[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 21 (Tuesday, February 1, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-346]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: February 1, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 92-NM-173-AD; Amendment 39-8792; AD 94-01-10]
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Series Airplanes
Equipped With Pratt and Whitney PW2000 Series Engines
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive
(AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, that
currently requires inspections, adjustments, and functional checks of
the engine thrust reverser system; and modification of the engine
thrust reverser directional control valve. This amendment adds a
requirement for installation of an additional thrust reverser system
locking feature; revises the compliance time for accomplishing the
modification; adds airplanes to the applicability; and requires
periodic functional tests of the locking feature following its
installation. This amendment is prompted by results of a safety review
of the thrust reverser system on these airplanes. The actions specified
by this AD are intended to prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in
flight and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
DATES: Effective March 3, 1994.
The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-
0028, Revision 1, dated October 29, 1992, and Boeing Service Bulletin
757-78-0028, Revision 2, dated January 14, 1993, as listed in the
regulations, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of
March 3, 1994.
The incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed
in the regulations was approved previously by the Director of the
Federal Register as of September 16, 1991 (56 FR 46725, September 16,
1991).
ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be
obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules
Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of
the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,
Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeffrey Duven, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2688; fax (206) 227-1181.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations by superseding AD 91-20-09, Amendment 39-8043 (56
FR 46725, September 16, 1991), which is applicable to certain Boeing
Model 757 series airplanes equipped with Pratt and Whitney PW2000
series engines, was published as a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register on August 6, 1993 (58 FR
42034). The action proposed to require certain inspections,
adjustments, and functional checks of the engine thrust reverser
system; modification of the engine thrust reverser directional control
valve; installation of an additional thrust reverser system locking
feature (sync lock); and periodic functional tests of the locking
feature following its installation.
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate
in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to
the comments received.
One commenter supports the proposed rule.
One commenter requests that paragraph (e) of the proposed rule be
revised to require only the ``sync lock test'' portion of the proposed
functional test. The commenter indicates that the proposed ``Thrust
Reverser Auto Restow and Sync Lock Test'' is a combination test
procedure that consists of an auto restow test of the entire thrust
reverser assembly and a test of the sync lock mechanism. The commenter
believes that this combination test procedure is more extensive than
that which is necessary to verify proper functioning of the sync lock.
The FAA concurs with the commenter's request. The FAA's objective
in proposing periodic functional tests of the sync lock device is to
ensure the integrity of the locking function. The FAA included the auto
restow portion of the functional test in the proposal because the
airplane maintenance manual does not distinguish between the sync lock
test and the auto restow test. However, since issuance of the proposal,
Boeing has submitted to the FAA separate procedures for accomplishment
of the sync lock integrity test described in the airplane maintenance
manual. These procedures are accomplished independently of the auto
restow test and other thrust reverser system tests. Accordingly, the
FAA has revised paragraph (e) of the final rule to remove the
requirement to accomplish the auto restow portion of the functional
test and to specify instructions for accomplishment of the sync lock
integrity test only.
The Air Transport Association (ATA) of America, on behalf of
several of its members, requests that the FAA review its justification
for including in an AD the functional test requirements proposed in
paragraph (e). ATA members are not opposed to accomplishing the
proposed tests as part of their maintenance programs, but are opposed
to accomplishing the tests as part of the requirements of this AD. The
commenters believe that the adoption of paragraph (e), as proposed, is
equivalent to issuing a Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMR)
item by means of an AD.
The FAA does not concur. The FAA acknowledges that similarities
exist between the periodic functional tests of the sync lock, as
required by paragraph (e) of this AD, and tasks denoted as CMR items.
The extent of those similarities is that both CMR items and the
periodic functional tests required by this AD place specific
requirements on operators of Model 757 series airplanes with respect to
scheduling airplane maintenance activities.
Generally, CMR items define specific repetitive inspections or
component replacements for equipment, systems, and installations.
Accomplishment of these CMR items ensures that the likelihood of
certain failures that could occur during operation of the airplane does
not exceed the limitations specified in Federal Aviation Regulations
(FAR) 25.1309, which is applicable to the design and approval of
transport category airplanes.
