE to the use of existing facilities. The principal
facilities currently available are the Nova Facility at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Pegasus II Facility at
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
1.B.1.2 Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the National
Ignition Facility (NIF). Under this alternative, the capabilities of
the NIF would add to the existing facilities used to study the physics
of secondaries. The NIF would house the world's most powerful laser,
focusing 192 laser beams onto a target containing isotopes of hydrogen.
NIF experiments are designed to address, to various degrees, certain
weapons issues connected with fusion ignition and boosting; weapon
effects; radiation transport; and secondary implosion, ignition, and
output. Most of these processes occur at very high energy density
(i.e., at high temperatures and pressures) and are relevant to a
weapon's performance. The NIF would achieve higher temperatures and
pressures, albeit in a very small volume, than any other existing or
proposed stockpile stewardship facility. The energy available to
conduct experiments with the NIF would be about 50 times that available
with Nova. Five alternative locations at four DOE sites were studied
for the NIF: LLNL, LANL, NTS--Area 22 main site location
[[Page 68018]]
and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), and Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL), New Mexico.
1.B.1.3 Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the Atlas
Facility. Under this alternative, the Atlas Facility would be added to
the existing facilities used to study the physics of secondaries. The
Atlas Facility, a pulsed-power experimental facility that builds upon
special equipment existing at LANL TA-35 (the technical area which
contains the existing pulsed-power infrastructure), would provide the
capability to create pressures and volumes necessary to accurately
benchmark weapon-related computational predictions. The need to perform
experiments with macroscopic pulsed-power targets, as well as with
lasers, exists not only because of the limits of measurement
diagnostics and improved ease of measurement at larger scale, but also
because some of the physical phenomena that must be investigated cannot
readily be scaled down to smaller sizes without affecting some
parameters of importance. Existing facilities are not adequate to
analyze some secondary physics issues.
1.B.2 Comparison of Alternatives. The capabilities that would be
provided by the two proposed facilities, the NIF and the Atlas
Facility, are independent components needed to improve the
understanding of the physics of nuclear weapon secondaries. As
explained in Section 3.3 and Appendices I and K of the PEIS, because
each facility responds to a different need and provides different
capabilities related to nuclear weapons secondaries, they are
complementary proposals.
1.B.2.1 Cost and Technical Factors. National Ignition Facility.
Total capital costs for construction of the NIF at LLNL would be
approximately $1.1 billion. The capital and life-cycle comparative cost
evaluation indicates the LLNL site will have the lowest capital and the
lowest overall costs (by about 5%) of the alternative sites considered.
Construction is anticipated to take about five years.
In regard to technical risk, LLNL has the most extensive experience
in developing, designing, constructing, and operating high power,
large-aperture, solid-state lasers and optical components. The
extensive solid-state laser infrastructure, equipment, and facilities
at LLNL exceed those of the alternative sites. LLNL has improved this
infrastructure continuously as it has built a succession of highly
sophisticated solid-state lasers. LLNL also has the most extensive
surrounding high-technology infrastructure.
The Inertial Confinement Fusion Program (ICF) and the NIF have been
supported by a succession of independent technical reviews conducted by
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the Fusion Policy Advisory
Committee (FPAC), the Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee
(ICFAC), and the JASON Committee (a group of independent experts who
evaluated the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program).
These reviews enabled the Department to plan the next reasonable steps
to further the pursuit of ICF goals and to evaluate their relationship
to SBSS. In September 1990, the NAS concluded that a solid state glass
laser, as proposed for NIF, was the only driver capable of achieving
ignition within a decade. Also in September 1990, as part of the
Inertial Fusion Energy plan, the FPAC urged support for the ICF
ignition facility, driven by a solid state glass laser as recommended
by the NAS, as the most important next step in the investigation of
inertial fusion energy's potential. In May 1994, the ICFAC stated that
they believed that the ICF research and development program has a key
role to play in ``science-based stewardship.'' They continued by saying
that an essential ingredient in this role will be the achievement of
ignition of a fusion capsule in the laboratory. In February 1996, their
final report concludes that good progress in target physics continues
and that DOE should proceed with the next step in the NIF project. In
November 1994, the JASON Committee strongly endorsed the NIF, calling
it ``the most scientifically valuable of the programs proposed for
SBSS.'' They did not identify any other technologies that could provide
the technical capabilities of the NIF. In March 1996, the JASON
Committee reiterated their previous comment about the NIF and further
concluded, ``that the present ICF Program does make an important
contribution to SBSS, and that the NIF will substantially increase this
contribution * * *'' The committee recommended proceeding with the NIF.
Atlas Facility. Capital costs to build the Atlas Facility are
estimated to be about $43 million. Construction will take about four
years. Because LANL has more extensive expertise in microsecond pulsed-
power than any other DOE site, and because the Atlas Facility would
utilize the extensive existing infrastructure and special equipment
available at LANL, no other DOE sites were considered for the Atlas
Facility. Proceeding with the construction of the Atlas Facility is
also consistent with the November 1994 JASON Committee review mentioned
above.
1.B.2.2 Environmental Factors. National Ignition Facility. DOE
prepared a Project Specific Analysis (Appendix I of the PEIS) to
address the environmental impacts associated with construction and
operation of the NIF. Potential environmental impacts were assessed for
the No Action alternative and two design capabilities (i.e., Conceptual
Design and Enhanced Design options) at all five candidate locations.
The analysis indicates that there would be few differences in the
environmental impacts between the candidate sites and little
environmental impact in any case. The maximum daily particulate matter
concentration in the air during site clearing would exceed applicable
air quality standards for suspended particles less than 10 microns in
diameter (PM10) at LLNL and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF).
However, the ambient air quality impacts would be localized and of
short duration. Land requirements would be greatest at NTS (45.0
acres), although this acreage is less that 1 percent of the uncommitted
land at NTS. Conversely, the least amount of uncommitted land that
would be required for NIF would be 7.9 acres at the NLVF. However, this
acreage represents the largest percentage of uncommitted land at a
candidate site (56 percent). Of greater significance would be the
quality of the habitat of the uncommitted land that would be affected
by NIF construction. The highest quality habitats that would be
affected are forest (9.9 acres) at LANL or desert (45 acres) at NTS. At
the other candidate sites, habitat disturbance would occur to
previously disturbed grassland (LLNL and SNL) or to an area of sparse
vegetation (NLVF). The risk to the public from a facility accident
involving the release of radioactive material would be greatest at NLVF
and SNL, although the potential for the actual occurrence of such an
accident would be extremely low.
