94-2225. Adoption of Recommendations and Statement Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure

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    [FR Doc No: 94-2225]
    
    
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    [Federal Register: February 1, 1994]
    
    
      
                                                        VOL. 59, NO. 21
    
                                              Tuesday, February 1, 1994
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    ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
    
     
    
    Adoption of Recommendations and Statement Regarding 
    Administrative Practice and Procedure
    
    AGENCY: Administrative Conference of the United States.
    
    ACTION: Notice.
    
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    SUMMARY: The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 
    adopted two recommendations its Forty-Ninth Plenary Session. The 
    recommendations concerning improving the environment for agency 
    rulemaking and procedures for regulation of pesticides. The Conference 
    also adopted one formal statement at the Plenary Session on the right 
    of persons to consult with counsel in agency investigations.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: Renee Barnow, 202-254-7020.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Administrative Conference of the United 
    States was established by the Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. 
    591-596. The Conference studies the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness 
    of the administrative procedures used by federal agencies in carrying 
    out administrative programs, and makes recommendations for improvements 
    to the agencies, collectively or individually, and to the President, 
    Congress, and the Judicial Conference of the United States (5 U.S.C. 
    594(1)). At its Forty-Ninth Plenary Session, held December 9-10, 1993, 
    the Assembly of the Administrative Conference of the United States 
    adopted two recommendations and one formal statement.
        Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for Agency 
    Rulemaking, concerns the federal agency rulemaking process, which has 
    become both increasingly less effective and more time-consuming. To 
    improve the environment for agency rulemaking, the Conference 
    recommends specific steps that the President, Congress, and the courts 
    should take to eliminate undue burdens on agency legislative 
    rulemaking.
        With regard to presidential oversight, ACUS recommends that 
    presidential oversight and review be reserved for the most important 
    rules and that the agencies be given clear policy guidance in a 
    directive, approved by the President, specifying what is required. In 
    addition, the reviewing or oversight entity should avoid, to the extent 
    possible, extensive delays in the rulemaking process. The review 
    process itself should be open to public scrutiny, following guidelines 
    previously developed by the Administrative Conference. With regard to 
    legislatively-imposed constraints, ACUS recommends that Congress should 
    review and rationalize legislatively-mandated rulemaking procedures, 
    and specific proposals are offered for Congress' consideration. ACUS 
    recommends that courts should be sensitive not to require greater 
    justification for rules than necessary. It also advises that a 
    ``reasoned statement'' that explains the basis and purpose of the rule 
    and addresses significant issues raised in public comments should be 
    adequate for review. Finally, recognizing that rulemaking is not just a 
    product of external constraints, ACUS recommends a number of steps 
    agency managers can take to improve their internal processes.
        Recommendation 93-5, Procedures for Regulation of Pesticides, calls 
    for the adoption of a more coordinated and strategic procedural 
    framework for the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
    (``FIFRA'') involving the creation of multiple and reinforcing 
    incentives for regulatory compliance by registrants, for timely and 
    accurate decisionmaking by EPA, and for effective public participation. 
    The Conference recommends that EPA promulgate and communicate clear 
    data standards and guidance on the data expected from registrants. ACUS 
    also recommends that Congress authorize EPA to levy administrative 
    civil money penalties upon registrants submitting data that fail to 
    meet previously announced, clear standards. With regard to suspension 
    and cancellation proceedings, which involve scientific data concerning 
    risks and benefits, ACUS recommends use of informal procedures by which 
    EPA gives registrants detailed reasons for the agency's actions and 
    then provides registrants with sufficient time to file responsive 
    written comments and supporting documentation. However, an opportunity 
    should be provided to allow affected parties to show cause why oral 
    testimony or cross-examination is justified. Among other specific 
    recommendations, ACUS urges Congress to consider giving EPA the 
    authority to use informal procedures to order the phase-down of 
    existing pesticides when there are safer, effective products or 
    practices available.
        Statement No. 16, Right to Consult with Counsel in Agency 
    Investigations, addresses the procedures that govern the relationship 
    between a federal agency and persons compelled to appear before the 
    agency in investigations that may lead to civil or criminal 
    prosecution. While addressing certain issues raised in these 
    investigations, the Conference concluded that a uniform set of 
    recommendations concerning agency procedures was not appropriate given 
    the differences among federal agencies in the roles of investigators 
    and the methods by which witnesses or parties appear before agencies.
        The full texts of the recommendations and statement are set out in 
    the Appendix below. The recommendations will be transmitted to the 
    affected agencies and, if so directed, to the Congress of the United 
    States. The Administrative Conference has advisory powers only, and the 
    decision on whether to implement the recommendations must be made by 
    each body to which the various recommendations are directed.
        Recommendations and statements of the Administrative Conference are 
    published in full text in the Federal Register. In past years 
    Conference recommendations and statements of continuing interest were 
    also published in full text in the Code of Federal Regulations (1 CFR 
    parts 305 and 310). Budget constraints have required a suspension of 
    this practice in 1994. However, a complete listing of past 
    recommendations and statements are published in the Code of Federal 
    Regulations. Copies of all past Conference recommendations and 
    statements, and the research reports on which they are based, may be 
    obtained from the Office of the Chairman of the Administrative 
    Conference. As explained at 1 CFR 304.2, requests for single copies of 
    such documents will be filed at no charge to the extent that supplies 
    on hand permit.
        The transcript of the Plenary Session is available for public 
    inspection at the Conference's offices at Suite 500, 2120 L Street NW., 
    Washington, DC.
    
        Dated: January 25, 1994.
    Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
    Research Director.
    
    Appendix--Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the 
    United States
    
        The following recommendations were adopted by the Assembly of the 
    Administrative Conference on December 9 and 10, 1993, respectively:
    
    Recommendation 93-4  Improving the Environment for Agency 
    Rulemaking
    
        Informed observers generally agree that the rulemaking process has 
    become both increasingly less effective and more time-consuming. The 
    Administrative Procedure Act does not reflect many of the current 
    realities of rulemaking. The APA's cumbersome ``formal rulemaking'' 
    procedures are rarely used except in some adjudicative-type rate 
    proceedings. Meanwhile, the APA's simple ``informal rulemaking'' 
    procedures (set forth in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553) have been overlain with an 
    increasing number of constraints: Outside constraints imposed by 
    Congress, the President, and the courts, and internal constraints 
    arising from increasingly complex agency management of the rulemaking 
    process.1 As a result, many federal agencies, faced with 
    unsatisfactory rulemaking accomplishments in recent years, have turned 
    to alternatives such as less formal policy statements or adjudicative 
    orders to achieve regulatory compliance.2
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        \1\ See generally McGarity, Some Thoughts on ``Deossifying'' the 
    Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L. J. 1385 (1991).
        \2\See Conference Recommendation 92-2, ``Agency Policy 
    Statements,'' 1 CFR 305.92-2 (1993), which distinguished 
    ``legislative'' rules, normally promulgated through notice-and-
    comment procedures, from interpretive rules and policy statements, 
    which are exempt from such procedures. The present recommendation 
    addresses legislative rulemaking.
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        The Conference believes that the environment for agency legislative 
    rulemaking can be improved. This recommendation sets out a coordinated 
    framework of proposals aimed at promoting efficient and effective 
    rulemaking by addressing constraints on the current process that derive 
    from a variety of sources. We present an integrated approach for 
    improving the rulemaking environment in order to relieve agencies of 
    unnecessary pressures and disincentives relating to rulemaking. We also 
    identify desirable revisions of section 553 relating to legislative 
    rulemaking. In doing so, this recommendation both presents new 
    proposals and incorporates previous Conference recommendations.
    
