99-2715. United States v. Halliburton Company; Public Comment and Plaintiff's Response  

  • [Federal Register Volume 64, Number 29 (Friday, February 12, 1999)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 7208-7210]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 99-2715]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
    
    Antitrust Division
    [Civil No. 98-CV-2340 (TPJ)]
    
    
    United States v. Halliburton Company; Public Comment and 
    Plaintiff's Response
    
        Pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
    16(b)-(h), the United States of America hereby publishes below the 
    comment received on the proposed Final Judgment in United States v. 
    Halliburton Company, et al., Civil No. 98-CV-2340 (TPJ), filed in the 
    United States District Court for the District of Columbia, together 
    with the United States' response to the comment.
        Copies of the comment and response are available for inspection in 
    Room 215 of the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 
    Seventeh Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202/514-2481) 
    and at the office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for 
    the District of Columbia, 333 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC 
    20001. Copies of these materials may be obtained upon request and 
    payment of a copying fee.
    Constance K. Robinson,
    Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
    
    Plaintiff's Response to Public Comment
    
        Pursuant to the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and 
    Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 16(b)-(h) (1997) (``Tunney Act''), the 
    United States hereby responds to the single public comment received 
    regarding the proposed Final Judgment in this case.
    
    I. Background
    
        On September 29, 1998, the United States Department of Justice 
    (``the Department'') filed the Complaint in this matter. The Complaint 
    alleges that the proposed merger of Halliburton Company 
    (``Halliburton'') and Dresser Industries, Inc. (``Dresser'') would 
    combine two of only four companies that provide logging-while-drilling 
    (``LWD'') tools and services for oil and natural gas drilling and are 
    the only sources of current and likely future innovations in new or 
    improved LWD tools. LWD tools provide data during drilling for oil on 
    the type of formation being drilled, whether there is oil in the 
    formation, and the ease with which the oil can be extracted from the 
    formation. LWD tools are mounted on the drill string and measure and 
    transmit data while the drilling is ongoing that allow the drillers to 
    determine if changes should be made in the drilling. Also mounted on 
    the drill string with LWD tools are measurement-while-drilling 
    (``MWD'') tools. MWD tools measure and transmit data while the drilling 
    is ongoing about the direction and angle of the drill bit. Because it 
    is necessary that LWD tools and MWD tools be compatible, customers who 
    want to use both types of tools on a particular drilling project 
    usually obtain them from the same company. The proposed merger would 
    reduce competition and likely lead to higher prices for LWD services, 
    reduce LWD service quality, and slow the pace of LWD-related 
    innovation, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
    18 (1997).
        Simultaneously with the filing of the Complaint, the Plaintiff 
    filed the
    
    [[Page 7209]]
    
    proposed Final Judgment and a Stipulation and Order signed by all the 
    parties that allows for entry of the Final Judgment following 
    compliance with the Tunney Act. A Competitive Impact Statement 
    (``CIS'') was also filed, and subsequently published in the Federal 
    Register on November 2, 1998. The CIS explains in detail the provisions 
    of the proposed Final Judgment, the nature and purposes of these 
    proceeding, and the transaction giving rise to the alleged violation.
        To prevent the competitive harm, the proposed Final Judgment 
    requires the defendants to divest Halliburton's worldwide LWD business, 
    including virtually all of Halliburton's LWD tools, enough of its MWD 
    tools for use with the LWD tools, manufacturing, workshop, and testing 
    and repair equipment, a U.S. facility, the right to hire employees of 
    the LWD business, and worldwide, royalty-free, irrevocable licenses to 
    the intellectual property used in connection with the use, manufacture 
    or sale of the transferred tools.
        The sixty-day comment period for public comments expired on January 
    1, 1999. The Department received only one comment.\1\ The comment was 
    prepared by Mr. Geoffrey A. Mantooth, an attorney, on behalf of his 
    client, Mr. Serge A. Scherbatskoy.
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        \1\ The comment is attached. The Department plans to publish 
    promptly the comment and this response in the Federal Register. The 
    Department will provide the Court with a certificate of compliance 
    with the requirements of the Tunney Act and file a motion for entry 
    of the Final Judgment once publication takes place.
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    II. Response to the Public Comment
    
