[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 27 (Monday, February 10, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 5907-5913]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-3175]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 71
RIN 3150-AF58
Fissile Material Shipments and Exemptions
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its
regulations regarding the shipment of exempt quantities of fissile
material and the shipment of fissile material under a general license.
This emergency final rule restricts the use of beryllium and other
special moderating materials (i.e., graphite and deuterium) in the
shipment of fissile materials and consigns quantity limits on fissile
exempt shipments. These amendments are necessary to correct a recently
discovered defect in the current regulations which could permit, in
special circumstances, nuclear criticality to occur in shipments of
fissile materials which are permitted to take place without specific
Commission approval. The regulatory defect is not indicative of unsafe
fissile material shipments in the past. Rather, it was identified by
Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) during preparation for shipment of an
unprecedented type of fissile material that could result in nuclear
criticality under current requirements. This unique material is
produced as a waste product from processing of strategic material
resulting from operations to commercially downblend weapons-usable
fissile material from the former Soviet Union. Although this rule is
being issued as an immediately effective final rule, the Commission is
requesting public comment and will revise the rule if necessary.
[[Page 5908]]
DATES: This final rule is effective on February 10, 1997. Comments must
be received by March 12, 1997. If public comments require changes in
the rule, timely notice will be published in the Federal Register.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or in
written form. Mail written comments to: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and Service
Branch. Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD
between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. For information on
submitting comments electronically, see the discussion under Electronic
Access in the Supplementary Information Section. Copies of comments
received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Naiem S. Tanious, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6103, E-mail: INTERNET:[email protected]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On September 11, 1996, an NRC fuel cycle facility licensee, Babcock
& Wilcox, Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (B&W), notified NRC by telephone
that it had discovered that the NRC and U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations (10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453,
respectively) on fissile exempt shipments do not provide adequate
criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material \1\
(enriched uranium containing beryllium oxide.) Specifically, B&W
discovered through calculations, that a shipment, intended to be
shipped pursuant to Sec. 71.53(d), containing large amounts of an
exempt concentration of enriched uranium in the presence of beryllium,
could result in a nuclear criticality. \2\ B&W indicated that a
beryllium oxide-enriched uranium mixture would be produced as a waste
product from its processing of strategic material resulting from
operations to commercially downblend weapons-usable fissile material
from the former Soviet Union. B&W promptly notified the NRC of its
concern, provided its calculations to the NRC, and made commitments not
to make any such shipments. The NRC staff subsequently reviewed and
verified B&W's calculations and determined that expeditious revisions
to NRC regulations are needed to correct the deficiency because an
inadvertent nuclear criticality in the public domain could involve
fatalities, health effects from the resulting radiations, and extensive
clean-up costs.
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\1\ Fissile material is defined in 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR
Part 173 as: Plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-
233, uranium-235, or any combination of these radionuclides.
Packages used for shipment of materials containing these
radionuclides must meet specific standards and operating limits
designed to preclude nuclear criticality during transport, unless
expected by specific regulations (e.g. 10 CFR 71.53 or 49 CFR
173.453).
\2\ For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality means a
condition in which an uncontrolled, self-sustaining and neutron-
multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is
generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of
fissile material and neutron moderating material exist together in a
favorable configuration. The neutron moderating material cannot
achieve criticality by itself in any concentration or configuration.
It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve
criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.
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The criticality safety problem brought to NRC's attention with
respect to Sec. 71.53 caused the NRC staff to review 10 CFR Part 71 to
determine whether any other provisions of this Part might be similarly
deficient. The general licenses in Secs. 71.18 and 71.22 provide for
criticality control by limiting the quantity of fissile material in a
single package (i.e., similar to the quantity-based fissile exemptions
in 10 CFR 71.53). Section 71.18 also assigns a criticality transport
index (pursuant to Sec. 71.4) to each package. These sections were
found to have deficiencies comparable to those discovered in Sec. 71.53
in that there are no restrictions placed on special moderating
materials (i.e., materials which would increase the number of neutrons
available to cause fission as compared with ordinary water), and
Sec. 71.22 has the additional deficiency of not limiting the total
amount of fissile material in a conveyance. During the NRC staff's
review, sections Sec. 71.20 and Sec. 71.24, which also provide general
licenses, were found to be adequate in that the moderators of concern
were excluded.