    Presidential Constraints
    
        We continue to support presidential coordination of agency 
    policymaking as beneficial and necessary.3 We are concerned, 
    however, that, unless properly focused, this additional review may 
    impose unnecessary costs. All recent presidents have undertaken some 
    level of review and coordination of agency rulemaking. Presidential 
    review of rules, as undertaken under various executive orders applied 
    by the Office of Management and Budget and other White House entities, 
    has often required agencies to submit nearly all proposed and final 
    rules to a review process in which the rules are screened and analyzed 
    for consistency with presidential objectives. Some of these objectives 
    have been incorporated into analytical requirements found in separate 
    executive orders.4 This screening process can unduly slow the 
    entire system of rulemaking; it can inhibit the growth of the promising 
    consensus-based alternative of negotiated rulemaking;5 and it can 
    create undesirable tensions between the reviewing entities and agency 
    policymakers. While these analytical emphases can be rationalized 
    individually, in the aggregate, they can result in redundant 
    requirements, boilerplate-laden documents, circumvention, delays, and 
    clutter in the Federal Register. Although specific presidential review 
    policies have varied among Administrations, these recommendations set 
    forth principles that the Conference believes generally should govern 
    presidential review of rules.
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        \3\See Conference Recommendation 88-9, ``Presidential Review of 
    Agency Rulemaking'' 1 CFR 305.88-9 (1993) (applying Presidential 
    oversight to both executive branch and independent agencies).
        \4\Among the mandates reflected in these executive orders are 
    requirements that agency rulemakers include cost-benefit estimates 
    and analyses of the proposed and final rule's impact on federalism, 
    family values, and future litigation, of whether it effects a 
    ``regulatory taking,'' and of other matters. The Conference of 
    course takes no position on the merits of the values underlying 
    these executive orders.
        \5\See Conference Recommendations 82-4 and 85-5, ``Procedures 
    for Negotiating Proposed Regulations,'' 1 CFR 305.82-4, 305.85-5 
    (1993);'' Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. 561-69.
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        We therefore recommend that presidential oversight and review be 
    reserved for the most important rules and that the agencies be given 
    clear policy guidance in a directive, approved by the President, 
    specifying what is required. In addition, the reviewing or oversight 
    entity should avoid, to the extent possible, extensive delays in the 
    rulemaking process. The review process itself should be open to public 
    scrutiny--following guidelines previously developed by the 
    Administrative Conference.6 The President's policy should 
    encourage planning and coordination of regulatory initiatives, and 
    early dialogue between agencies and the reviewing entity. To this end, 
    the concept of a unified agenda of regulations is a useful tool and 
    should be preserved. We also believe that additional non-APA analytical 
    requirements should be kept to a minimum. The cumulative impact of such 
    requirements on the rulemaking process should be considered before 
    existing requirements are continued or additional ones imposed. We also 
    believe it is useful to periodically reassess the continued viability 
    and relevance of the various presidential directives.7
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        \6\See Conference Recommendation 88-9, ``Presidential Review of 
    Agency Rulemaking,'' 1 CFR 305.88-9 (1993) at 4.
        \7\While the most recent executive order of presidential review 
    of rules generally reflects the views set forth in this 
    recommendation, see Executive Order 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 
    (1993), the Conference takes no position on the specifics of that 
    order.
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    Legislative Constraints
    
        Congress should similarly review and rationalize legislatively-
    mandated rulemaking procedures. Specifically, we recommend that it 
    refrain, as it generally has done since the 1970s, from imposing 
    program-specific rulemaking requirements that go beyond the APA's basic 
    notice-and-comment procedures.8 Statutory ``on-the-record'' and 
    ``hybrid'' rulemaking provisions that require adjudicative fact-finding 
    techniques such as cross-examination, or more stringent provisions for 
    judicial review (in particular, use of the ``substantial evidence'' 
    test instead of the normal ``arbitrary and capricious'' test), can be 
    unnecessarily burdensome or confusing and should be repealed.9 
    Although additional procedures can sometimes be beneficial--see, e.g., 
    Section 307 of the Clean Air Act (providing additional safeguards for 
    rulemaking with significant economic and competitive effects)10--
    they should be imposed only after careful review and attention by 
    Congress to possible unintended consequences. Otherwise, such additions 
    generally should be left to the discretion of individual 
    agencies.11
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        \8\See Conference Recommendation 76-3, ``Procedures in Addition 
    to Notice and the Opportunity to Comment in Informal Rulemaking,'' 1 
    CFR 305.76-3 (1993).
        \9\See Conference Recommendation 80-1, ``Trade Regulation 
    Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade 
    Commission Improvement Act,'' 1 CFR 305.80-1 (1993).
        \1\042 U.S.C. 7607.
        \1\1See Conference Recommendation 76-3, ``Procedures in Addition 
    to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking,'' 
    1 CFR 305.76-3 (1993).
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        Similarly, legislatively-imposed time limits on rulemaking, while 
    understandable, can be unrealistic, resulting in either hastily-imposed 
    rules or missed deadlines that undermine respect for the rulemaking 
    process.12 Legislative deadlines backed by statutory or regulatory 
    ``hammers'' (mandating, for example, that the proposed rule or some 
    other policy change13 automatically take effect upon expiration of 
    the deadline) are particularly undesirable and often counter-
    productive;14 they are generally less desirable than the 
    alternative of judicial enforcement of deadlines.15
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        \1\2See Conference Recommendation 78-3, ``Time Limits on Agency 
    Action,'' 1 CFR 305.78-3 (1993).
        \1\3See, e.g., Conference Recommendation 90-8, ``Rulemaking and 
    Policymaking in the Medicaid Program,'' 1 CFR 305.90-8 (1993).
        \1\4Where the ``hammer'' applied because of a failure to meet a 
    deadline is that a proposed rule becomes effective, the anomalous 
    result is that a policy that has withstood no public airing will be 
    implemented.
        \1\5Courts should continue, where appropriate, to consider 
    whether agency action in a rulemaking is ``unreasonably delayed.'' 
    See 5 U.S.C. 706(1); Telecommunications Research and Action Center 
    v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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        Finally, legislation ancillary to the APA that creates additional 
    rulemaking impediments should be reconsidered. Statutes such as the 
    Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires a special analysis of 
    virtually all rules' effects on small business, may have laudable 
    intentions, but their requirements are often both too broadly 
    applicable and not sufficiently effective in achieving their goals. If 
    such requirements are imposed, Congress should focus them more 
    narrowly, by, for example, confining their application to significant 
    rules or particular categories of rules.
    
