[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 34 (Thursday, February 20, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 7721-7725]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4219]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
RIN 3150-AF53
Changes to Nuclear Power Plant Security Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise
its regulations to delete certain security requirements associated with
an internal threat. This action follows reconsideration by the NRC of
nuclear power plant physical security requirements to identify those
requirements that are marginal to safety, redundant, or no longer
effective. This action would reduce the regulatory burden on licensees
without compromising physical protection against radiological sabotage
required for public health and safety.
DATES: Submit comments by May 6, 1997. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission
is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before
this date.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be sent to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Docketing and Service
Branch.
Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,
between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
For information on submitting comments electronically, see the
discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information
Section.
Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments
received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L
Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also
be viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin
Board established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under
Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information Section.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Sandra Frattali, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-6261, e-mail sdf@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In a memorandum dated September 3, 1991 (COMFR-91-005), the
Commission requested the NRC staff to re-examine the security
requirements associated with an internal threat to nuclear power plants
that are contained in 10 CFR Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants
and Materials.'' The NRC staff completed its re-examination and
recommended some changes in 10 CFR Part 73 to the Commission (SECY-92-
272, August 4, 1992). In a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated November
5, 1992, the Commission directed the NRC staff to work with the Nuclear
Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) now known as the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI). Following three public meetings with NUMARC,
the NRC staff recommended to the Commission (SECY-93-326, December 2,
1993) additional changes to
[[Page 7722]]
Part 73 that would provide significant relief to licensees without
compromising the physical security of the plants. In a Staff
Requirements Memorandum dated February 18, 1994, the Commission
directed the NRC staff to proceed with a rulemaking.
Discussion
Seven areas in Part 73 were identified as candidates for
modification through rulemaking. One of the recommended changes,
relating to access of personnel and materials into reactor containments
during periods of high traffic, has been addressed by a separate
rulemaking. This recommended change was adopted in a final rule
published on September 7, 1995 (60 FR 46497). Six other changes
originally considered for this rulemaking were the subject of Generic
Letter 96-02 issued February 13, 1996. This generic letter identified
certain areas in which licensees might choose to revise their physical
security plans without having to wait for issuance of the rule plan.
One of these (discussed in detail later), an option to leave vital area
doors unlocked provided certain compensatory measures are taken, has
been reconsidered in light of recent tampering events. Consequently,
that change is not being proposed in this rulemaking.
The five remaining changes being addressed in this proposed
rulemaking are as follows:
1. Search requirements for on-duty guards, Sec. 73.55(d)(1);
2. Requirements for vehicle escort, Sec. 73.55(d)(4);
3. Control of contractor employee badges, Sec. 73.55(d)(5);
4. Maintenance of access lists for each vital area,
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A); and
5. Key controls for vital areas, Sec. 73.55(d)(8).
1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (Sec. 73.55(d)(1)).
Under current regulations, armed security guards who leave the
protected area as part of their duties must be searched for firearms,
explosives, and incendiary devices upon re-entry into the protected
area. Requiring a guard to go through an explosives detector or
searching packages carried by the guard protects against the
introduction of contraband. Because an armed guard carries a weapon on
site, passage of the guard through the metal detector, the principal
purpose of which is to detect firearms, serves little purpose. The
guard has to either remove the weapon while passing through the
detector or be subject to a hand search. Either approach makes little
sense for the guard who is authorized to carry a weapon on site.
Further, removing and handling the guard's weapon could present a
personnel safety risk.
This proposed rule would allow armed security guards who are on
duty and have exited the protected area on official business to reenter
the protected area without being searched for firearms (by a metal
detector). Unarmed guards and watchpersons would continue to meet all
search requirements. All guards would continue to be searched for
explosives and incendiary devices because they are not permitted to
carry these devices into the plant.
2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort Sec. (73.55(d)(4)).
The present requirement for a searched, licensee-owned vehicle
within the protected area to be escorted by a member of the security
organization, even when the driver is badged for unescorted access,
does not contribute significantly to the security of the plant. Under
the current regulations, all vehicles must be searched prior to entry
into the protected area except under emergency conditions. Further, all
vehicles must be escorted by a member of the security organization upon
entry into the protected area except for ``designated licensee
vehicles.'' Designated licensee vehicles are those vehicles that are
limited in their use to onsite plant functions and remain in the
protected area except for operational, maintenance, repair, security,
and emergency purposes. Under this requirement, those licensee-owned
vehicles that are not ``designated licensee vehicles'' must be escorted
at all times while in the protected area even when they are driven by
personnel with unescorted access.
This proposed rule would eliminate the requirement for escort of
licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area for work-related
purposes provided that these vehicles are driven by licensee employees
who have unescorted access. (This amendment would still preclude
periodic entry of a delivery truck without an escort.) This change
would provide burden relief to licensees without significantly
increasing the level of risk to the plant.
3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges (Sec. 73.55(d)(5)).
Contractor employees with unescorted access are required to return
their badges when leaving the protected area. Current regulatory
practice allows licensee employees to leave the protected area with
their badges if adequate safeguards are in place to ensure that the
security of the badge is not jeopardized. Because contractors and
licensees are subject to the same programs required for unescorted
access, there is no reason to employ more stringent badge control
requirements for contractor employees.
This proposed rule would allow contractor employees to take their
badges offsite under the same conditions that apply to licensee
employees.
4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area
(Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).