These CMR items are identified as a result of safety analyses of
airplane electrical, electronic, pressurization, and propulsion
systems. These analyses must be completed and approved by the FAA prior
to its issuance of an airplane Type Certificate (TC). Following
issuance of the TC, other necessary inspections, component
replacements, or overhaul intervals for airplane systems that are based
on in-service experience with the airplane, but that do not result in
re-evaluation of the basic safety analysis on which approval of the
system is based, are not included as additional CMR items; rather,
these are addressed through changes to the airplane maintenance program
or as the subjects of AD's.
In conclusion, while the effect of a CMR item is the same as that
of an AD requirement, its derivation is different. A CMR item is based
on a statistical analysis required by FAR 25.1309; an AD requirement is
based on follow-up work that is necessary to address an unsafe
condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the
same type design.
This AD addresses an unsafe condition identified as deployment of a
thrust reverser during flight, and requires the installation of an
additional thrust reverser system locking feature to correct that
unsafe condition. The periodic functional tests contained in paragraph
(e) of this AD are not the result of a re-evaluation of the safety
analyses for Model 757 series airplanes with respect to FAR 25.1309
requirements. These tests have been established to ensure the
effectiveness of the modification required to address the identified
unsafe condition. The FAA considers issuance of this AD to be
necessary, since AD's are the means by which accomplishment of
procedures and adherence to specific compliance times are made
mandatory.
ATA states further that, if the FAA finds sufficient justification
to include the functional test requirements in this AD, an alternative
to accomplishing paragraph (e) should be provided in the final rule.
That alternative would include the following:
1. Within 3 months after accomplishing the sync lock installation,
operators would be required to revise the FAA-approved maintenance
inspection program to include a functional test of the sync lock. The
initial test would be accomplished within 1,000 hours time-in-service
after modification. This AD would no longer be applicable for operators
that have acceptably revised the maintenance program.
2. Operators complying with this suggested alternative could use an
alternative recordkeeping method in place of that otherwise required by
FAR 91.417 or 121.380.
3. For operators complying with this suggested alternative, the FAA
would be defined as the cognizant Principal Maintenance Inspector
(PMI).
ATA reasons that its suggested alternative to accomplishing
paragraph (e) of this AD is justified because no data exist to show
that repetitive tests of a modified thrust reverser cannot be handled
adequately through an operator's maintenance program.
The FAA does not concur. As discussed previously, the FAA has
determined that repetitive functional tests are necessary to ensure
that the sync lock modification is effective in preventing the
identified unsafe condition. This determination is based on the fact
that the sync lock is a new design whose reliability has not been
adequately proven through service experience. The ATA's proposal would
enable each operator to determine whether and how often these tests
should be conducted. In light of the severity of the identified unsafe
condition, the FAA has determined that allowing this degree of operator
discretion is inappropriate at this time. However, as the FAA obtains
further information with regard to in-service experience, it may
consider revising the requirements of paragraph (e) of this AD based on
that new data.
One commenter, Boeing, opposes the requirement contained in
paragraph (e) of the proposal for periodic functional tests of the sync
lock following accomplishment of the sync lock installation, and
proposes that the paragraph be removed until the FAA reviews the ``more
comprehensive'' scheduled maintenance recommendations developed by the
Model 757/767 Thrust Reverser Working Group (TRWG). Boeing indicates
that these more comprehensive tests will be recommended for maintenance
of the thrust reverser system in the next revision to the Maintenance
Review Board (MRB) report. Boeing also adds that the proposed interval
at which the tests specified in paragraph (e) of this AD must be
accomplished will be inconsistent with the next revision to the MRB
report.
Boeing states that any scheduled maintenance requirements for
airplanes on which the sync lock installation has been accomplished
should be presented at a Model 757 Industry Steering Committee meeting
with the FAA, which is scheduled for December 1993. Boeing adds that,
contingent upon FAA approval, recommendations developed by the TRWG
will be included in Revision D to the MRB report, which will be
published in the first quarter of 1994. Boeing believes that adoption
of the maintenance recommendations contained in the forthcoming
revision to the MRB report will ensure that an adequate level of
safety, with regard to the sync lock installation, will be maintained
by all operators of Model 757 series airplanes.
The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request. The FAA finds
that addressing the sync lock integrity test in a recommended action,
such as the MRB report, will not ensure an acceptable level of safety
with regard to the thrust reverser maintenance program. The FAA has
determined that requiring the periodic functional tests of the sync
lock integrity in this AD will provide an adequate level of safety.