    Judicial Constraints
    
        Other constraints on rulemaking that warrant similar 
    reconsideration have been imposed through judicial review. The APA, in 
    section 706, provides that agency rules may be set aside if they are 
    ``arbitrary or capricious,'' represent an ``abuse of discretion,'' or 
    are ``otherwise not in accordance with law.'' The evolving scope of 
    judicial review of agency rules, along with the timing of much such 
    review at the preenforcement stage, has contributed to what is 
    sometimes an overly intrusive inquiry. This, in turn, has led agencies 
    to take defensive measures against such review. While some tension is 
    an inevitable adjunct of the process of judicial review, we believe 
    that steps can be taken to lessen some of the burdens without loss of 
    effective outside scrutiny of agency rules.
        The tendency of some courts to require extra-APA procedures in 
    rulemaking was arrested by the Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee decision 
    in 1978.16 Nevertheless, while the prevailing judicial 
    interpretation of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review 
    (which became known as the ``hard look doctrine'') has promoted 
    reasoned decisionmaking, courts have not infrequently remanded rules on 
    the basis of an agency's failure to respond adequately to comments, 
    consider relevant factors, or explain fully the bases for its rule. 
    Courts should be sensitive not to require greater justification for 
    rules than necessary; a reasoned statement that explains the basis and 
    purpose of the rule and addresses significant issues raised in public 
    comments should be adequate.
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        \1\6Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 
    (1978).
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        Preenforcement review, expanded by the Supreme Court in the 1967 
    Abbott Laboratories cases,17 endorsed by the Conference in various 
    recommendations,18 and codified in numerous rulemaking programs, 
    has the virtue of settling legal issues early and definitively. When 
    overused, however, preenforcement review can have the negative effect 
    of inducing precautionary challenges to most rules and the raising of 
    as many objections to a rule as possible, including somewhat 
    speculative challenges pertaining to the rule's potential application.
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        \1\7Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet 
    Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
        \1\8See Conference Recommendation 74-4, ``Preenforcement 
    Judicial Review of Rules of General Applicability,'' 1 CFR 305.74-4 
    (1993); Conference Recommendation 91-5, ``Facilitating the Use of 
    Rulemaking by the National Labor Relations Board,'' 1 CFR 305.91-5 
    (1993).
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        Under the Abbott Laboratories standard, challenges to a rule are 
    permitted where issues are appropriate for judicial review and where 
    the impact on a challenger is direct and immediate. The Conference 
    believes that the Abbott Laboratories standard strikes a sensible 
    balance, and that preenforcement challenges generally are appropriate 
    where the administrative record provides a sufficient basis for the 
    court to resolve the issues before it. Thus, a preenforcement challenge 
    to a rule based on the procedures used in the rulemaking should 
    normally be permitted. Preenforcement review that involves a facial 
    challenge to a rule's substantive validity (whether because of a 
    conflict with a statute or the Constitution, or because of the 
    inadequacy of the facts or reasoning on which it is based) should also 
    generally be heard.19 In contrast, challenges to a rule because it 
    might be applied in a particular way should normally be deferred until 
    the rule has actually been applied.
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        \1\9A challenge based on the facial invalidity of the rule, in 
    this context, would normally be directed at a requirement or course 
    of action to which the agency has clearly committed itself.
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        Although prompt resolution of legal issues is to be encouraged, 
    Congress should be cautious in coupling mandated time-limited 
    preenforcement review with preclusion of review at the enforcement 
    stage. Such time-limited review should be provided for only in the 
    situations and conditions specified in Recommendation 82-7.20 
    Where Congress does set time limits for preenforcement review, it 
    should, in the interests of consistency, generally specify that 
    preenforcement review should occur within 90 days of a rule's issuance. 
    Current statutory specifications vary. There does not seem to be any 
    reason for variation that outweighs the benefits of uniformity in this 
    context.
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        \2\0Recommendation 82-7, ``Judicial Review of Rules in 
    Enforcement Proceedings,'' 1 CFR 305.82-7 (1993), sets out criteria 
    for when judicial review should be limited at the enforcement stage, 
    and what kinds of issues should remain reviewable at that stage.
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        Congress should also amend any existing statutes that mandate use 
    of the ``substantial evidence'' test for reviewing legislative rules, 
    by replacing it with the ``arbitrary and capricious'' test. The 
    occasional introduction of the substantial evidence test in the 
    rulemaking context has created unnecessary confusion; some courts apply 
    it in a manner identical to that of the ``arbitrary and capricious'' 
    test; others believe that it sets a higher standard. The Conference 
    believes that the arbitrary and capricious test provides sufficient 
    review in the informal rulemaking context.
        The intensity of judicial review directly affects the rulemaking 
    process. For example, the scope of review of agency statutory 
    interpretations is governed by the deferential Chevron test, which 
    requires affirmance if the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous 
    statute is permissible.21 On the other hand, when reviewing the 
    reasonableness of an agency's policy and factual justifications for its 
    rules, courts apply the stricter ``hard look'' doctrine.22 
    Deferential review of the legal issue of statutory interpretation, 
    coupled with the rigorous review of a rule's factual and policy 
    underpinnings that the ``hard look'' doctrine specifies, has been 
    criticized as anomalous. The Conference believes, however, that the 
    review standards can be harmonized by looking beyond the labels. That 
    is, under both of these doctrines, courts are required to determine 
    independently the limits of the agency's statutory authority and 
    whether the factors the agency took into account in formulating the 
    rule were permissible. Following that determination, courts properly 
    defer to an agency's permissible reading of its statute and to its 
    choice of inferences from the facts in making policy decisions. Courts 
    would help make their review more consistent and predictable if they 
    articulated more clearly this two-step approach. Both the Chevron and 
    ``hard look'' doctrines would then be understood as including a 
    searching review of the range of an agency's legally permissible 
    choices (statutory, policy, and factual), combined with, in each 
    instance, deference to the agency's reasonable selection among such 
    choices, once the alternatives are determined to be within the 
    permissible range.
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        \2\1Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
        \2\2Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual 
    Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (State Farm).
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        Finally, in order to prevent additional litigation, courts should 
    be encouraged to address certain issues that arise in many if not most 
    reviews of rules. Reviewing courts should, for example, specify, to the 
    extent feasible, which portions of the rule, if any, are to be set 
    aside, vacated, stayed or otherwise affected by the decision in the 
    case. They should seek to ensure that portions of a rule unaffected by 
    a finding of illegality remain in effect, unless the rule expressly or 
    impliedly indicates that the rule is inseverable. A reviewing court 
    should also consider the extent to which its mandate will apply 
    retroactively. In considering the effect to be given to its decision, 
    the court should weigh the impact of the decision on parties not before 
    the court, and recognize their interest in being heard or adequately 
    represented prior to any ruling that adversely affects them.
    