Atlas Facility. DOE prepared a Project Specific Analysis (Appendix
K of the PEIS) to address the environmental impacts associated with
construction and operation of the Atlas Facility. Because the proposal
for the Atlas Facility involves modification to the existing facilities
within LANL's TA-35, construction impacts are expected to be small.
Very little land (0.1 acre) would be disturbed and the construction
activities would largely involve internal modifications to existing
facilities.
Impacts associated with operations would also be negligible. The
Atlas
[[Page 68019]]
Facility would not utilize any significant quantities of natural
resources, would not cause any significant socioeconomic changes at
LANL, and would not generate significant quantities of wastes. LANL has
adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and
dispose of wastes that would be generated by the Atlas Facility.
Impacts to human health from Atlas Facility operations are expected to
be small and within regulatory limits.
1.B.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. National Ignition
Facility. The environmentally preferable alternative is the No Action
alternative. However, in the absence of underground nuclear testing, it
is the Department's technical judgment that its ability to carry out
its statutory mission responsibilities would be impaired without the
capabilities that would be provided by the NIF. For this reason, the No
Action alternative with regard to the NIF is not reasonable.
Based on the PEIS analysis of the action alternatives, siting the
NIF at LLNL would have low or no adverse environmental impacts for most
environmental resource categories (land use, air quality and noise,
water biota, cultural, paleontologic, socioeconomic, human health, and
waste management) and would have the highest beneficial socioeconomic
impacts, compared to other site alternatives. After balancing the
overall potential environmental impacts at the other candidate sites
against LLNL, DOE concluded that none of the alternative candidate
sites is environmentally preferable to LLNL for the NIF.
Atlas Facility. The environmentally preferable alternative is the
No Action alternative. However, in the absence of underground nuclear
testing, it is the Department's technical judgment that its ability to
carry out its statutory mission responsibilities would be impaired
without the capabilities that would be provided by the Atlas Facility.
For this reason, the No Action alternative with regard to the Atlas
Facility is not reasonable.
Because the Atlas Facility would rely upon existing facilities and
special equipment already located at LANL, no additional site
alternatives were analyzed. As discussed above, the single action
alternative, to construct and operate the Atlas Facility at LANL TA-35,
would result in negligible environmental impact.
1.B.4 Decision. National Ignition Facility. DOE's decision is to
proceed with the construction and operation of the NIF (enhanced design
option) at LLNL. Without the improved experimental capabilities offered
by the NIF, DOE would lack the ability to evaluate significant weapon
performance issues, which could adversely affect confidence in the
nation's nuclear deterrent. Among the alternatives determined to be
reasonable, construction and operation of the NIF at LLNL is
environmentally preferable, the least cost and, due to LLNL's existing
infrastructure for laser technology, the least technical risk.
Mitigation. The NIF mitigation measures appropriate to the LLNL
site as identified in the PEIS (Appendix I, Paragraph I.4.7), will be
formalized in a NIF Mitigation Action Plan. The plan will be issued by
the DOE and monitored for compliance by its representatives during
construction of the NIF. Mitigation measures appropriate to NIF
operations will be incorporated in operating plans and procedures. A
brief summary of the mitigation actions that will be taken follows.
Construction materials will be stored in temporary laydown areas.
When construction is complete, a Reclamation Plan will be developed and
actions taken to restore the construction material laydown areas to
their original condition. To assure that the public is aware of the NIF
construction activities the public will be informed, through the local
news media, that elevated noise levels will occur for several months
during construction of the NIF. Visual monitoring will be done to
determine the effectiveness of conventional water-spraying dust control
measures to assure that air quality standards are not exceeded. A Storm
Water Pollution Prevention Plan will be developed and a Storm Water
Permit will be obtained from the San Francisco Bay Region Water Quality
Control Board for storm water discharges during construction. No more
than 60 days before the start of construction, a special status species
survey will be conducted for protected and sensitive biological
resources within the NIF site and laydown areas, and mitigation actions
taken as necessary. Exclusion or buffer zones will be established to
avoid any sensitive locations. Appropriate mitigation measures will be
implemented to avoid or minimize potential adverse impacts to protected
and sensitive resources, such as state and federally-listed threatened
and endangered species. Construction crews will be informed of any
environmental concerns that exist and requested to avoid sensitive
areas. An alternative construction entrance will be utilized to prevent
traffic congestion during major construction activities such as major
concrete pours.
For external combustion boilers, a permit will be obtained from the
San Francisco Bay Area Air Quality Management District to comply with
local area air quality standards. Hazardous materials will be
inventoried and moved out of the area during flood conditions during
NIF construction and operation. A Facility Safety Plan and Construction
Safety Plan will be developed that will identify safety requirements
for construction and operation of the NIF. A Waste Minimization Plan
will be developed for the operational phase to evaluate the potential
net reduction of hazardous, radioactive, and mixed waste streams. Other
mitigation measures, identified in Sections I.4.7.2.4 and I.4.7.2.5 of
Volume III of the PEIS, will be implemented to the extent practicable.
Atlas Facility. DOE's decision is to proceed with the construction
and operation of the Atlas Facility at LANL's TA-35. Without improved
experimental capabilities offered by the Atlas Facility, DOE would lack
the ability to evaluate significant weapon performance issues, which
could adversely affect confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent.
Among the alternatives determined to be reasonable, construction and
operation of the Atlas Facility is environmentally preferable, the
least cost, and the least technical risk.
Mitigation. The mitigation measures appropriate to the Atlas
Facility construction and operation will be formalized in an Atlas
Facility Mitigation Action Plan. The plan will be issued by the DOE and
monitored for compliance by its representatives during construction and
operation of the Atlas facility. There is a potential for public
exposure to nonstatic magnetic fields from the Atlas Facility for short
periods when operated. Monitoring at various locations around the Atlas
Facility will be conducted to insure fields greater than 1 Gauss (a
measure of electromagnetism) do not cause adverse impacts. Warning
signs and other administrative controls, such as road closures, will be
put in place prior to the operation of the Atlas Facility, as
necessary.