Packages for shipments made in accordance with a fissile material
exemption in Sec. 71.53 or the general license in Sec. 71.18 or
Sec. 71.22, are not required to be certified by NRC. The intent of
Secs. 71.53, 71.18, and 71.22 is that any materials packaged and
shipped in accordance with the limits in these sections (and the other
applicable sections of 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173) are
incapable of an inadvertent criticality. The B&W analyses demonstrated
that a deficiency exists in these requirements.
The NRC has already taken a number of actions to resolve the
potential safety problem identified by B&W. First, the NRC obtained a
commitment from B&W not to ship Be-U materials without prior NRC
authorization and confirmed this commitment in a Confirmatory Action
Letter (CAL) dated October 10, 1996. Subsequently, the CAL was
superseded by an immediately effective Confirmatory Order Modifying
License dated December 16, 1996, which imposed B&W's commitment as a
legally binding license condition. The NRC had no reason to doubt B&W's
earlier voluntary commitment because B&W had demonstrated its concern
for safety by bringing the problem in the first place to the NRC's
attention. However, the NRC staff also believed that, given the
significance of this issue for public health and safety, the NRC needed
to exercise its full authority to assure itself and the public that the
one licensee known to be in a position to make potentially unsafe
shipments was legally prevented from doing so pending completion of
this rulemaking.
On December 5, 1996, NRC also issued NRC Information Notice 96-63
to all NRC licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material.
The purpose of this information notice was to alert all such licensees
to this problem so that any of them who might be in a position to make
potentially unsafe shipments could take appropriate measures.
The NRC also brought this problem to the attention of the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE). DOT is a co-regulator of fissile material shipments and is
currently revising its parallel regulations in 49 CFR Part 173 on an
expedited basis. DOE makes many shipments of fissile exempt material
each year.
Discussion
The safety problem uncovered by the B & W calculations, and
verified by the NRC, involves quantities, geometries, and
concentrations of fissile materials and moderators which could result
in criticality when shipped in compliance with sections of the
regulations for which criticality analyses are not required. The
current regulations (fissile exemptions in Sec. 71.53 and the general
licenses in Secs. 71.18 and 71.22) are based on the assumption that
water is the only moderator which might be present in fissile exempt
shipments. These rules are assumed to provide inherent criticality
safety without a need for shippers to perform separate analyses.
However, some moderators (herein referred to as special moderating
materials) can increase the number of
[[Page 5909]]
neutrons available to cause fission as compared to ordinary water and
result in the potential for criticality in shipments where these
moderators are present, even though the shipments are in compliance
with 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453.
Until recently, the presence of special moderating materials in
significant quantities in NRC-regulated shipments of fissile exempt
materials was not anticipated. However, certain international
initiatives, including efforts of reduction in stockpiles of strategic
material by processing for commercial use, have resulted in the greater
likelihood of inclusion of these materials in NRC regulated shipments.
The materials proposed to be shipped by B&W, which prompted this final
rule, resulted from such a source. A recent contract was awarded to B&W
to process weapons-usable enriched uranium materials from the Republic
of Kazakstan. The waste product of the processing, a uranium-beryllium
filtercake, met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53(d) and
49 CFR 173.453(d). However, B&W used a computer model of the enriched
uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, to demonstrate that if the
packages were loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at the
regulatory fissile exempt concentration limit, adequate confidence in
nuclear criticality safety would not have been provided. NRC has
verified through independent analyses that the concerns raised by the
B&W analysis are valid and apply to other geometries and moderating
characteristics as well. To guard against inadvertent criticality, this
final rule restricts shipments of fissile material with three special
moderating materials: beryllium, graphite, and deuterium.
However, limiting beryllium, graphite, and deuterium to trace
quantities would not completely eliminate the possibility of
criticality in fissile exempt or generally licensed shipments. There is
also a need to limit the quantity of material in a single consignment
(the B&W criticality model calculations were performed using 200 cm
high infinite slab configuration). The problem of a lack of control on
the total amount of fissile exempt material in an exempt shipment, was
originally identified during the revision process for the 1996 Edition
of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) ``Regulations for
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material,'' Safety Series No. 6,
1996. The problem was addressed in Safety Series No. 6, 1996, by
adopting a consignment limit on the amount of fissile exempt material
that a shipper could transport as a private carrier or deliver to a
common carrier for shipment. The NRC cannot presently enforce a limit
on the total quantity of fissile material in a common carrier shipment
because the regulations do not require a transport index for each
package or require shipment by exclusive use. The latter would restrict
the ability to use common carriers, while requiring a transport index
would negate much of the advantage gained by the exemption. Consignment
limits are enforceable and represent a practical operating limit that
would prevent the potentially unsafe accumulation of fissile exempt
materials during shipment.