    Amendment of the APA
    
        As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the APA, some of its 
    rulemaking provisions need to be updated. Section 553(c), which does 
    not now state a length of time for the comment period, should be 
    amended to specify that a comment period of ``no fewer than least 30 
    days'' be provided (although a good cause exception for shorter periods 
    should be incorporated). This would relieve agencies of the need to 
    justify comment periods that were 30 days or longer. The thirty-day 
    period is intended as a minimum, not a maximum; agencies would still be 
    encouraged to allow longer comment periods and to leave the record open 
    for the receipt of late comments.23 Section 553 should also 
    specify that a second round of notice and comment is not required where 
    the final rule is the ``logical outgrowth'' of the proposed rule, thus 
    codifying generally accepted doctrine.24 A provision requiring 
    maintenance of a public rulemaking file should be incorporated into 
    section 553, so that those who seek access to the file are not forced 
    to rely on the Freedom of Information Act to obtain it.25 (The 
    content of such a file is discussed further below in connection with 
    internal agency management initiatives.)
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        \2\3See Conference Statement #7, ``Views of the Administrative 
    Conference on Proposals Pending in Congress to Amend the Informal 
    Rulemaking Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,'' 1 CFR 
    310.7 (para. 2).
        \2\4See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 
    1974), in which the 1st Circuit originated the ``logical outgrowth'' 
    test. It was subsequently embraced by other circuits, particularly 
    the D.C. Circuit. See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 
    1991); International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. 
    Implement Workers of America v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 
    1991); American Medical Association, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989); 
    NRDC v. USEPA, 824 F.2d 1258 (1st Cir. 1987); United Steelworkers v. 
    Schuykill Metal Corp., 828 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1987); National Black 
    Media Coalition v. FCC, 791 F.2d 1016 (2nd Cir. 1986); Chocolate 
    Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985).
        \2\5Statement #7, supra n. 23, at 4.
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        In addition, the requirement in section 553(c) of a statement of 
    basis and purpose for the rule should be revised to require a 
    ``reasoned statement''26 (deleting the ``conciseness'' provision), 
    which includes a response to significant issues raised in the public 
    comments.27 These changes are designed to codify the salutary 
    aspects of the caselaw on rulemaking, discourage insubstantial 
    arguments and objections on review, and stem the tendency to require 
    additional, more burdensome justifications.
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        \2\6State Farm, supra n. 22, 463 U.S. at 57 (quoting Greater 
    Boston Television Corp. v, FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
        \2\7Conference Statement #7, supra n. 23, at 5.
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        Another long-overdue change in the Act is elimination of section 
    553(a)(2)'s exemption from notice-and-comment procedures for matters 
    relating to ``public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.'' 
    As the Conference recognized as early as 1969, this ``proprietary 
    exemption'' is an anachronism.28 The exemption for ``military or 
    foreign affairs function[s]'' in section 553(a)(1) should be narrowed 
    so that all but secret aspects of those functions are open to public 
    comment.29
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        \2\8See Conference Recommendation 69-8, ``Elimination of Certain 
    Exemptions From the APA Rulemaking Requirements,'' 1 CFR 305.69-8 
    (1993).
        \2\9See Conference Recommendation 73-5, ``Elimination of the 
    `Military or Foreign Affairs Function' Exemption from APA Rulemaking 
    Requirements,'' 1 CFR 305.73-5 (1993).
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    Internal Agency Management Initiatives
    
        Rulemaking is not just a product of external constraints. The 
    agency's own processes for developing rules and reviewing them 
    internally affect the rulemaking environment. Thus, agency management 
    initiatives can have a significant impact on the effectiveness and 
    efficiency of rulemaking. The Conference recommends a number of steps 
    agency managers can take to improve their internal processes.
        Senior agency staff should develop management strategies to set 
    priorities and track agency rulemaking initiatives.30 Agencies 
    should seek to involve the presidential oversight entity in the 
    rulemaking process as early as feasible, in order to reach agreement on 
    the significance of rules in the developmental stage, to provide 
    greater coordination, and to speed final oversight review. Agencies 
    should also review their existing systems for developing and reviewing 
    regulations, to determine where problems and bottlenecks are occurring. 
    They should seek to achieve more rapid internal clearances of proposed 
    and final rules, and to develop reasoned analyses31 and responses 
    to significant issues raised in public comments. They should also take 
    steps to manage the rulemaking file (and associated requests for access 
    to it).32 The file should, to the extent feasible, contain notices 
    of the rulemaking, all written33 comments submitted to the agency, 
    and copies or an index of all written factual material, studies, or 
    reports substantially relied on or seriously considered by the agency 
    in formulating its proposed and final rule (except insofar as 
    disclosure is prohibited by law). Materials substantially relied on or 
    seriously considered need not encompass every study, report, or other 
    document that the agency may have in its files or has otherwise used, 
    but they should include those that exerted a significant impact on the 
    agency's thinking, even if they represent an approach that the agency 
    ultimately did not accept.
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        \3\0See Conference Recommendation 87-1, ``Priority Setting and 
    Management of Rulemaking by the Occupational Safety and Health 
    Administration,'' 1 CFR 305.87-1 (1993).
        \3\1See Conference Recommendation 85-2, ``Agency Procedures for 
    Performing Regulatory Analysis of Rules, 1 CFR 305.85-2 (1993); 
    Conference Recommendation 88-7, ``Valuation of Human Life in 
    Regulatory Decisionmaking,'' 1 CFR 305.88-7 (1993).
        \3\2Computerized access should be made available, preferably in 
    a uniform system government-wide. See Conference Recommendation 88-
    10, ``Federal Agency Use of Computers in Acquiring and Releasing 
    Information,'' 1 CFR 305.88-5 (1993).
        \3\3''Written'' includes documents in electronic form.
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        Agencies should also consider innovative methods for developing and 
    getting public input on rules. Agencies should use advisory or 
    negotiated rulemaking committees where appropriate to improve the 
    quality and acceptability of rules.34 They should also consider 
    the use of ``direct final'' rulemaking where appropriate to eliminate 
    double review of noncontroversial rules. Direct final rulemaking 
    involves issuing a rule for notice and comment, with an accompanying 
    explanation that if the agency receives no notice during the comment 
    period that any person intends to file an adverse comment, the rule 
    will become effective 30 days (or some longer period) after the comment 
    period closes.
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        \3\4Any government-wide policy concerning the use of advisory 
    committees should be consistent with their use as part of the 
    process of negotiated rulemaking.
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    Recommendation
    
        To improve the environment for agency legislative rulemaking, the 
    President, Congress, and the courts should take steps to eliminate 
    undue burdens on agency legislative rulemaking; Congress should update 
    the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking provisions; and agencies 
    should review their internal rulemaking environment and, where 
    appropriate, implement internal management initiatives aimed at 
    improving the effectiveness and efficiency of their efforts.
    
    I. Presidential Oversight\35\ of Rulemaking
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        \35\The recommendations contained in this section apply to 
    oversight of both executive and independent agencies. The Conference 
    has previously recommended that presidential review of rulemaking 
    apply to the independent agencies to the same extent it applies to 
    the rulemaking of the Executive Branch departments and agencies. See 
    Conference Recommendation 88-9, ``Presidential Review of Agency 
    Rulemaking,'' 1 CFR 305.88-9 (1993).
        The term ``presidential oversight entity,'' as used herein, is 
    that part of the Executive Office of the President delegated 
    responsibility for review and oversight of agency rulemaking.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        A. The President's program for coordination and review of agency 
    rules should be set forth in a directive that is reviewed periodically. 
    The program should be sensitive to the burdens being imposed on the 
    rulemaking process, and implementation of the program should ensure 
    that it does not unduly delay or constrain rulemaking. The President 
    should consider the cumulative impact of existing analytical 
    requirements on the rulemaking process before continuing these 
    requirements or imposing new ones.36
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        \3\6In recommending review of analytical requirements beyond 
    those contained in the APA, we express no position on the 
    substantive policies being mandated.
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        B. The President's directive, as well as the explanations provided 
    and the procedures followed by the presidential oversight entity, 
    should, insofar as practicable:
        1. Promote dialogue and coordination between the oversight entity 
    and rulemaking agencies in the early identification and selection of 
    rules warranting application of the review process;
        2. Set forth the relevant analytical requirements that the 
    oversight entity should apply to agency rulemaking, and provide 
    interpretive guidance to assist agencies in complying with these 
    requirements;
        3. Ensure appropriate expedition and openness in the process, in 
    accordance with Conference Recommendation 88-9;
        4. Support a process for planning regulatory initiatives and 
    tracking rule development; and
        5. Encourage and support agency efforts to use consensual processes 
    such as negotiated rulemaking.
    