1.C. Next Generation Experimental Facilities for Stockpile Stewardship
Related to the proposed actions for enhanced experimental
facilities is the issue of next generation experimental facilities. In
commenting on the Draft PEIS, some commentors suggested that potential
next generation experimental facilities be analyzed as part of the
proposed action. The Final PEIS
[[Page 68020]]
includes a discussion of potential next generation experimental
facilities and the reasons why they are not proposed actions or
alternatives (Section 3.3.4). These facilities, while contemplated on
the basis of anticipated technical need, have not reached the stage of
design maturity through research and development for DOE to include a
decisionmaking analysis at this time.
However, the PEIS does describe, in general terms or by reference,
what is known today about their potential environmental impacts. The
environmental impacts from these facilities as contemplated today would
not be significantly different from existing ``similar'' facilities. By
characterizing the potential impacts in this way, the decisionmaker was
aware of the potential program-level cumulative impacts of the next
generation facilities when deciding whether to pursue a program of
enhanced experimental capability. If DOE were to propose to construct
and operate such next generation facilities in the future, appropriate
NEPA review would be performed.
1.D. Transport and Storage of Plutonium-242
As a result of the Record of Decision for the Interim Management of
Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site EIS (DOE/EIS-0220),
existing plutonium-242 in nitrate solutions at H-Canyon at SRS will be
stabilized by conversion to plutonium oxide in the HB-line. The
plutonium-242 oxide would then be stored. The PEIS evaluates the need
for plutonium-242 for stockpile stewardship activities and transport
and storage of this material.
1.D.1 Alternatives. 1.D.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action
alternative, the plutonium-242 material would remain at SRS and be
stored in existing facilities at either the FB-Line or Building 235F.
1.D.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Store Plutonium-242 at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Under this alternative, the
plutonium-242 would be transported to LANL and stored in an existing
plutonium facility.
1.D.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Store Plutonium-242 at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Under this alternative, the
plutonium-242 would be transported to LLNL and stored in Building 332.
1.D.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 1.D.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors. Transporting the plutonium-242 material would only require a
fraction of one Safe, Secure Trailer shipment, and the costs are not
significant. Because there is existing storage capacity at all three
sites, the storage costs are comparable and not significant.
The programmatic need for shipment of this material is contained in
a classified appendix to the Final PEIS. If the plutonium-242 material
were not transported to LANL or LLNL, it could not be used for
stockpile stewardship purposes.
1.D.2.2 Environmental Factors. The small quantity of plutonium-242
material is within the quantities of materials historically stored at
all three sites. Regardless of the storage location for this material,
there would be negligible environmental impacts. A high-bounding case
analysis of the risk from the transport of this material (see Section
4.19 of the PEIS) indicates low risk for either LANL or LLNL.
1.D.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For plutonium
storage, the No Action alternative is the environmentally preferable
alternative because there would be no potential impacts associated with
transportation. However, the No Action alternative would not enable the
plutonium-242 material to be used as needed for stockpile stewardship
purposes, and is, therefore, not considered reasonable. For the action
alternatives, storage at LANL is the environmentally preferable
alternative because there is slightly less risk associated with
transportation from SRS (due to the shorter distance from SRS).
1.D.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to transport the plutonium-242
material to LANL and store this material in an existing plutonium
facility. LANL currently performs most of the plutonium activities for
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and has the necessary
facilities for storing this material. LLNL, although a reasonable
alternative, is currently reducing its inventory of plutonium.
2. Proposed Action (2)--Rightsizing the Industrial Base
With a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile, the capacity to
manufacture nuclear weapons components and assemble or disassemble
nuclear weapons can be reduced. For each required mission capability,
the Department evaluated a No Action alternative, a downsize-in-place
alternative, and an alternative that would transfer the mission to a
weapons laboratory or to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). For pit component
fabrication (a capability which no longer exists due to the closure of
the Rocky Flats Plant in 1992), the Department evaluated reestablishing
this capability, with an attendant small capacity, at Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL) or the Savannah River Site (SRS), in
addition to the No Action alternative (see Proposed Action 3).
2.A. Weapons Assembly/Disassembly
Weapons assembly/disassembly provides the capability to disassemble
(dismantle) retired weapons, assemble nuclear and nonnuclear components
into nuclear weapons, and perform weapons surveillance. In addition,
this mission includes the capability to conduct nonintrusive
modification pit reuse (external modifications to the pit) at the
weapons assembly/disassembly facility. This mission also includes an
option to store strategic reserves of nuclear components (pits and
secondaries).
2.A.1 Alternatives. 2.A.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action
alternative, this mission would continue at Pantex in current
facilities, but Pantex would not develop the capability to perform
nonintrusive modification pit reuse. Currently, nonintrusive
modification pit reuse can only be performed at the plutonium research
and development (R&D) facilities at LANL and LLNL.
2.A.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Pantex Plant. This
alternative would downsize and consolidate assembly/disassembly
facilities and operations. Downsizing of the assembly/disassembly
operation at Pantex would consist of an in-place decrease in facility
footprint and relocation into modern existing facilities, mostly within
Zone 12. No new construction would be required at Pantex; however,
relocation and reinstallation of equipment would be required. The
capabilities for nonintrusive modification pit reuse would be
established in existing facilities within Zone 12. These facilities
would also have the capability to support pit recertification and
requalification operations.
2.A.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Nevada Test Site
(NTS). This alternative is based on the use of the existing Device
Assembly Facility and other plant infrastructure available at the NTS
site that is required to maintain the capability for underground
nuclear testing and experimentation. Because the Device Assembly
Facility is not large enough to meet assembly/disassembly mission
requirements, new construction would be required.
2.A.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.A.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors. Downsizing the Pantex Plant is the lower cost action
alternative. Significant capital construction (about $250 million in
1995 dollars) would be required if the mission were relocated to NTS.
[[Page 68021]]
Downsizing Pantex presents less technical risk than relocation to NTS
because of the need to relocate and requalify processes at NTS, the
uncertainty in availability of key personnel, and the one year gap in
operations that would be necessary while the transition occurred.
2.A.2.2 Environmental Factors. Downsizing the Pantex Plant would
have a net positive effect on environmental impacts compared to the No
Action alternative. No land would be disturbed, groundwater withdrawals
would be reduced, and accident risks would also be less than the No
Action alternative because of the consolidation of the facility
footprint (smaller area) into Zone 12. Socioeconomic impacts at Pantex
would result because of reductions in workload that will occur when the
current weapons dismantlement backlog is eliminated in about three
years. The additional socioeconomic impacts due to facility downsizing
after this dismantlement is complete are relatively small.