The FAA recognizes that differences exist currently where this AD
requires that the sync lock integrity test be accomplished at more
frequent intervals than those currently proposed by Boeing for
inclusion in the MRB report. However, the FAA has determined that the
test interval of 4,000 hours time-in-service, which will be recommended
by Boeing for inclusion in the next revision to the MRB report, is too
long in light of the sync lock function and the limited information
available to substantiate in-service experience of the sync lock.
Consequently, the FAA has based the requirement for accomplishment of
the test at intervals of 1,000 hours time-in-service, as specified in
paragraph (e) of this AD, on a philosophy that will ensure that all
affected operators will accomplish a common sync lock integrity test at
common intervals.
The FAA anticipates that when the revised MRB report is issued in
early 1994, that revision will contain a recommendation for
accomplishment of the sync lock integrity test that is consistent with
the requirements of paragraph (e) of this AD, thereby allowing the MRB
to be consistent with AD-required actions.
Several commenters request that the repetitive interval for
functional tests of the sync lock installation be increased from the
proposed 1,000 hours time-in-service to 3,000 hours time-in-service.
One commenter states that, according to results of a check of the sync
lock installation accomplished by Boeing, the proposed 1,000-hour
functional test was intended to be accomplished only on Model 767
series airplanes due to physical changes between the sync lock systems
installed on Model 757 and 767 series airplanes. One commenter reasons
that the proposed interval for functional tests of the sync lock device
should be 3,000 hours time-in-service because AD 91-20-09 (which will
be superseded by this proposed AD) specifies a 3,000-hour interval for
inspections and tests of the thrust reverser system.
The FAA does not concur with the commenters' request. The test
interval specified in this AD is reduced from the interval specified in
AD 91-20-09 because only limited information is available currently to
substantiate the in-service reliability of the sync lock device.
Consequently, the FAA has established an appropriate functional test
interval to ensure all affected operators will accomplish a common sync
lock integrity test at common intervals not to exceed 1,000 hours time-
in-service.
``Note 2'' of this final rule has been revised to state that
paragraph ``(c)'' of this AD restates the requirement for repetitive
inspections contained in paragraph (d) of AD 91-20-09, Amendment 39-
8043. An incorrect reference to paragraph ``(d)'' of this AD was made
in ``Note 2'' of the supplemental NPRM.
After careful review of the available data, including the comments
noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public
interest require the adoption of the rule with the change previously
described. The FAA has determined that this change will neither
increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of
the AD.
There are approximately 211 Model 757 series airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 192
airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will
take approximately 624 work hours per airplane to accomplish the
required modification, and that the average labor rate is $55 per work
hour. Required parts will be supplied by the manufacturer at no cost to
operators. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on
U.S. operators to accomplish the required modification is estimated to
be $6,589,440, or $34,320 per airplane.
The FAA recognizes that the required modification (sync lock
installation) entails a large number of work hours to accomplish.
However, the 5-year compliance time specified in paragraph (d) of this
AD should allow ample time for the sync lock installation to be
accomplished coincidentally with scheduled major airplane inspection
and maintenance activities, thereby minimizing the costs associated
with special airplane scheduling.
In addition, the FAA estimates that 270 airplanes of U.S. registry
will be required to accomplish the periodic functional tests required
by this AD, that it will take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to
accomplish each functional test, and that the average labor rate is $55
per work hour. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD
on U.S. operators to accomplish each functional test is estimated to be
$14,850, or $55 per airplane.
Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S.
operators is estimated to be $6,604,290. This total cost figure assumes
that no operator has yet accomplished the requirements of this AD.
The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in
accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final
rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the
preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is
not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
(2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a
significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial
number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action
and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained
from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption
ADDRESSES.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part
39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C.
106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing amendment 39-8043 (56 FR
46725, September 16, 1991), and by adding a new airworthiness directive
(AD), amendment 39-8792, to read as follows:
94-01-10 Boeing: Amendment 39-8792. Docket 92-NM-173-AD. Supersedes
AD 91-20-09, Amendment 39-8043.
Applicability: Model 757 series airplanes equipped with Pratt
and Whitney PW2000 series engines, certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished
previously.