    II. Congressional Structuring of Rulemaking
    
        A. Section 553 of title 5, United States Code, which established 
    the framework for legislative rulemaking, has operated most efficiently 
    when not encumbered by additional procedural requirements. Congress 
    generally should refrain from creating program-specific rulemaking 
    procedures or analytical requirements beyond those required by the APA. 
    When Congress determines that additional procedures beyond those 
    required by section 553 are justified by the nature of a particular 
    program, such procedures should be focused on identified problems and, 
    where possible, adopted incrementally or after experimentation.37 
    In addition, Congress should repeal formal (``on-the-record'') or other 
    adjudicative fact-finding procedures in rulemaking in any existing 
    statutes mandating such procedures.38
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        \3\7See, for example, the development of more specific, but not 
    necessarily more burdensome, procedures for EPA rulemaking that has 
    significant economic and competitive effects. See 42 U.S.C. 
    Sec. 7607 (Sec. 307 of the Clean Air Act). See also Conference 
    Recommendation 76-3, ``Procedures in Addition to Notice and the 
    Opportunity for Comment in Informal Rulemaking,'' 1 CFR 305.76-3 
    (1993), which encourages agency experimentation with use of oral 
    procedures beyond simple notice and comment in some circumstances.
        \3\8Conference has recommended against the mandated use of 
    cross-examination and other ``adjudicative'' procedures for agency 
    fact-finding in rulemaking. See, e.g., Conference Recommendation 79-
    1, ``Hybrid Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission,'' 
    1 CFR 305.79-1 (1993). The Conference recognizes, however, that more 
    formal procedures may be appropriate for ratemaking based on party-
    related facts. See United States v. Florida East Coast RR, 410 U.S. 
    224 (1973). Congress may also wish to consider whether less formal 
    hybrid processes may be useful in contexts currently requiring 
    formal rulemaking.
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        B. In general, Congress should not legislate time limits on 
    rulemaking, but should instead rely on judicial enforcement of prompt 
    agency action under Sec. 706(1) of the APA.39 However, if Congress 
    determines that a deadline is appropriate, it also should ensure that 
    the agency has sufficient resources to support the required rulemaking 
    effort without distorting the agency's other regulatory functions. If 
    Congress further determines that a default rule is necessary where an 
    agency does not meet a deadline, it should specify the terms of that 
    rule and, in particular, should not impose ``regulatory hammers'' that 
    would cause the agency's proposed rules to take effect automatically.
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        \3\9This is not a comment on the legitimacy of congressional 
    directives in this regard, but on their impracticality. On the other 
    hand, agency self-imposed deadlines are encouraged, see V(D), below. 
    For more detailed advice on time limits, see paragraph 5 of 
    Conference Recommendation 78-3, ``Time Limits on Agency Action,'' 1 
    CFR 305.78-3 (1993).
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        C. Congress should reconsider the need for continuing statutory 
    analytical requirements that necessitate broadly applicable analyses or 
    action to address narrowly-focused issues.40 If Congress 
    nonetheless determines that such analytical requirements are necessary, 
    Congress should structure its requirements more narrowly (e.g., by 
    confining their application to the most significant rules or to rules 
    likely to be affected by the stated concern).
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        \4\0See, e.g., the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980. The 
    Conference takes no position on the substantive issues the Act seeks 
    to address. Insofar as possible, however, such concerns are more 
    appropriately included in the President's oversight guidelines. See 
    I(B)(2) above.
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    III. Timing and Scope of Judicial Review
    
        Congress and the courts generally should be sensitive to the impact 
    of judicial review on agency rulemaking and should seek to simplify, 
    clarify, and harmonize provisions for judicial review of rules.
    A. Congress and the Courts
        In determining whether preenforcement challenges to rules are 
    appropriate, courts have traditionally evaluated ``both the fitness of 
    the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
    withholding its consideration.''41 Adherence to this standard 
    benefits both agencies and those affected by agency rules. Congress 
    generally should authorize and courts should allow preenforcement 
    challenges where the administrative record is a sufficient basis for 
    resolving the issues. Thus, preenforcement challenges to a rule based 
    on the procedures used in the rulemaking or on the asserted substantive 
    invalidity of the rule, however it would be applied, should normally be 
    permitted. Claims of substantive invalidity would include facial 
    challenges based on statutory or constitutional grounds, or asserting 
    the inadequacy of the facts or reasoning underlying the rule. 
    Challenges to a rule on the basis that the rule might be applied in a 
    particular way should normally be deferred until the application seems 
    likely or has occurred.
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        \4\1Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra n. 17, 387 U.S. at 
    149.
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    B. Congress
        1. Congress should be cautious in mandating time-limited 
    preenforcement review coupled with preclusion of review at the 
    enforcement stage, and should rely on time limits only in the 
    situations and conditions specified in Recommendation 82-7.42 
    Congressional time limits on preenforcement review should be understood 
    to bar later challenges in the enforcement context only to the extent 
    specified by Congress. Where Congress mandates a time limit on 
    preenforcement review, it generally should specify that such review be 
    requested within 90 days of the issuance of the rule.43 It should 
    also provide that preenforcement review cases be directly reviewable in 
    the courts of appeals, and that a stay or partial stay of the rule's 
    effectiveness ordinarily be issued only on the demonstration of 
    likelihood of success on the merits and the prospect of significant 
    private harm if the rule is permitted to take effect.
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        \4\2See Conference Recommendation 82-7, ``Judicial Review of 
    Rules in Enforcement Proceedings,'' 1 CFR 305.82-7 (1993).
        \4\3Congress should likewise reevaluate existing statutes for 
    conformity with this approach.
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        2. The standards set out in Sec. 706(2)(A) of the APA's judicial 
    review provisions should apply in all cases involving review of rules. 
    Specifically, Congress should not provide for the use of the 
    ``substantial evidence'' test for agency rules. It should conform 
    existing statutes to this standard by deleting the use of the 
    ``substantial evidence'' test for review of agency rules.
    C. Courts
        1. In articulating the doctrines used in the judicial review of 
    rulemaking, reviewing courts should more clearly harmonize the 
    deferential Chevron doctrine, applied in reviewing agency 
    interpretation of its statutory authority, with the ``hard look'' 
    doctrine, used in examining an agency's justification for its rule. 
    Courts, in applying these doctrines, should recognize that both the 
    Chevron and ``hard look'' tests call for a searching review of the 
    range of factors or permissible choices that may be considered by the 
    agency, and require deference to agency application of those factors 
    once they are shown to be legally appropriate.
        2. When reviewing an agency's explanation for its rule, courts 
    should consider the context of the entire proceeding and concern 
    themselves principally with whether the agency's overall explanation 
    and analysis is reasonable, including its response to the significant 
    issues raised in public comments.
        3. In reviewing challenges to agency rules, courts should, to the 
    extent feasible and after taking into account the effect of the 
    decision on affected persons not before the court, consider: (a) 
    Whether any portion of a rule unaffected by a finding of illegality 
    should remain in full force and effect; (b) which portions of the 
    challenged rule, if any, are to be set aside, vacated, stayed, or 
    otherwise affected by the court's decision in a case; and (c) the 
    extent to which the court's mandate should apply retroactively.
        4. Courts should continue, where appropriate, to consider whether 
    agency action in a rulemaking is ``unreasonably delayed.''44
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        \4\4See n. 15, 39, supra.
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    IV. Amendments to the APA's Legislative Rulemaking Provisions
    
