[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 248 (Wednesday, December 28, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page ]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-31857]
[Federal Register: December 28, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos. 50-261; 50-325 and 50-324; 50-400
Carolina Power & Light Co.; (H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant,
Unit No. 2, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2; Shearon
Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1); Exemption
I
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L or the licensee) is the holder
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 for Brunswick
Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, (Brunswick) located in Brunswick
County, North Carolina; Facility Operating License No. DPR-23 for H.B.
Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, (Robinson) located in
Darlington County, South Carolina; and Facility Operating License No.
NPF-63 for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, (Harris) located
in Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina. The licenses authorize
the operation of the above facilities.
The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is
subject to all rules, regulations and Orders of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (the Commission or NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The
facilities consist of two boiling water reactors located at the
licensee's Brunswick site, and two pressurized water reactors, one
located at the Robinson site and one at the Harris site.
Paragraph (a) of Section 73.55, ``Requirements for physical
protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against
radiological sabotage,'' of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR) states, in part, that ``the licensee shall establish and
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization
that will have as its objective to provide high assurance that
activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk
to the public health and safety.''
Paragraph (1) of Section 73.55(d), ``Access Requirement,''
specifies that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and
vehicle access into a protected area.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) requires
that ``A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for
all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escort.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not
employed by the licensee (i.e., a contractor) may be authorized access
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be
returned upon exit from the protected area . . . .''
The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access
control system that would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals
with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the
site.
An exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is
required to allow contractors who have unescorted access to take their
badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site. By
letters dated July 29, 1994, and December 5, 1994, and December 5,
1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements of
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.
III
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are (1)
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security, and (2) are otherwise in the public interest.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee
to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall
level of system performance provides protection against radiological
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the
regulation.
Currently, unescorted access into protected areas of the Harris
unit is controlled through the use of a photograph on a badge and a
separate keycard. At Brunswick and Robinson, unescorted access into
protected areas is controlled through the use of a photograph on a
combination badge and keycard (hereafter, referred to as badge). The
security officers at each entrance station use the photograph on the
badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The
individual is then given the badge to allow access. The badges for both
licensee employees and contractor personnel who have been granted
unescorted access are issued upon entrance at each entrance/exit
location and are returned upon exit. The badges are stored and are
retrievable at each entrance/exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR
73.55(d)(5), contractor individuals are not allowed to take badges
offsite. In accordance with the plants' physical security plans,
neither licensee employees nor contractors are allowed to take badges
offsite.
Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized for
unescorted entry into protected areas would have the physical
characteristics of his/her hand (hand geometry) registered with his/her
badge number in the access control computer. Access is then controlled
by the individual requesting access placing his/her badge into the card
reader and his/her hand on a measuring surface, the computer then
compares the hand geometry to the registered badge number. If the
characteristics of the hand geometry stored in the computer match the
badge number, access is granted. If the characteristics do not match,
access is denied. This provides a nontransferable means of identifying
that the individual possessing the badge is the individual who was
granted unescorted access. It also provides a positive means of
assuring that a stolen or lost badge could not be used to gain access,
thus eliminating the need to issue and retrieve the badges while
maintaining the same high level of assurance that access is granted to
only authorized individuals. All other access processes, including
search function capability, would remain the same. The system will not
be used for persons requiring escorted access (i.e., visitors). The
access process will continue to be under the observation of security
personnel located within a hardened cubicle who have final control over
the release of the entrance station turnstiles. A numbered picture
badge identification system will continue to be used for all
individuals who are authorized access to the protected area with
escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all individuals while
inside the protected area.
The licensee will use the hand geometry equipment which will meet
the detection probability of 90 percent with a 95 percent confidence
level. Testing evaluated by Sandia National Laboratory (Sandia report
entitled ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification
Devices,'' SAND91-0276 UC-906 Unlimited Release, Printed June 1991)
demonstrated that the proposed hand geometry system is capable of
meeting the proposed detection probability and confidence level. Based
upon the results of the Sandia report and on its experience with the
current photo-identification system, the proposed system will have a
false acceptance rate that is at least as low as that of the current
system. The Physical Security Plans for the sites will be revised to
include implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control
system and to allow licensee employees and contractors to take their
badges offsite.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which
would be provided by the regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Carolina Power &
Light Company an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR
73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from
the protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee,
i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the
protected area, can take their badges offsite. Pursuant to 10 CFR
51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this
exemption will not result in any significant adverse environmental
impact (59 FR 65545).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 20th day of December 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-31857 Filed 12-27-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