Transferring the assembly/disassembly mission to NTS would entail
upgrading and expanding the Device Assembly Facility. It is estimated
that 18.5 additional acres would be disturbed. Although cultural and
biotic resources are not expected to be impacted, the presence of a
federally listed endangered species (the desert tortoise) at NTS would
require a site survey to determine the potential for impacts. Water
requirements to support the assembly/disassembly mission at NTS would
amount to about 4 percent more than normal projected usage.
Transferring the assembly/disassembly mission to NTS would create
positive socioeconomic impacts at NTS, and significant negative
socioeconomic impacts at Pantex.
Risks to worker health would be essentially the same at either
location. Worker exposure to radiation is expected to be about equal
for the NTS and the downsizing of Pantex alternatives. Radiation
exposure to members of the public from normal operation would be well
within regulatory limits at both sites. Although the remoteness of the
NTS site yields a lower potential accident risk, the risk to the public
from an accident at Pantex is very low. Relocation to NTS would also
eliminate the risk associated with the transport of low level waste
from Pantex to the NTS for disposal. These transportation risks,
however, are very low.
2.A.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally
preferable alternative is to downsize existing capabilities at Pantex.
No land would be disturbed, groundwater withdrawals would be reduced
compared to usage under the No Action alternative, and accident risks
would also be less than under the No Action alternative because of the
consolidation of the facility footprint into Zone 12.
2.A.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing
assembly/disassembly facilities presently located at the Pantex Plant.
This is the environmentally preferable alternative, it exhibits the
least technical risk, and is also the least-cost alternative.
2.B. High Explosives Fabrication
The high explosives fabrication mission includes capabilities
required for manufacturing process development, formulation, synthesis,
main charge manufacturing and energetic component manufacture. The high
explosives fabrication mission also supports some high explosives
surveillance and some stockpile stewardship activities.
2.B.1 Alternatives. 2.B.1.1 No Action. Under No Action, Pantex
would continue fabrication and surveillance of high explosives
components for nuclear weapons. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) would continue to
perform weapon high explosives research and development, some
surveillance, and high explosives safety studies.
2.B.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize at the Pantex Plant. This
alternative would downsize and consolidate current high explosives
operations and facilities at the Pantex Plant. Only minor modifications
to existing facilities within Zones 11 and 12 would be required. This
alternative would be considered only in conjunction with maintaining
the weapons assembly/disassembly mission at Pantex.
2.B.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would transfer high explosives
operations from Pantex to LANL. This alternative would use existing
LANL research and development facilities, which have sufficient
capacity for high explosives requirements. There would be no new
building construction and no significant modifications required.
2.B.1.4 Action Alternative 3--Relocate to the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL). This alternative would transfer high
explosives operations from Pantex to LLNL, and would use existing LLNL
research and development facilities. It would also require construction
of one new facility for storage of high explosives at Site 300.
2.B.1.5 Action Alternative 4--Relocate to both the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
This option would involve splitting the high explosives mission between
the two laboratories to protect core competencies at both. Since its
impact is bounded by the previous two options, this option was not
analyzed further in the PEIS.
2.B.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.B.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors. The costs to perform the high explosives mission are not
large, and are comparable for all site alternatives. The current high
explosives fabrication mission at Pantex costs about $17 million per
year. The future high explosives fabrication mission will be relatively
small, costing $2-3 million per year (assuming the selected site has
other missions to absorb site overhead).
Since the U.S. does not have plans to develop new-design weapons,
there is a concern that the laboratories will lose their core
competencies in the area of high explosives technology. However, these
competencies can be retained through greater teaming and integration of
plant and laboratory capabilities and activities. This approach would
attempt to protect core competence at the weapons laboratories in high
explosives technology while retaining the overall fabrication mission
at Pantex, the site with historical production experience.
2.B.2.2 Environmental Factors. Environmental impacts from facility
modification and operation are comparable for all alternatives, and are
less than current operations. However, relocation of the high
explosives fabrication mission to LANL or LLNL would result in minor
additional environmental impacts due to the increased level of
operations at those sites compared to the No Action alternative, and
the small construction required at LLNL (less than 2.5 acres).
Socioeconomic impacts are relatively small for all alternatives. There
are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated with the
high explosives fabrication mission. Risks to neighboring populations
from credible facility accidents would be small for all alternatives.
2.B.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For high explosives
fabrication, the environmentally preferable alternative is to downsize
existing capabilities at the Pantex Plant. Environmental impacts under
this alternative would be lower than under the No Action alternative.
2.B.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing high
explosives fabrication facilities at the Pantex Plant.
[[Page 68022]]
This is the environmentally preferable alternative, the least-cost
alternative and, when coupled with greater teaming and integration of
plant and laboratory capabilities, has low technical risk. This
decision is also consistent with Section 3140 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104-201), which
requires that the high explosives fabrication mission be performed at
Pantex.
2.C. Secondary and Case Fabrication
The secondary and case fabrication mission includes activities to
support fabrication, surveillance and inspection of secondaries and
components. Functional capabilities for these services include
operations to physically and chemically process, machine, inspect,
assemble, and disassemble secondary and case materials. Materials
include depleted uranium, enriched uranium, uranium alloys,
isotopically enriched lithium hydride and lithium deuteride, and other
materials.
2.C.1 Alternatives. 2.C.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action
alternative, DOE would continue secondary and case fabrication at the
Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The Y-12 Plant would maintain the capability
to produce and assemble secondaries, cases, and related nonnuclear
weapon components.
2.C.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Y-12 Plant at Oak
Ridge. This alternative would downsize the existing secondary and case
fabrication facilities at the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The downsized
facilities would only require approximately 14 percent of the existing
Y-12 Plant floor space, and no new facility construction would be
needed to support the secondary and case fabrication mission.
Modifications to the existing buildings would be required, both to
implement the downsized mission and to upgrade the buildings to meet
natural phenomena requirements (e.g., seismic events).
2.C.1.3 Action Alternative 2-- Relocate to the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would transfer the secondary and
case fabrication operations to 11 existing buildings at LANL using
manufacturing processes proven at the Y-12 Plant. Modifications to the
LANL facilities would be required to perform the secondary and case
fabrication mission.