        Congress should update the APA and eliminate outmoded provisions. 
    It should codify court decisions that have increased the effectiveness 
    of public participation in the rulemaking process. In particular, 
    Congress should consider amending section 553 of the APA to:
        A. Eliminate the exemption (Sec. 553(a)(2)) for rules relating to 
    public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts, and delete the 
    exemption (Sec. 553(a)(1)) of military and foreign affairs matters, 
    except for secret matters;45
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        \4\5See Conference Recommendation 69-8, ``Elimination of Certain 
    Exemptions From the APA Rulemaking Requirements,'' 1 CFR 305.69-8 
    (1993), and Conference Recommendation 73-5, ``Elimination of the 
    `Military or Foreign Affairs Function' Exemption from APA Rulemaking 
    Requirements,'' 1 CFR 305.73-5 (1993). The latter recommendation 
    urged eliminating the APA's categorical exemption for matters 
    pertaining to the military or foreign affairs function. It does 
    recognize, however, that a modified exemption may be appropriate for 
    matters ``specifically required by executive order to be kept secret 
    in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.''
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        B. Specify a comment period of ``no fewer than 30 days'' 
    (Sec. 553(c)),46 provided that a good cause provision allowing 
    shorter comment periods or no comment period is incorporated, and 
    codify the doctrine holding that a second round of notice and comment 
    is not required if the final rule is a ``logical outgrowth'' of the 
    noticed proposed rule;
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        \4\6The 30-day period is intended as a minimum, not a maximum. 
    Agencies are encouraged to use longer periods for public comment.
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        C. Require establishment of a public rulemaking file beginning no 
    later than the date on which an agency publishes an advance notice of 
    proposed rulemaking or notice of proposed rulemaking, whichever is 
    earlier.
        D. Restate the ``concise'' statement of basis and purpose 
    requirement (Sec. 553(c)) by codifying existing doctrine that a rule 
    must be supported by a ``reasoned statement,'' and that such statement 
    respond to the significant issues raised in public comments.
        To the extent permitted by law, agencies should adopt these 
    proposed policies pending Congressional action.
    
    V. Agency Management Initiatives
    
        In order to improve their internal rulemaking environments, 
    agencies should develop management techniques to ensure efficient and 
    effective administration of rulemaking. Such techniques should include:
        A. Systematically setting priorities at the highest agency levels 
    and tracking rulemaking initiatives, including identifying clearly who 
    has the authority to ensure that agency schedules and policies are 
    followed;
        B. Coordinating with the presidential oversight entity on the 
    identification of rules warranting review as early in the process as is 
    feasible, and establishing internal review procedures at the highest 
    levels to ensure compliance with presidential analytical requirements;
        C. Reviewing the agency's existing system for developing and 
    reviewing regulations, to determine where problems and bottlenecks are 
    occurring, and to improve and streamline the process;
        D. Achieving timely internal clearances of proposed and final 
    rules, using, where feasible, publicly announced schedules for 
    particular rulemaking proceedings;
        E. Managing rulemaking files, so that maximum disclosure to the 
    public is achieved during the comment period and so that a usable and 
    reliable file is available for purposes of judicial review. The 
    rulemaking file should, insofar as feasible, include (1) all notices 
    pertaining to the rulemaking, (2) copies or an index of all 
    written47 factual material, studies, and reports substantially 
    relied on or seriously considered by agency personnel in formulating 
    the proposed or final rule (except insofar as disclosure is prohibited 
    by law), (3) all written comments submitted to the agency, and (4) any 
    other material required by statute, executive order, or agency rule to 
    be made public in connection with the rulemaking.48
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        \4\7``Written'' includes documents in electronic form.
        \4\8See Conference Statement #7, 1 CFR 310.7 (1993), ``Views of 
    the Administrative Conference on Proposals Pending in Congress to 
    Amend the Informal Rulemaking Provisions of the Administrative 
    Procedure Act.''
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        F. Making use, where appropriate, of negotiated rulemaking and 
    advisory committees;
        G. Considering innovative methods for reducing the time required to 
    develop final rules without eliminating the opportunity for 
    consideration and comment;
        H. Taking steps to ensure that proposed rules are acted on in a 
    reasonably timely manner or withdrawn; and
        I. Evaluating and reconsidering existing rules and initiating 
    amendments and repeals where appropriate.
    
    Recommendation 93-5  Procedures for Regulation of Pesticides.
    
        The Environmental Protection Agency cannot accomplish its 
    substantive mission in regulating pesticides without change and 
    improvement in the Agency's regulatory procedures. The Conference 
    recommends the adoption of a more coordinated and strategic procedural 
    framework for the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
    (``FIFRA''). EPA needs procedures that create multiple and reinforcing 
    incentives for regulatory compliance by registrants, for timely and 
    accurate decisionmaking by EPA, and for effective public participation.
    