Note 1: Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD restate the
requirements of AD 91-20-09, Amendment 39-8043, paragraphs (a) and
(b). As allowed by the phrase, ``unless accomplished previously,''
if the requirements of AD 91-20-09 have been accomplished
previously, paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD do not require those
actions to be repeated.
Note 2: Paragraph (c) of this AD restates the requirement for
repetitive inspections contained in paragraph (d) of AD 91-20-09,
Amendment 39-8043. Paragraph (c) of this AD requires that the first
inspection required by this AD must be performed within the
specified repetitive inspection interval after the last inspection
performed in accordance with paragraph (d) of AD 91-20-09.
To prevent deployment of a thrust reverser in flight and
subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the
following:
(a) Within 14 days after September 16, 1991 (the effective date
of AD 91-20-09, Amendment 39-8043), accomplish either paragraph
(a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD.
(1) Accomplish both paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii) of this
AD:
(i) Inspect the thrust reverser Directional Control Valve (DCV)
assemblies of both engines to determine the solenoid-driven pilot
valve's part number, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 757-78A0027, dated September 9, 1991.
(A) If any DCV has a suspect pilot valve as specified in the
service bulletin, prior to further flight, replace the DCV with a
DCV that has a part number of a non-suspect solenoid-driven pilot
valve, in accordance with the service bulletin.
(B) If a DCV has a non-suspect solenoid-driven pilot valve as
specified in the service bulletin, that pilot valve does not need to
be replaced.
(ii) Perform all tests and inspections of the engine thrust
reverser control and indication system on both engines in accordance
with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0025, dated September 9, 1991.
Prior to further flight, correct any discrepancy found in accordance
with the service bulletin.
(2) Accomplish paragraph (a)(1) of this AD on one engine's
thrust reverser and deactivate the other engine's thrust reverser,
in accordance with section 78-31-1 of Boeing Document D630N002,
``Boeing 757 Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision 8, dated January
15, 1991.
(b) Within 24 days after September 16, 1991 (the effective date
of AD 91-20-09, Amendment 39-8043), the requirements of paragraph
(a)(1) of this AD must be accomplished on both engines' thrust
reverser systems.
(c) Repeat the tests and inspections specified in paragraph
(a)(1)(ii) at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight hours, and prior
to further flight following any maintenance that disturbs the thrust
reverser control system. Prior to further flight, correct any
discrepancy found in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-
0025, dated September 9, 1991.
(d) Within 5 years after the effective date of this AD, install
an additional thrust reverser system locking feature (sync lock
installation), in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-
0028, Revision 1, dated October 29, 1992, or Revision 2, dated
January 14, 1993.
(e) Within 1,000 hours time-in-service after installing the sync
lock required by paragraph (d) of this AD (either in production or
by retrofit), or within 1,000 hours time-in-service after the
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later; and thereafter at
intervals not to exceed 1,000 hours time-in-service: Perform
functional tests of the sync lock in accordance with the ``Thrust
Reverser Sync Lock Integrity Test'' procedures specified below. If
any discrepancy is found during any test, prior to further flight,
correct it in accordance with procedures described in the Boeing 757
Maintenance Manual.
``Thrust Reverser Sync Lock Integrity Test
1. General
A. Use this procedure to test the integrity of the thrust
reverser sync locks.
2. Thrust Reverser Sync Lock Test
A. Prepare for the Thrust Reverser Sync Lock Test.
(1) Open the AUTO SPEEDBRAKE circuit breaker on the overhead
circuit breaker panel, P11.
(2) Do the steps that follow to supply power to the thrust
reverser system:
(a) Make sure the thrust levers are in the idle position.
Caution: Do not extend the thrust reverser while the core cowl
panels are open. Damage to the thrust reverser and core cowl panels
can occur.
(b) Make sure the thrust reverser halves are closed.
(c) Make sure the core cowl panels are closed.
(d) Put the EEC maint power switch or the EEC power L and EEC
power R switches to the Altn position.
(e) For the left engine:
(1) Put the EEC MAINT CHANNEL SEL L switch to the AUTO position.
(2) Put the L ENG fire switch to the NORM position.
(f) For the right engine:
(1) Put the EEC MAINT CHANNEL SEL R switch to the AUTO position.
(2) Put the R ENG fire switch to the NORM position.
(g) Make sure the EICAS circuit breakers (6 locations) are
closed.