Therefore, this final rule restricts special moderating materials
and includes consignment limits on shipments of fissile materials under
the provisions of Secs. 71.22 and 71.53. This final rule also restricts
special moderating materials under the provisions of Sec. 71.18.
Together these changes will eliminate the possibility of inadvertent
criticality during shipments made in compliance with 10 CFR 71.18,
71.22, or 71.53. The NRC anticipates that DOT will issue parallel
revisions to 49 CFR Part 173. Accordingly, NRC and DOT are coordinating
the necessary revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR Part 173.
Compatibility With the IAEA Standards
On September 9, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IAEA approved
the 1996 revisions to Safety Series No. 6. Among the changes in these
revised IAEA regulations are that consignment limits and limits on the
types of moderators were placed on the fissile exemptions in paragraph
672 of Safety Series No. 6, 1996. The changes to 10 CFR Part 71 made by
this rulemaking are generally compatible with the changes made to IAEA
Safety Series No. 6, 1996. Future revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 and 49
CFR Part 173 are planned by NRC and DOT, respectively, to bring them
into general accord with other sections of IAEA Safety Series No. 6,
1996.
One area in which this final rule for 10 CFR Part 71 is not
compatible with IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1996, paragraph 672 is that
graphite was added as a special moderating material in the 1995
revisions to 10 CFR Part 71 (60 FR 50248), but does not appear in IAEA
Safety Series No. 6, 1996. [Graphite is limited by the current general
licenses in 10 CFR 71.20 and 71.24.] The NRC believes that it is
appropriate to continue to limit graphite (being a special moderating
material) in domestic regulations for shipment of fissile material.
Therefore, the revisions to the fissile exemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 and
the general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 71.20 provide for exclusion of
other than trace quantities of graphite.
Alternatives Considered
To determine the appropriate amendments to 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and
71.53, the NRC staff considered the following three alternatives:
1. The No-Action Alternative. This alternative is not acceptable to
the NRC. Shipments of fissile material (Be-U mixtures) meeting the
fissile material exemption requirements could be made in a
configuration that does not maintain criticality safety during
transport. Therefore, this alternative was not pursued.
2. Eliminate the fissile material exemption. This alternative is
not acceptable to the NRC. Elimination of fissile material exemption,
while solving the criticality safety problem identified by B&W, would
create other problems. Many packages, such as those containing low-
level radioactive waste materials (e.g., ion-exchange resins), contain
only trace concentrations of fissile nuclides, which are incidental to
the overall radioactivity of the package contents, and criticality
events are not credible for shipments of these packages. The Sec. 71.53
fissile material exemptions are applied for these shipments, and there
is a continuing need to provide for this application. Elimination of
Sec. 71.53 would place an additional burden and cost on many shippers
whose shipments posed no criticality safety concerns. Therefore, this
alternative was not pursued.
3. Revise the fissile material exemptions in Sec. 71.53 and the
general licensees in Secs. 71.18 and 71.22 to exclude the presence of
special moderating materials such as beryllium, deuterium and graphite
in other than trace quantities, and place consignment limits on
shipments. Together these changes solve the criticality safety problem
identified by B&W and the related problem of the potential accumulation
of an unsafe quantity of fissile materials in a shipment. Given the
limited number of affected shipments and the small number of licensees
involved, some additional costs on shippers may be expected because
they can no longer use the fissile material exemptions and general
licenses for materials with beryllium, deuterium and graphite in other
than trace quantities, and because some shipments may have to be
divided to meet the consignment limits. It keeps the exemption and
general license provisions available for other shippers.
[[Page 5910]]
This alternative was chosen by the NRC staff, and is the basis for the
following specific changes in Secs. 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53.
Changes in 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22, and 71.53
Section 71.18
The title of Sec. 71.18: General license: Fissile material, limited
quantity per package, remains the same. Also paragraphs (a), (b), and
(c) in Sec. 71.18 remain the same. The old paragraph (d) in Sec. 71.18
is replaced by three new paragraphs: (d), (e), and (f). The new
paragraph (d) covers general licenses for packages containing no more
than a type A quantity of radioactive material where fissile material
is mixed with substances having an average hydrogen density greater
than water (defined in Sec. 71.20). The new paragraph (e) restricts the
quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched in
deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile material
mass. The new paragraph (f) is a modification of the old paragraph (d)
that includes a simplified formula for calculation of the minimum
transport index.