        Mr. Mantooth observes that the proposed Final Judgment ``attempts 
    to distinguish between `LWD Service' and `MWD Services,' and allows 
    Halliburton to keep some of its MWD Services.'' Mr. Mantooth then 
    states that the proposed Final Judgment ``does not give any basis or 
    reason for the definitions of LWD and MWD. The distinction between LWD 
    and MWD appears to arbitrary and without merit.'' Mr. Mantooth 
    continues by citing classifications of LWD and MWD tools that appear in 
    Schedule A of the proposed Final Judgment, contrasting these 
    classifications with descriptions appearing in an industry trade 
    journal (copy attached to his comment), and concluding that in that 
    particular journal ``the distinction between LWD and MWD is clearly 
    blurred.'' Mr. Mantooth ends his letter with a request for ``a more 
    realistic definition'' of LWD Services. He provides no suggestions for 
    doing so.
        Mr. Mantooth's comment appears to be arguing either that the 
    Department should have alleged a broader market and required 
    divestiture of more MWD assets, or that the proposed Final Judgment's 
    description of the divestiture assets is not sufficiently specific or 
    clear. Neither argument is adequate to support a conclusion that the 
    public interest would not be served by entry of the proposed Final 
    Judgment.
        The Department defined the product market as LWD services for 
    offshore drilling projects. This definition, which excluded MWD 
    services, was based on investigation and analysis, using judicial 
    precedent and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the 
    Department and the Federal Trade Commission. As is set forth in 
    paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Complaint, MWD tools and LWD tools provide 
    different measurements--the former measure the direction and angle of 
    the drill bit, while the latter evaluate the formation through which 
    the drill bit is cutting. Many drillers purchase only MWD services, and 
    there are a number of firms that provide MWD services that do not 
    supply LWD services. While the component used to transmit data from MWD 
    tools does share characteristics with the component used to transmit 
    data from LWD tools, the tools themselves are distinct. Mr. Mantooth's 
    attachment to his letter focuses on the data transmission components, 
    not on the tools.\2\
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        \2\ While Mr. Mantooth may believe the Department should have 
    alleged a broader product market, the public interest standard set 
    forth in the Tunney Act does not extend ``to evaluate claims that 
    the government did not make and to inquire as to why they were not 
    made.'' United States v Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1459 (D.C. 
    Cir. 1995); see also United States v Associated Milk Producers, 
    Inc., 534 F.2d 113, 117-18 (8th Cir. 1976). Mr. Mantooth's comment, 
    to the extend it challenges the Department's product market, does 
    not therefore provide a reason to find that the proposed Final 
    Judgement fails to satisfy the public interest.
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        Mr. Mantooth may not intend to disagree with the Department's 
    product market, but simply expressing a concern that there is 
    insufficient specificity in the description of the divestiture assets. 
    The Department believes that such a concern is unwarranted. Although 
    there are similarities in the two pieces of equipment cited in the 
    attachment to Mr. Mantooth's comment, the Department believes the list 
    of tools in Schedule A to the proposed Final Judgment is sufficiently 
    specific. HDS1, which is used to transmit data from MWD tools, and 
    HDSM, which is used to transmit data from LWD tools, are distinct 
    products. The Department is confident that prospective purchasers will 
    be able to get the equipment contemplated by the proposed Final 
    Judgment, and that the Department will be able to ensure that its 
    contemplated remedy is effected.
    
    III. Conclusion
    
        After careful consideration of the comment, the Plaintiff concludes 
    that Mr. Mantooth's comment does not change its determination that 
    entry of the proposed Final Judgment will provide an effective and 
    appropriate remedy for the antitrust violation alleged in the Complaint 
    and is in the public interest. The Plaintiff will move the Court to 
    enter the proposed Final Judgment after the public comment and this 
    Response has been published in the Federal Register, as 15 U.S.C. 16(d) 
    requires.
    
        Dated this 27th day of January, 1999.
    
            Respectively submitted,
    Angela L. Hughes,
    Member of The Florida Bar, #211052.
    
    Robert L. McGeorge,
    Joan H. Hogan,
    Andrew K. Rosa,
    Salvatore Massa,
    U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7ty Street, NW, 
    Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-6351.
    
    Wofford, Zobal & Mantooth
    
    Patent Attorneys
    
    110 West Seventh, Suite 500, Fort Worth, Texas 76102
    
    December 29, 1998.
    Via Federal Express
    
    Mr. Roger W. Fones,
    Chief, Transportation, Energy and Agricultural Section, Antitrust 
    Division, 325 Seventh Street, N.W., Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 
    20530
    
    Re: United States v. Halliburton Company, Case No. 98-CV-2340
    
        Dear Mr. Fones: Pursuant to the invitation in the Federal 
    Register of November 2, 1998, (Volume 63, Number 211), the following 
    is a comment on the subject case:
        The proposed final judgment attempts to distinguish between 
    ``LWD Services'' and ``MWD Services'', and allows Halliburton to 
    keep some of its MWD Services.
        Yet, the proposed final judgment does not give any basis or 
    reason for the definitions of LWD and MWD. The distinction between 
    LWD and MWD appears to be arbitrary and without merit. For example, 
    in Schedule A of the proposed final judgment, LWD includes CWRGM 
    Resistivity, DNSC Density, and SCWR Slim Resistivity Tool, while MWD 
    includes HDSM Directional Tool, HDS1 MWD Kits, and RX4 MLWD Surface 
    System. In the May 1998 issue of Hart's Petroleum Engineer 
    International, page 17 (copy enclosed), the distinction between LWD 
    and MWD is clearly blurred.
        The undersigned would appreciate a more realistic definition of 
    LWD services. If there
    
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    are any questions, please do not hesitate to call.
    
            Very Truly Yours,
    Geoffrey A. Mantooth,
    Attorney for Serge A. Scherbatskoy.
    
    cc: United States District of Columbia (w/enclose)
    
        The MWD Comparison Tables which is the enclosure to the letter sent 
    by Geoffrey A. Mantooth of Wofford, Zobal & Mantooth can be obtained 
    from the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 7th 
    Street, Room 215, Washington, D.C. 20530 (202/514-2481) or the United 
    States District Court, District of Columbia.
    
    Certificate of Service
    
        I hereby certify that I have caused a copy of the foregoing 
    Plaintiff's Response to Public Comments, as well as the attached copy 
    of the public comment received from Geoffrey A. Mantooth on behalf of 
    Serge A. Scherbatskoy, to be served on counsel for Defendants in this 
    matter by facsimile and first class mail, postage prepaid, at the 
    addresses set forth below.
        Counsel for Defendant Halliburton Company:
    Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Esquire,
    Vinson & Elkins, 1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 
    20004-1008, Telephone: (202) 639-6580, Facsimile: (202) 639-6604.
    
        Counsel for Defendant Dresser Industries, Inc.:
    Helen D. Jaffe, Esquire,
    Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10153, 
    Telephone: (212) 310-8572, Facsimile: (212) 310-8007.
    
        Dated: January 27, 1999.
    Angela L. Hughes,
    [FR Doc. 99-2715 Filed 2-10-99; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
02/12/1999
Department:
Antitrust Division
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
99-2715
Pages:
7208-7210 (3 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Civil No. 98-CV-2340 (TPJ)
PDF File:
99-2715.pdf