2.C.1.4 Action Alternative 3--Relocate to the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL). This alternative would transfer the
secondary and case fabrication operations to existing buildings at LLNL
using manufacturing processes proven at the Y-12 Plant. The secondary
and case fabrication facilities at LLNL would principally involve
modifications to six buildings.
2.C.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.C.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge is the least-cost
alternative because of significant facility modification costs (about
$130 million at LANL and about $185 million at LLNL, both in 1995
dollars) that would be required if the mission were relocated.
Downsizing the Y-12 Plant also presents less technical risk than
relocation to the other sites because a production infrastructure for
secondaries and cases currently exists at the Y-12 Plant and processes
would not need to be relocated and requalified. In addition, downsizing
the Y-12 Plant provides greater program flexibility by allowing some
additional capacity to be maintained in a standby mode at minimal cost.
2.C.2.2 Environmental Factors. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant would not
impact land, cultural or biotic resources. Downsizing would improve the
efficiency of operations and significantly reduce natural resource
requirements. Negative socioeconomic impacts associated with downsizing
would be somewhat mitigated by positive socioeconomic impacts
associated with the decontamination and decommissioning of facilities
no longer required.
Transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission to either
LANL or LLNL would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at those
sites and a large negative socioeconomic impact at Oak Ridge due to the
phaseout of this mission. For the relocation to LLNL alternative, a
small area of land (less than one acre) would be disturbed, but impacts
to cultural and biotic resources are not expected. Transfer of the
secondary and case fabrication mission from Oak Ridge would entail
small, one time impacts associated with moving the strategic reserve of
highly enriched uranium to a new location.
Radiation exposure to workers is expected to be about equal for all
three action alternatives and well within regulatory limits. Potential
radiological impacts from accidents were determined to be about equal
for Oak Ridge and LANL, and slightly higher for LLNL due to its closer
proximity to populated areas.
2.C.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For secondary and
case manufacturing, the environmentally preferable alternative is to
downsize the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant would
not impact land, cultural, or biotic resources. Downsizing would
improve the efficiency of operations and significantly reduce natural
resource requirements compared to the No Action alternative.
2.C.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing
secondary and case fabrication facilities located at the Y-12 Plant at
Oak Ridge. This is the environmentally preferable alternative, has the
least technical risk, and is the least-cost alternative.
2.D. Nonnuclear Fabrication
Nonnuclear fabrication consists of the fabrication of electrical,
electronic, electro-mechanical, and mechanical components (plastics,
metals, composites), the assembly of arming, fuzing, and firing
systems, and surveillance inspection and testing of nonnuclear
components.
2.D.1 Alternatives. 2.D.1.1 No Action. The No Action alternative
would maintain these activities at their present location at the Kansas
City Plant (KCP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL). KCP manufactures nonnuclear weapon
components and conducts surveillance testing on them. SNL conducts
system engineering of nuclear weapons, designs and develops nonnuclear
components, conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear testing,
manufactures some nonnuclear weapons components, and provides safety
and reliability assessments of the stockpile. LANL also manufactures a
few nonnuclear weapons components and conducts surveillance on certain
nonnuclear weapons components.
2.D.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Kansas City Plant
(KCP). The downsized nonnuclear fabrication alternative consists of
three major factory segments designed around electronics, mechanical,
and engineered materials product lines, procuring some components from
outside sources, and reducing the KCP facility area. This alternative
consists of downsizing and consolidating existing facilities and would
require facility modification but no new construction.
2.D.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). This alternative would use the
existing expertise, capability, and infrastructure at LANL, LLNL, and
SNL to satisfy fabrication requirements for nonnuclear components. This
alternative would transfer the majority of current KCP missions to SNL,
except for nuclear system plastic components, which would go either to
LANL or LLNL, and high energy detonator inert components,
[[Page 68023]]
which would go to LANL. In addition, there is an option of moving the
reservoir mission to either SNL or LANL. This alternative would require
construction of a new stand-alone production site at SNL, consisting of
six new buildings and renovations or minor modifications to some
existing buildings.
2.D.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 2.D.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors. Because of significant facility construction or modification
costs to relocate the mission (about $235 million in 1995 dollars),
downsizing the KCP is the least-cost alternative. Downsizing KCP also
presents significantly less technical risk than relocation to the other
sites, because a production infrastructure for nonnuclear components
currently exists and processes would not need to be relocated and
requalified.
2.D.2.2 Environmental Comparison. For the alternative that would
downsize KCP, the construction activities would involve internal
modifications to the existing facility. No land would be disturbed. For
the alternative that would transfer the KCP mission to the
laboratories, construction impacts would involve internal facility
modifications at LANL and LLNL. At SNL, approximately 22 acres of land
would be disturbed to construct new facilities. This represents 6
percent of the undisturbed land at SNL. Potential impacts to cultural
and biotic resources could occur.
There are minimal air impacts for both alternatives. Water
requirements for a downsized facility at KCP would be reduced 31
percent compared to No Action. For the alternative that would transfer
the mission to the laboratories, groundwater use would increase by less
than 1 percent over No Action usage at LANL and LLNL, but would
increase by 64 percent over No Action usage at SNL. This would still
represent only 29 percent of the groundwater rights and thus, no
adverse impacts are expected. Transferring the nonnuclear mission to
the laboratories would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at
those sites, and a large negative socioeconomic impact at KCP due to
the phaseout of this mission.
There are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated
with the nonnuclear fabrication mission, and there are no significant
adverse impacts associated with normal operations. Accident profiles at
the sites would not change as a result of downsizing at KCP or
transferring the nonnuclear fabrication mission to the laboratories.
Risks to neighboring populations from credible facility accidents would
be small for all alternatives. All three sites have adequate existing
waste management facilities to treat, store, and dispose of wastes that
would be generated by this mission.
2.D.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally
preferable alternative is to downsize existing facilities at the KCP.
The relocation of this mission to SNL, LANL or LLNL would entail
additional environmental impacts associated with the construction and
operation of new facilities.
2.D.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing
facilities at the KCP. This is the environmentally preferable
alternative, it exhibits the least technical risk, and is also the
least-cost alternative.
3. Proposed Action (3)--Reestablishing Manufacturing Capability and
Capacity for Pit Components
This capability, hereafter referred to as pit fabrication, includes
all activities necessary to fabricate new pits, to modify the internal
features of existing pits (intrusive modification), and to recertify or
requalify pits.