Section 71.22
The title of Sec. 71.22: General License: Fissile material, limited
quantity, controlled shipment, remains the same. Also paragraphs (a),
(b), and (c) in Sec. 71.22 remain the same. The old paragraph (d) is
modified with the addition of a new table and accompanying formula
which restrict the mass of uranium-235 and other fissile material in a
controlled shipment. The table gives both new limits of 290 g and 180 g
for uranium-235 and other fissile materials, when these materials are
mixed with substances having hydrogen density greater than water; the
table also gives the old Sec. 71.22 limits for shipments of U-235 and
other fissile material when mixed with substances having a hydrogen
density less than or equal to water. The new paragraph (e) restricts
the quantity of beryllium, graphite, or hydrogenous material enriched
in deuterium in a package to no greater than 0.1% of the fissile
material mass. Paragraph (f) is the same as old paragraph (e).
Section 71.53
The title of Sec. 71.53 remains the same. The introductory
paragraph restates the old Sec. 71.53 language that packages are
exempted from the fissile material standards of Sec. 71.55 and
Sec. 71.59; however, the same paragraph restricts these exempted
packages to only situations when beryllium, graphite, or deuterium is
not present in quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.
A new paragraph (a) is added which contains a formula and an
accompanying table to limit individual consignment, but also includes
the requirements in old paragraphs (a), (b)(1) and (2), and (d) . The
remainder of Sec. 71.53 (paragraphs (b), (c), and (d)) is essentially
the same as the old Sec. 71.53 (paragraphs (c), (f), and (e)).
Good Cause for Immediate Adoption
The Commission is promulgating this emergency final rule because
the problem of regulatory safety limits over quantities and
concentrations of fissile material and moderators, which has been
demonstrated to permit criticality in at least one proposed shipment,
is an important safety issue meriting immediate corrective action. An
accidental nuclear criticality in the public domain would very likely
involve fatalities, health effects from the resulting radiations, and
extensive clean-up costs.
Shipments of fissile exempt material are normally made without any
associated criticality analysis because in the past it has been assumed
that the regulations provide inherent criticality safety. However,
B&W's contemplated shipment demonstrates that this assumption is not
correct for all possible types of shipments. While the Commission
expects that B&W's commitment, as expressed in the NRC's Confirmatory
Order, not to undertake shipments without the prior approval of the
NRC, and the Information Notice issued to all licensees authorized to
possess special nuclear material, will prevent an unsafe shipment from
occurring pending revision of its rules, the Commission does not track
shipments by licensees made under the provisions of 10 CFR 71.18,
71.22, or 71.53. Moreover, the nature of the materials being imported
and shipped domestically has recently changed due to initiatives with
the States of the former Soviet Union to reduce weapons-usable material
such as high-enriched uranium. The materials B&W had intended to ship
were byproducts from processing this type of material. Shipments made
under 10 CFR 71.18, 71.22 or 71.53 are made without specific NRC
approval and the possibility exists that a licensee could unwittingly
make an unsafe shipment in reliance upon the present rules. Thus, the
Commission must amend its rules quickly to prevent unsafe shipments
from occurring.
For the reasons stated above, the Commission finds good cause,
pursuant to Section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
(5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B)), to dispense with notice and prepromulgation
public comment as being impracticable and contrary to the public
interest. Further, the Commission finds, pursuant to Section 553(d)(3)
of the APA (5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3)), that good cause exists for making
these amendments immediately effective because the need to have these
regulations in place outweighs the inconvenience, if any, to licensees
who may need to alter shipping plans.
Nevertheless, the Commission is providing a 30-day post-
promulgation public comment period during which interested persons are
invited to submit their comments to the Commission. Within a reasonable
time after the end of the comment period, the Commission will publish a
statement in the Federal Register containing an evaluation of the
significant comments received and any revisions of the rule to be made
as a result of the comments.
Electronic Access
Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or
WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly
available communications software packages, or directly via Internet.
Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as
practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking
subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free
number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set
as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1).
Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem
can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the
``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's
Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also
have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the
particular subsystem.
The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial
phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using
Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact
FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld
menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State
Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that
point, a menu will be
[[Page 5911]]
displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission''
that will take you to the NRC Online main menu. The NRC Online area
also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc'' at a FedWorld
command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main menu, you may
return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to FedWorld'' option from
the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access NRC at FedWorld by
using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full access to all NRC
systems, but you will not have access to the main FedWorld system.
If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and
menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download
documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or
upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files
can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you
will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).
An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with
descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP
access.
Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web,
like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does
not display the NRC Rules Menu.