Warning: The thrust reverser will automatically retract if the
electrical power to the EEC/thrust reverser control system is turned
off or if the EEC maint power switch is moved to the norm position.
The accidental operation of the thrust reverser can cause injury to
persons or damage to equipment can occur.
(h) Make sure these circuit breakers on the main power
distribution panel, P6, are closed:
(1) Fuel cond cont L
(2) Fuel cond cont R
(3) T/L interlock L
(4) T/L interlock R
(5) Left T/R sync lock
(6) Right T/R sync lock
(7) L eng electronic engine control altn pwr (if installed)
(8) R eng electronic engine control altn pwr (if installed)
(i) Make sure these circuit breakers on the overhead circuit
breaker panel, P11, are closed:
(1) Air/gnd sys 1
(2) Air/gnd sys 2
(3) Landing gear pos sys 1
(4) Landing gear pos sys 2
(j) For the left engine, make sure these circuit breakers on the
P11 panel are closed:
(1) Left engine pdiu
(2) Left engine thrust reverser cont/scav press
(3) Left engine electronic engine control altn pwr (if
installed)
(4) Left engine thrust reverser pri cont
(5) Left engine thrust reverser sec cont
(k) For the right engine, make sure these circuit breakers on
the P11 panel are closed:
(1) Right engine pdiu
(2) Right engine thrust reverser cont/scav press
(3) Right engine electronic engine control altn pwr (if
installed)
(4) Right engine thrust reverser pri cont
(5) Right engine thrust reverser sec cont
(l) Supply electrical power.
(m) Remove the pressure from the left (right) hydraulic system.
B. Do the Thrust Reverser Sync Lock Test.
(1) Move and hold the manual unlock lever on the center actuator
on both thrust reverser sleeves to the unlock position.
(2) Make sure the thrust reverser sleeves did not move.
(3) Move the left (right) reverser thrust lever up and rearward
to the idle detent position.
(4) Make sure both thrust reverser sleeves move aft
(approximately 0.15 to 0.25 inch).
(5) Release the manual unlock lever on the center actuators.
Warning: Make sure all persons and equipment are clear of the
area around the thrust reverser. When you apply hydraulic pressure
the thrust reverser will extend and can cause injuries to persons or
damage to equipment.
(6) Pressurize the left (right) hydraulic system.
(7) Make sure the thrust reverser extends.
(8) Move the left (right) reverser thrust lever to the fully
forward and down position to retract the thrust reverser.
C. Put the Airplane Back to its Usual Condition.
(1) Remove hydraulic pressure.
(2) Close the left and right fan cowls.
(3) Close the AUTO SPEEDBRAKE circuit breaker on the P11 panel.
(4) Remove electrical power if it is not necessary.
D. Repeat the Thrust Reverser Sync Lock Test on the other
engine.''
(f) Installation of the sync lock, as required by paragraph (d)
of this AD, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this AD.
(g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the
compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall
submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal
Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the
Manager, Seattle ACO.
Note 3: Approvals of alternative methods of compliance issued
for AD 91-20-09 constitute valid approvals for compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) through (c) of this AD.
Note 4: Information concerning the existence of approved
alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be
obtained from the Seattle ACO.
(h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR
21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the
requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(i) The actions shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 757-78A0027, dated September 9, 1991; Boeing
Service Bulletin 757-78-0025, dated September 9, 1991; Boeing
Document D630N002, ``Boeing 757 Dispatch Deviation Guide,'' Revision
8, dated January 15, 1991; Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0028,
Revision 1, dated October 29, 1992; and Boeing Service Bulletin 757-
78-0028, Revision 2, dated January 14, 1993. The incorporation by
reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-78A0027, dated
September 9, 1991; Boeing Service Bulletin 757-78-0025, dated
September 9, 1991; Boeing Document D630N002, ``Boeing 757 Dispatch
Deviation Guide,'' Revision 8, dated January 15, 1991; was approved
previously by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51 as of September 16, 1991 (56
FR 46725, September 16, 1991). The incorporation by reference of the
remainder of the service documents listed above is approved by the
Director of Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and
1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207.
Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the
Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700,
Washington, DC.
(j) This amendment becomes effective on March 3, 1994.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 3, 1994.
Darrell M. Pederson,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 94-346 Filed 1-31-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