3.A.1 Alternatives. 3.A.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action
alternative, DOE would continue to use existing capabilities at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL). LANL maintains a limited capability to fabricate
plutonium components using its plutonium research and development
facility, and performs surveillance to provide safety and reliability
assessments of the stockpile. In addition, less extensive capabilities
would continue at LLNL to support material and process technology
development.
3.A.1.2 Action Alternative 1--Reestablish Capability at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would reconfigure
the plutonium facility at LANL to fulfill the pit fabrication mission.
This alternative would locate pit manufacturing in existing facilities.
Existing equipment would be retained as much as possible, but some
equipment would need to be upgraded.
3.A.1.3 Action Alternative 2--Reestablish Capability at the
Savannah River Site (SRS). This alternative would establish a pit
fabrication facility at SRS within existing facilities, but with new
equipment and systems. Facilities are available at the SRS, in F-Area
and H-Area, which could house all the process functions required for
the manufacture of plutonium pits. New equipment and systems would be
required for the pit fabrication facility.
3.A.2 Comparison of Alternatives. 3.A.2.1 Cost and Technical
Factors Technical risk associated with each alternative was assessed by
comparing the relative experience of each site in the pertinent
production capability areas. No pits are currently being produced for
the nuclear weapon stockpile, and neither site has done so in the
recent past. However, LANL has recently provided pits for nuclear
explosive testing, and is currently producing plutonium-238 heat
sources for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
programs. Also, LANL continues to perform pit surveillance and
technology development activities directly related to the required
capabilities for pit fabrication.
SRS is currently processing and shipping plutonium-238 to LANL to
support fabrication of NASA heat sources. Although SRS has a health,
safety, and security infrastructure for plutonium operations, the
historical mission for the site was separation and production of
plutonium metal for shipment to other sites for weapons program use.
Consequently, SRS has no experience with the kinds of capabilities
required for precision nuclear component manufacturing and the
ancillary supporting functions.
The required workload for the fabrication of new replacement pits
is small. DOE foresees only the replacement of pits destroyed in
routine surveillance testing unless a near-term, life-limiting
phenomenon is discovered in stockpile pits. Historical pit surveillance
data and pit life studies do not predict a near-term problem. However,
data are limited for weapons older than 25 years, and for the youngest
weapons in the stockpile.
The technological capability to manufacture all of the pit designs
in the enduring stockpile provides an inherent capacity to manufacture
about 50 pits per year in single shift operations. During weapon
refurbishment to replace other components, DOE expects most pits to be
requalified and reused. About 20 pits per year are expected to be
required to replace pits destroyed in routine surveillance testing. A
capacity of about 50 pits per year is, therefore, judged to be
sufficient for the next 10 or more years.
The construction costs for providing such a limited pit fabrication
capacity are less at LANL (about $310 million in 1995 dollars) than at
SRS (about $490 million in 1995 dollars). This is largely because the
capability would be additive to existing capabilities at LANL
[[Page 68024]]
while a completely new stand-alone capability would be required at SRS.
Both estimates include the costs of planned refurbishment of the LANL
plutonium facility for its ongoing pit surveillance and stockpile
stewardship missions. In addition, annual operating costs would be
considerably less at LANL (about $30 million versus $60 million at SRS)
because the mission would be additive to other existing missions and
would not have to carry all facility overhead costs.
The technical risk at LANL would be less, due to the existing
experience base for stockpile stewardship and pit surveillance
missions. The LANL capability would also be in place at least two years
earlier than the SRS alternative.
In reestablishing plutonium pit fabrication capability, DOE
considered establishing a larger fabrication capacity more in line with
the capacity planned for other manufacturing functions. Larger capacity
was rejected, however, because of the small current demand for the
fabrication of replacement pits, and the significant, but currently
undefined, time period before additional capacity may be needed.
3.A.2.2 Environmental Factors--Upgrades to existing facilities
would be required for each alternative, and no new land would be
disturbed. During operations, both alternatives would utilize similar
facilities, procedures, and natural resources. Therefore, both
alternatives would result in similar operational environmental impacts
for most natural resource areas. Impacts to air quality would be
minimal and well within established standards. At SRS, water
requirements would be provided from surface water, which is plentiful,
and no adverse impacts would be expected. At LANL, groundwater would be
used. Water requirements for this mission, which would be less than 1
percent of projected No Action usage, could be adequately met without
exceeding the groundwater allotment at LANL.
Socioeconomic impacts are comparable for either alternative,
although SRS would require more additional new workers. Worker exposure
to radiation would be larger at SRS due to the larger added workforce,
but within regulatory limits for both alternatives. Both sites have
adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and
dispose of wastes that would be generated by the pit fabrication
mission. Risks to neighboring populations from normal operations or
credible facility accidents would be small for both alternatives.
3.A.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For pit
manufacturing, the No Action alternative is the environmentally
preferable alternative. Under the No Action alternative, no new
construction would be required, and the Department would continue with
the existing pit research and development capability at LANL and LLNL.
However, DOE would not have the capability to replace the pit component
in stockpile weapons if necessary, nor protect against stockpile
attrition through surveillance testing. Thus, No Action is not a
reasonable alternative.
Of the two action alternatives, which would reestablish pit
manufacturing capabilities at either LANL or SRS, LANL is the
environmentally preferable alternative. Although overall environmental
impacts are projected to be similar between the two sites, LANL was
judged to be preferable due to the fact that the radiological risks to
workers during normal operations are projected to be less than at SRS.
3.A.4 Decision. DOE's decision is to reestablish the pit
fabrication capability, at a small capacity, at LANL. This is the
environmentally preferable alternative, it exhibits the least technical
risk, and is also the least-cost alternative. This decision limits the
plutonium fabrication facility plans to a facility sized to meet
expected programmatic requirements over the next ten or more years. It
is not sized to have sufficient capacity to remanufacture new plutonium
pits at the same production rate as that of their original manufacture.
DOE will perform development and demonstration work at its operating
plutonium facilities over the next several years to study alternative
facility concepts for larger capacity. Environmental analysis of this
larger capacity has not been performed at this time because of the
uncertainty in the need for such capacity and the uncertainty in the
facility technology that would be utilized. Should a larger pit
fabrication capacity be required in the future, appropriate
environmental and siting analysis would be performed at that time.