    The Reregistration Process
    
        The reregistration of existing pesticides under contemporary risk 
    assessment standards, and the removal of unacceptable pesticides from 
    the marketplace, are examples where procedures can hinder the agency's 
    prospects for success in its substantive mission. Reregistration of 
    existing pesticides, which Congress originally directed to be completed 
    by 1976, became sufficiently delayed so that Congress in 1988 amended 
    FIFRA specifically to force the completion of reregistration by 1998. 
    Yet subsequent delays in the reregistration process may cause EPA to 
    miss this congressional deadline. To some extent, the delay may reflect 
    the underlying difficulty and resource-intensiveness of the risk 
    assessment enterprise with which EPA has been charged. There are some 
    50,000 pesticide products that are separately formulated from 642 
    identified active ingredients. Although EPA has tried to expedite its 
    task by focusing reregistration on some 402 ``cases'' (composed of 
    single or related active ingredients), each case can require evaluation 
    of 100-150 separate studies, every one of which may pose further 
    questions of scientific protocol and interpretation. It may be that 
    EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs needs more personnel to match its 
    regulatory task.
        Whatever the case for additional resources (a question not 
    addressed by the Conference), there is a more basic need for timely and 
    adequate data from registrants--all else in the reregistration process 
    depends on this. Yet the reregistration process does not now provide 
    sufficient procedural incentives to encourage submission of timely and 
    adequate data. In general, because registrants continue to market their 
    products during reregistration, they have little to lose by regulatory 
    decisions that are reached later rather than sooner. Although the 1988 
    FIFRA Amendments require registrants to identify data gaps, and commit 
    to fill them, the 1988 Amendments do not provide the agency with 
    sufficient tools to police tardy or inadequate data submissions.
        As to tardiness, the 1988 Amendments authorized the agency to 
    suspend registrations of those registrants that fail to submit data. 
    But EPA must first provide nonsubmitters with 30-days' notice in 
    response to which registrants can demand a limited hearing (which must 
    be held within 75 days); the 1988 Amendments further provide that 
    registrants suspended for not submitting data can have their 
    registrations ``reinstated'' upon submission of the data. Some 
    registrants, ironically, have used these suspension procedures as a 
    means of obtaining penalty-free and self-awarded extensions of time. In 
    the 7 months between August 1991 and February 1992, for example, EPA 
    found it necessary to issue 70 Notices of Intent to Suspend for 
    nonsubmittal of data, yet in the majority of these instances (53) the 
    registrants merely submitted their data prior to exhausting their 
    procedural rights and were no worse off for having missed their 
    deadlines. To create an additional disincentive for untimely data 
    submissions it is necessary to make lateness costly to the registrant. 
    To this end, the Conference recommends that Congress authorize EPA to 
    impose civil money penalties for untimely data.
        As to the adequacy of data, EPA may now have the theoretical (but 
    untested in court) capacity to suspend or cancel the registration of 
    those pesticides for which inadequate data have been submitted. 
    However, the more common response to inadequate data is a ``data call-
    in,'' through which the agency demands that studies be redone--a source 
    of additional delay that the agency has identified as significant. Even 
    with respect to its highest priority pesticides, EPA has in the recent 
    past found 50 percent of studies to be either inadequate, 
    ``upgradable'' or otherwise requiring supplementation. Although the 
    cost of redoing studies should provide some incentive for registrants 
    to ensure that their studies meet EPA's quality criteria, it does not 
    seem to provide a sufficient incentive. In fairness to some 
    registrants, there is evidence that EPA itself may be partially to 
    blame for the high rates of data rejection. In 1992, an internal agency 
    review found that misinterpretation of data requirements and poor 
    guidance from EPA case managers were in part responsible for the 
    inadequacy of data submissions. The Conference therefore recommends 
    that EPA promulgate and communicate clear data standards and guidance 
    on the data expected from registrants. To help prevent the submission 
    of inadequate data even after sufficiently clear agency guidance has 
    been given, the Conference recommends that Congress authorize EPA to 
    levy administrative civil money penalties upon registrants submitting 
    data that fail to meet previously announced standards. This will not 
    only create incentives for registrants to take the extra steps 
    necessary to ensure the adequacy of their submittals, but it will also 
    create incentives for the agency to make clear its expectations.
        Whatever the additional tactical advantages that the agency may 
    gain by improving its own ability to enforce data timeliness and 
    adequacy, the sheer number of studies and the innumerable decisions 
    requiring agency discretion suggest that more global incentives are 
    needed to ensure that registrants themselves have a stake in timely and 
    adequate data. The danger is that the reregistration process now has 
    become, even with the best of intentions, an analytical treadmill 
    powered by the rhythms of data call-ins, subsequent requests for data 
    waivers and time extensions, submission of data that do not always meet 
    EPA's standards for adequacy, and further data call-ins that restart 
    the sequence. The Conference believes that the unique demands of the 
    reregistration process justify congressional consideration of a 
    ``hammer'' provision that would legislatively impose an automatic 
    suspension of all ``List A'' pesticides (those high-priority pesticides 
    to which there is greatest human exposure) for which there are still 
    significant data gaps within the registrant's control, and of which the 
    registrant is aware--subject to a provision for a registrant to 
    petition for reinstatement. Such a provision would not only provide an 
    overarching incentive for registrants to favor the completion rather 
    than postponement of their data obligations, but it would also better 
    align the reregistration process with FIFRA's central procedural 
    presumption--that, in the face of uncertainty, applicants (especially 
    those seeking to reregister pesticides with extensive human exposure) 
    should bear the burden of proof in establishing that their pesticides 
    do not pose unreasonable risks.
    
    Suspension and Cancellation Hearings
    
        Apart from improvements in the reregistration process, the 
    Conference urges Congress to substitute a relatively informal 
    decisionmaking process for the formal adjudicatory hearings that 
    registrants can now demand in cancellation and suspension matters. In 
    the past, formal hearings under FIFRA have averaged 1,000 days to 
    complete. These hearings can directly impose on EPA significant 
    resource costs and can also indirectly discourage the agency from 
    aggressive prehearing negotiations with registrants (lest the 
    registrant ``take EPA to hearing''). It is not surprising that EPA has 
    long sought alternatives to cancellation hearings. For years, it sought 
    to identify problem pesticides for heightened regulatory attention in a 
    ``Special Review'' process. There is little need for procedural 
    formality in these types of decisions. At issue in most cancellation 
    and suspension proceedings are scientific data concerning risks and 
    benefits, disputes over which can generally be well-ventilated when EPA 
    gives registrants detailed reasons for the agency's actions and then 
    provides registrants with sufficient time to file responsive written 
    comments and supporting documentation. For those cases where oral 
    testimony or cross-examination is justified, the benefits of more 
    formal procedures can be preserved by providing registrants an 
    opportunity to show cause why such procedures are warranted. 
    Accordingly, the Conference recommends that Congress pattern 
    cancellation and suspension proceedings on a basic notice-and-comment 
    model, with more formal procedures available only if a party will be 
    demonstrably prejudiced by the informal procedure.
    
    Labeling and Phase-down Procedures
    
        Although the reregistration process and adjudicatory hearings are 
    the most visible aspects of pesticide regulation in need of procedural 
    improvement, they are not the only places where procedural reform is 
    important. Since the late 1980's, EPA has in fact sought to reduce the 
    risks of pesticides through private negotiations with registrants over 
    label changes that impose restrictions on use. Such regulatory action 
    has the potential to attain interim risk-reduction quickly when 
    warranted by available data, without going through the cumbersome 
    Special Review and cancellation procedures, even when complete 
    reregistration may still be years away. But there are also 
    disadvantages to relying so heavily on private negotiations with 
    registrants--chief among them the lack of participation among the 
    various interested publics in crafting label changes. In the early 
    1980's, similar concern about privately negotiated Special Review and 
    pre-Special-Review decisions seriously undermined the agency's 
    credibility and slowed regulatory progress. In 1985, EPA adopted 
    procedures to open the door for information from, and participation by, 
    the public in those processes.1 The Conference recommends that EPA 
    adopt analogous procedures to regularize and open the agency's 
    negotiated label program. In addition, because label changes are 
    effective in reducing risk only if they are actually implemented in the 
    field, the Conference recommends procedures to facilitate feedback from 
    registrants, pesticide users, and all other interested persons on the 
    effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the interim risk-reduction measures 
    EPA has adopted. Moreover, the Conference recommends that EPA's Office 
    Of Pesticide Programs (OPP) establish regular channels of communication 
    with EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance to inform 
    that office of all label changes and of any material information 
    received by OPP on noncompliance with such changes.
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        \1\40 CFR Part 154, Subpart B.
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        The Conference also urges Congress to consider providing EPA with a 
    new procedural device designed to accommodate a safer pesticides 
    policy: The ability by informal procedures to order the phase-down of 
    existing pesticides when there are available for use safer, effective 
    pest management products or practices.2 Empowering the agency to 
    develop an informal phase-down mechanism would have several procedural 
    advantages. First, ordering the phase down of an existing pesticide on 
    relative risk grounds will cause less stigmatization of an existing 
    product than would a cancellation proceeding based on the traditional, 
    more absolutist ``unreasonable risk'' judgment. Second, phase-down 
    procedures provide for an incremental style of decisionmaking in which 
    EPA's reasoned judgments about comparative risk can be tested and 
    reevaluated without making irreversible decisions about existing 
    pesticides in cancellation proceedings. Finally, phase-down procedures 
    based on relative risk can reinforce and integrate EPA's pesticide 
    programs under FIFRA with other federal environmental programs.
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        \2\Without taking any position on the substantive questions 
    involved in determining the relative safety and effectiveness of 
    pest control measures, the Conference notes EPA's interest in both 
    the present and prior presidential administrations in developing 
    such a substantive capability.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Recommendation
    
    I. Adequacy and Timeliness of Data
    
        A. EPA should adopt, whenever possible, rules setting clear 
    standards for pesticide reregistration data and should communicate 
    those standards to registrants.
        B. Congress should authorize EPA to impose administrative civil 
    money penalties on registrants for the failure to submit data by any 
    applicable deadline, or for submitting data (even if timely) that do 
    not comply with the data standards adopted by EPA.3
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        \3\Imposition of penalties should be through formal 
    adjudication. See Conference Recommendation 93-1 ``Use of APA Formal 
    Procedures in Civil Money Penalty Proceedings,'' 58 FR 45409 (Aug. 
    30, 1993).
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        C. Congress should consider imposing an automatic suspension of 
    ``List A'' (high priority) pesticides for which there still remain, by 
    a date to be set by Congress, previously identified and significant 
    gaps in data within the registrant's control, and of which the 
    registrant is on notice. Once suspended, pesticides could be reinstated 
    through a petition process.
    