For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis,
Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD3@nrc.gov.
Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined, under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
and therefore an environmental impact statement (EIS) is not required.
The Commission's ``Final Environmental Statement on the
Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes,'' NUREG-
0170, dated December 1977, is NRC's generic EIS, covering all types of
radioactive material transportation by all modes (road, rail, air, and
water). The total limited quantity impacts were included in the overall
transportation risk assessment in NUREG-0170 and found to be
acceptable. The radiological safety impact estimates in this EIS
clearly bound the impacts for limited quantity shipments of fissile
material containing special moderating materials.
This final rule affects only a small subset of the limited quantity
shipments, i.e., those that contain both fissile material and special
moderating materials. NUREG-0170 does not specify the annual number of
limited quantity, fissile material shipments containing special
moderating materials, but does estimate that 50,000 NRC-certified
fissile material packages (used for larger quantities of, and/or more
highly enriched, fissile materials) would be shipped in 1985. The
number of shipments affected by this final rule is a small fraction of
the NRC certified fissile package shipments because fissile materials
containing special moderating materials are less common than moderately
enriched fissile materials.
The options available to licensees under this final rule include
shipping the material using different administrative controls (i.e.,
shipping it as a fissile material and not using the quantity-limited
exemption/general license) or reducing the special moderating material
concentration to specified limits. The NRC staff believes the first
option may prove more economical because the increase in cost in making
a single shipment under fissile material controls is less than that
involved in reducing or removing the special moderating material. Under
this option, the same number of shipments are made as before the rule
change, but shipments of fissile materials containing special
moderating material would be made in NRC certified packages. Under the
latter option, the concentration of special moderating material might
be reduced through additional processing, perhaps involving dilution or
extraction. This option may involve additional transportation, either
due to the increase in shipment volume due to dilution, or the
transportation of extracted materials. Since the quantities of affected
fissile materials are relatively small, staff believes the additional
transportation would also be small.
The two options provide the added nuclear criticality safety
control the rule seeks, either through the use of NRC-certified
packages, and the administrative controls associated with their use, or
through the reduction of the concentration of special moderating
materials to an acceptably low level. Thus, the ultimate environmental
impact of the rule is beneficial in that criticality safety is
increased.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule does not contain a new or amended information
collection requirement subject to requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing information
collection requirements were approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, approval number 3150-0008.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has determined that this action is not a
major rule and has verified this determination with the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.
Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that a backfit analysis is not required for
this final rule because these amendments do not involve any provisions
that would require backfits as defined in 10 CFR Part 50.109(a)(1).
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71
Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear
materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting
the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.
PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2201,
2232, 2233, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242,
as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
Section 71.97 also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94
Stat. 789-790.
2. Section 71.18 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 71.18 General license: Fissile material, limited quantity per
package.
(a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the Commission
to transport
[[Page 5912]]
fissile material, or to deliver fissile material to a carrier for
transport, without complying with the package standards of subparts E
and F of this part, if the material is shipped in accordance with this
section.
(b) The general license applies only to a licensee who has a
quality assurance program approved by the Commission as satisfying the
provisions of subpart H of this part.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, this
general license applies only when a package contains no more than a
Type A quantity of radioactive material, including only one of the
following:
(1) Up to 40 g of uranium-235;
(2) Up to 30 g of uranium-233;
(3) Up to 25 g of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium, except
that for encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special
form, an A1 quantity of plutonium may be present; or
(4) A combination of fissile radionuclides in which the sum of the
ratios of the amount of each radionuclide to the corresponding maximum
amounts in paragraphs (c) (1), (2), and (3) of this section does not
exceed unity.
(d) For packages where fissile material is mixed with substances
having an average hydrogen density greater than water, this general
license applies only when a package contains no more than a Type A
quantity of radioactive material, including only one of the following:
(1) Up to 29 g of uranium-235;
(2) Up to 18 g of uranium-233;
(3) Up to 18 g of fissile radionuclides of plutonium, or
(4) A combination of fissile radionuclides in which the sum of the
ratios of the amount of each radionuclide to the corresponding maximum
amounts in paragraphs (d) (1), (2), and (3) of this section does not
exceed unity.
(e) Except for the beryllium contained within the special form
plutonium-beryllium sources authorized in paragraph (c) of this
section, this general license applies only when beryllium, graphite, or
hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present in quantities
exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.