Mitigation. Specific mitigation measures are not addressed for the
stockpile management decisions of this ROD, although many potential
mitigation measures are identified in the PEIS. In accordance with the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program's two-tiered NEPA
Strategy, these specific mitigation measures will be addressed, as
necessary, on a site-by-site basis, in any site-specific NEPA analyses
needed to implement the stockpile management decisions of this ROD.
Strategic Reserve Storage
The PEIS also evaluates storage alternatives for strategic reserve
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium that has not been
declared surplus to national security needs). However, a decision on
storage of strategic reserve materials will be made later in the Record
of Decision on the Final PEIS for the Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials in conjunction with decisions on the
storage of surplus materials. The preferred alternatives for strategic
reserve storage described in both the Final PEIS for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management and the Final PEIS for the Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials are consistent. The
preferred alternatives are: (1) Highly enriched uranium strategic
reserve storage at Y-12; and (2) plutonium pit strategic reserve
storage in Zone 12 at Pantex.
Other Considerations
DOE has considered a wide range of views on alternatives for the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. However, it is national
security policy, as established by the President and Congress, that
must define the complex balance between U.S. national security policy
objectives for nuclear deterrence, arms control and nonproliferation.
Chapter 2 of the PEIS describes the national security policy
framework that defines the purpose and need for DOE's nuclear weapons
mission for the foreseeable future. That chapter also describes the
development of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives in response
to recent changes in national security policy, and puts those changes
in a broad technical perspective. Successive levels of technical detail
are provided in Volume I, Chapter 3 and Volumes II and III of the PEIS.
The discussions that follow refer to the appropriate sections of the
PEIS to avoid unnecessary repetition.
While the terms ``stockpile stewardship'' and ``stockpile
management'' are relatively new, the Program is not new when considered
in terms of its substructure capabilities. What the terms are meant to
convey is a post-Cold War change in Program focus away from large-scale
development and production of new-design nuclear weapons with nuclear
testing, to one that focuses on the safety and reliability of a
smaller, aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Even with this change
in focus, however, national security policies require DOE
[[Page 68025]]
to maintain the historical capabilities of the ongoing Program. The
actions selected in this Record of Decision flow logically from the
mission purpose and need, given the policy constraints placed on the
Program by the President and Congress. Enhanced experimental capability
(represented by the National Ignition Facility, Contained Firing
Facility, and Atlas Facility) is needed because, in the absence of
nuclear testing, it will provide the surrogate source of experimental
data that are needed to continually assess and certify a safe and
reliable stockpile. Rightsized manufacturing capacities at the Y-12
Plant (Oak Ridge), the Kansas City Plant, and Pantex will most
efficiently conform to the reduced requirements of a smaller, aging
stockpile in the absence of new-design weapon production. A
reestablished pit manufacturing capability at LANL will restore a
required capability of the Program that was temporarily lost as a
consequence of the closure of the Rocky Flats Plant.
The question of alternatives for the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program is complex because maintaining a nuclear weapons
stockpile, whatever its size, requires a complete integrated set of
technical capabilities as well as an appropriately sized manufacturing
capacity. The technical capabilities are generally characterized as
research, design, development, and testing; reliability assessment and
certification; and manufacturing and surveillance operations (Section
2.2 and Figure 2.7-2 of the PEIS). From a technical point of view, none
of these capabilities can be deleted if DOE is to maintain a safe and
reliable stockpile (Section 2.4 of the PEIS). Indeed, DOE has been
directed by the President and Congress to maintain these capabilities
(Section 2.4 of the PEIS).
Commentors on the PEIS questioned the different treatment of
stewardship and management alternatives, mainly the lack of
programmatic alternatives to science based stockpile stewardship.
Stewardship and management alternatives were treated differently in the
PEIS because they address fundamentally different problems. Stockpile
stewardship capabilities form the basis of DOE's judgments about the
safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in a
larger context, U.S. judgments about the nuclear weapons capabilities
of others (Section 2.4.1 of the PEIS). DOE did not consider it
reasonable to propose stewardship alternatives that would diminish,
rather than enhance, stewardship capabilities, particularly given the
fact that historic confidence in the safety and performance of the
stockpile was derived from the nuclear testing that is no longer part
of the ongoing stewardship program. National security policy requires
DOE to maintain, and in some areas enhance, the stewardship
capabilities of the three weapons laboratories and NTS (Section 2.2 of
the PEIS). The PEIS explains the basis for this conclusion in a
technical context, including the need for two independent nuclear
design laboratories (Section 2.4.1 of the PEIS). Therefore, the PEIS
did not propose any actions that would otherwise diminish ongoing
stewardship missions.
In the PEIS, the Department determined that there is only one
reasonable programmatic alternative for stockpile stewardship: enhanced
experimental capability (see Section 3.1.2). This determination is
consistent with a previous review made in November 1994 by the JASON
Committee, a group of independent experts who evaluated the Science-
Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program. The JASON Committee
concluded that ``[a] strong SBSS program, such as we recommend in this
report, is an essential component for the U.S. to maintain confidence
in the performance of a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent under a
comprehensive test ban.'' The JASON Committee further concluded that
``[in] the absence of nuclear weapons testing, improved understanding
of the warheads and their behavior over time will be derived from
computer simulations and analyses benchmarked against past data and
new, more comprehensive diagnostic information obtained from carefully
designed laboratory experiments. Toward this goal, the SBSS calls for
the construction of a number of experimental facilities which have
applications both in basic scientific research and in research directed
towards strengthening the underlying scientific understanding in the
weapons program.''
Section 3.1.2.4 of the PEIS discussed four possible programmatic
stewardship alternatives to enhanced experimental capability and
concluded that none of them were reasonable stand-alone alternatives.
These included: denuclearization (eliminate nuclear weapons in the
relative near term); restoration (continue to rely on underground
nuclear testing); remanufacturing (reproduce exact replicas of proven
designs); and maintenance (rely on enhanced surveillance and
revalidation to detect and correct problems). Both denuclearization and
restoration are inconsistent with United States national security
policy. Furthermore, while remanufacturing and maintenance already are,
and will continue to be key components of the Program, neither would
provide sufficient technical assurance that problems that may arise in
the stockpile will be effectively diagnosed and corrected.
Prior to the issuance of the Final PEIS, some commentors expressed
concern that the Department had not considered other programmatic
alternatives for stockpile stewardship (i.e., remanufacturing). In
response to their concerns, the Department asked Dr. Sidney D. Drell,
of the JASON Committee, to review the issue of remanufacturing as a
reasonable alternative to enhanced experimental capabilities.