    II. Informal Procedures
    
        A. Congress should eliminate the provisions in FIFRA allowing for 
    formal adjudicatory hearings in proposed suspension or cancellation 
    actions and should provide instead an informal procedure, including 
    notice in the Federal Register, that informs registrants and others of 
    the specific grounds on which EPA bases its proposed action and that 
    provides a reasonable opportunity to file written comments and data. 
    Only if a party will be demonstrably prejudiced by the written notice-
    and-comment process should the agency be required to grant the right to 
    introduce oral testimony or to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses.
        B. Congress should consider providing EPA the authority to order a 
    phase down in the use of any registered pesticide through an informal 
    notice-and-comment procedure in which EPA considers such factors as the 
    relative risks and benefits of the pesticide at issue when compared 
    with alternative pest management products and practices.
    
    III. Public Participation
    
        A. EPA should regularize and open for broader public participation 
    its informal procedures for achieving interim risk reduction through 
    pesticide label changes. EPA should inform the public, through a 
    Federal Register notice, when it commences private label negotiations 
    with registrants. EPA should simultaneously open a public ``negotiation 
    docket'' into which interested persons may submit comments they believe 
    might be relevant, for consideration by EPA and the registrants during 
    their negotiations. If, after negotiations with registrants, EPA 
    proposes a label change, it should publish a notice of the proposed 
    change in the Federal Register and provide the public an opportunity to 
    file written comments. The notice should include a concise, general 
    statement of the proposed label's basis and purpose, including a 
    summary of the material aspects of the agency's negotiations with 
    registrants.
        B. After requiring a label change, EPA should establish and 
    publicize the availability of a ``compliance docket,'' for any input 
    about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of interim risk-reduction 
    measures. In addition, EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) should 
    communicate to EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance the 
    adoption by OPP of label changes and any material information received 
    by OPP in its compliance docket.
    
    STATEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
    
        The following formal statement was adopted by the Assembly of the 
    Administrative Conference on December 9, 1993:
    
    Statement No. 16  Right to Consult With Counsel in Agency 
    Investigations
    
        In recent years, Congress has attached sanctions to an increasingly 
    wide range of regulatory violations, causing federal administrative 
    agencies to become involved more routinely in investigations that lead 
    to civil or criminal prosecution. The Administrative Conference has 
    completed a study that explores the procedures that govern the 
    relationship between the agency and a person compelled to appear before 
    the agency in such investigations.
        The Administrative Procedure Act at section 555(b) provides that 
    ``[a] person compelled to appear in person before an agency or 
    representative thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and 
    advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other qualified 
    representative. A party is entitled to appear in person or by or with 
    counsel or other duly qualified representative in an agency 
    proceeding.'' This brief reference to counsel in the APA leaves a 
    number of questions open. The Act, for example, does not specify the 
    types of actions attorneys may take in representing their clients 
    during agency investigative proceedings. It also does not indicate 
    precisely which persons coming in contact with an agency may invoke the 
    right to counsel.1
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        \1\The 1941 Attorney General's Report on Administrative 
    Procedure in Government Agencies is strangely taciturn on the 
    subject of legal representation. Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st 
    Sess. (1941). The report throughout refers to the presentations and 
    contentions of ``parties,'' without any indication whether parties 
    would or would not have the benefit of legal counsel. Statements in 
    both House and Senate committee reports regarding this provision of 
    the APA state simply that it is ``designed to confirm and make 
    effective'' the ``statutory and mandatory right'' of interested 
    persons to appear personally or with counsel before the agency. Sen. 
    Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 205, 263 (1946).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Because the roles of investigators in federal agencies, and the 
    methods by which witnesses or parties appear before agencies vary 
    considerably, the Administrative Conference does not believe it can 
    develop a uniform set of recommendations concerning these procedures. 
    However, the Conference believes it would be valuable to provide a 
    statement on some of the issues raised in such investigations 
    concerning the role of counsel so that those government officials 
    involved can be made aware of the issues and seek additional guidance 
    where warranted.
    
    I. Agency Exclusion of Counsel
    
        Although courts construing the APA's right-to-counsel provision 
    have held that the right includes the power to retain counsel of one's 
    own choosing, some federal agencies have, by rule or order, reserved 
    the power to exclude counsel who represents a person compelled to 
    appear before an agency representative during an investigation. They 
    have done so out of a concern that the particular attorney may impair 
    the effectiveness of the investigation, especially where the attorney 
    represents either multiple witnesses, or a witness and his or her 
    employer.
        Agencies should consider whether, in most situations, a person 
    compelled to appear in agency investigative proceedings ought to have 
    the discretion to choose his or her own counsel, even where counsel 
    represents multiple witnesses or parties in the matter. As courts have 
    held, an agency must have ``concrete evidence'' that an investigation 
    will be impaired before it may exclude counsel.2 Thus, the mere 
    fact of multiple representation, an employment relationship between the 
    witness and some other party involved in the investigation, or past 
    dealings between the agency and a particular attorney should not be 
    considered, in and of themselves, a sufficient basis for excluding the 
    counsel of a witness.
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        \2\See SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Professional 
    Reactor Operator Society v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Regardless of an agency's decision on the above matter, it has the 
    power to exclude counsel for disruptive or obstructionist behavior 
    during the proceedings, and to take action in situations where the 
    attorney is suspected of personal involvement in the potential 
    violations or matters under investigation.
    
    II. Consultation With Auxiliary Experts
    
        Because of the highly technical nature of many regulatory fields, 
    attorneys who advise witnesses or parties in some agency investigations 
    must consult with accountants, engineers, economists, or other experts 
    in order to provide effective legal assistance. The prevailing practice 
    among federal agencies is to allow such consultation with auxiliary 
    personnel, either by allowing the expert to attend the proceedings or 
    by allowing the attorney a reasonable opportunity during the proceeding 
    to consult with the expert about the substance of the investigation. 
    Agencies that do not currently provide this opportunity should consider 
    whether to allow counsel representing a person compelled to appear 
    before the agency reasonable access to auxiliary experts, regardless of 
    whether the investigation involves civil or criminal sanctions.
    
    III. Informing Persons of Their Right to Counsel
    
        Agencies should be sensitive to the right to counsel that persons 
    compelled to appear before it are granted under the APA and other 
    statutes, and should consider when it is appropriate to advise such an 
    individual of this right. Where necessary, agencies should consider 
    providing training on this subject to field investigators. In the 
    interest of maintaining an effective working relationship between 
    federal regulatory agencies and regulated parties, agencies should 
    consider whether it is appropriate to conduct a compelled investigative 
    proceeding in the absence of legal counsel when it is apparent that a 
    person is unaware of his or her right to counsel.
    
    [FR Doc. 94-2225 Filed 1-31-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6110-01-W
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
02/01/1994
Department:
Administrative Conference of the United States
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Action:
Notice.
Document Number:
94-2225
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: February 1, 1994