(f)(1) Except as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this section for
encapsulated plutonium-beryllium sources, this general license applies
only when, a package is labeled with a transport index not less than
the number given by the following equation, where the package contains
x grams of uranium-235, y grams of uranium-233, and z grams of the
fissile radionuclides of plutonium:
Minimum Transport Index = (0.25x + 0.33y + 0.4z).
(2) For a package in which the only fissile material is in the form
of encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special form,
the transport index based on criticality considerations may be taken as
0.025 times the number of grams of the fissile radionuclides of
plutonium.
(3) Packages which have a transport index greater than 10 are not
authorized under the general license provisions of this part.
3. Section 71.22 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 71.22 General license: Fissile material, limited quantity,
controlled shipment.
(a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the Commission
to transport fissile material, or to deliver fissile material to a
carrier for transport, without complying with the package standards of
Subparts E and F of this part, if limited material is shipped in
accordance with this section.
(b) The general license applies only to a licensee who has a
quality assurance program approved by the Commission as satisfying the
provisions of Subpart H of this part.
(c) This general license applies only when a package contains no
more than a Type A quantity of radioactive material and no more than
400 g total of the fissile radionuclides of plutonium encapsulated as
plutonium-beryllium neutron sources in special form.
(d) This general license applies only when:
(1) The mass of fissile radionuclides in the shipment is limited
such that the
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10FE97.000
where X and Y are the mass defined in the table following paragraph
(d)(2) of this section; or
(2) the encapsulated plutonium-beryllium neutron sources are in
special form and the total mass of fissile radionuclides in the
shipment does not exceed 2500 g.
Permissible Mass Limits for Shipments of Fissile Material
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fissile Fissile
material mass material mass
(g) mixed with (g) mixed with
substances substances
Fissile material having a having a
hydrogen hydrogen
density less density
than or equal greater than
to water water
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium-235(X).......................... 500 290
Other fissile material(Y)............... 300 180
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Except for the beryllium contained within the special form
plutonium-beryllium sources authorized in paragraphs (c) and (d) of
this section, this general license applies only when beryllium,
graphite or hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present
in quantities exceeding 0.1% of the fissile material mass.
(f) This general license applies only when shipment of these
packages is made under procedures specifically authorized by DOT, in
accordance with 49 CFR Part 173 of its regulations, to prevent loading,
transport, or storage of these packages with other fissile material
shipments.
[[Page 5913]]
4. Section 71.53 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 71.53 Fissile material exemptions.
Fissile materials meeting the requirements of one of the paragraphs
in (a) through (d) of this section are exempt from fissile material
classification and from the fissile material package standards of
Secs. 71.55 and 71.59, but are subject to all other requirements of
this part. These exemptions apply only when beryllium, graphite, or
hydrogenous material enriched in deuterium is not present in quantities
exceeding 0.1 percent of the fissile material mass.
(a) Fissile material such that
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR10FE97.001
for an individual consignment, where X and Y are the mass limits
defined in table following paragraph (a)(3) of this section,
provided that:
(1) Each package contains no more than 15 g of fissile material.
For unpackaged material the mass limit of 15g applies to the
conveyance; or
(2) The fissile material consists of a homogeneous hydrogenous
solution or mixture where the minimum ratio of hydrogen atoms to
fissile radionuclide atoms (H/X) is 5200 and the maximum concentration
of fissile radionuclides within a package is 5 g/liter; or
(3) There is no more than 5g of fissile material in any 10 liter
volume of material and the material is packaged so as to maintain this
limit of fissile radionuclide concentration during normal transport.
The Requirements for Packages Containing Fissile Material
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fissile Fissile
material mass material mass
(g) mixed with (g) mixed with
substances substances
having an having an
Fissile material average average
hydrogen hydrogen
density less density
than or equal greater than
to water water
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uranium-235(X).......................... 400 290
1Other fissile material(Y).............. 250 180
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Uranium enriched in uranium-235 to a maximum of 1 percent by
weight, and with total plutonium and uranium-233 content of up to 1
percent of the mass of uranium-235, provided that the fissile material
is distributed homogeneously throughout the package contents and does
not form a lattice arrangement within the package.
(c) Liquid solutions of uranyl nitrate enriched in uranium-235 to a
maximum of 2 percent by weight, with a total plutonium and uranium-233
content not exceeding 0.1 percent of the mass of uranium-235, and with
a minimum nitrogen to uranium atomic ratio (N/U) of 2.
(d) Plutonium, less than 1 kg, of which not more than 20 percent by
mass may consist of plutonium-239, plutonium-241, or any combination of
these radionuclides.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of February, 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 97-3175 Filed 2-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7950-01-P