In an October 28, 1996, letter to the Secretary of Energy, Dr.
Drell and another member of the JASON Committee, Dr. Richard L. Garwin,
stated that ``we must not only maintain a cadre of first-class weapon
scientists and engineers. We must also expand the existing science
based understanding of the stockpile. The existing S&T [Science and
Technology] base, including existing above-ground experimental
facilities, is not adequate to the task of stewardship over the long
term for an aging deterrent in the absence of nuclear tests. These
requirements cannot be met if the SSMP [Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program] as planned by the Department of Energy is replaced
simply by a program of remanufacturing or refurbishing existing weapons
without paying careful attention to the need of maintaining weapons
design capability, expanding our science based understanding of the
stockpile, and providing the sources of experimental data needed to
validate enhanced computer simulations.'' They concluded that ``[w]hile
remanufacturing is a necessary component of SSMP, it is not a
reasonable alternative to the pursuit of a science-based stockpile
stewardship or the need for enhanced experimental capability.''
National security policy also requires DOE to maintain a full
complement of stockpile management capabilities and appropriate
manufacturing capacity, albeit for a smaller post-Cold War stockpile.
Unlike stockpile stewardship capabilities, a smaller stockpile does
permit some reasonable siting alternatives for stockpile management
capabilities and capacities to accomplish the mission purpose and need
within the current national security policy framework (Section 2.4.2 of
the PEIS).
One important consideration in developing the PEIS was the
possibility
[[Page 68026]]
that future international treaties may lead to a smaller U.S.
stockpile, i.e., less than the currently defined START II protocol-
sized stockpile. The PEIS analyzed each of the two stockpile sizes
currently defined and directed by national security policy, a START I
Treaty stockpile (6000 accountable strategic weapons) and a START II
protocol-sized stockpile (3500 accountable strategic weapons). In
addition, the PEIS analyzed a hypothetical 1,000-weapon stockpile for
the purpose of providing a sensitivity analysis for decisions on
manufacturing capacity. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM)
process that specifies the types of weapons and quantities of each
weapon type in the stockpile is described in Section 1.1 of the PEIS.
The classified NWSM is developed based on Department of Defense force
structure requirements necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence and
comply with existing arms control treaties while pursuing further arms
control reductions. The PEIS describes this complex process, and
explains why DOE does not believe it reasonable to speculate on
additional stockpile sizes, which would necessarily entail the use of a
large number of arbitrary assumptions (Section 2.2 of the PEIS).
Nevertheless, DOE has considered the possibility that future national
security policy could define a path to a smaller stockpile. Therefore,
the analysis in the PEIS is very flexible in its approach to potential
changes in stockpile size.
It is important to note in this regard that, just as stockpile
stewardship capabilities are currently viewed by the United States as
furthering U.S. nonproliferation objectives by making the ``zero-
yield'' Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty feasible, it is reasonable to
assume that confidence in U.S. stewardship capabilities would remain as
important, if not more important, in future negotiations to reduce the
stockpile further. The path to even a very small (tens or hundreds of
weapons) or a zero stockpile would require the negotiation of complex
international treaties, most likely with provisions that require
intrusive international verification inspections of nuclear weapons-
related facilities. Therefore, DOE believes it reasonable to assume
that complex treaty negotiations, when coupled with complex
implementation provisions, could possibly stretch over several decades.
On such a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile
size alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, or
alternatives in the PEIS as they relate to stewardship capabilities.
The issues of maintaining the core competencies of the United States in
nuclear weapons, and the technical problems of a smaller, aging
stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing, would remain the same.
With regard to stockpile management capability and capacity, the
PEIS evaluates reasonable approaches for a gradual path to a very small
or zero stockpile. At some point on this path, further downsizing of
existing industrial plants or the alternative of consolidating
manufacturing functions at stewardship sites would become more
attractive as manufacturing capacity becomes a less important
consideration. In the near term, however, the decisions to downsize the
existing industrial plants would still be reasonable because the
projected downsizing investment would be recouped within a few years
through reduced operating expense, and downsizing in the near term is
consistent with potential longer-term decisions regarding plant
closures. With regard to reestablishing pit manufacturing capability,
DOE does not intend to establish a greater manufacturing capacity than
is inherent in reestablishing the basic manufacturing capability. Thus,
on a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile size
alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, or
alternatives in the PEIS with regard to stockpile management
capabilities and capacities.
Conclusions
With the issuance of this Record of Decision, the Department is
making the decisions necessary to: (1) construct and operate three
enhanced experimental facilities (the National Ignition Facility at
LLNL, the Contained Firing Facility at LLNL, and the Atlas Facility at
LANL); (2) downsize the existing weapons industrial plants (Y-12 at Oak
Ridge, the Kansas City Plant, and Pantex); and (3) reestablish the
plutonium pit component manufacturing capability at LANL. Additionally,
the Department has decided to transfer a small amount of plutonium-242
material from SRS to LANL for stockpile stewardship activities.
During the 30 day period following the Environmental Protection
Agency's notice that the Final PEIS had been filed, the Department
received four letters from government organizations in response to the
Final PEIS. Two of the letters, from the Tennessee Historical
Commission and the State of Missouri Office of Administration,
expressed no objection or comment. A third letter, from the
Environmental Protection Agency, indicated that the Agency's prior
comments on the Draft PEIS had been adequately addressed in the Final
PEIS, and that the Agency had no objections to the project as proposed.
The fourth letter, from the New Mexico Environmental Department,
provided comments on the nomenclature used to describe water resources
in and around the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These comments do not
change the analysis in the PEIS, but they have been considered in
preparing this Record of Decision. In making these decisions, all
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the
alternatives selected have been adopted.
These decisions will help enable the Department to assess and
certify the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile, while also supporting a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. These decisions will allow for the closing and ultimate
remediation of unnecessary industrial facilities, and reduce the cost
of existing manufacturing operations. These decisions reestablish the
required national security capability of plutonium pit fabrication.
These decisions are consistent with, and supportive of, national
security policy requirements established by the President and Congress
for nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, including
the safeguards established for U.S. entry into the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Finally, these decisions will help enable the Department to
maintain the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United
States in nuclear weapons, and maintain a safe and reliable nuclear
weapons stockpile.
Issued in Washington DC, December 19, 1996.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-32759 Filed 12-24-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