Maintaining separate access lists for each vital area and
reapproval of these lists on a monthly basis is of marginal value. At
many sites, persons granted access to one vital area also have access
to most or all vital areas. Therefore, licensees presently derive
little additional benefit from maintaining discrete lists of
individuals allowed access to each separate vital area in the facility.
Also, licensee managers or supervisors are required to update the
access lists at least once every 31 days to add or delete individuals
from these lists when appropriate. There is also a requirement to
reapprove the list every 31 days. However, reapproval of all
individuals on the lists at least every 31 days, to validate that the
lists have been maintained in an accurate manner is unnecessarily
burdensome.
This rulemaking would replace separate access authorization lists
for each vital area of the facility by a single listing of all persons
who have access to any vital area.
The proposed rulemaking would also change the requirement that the
list must be reapproved at least once every 31 days to quarterly. The
reapproval consists of a review to ensure that the list is current and
that only those individuals requiring routine access to a vital area
are included. Because of the requirement for a manager or supervisor to
update the list at least every 31 days, conducting this comprehensive
reapproval every 31 days is of marginal value. Comments from the public
are requested on the question of the benefits of separating the update
and reapproval requirements.
5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (Sec. 73.55(d)(8)).
Under current regulations, licensees change or rotate all keys,
locks, combinations, and related access control devices at least once
every twelve months. Because the rule also requires that these be
changed whenever there is a possibility of their being compromised,
requiring change at least every 12 months has been determined
[[Page 7723]]
by the NRC to be only marginal to security.
This proposed rule would remove the requirement for change every 12
months while retaining the requirement for changing for cause, when an
access control device has been compromised or there is a suspicion that
it may be compromised.
Locking of Vital Areas
As noted earlier, Generic Letter 96-02, described, among other
things, conditions under which licensees could leave vital areas
unlocked. Specifically, to leave a vital area unlocked, the licensee
would have had to ensure that the area is equipped with an alarmed
access control system that will alarm on unauthorized entry; ensure
that the doors to the area can be locked remotely; continue to maintain
a record of personnel access; to examine for explosives, with equipment
specifically designed for that purpose, all hand-carried packages
entering any protected area within which there is an unlocked vital
area; and to demonstrate a capability to protect against an external
adversary.1 This change was considered for inclusion in this
rulemaking but as a result of recent events, it has been rejected. If
vital areas are unlocked but alarmed, the response to an entry by an
unauthorized individual could require a considerable time and level of
effort to assure that important equipment was not damaged. Maintaining
VA doors locked limits the number of people who have access to the area
and ensures that personnel who enter are identified.
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\1\ Generic Letter 96-02 (February 13, 1996) identified those
areas in which licensees might choose to revise their security plans
without having to wait for the issuance of the rule changes. One
change would have provided the option of not locking the doors to a
vital area provided that the security of the plant would not be
compromised.
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In July and August of this year, tampering events were discovered
within vital areas of a reactor. The first search missed significant
tampering with safety-related switches. If vital areas are unlocked but
alarmed, an entry by an unauthorized individual, deliberate or
inadvertent, could require a considerable level of effort to assure
that important equipment was not damaged. It is also uncertain that
such alarms would always initiate the level of response needed to
evaluate the safety systems within the impacted vital area. In
addition, most safety equipment is automatic and rapid access to vital
areas is generally not required. Thus, this option of leaving a vital
area unlocked is no longer being considered.
Electronic Access
Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or
WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly
available communications software packages, or directly via Internet.
Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as
practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking
subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free
number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set
as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1).
Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem
can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the
``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's
Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also
have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the
particular subsystem.
The NRC subsystem on FedWorld can also be accessed by a direct dial
phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using
Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact
FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld
menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State
Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that
point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu.
The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc''
at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main
menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to
FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access
NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full
access to all NRC systems but you will not have access to the main
FedWorld system.
If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and
menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download
documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or
upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files
can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you
will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).
An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with
descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP
access.
Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web,
like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does
not display the NRC Rules Menu.
For more information on NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur Davis,
Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD3@nrc.gov.
Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion
The Commission has determined that this proposed rule is the type
of action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR
51.22(c)(3)(i). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement
nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this proposed
rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that
are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.). This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements.
Because the rule will reduce existing information collection
requirements, the public burden for this collection of information is
expected to be decreased by 102 hours per licensee. This reduction
includes the time required for reviewing instructions, searching
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and
completing and reviewing the collection of information. The NRC is
seeking public comment on the potential impact of the collection of
information contained in the proposed rule and on the following issues:
1. Is the proposed collection of information necessary for the
proper performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility?
2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected?
4. How can the burden of the collection of information be
minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques?
Send comments on any aspect of this proposed collection of
information, including suggestions for further reducing the burden, to
the Information
[[Page 7724]]
and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail
at [email protected]; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002), Office of Management and
Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Comments to OMB on the collections of information or on the above
issues should be submitted by March 24, 1997. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance
of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
Regulatory Analysis
A discussion of each of the five changes proposed in this rule is
provided in the supplementary information section. The costs and
benefits for each of the changes proposed in this rulemaking are as
follows:
1. Search Requirements for On-duty Guards (Sec. 73.55(d)(1)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by eliminating
unnecessary weapon searches of guards who are already allowed to carry
a weapon, which would result in better utilization of licensee
resources. There would be no reduction in plant security because the
potential for reduction in security personnel hours does not impact the
total size of the security force. Further, the potential safety risk to
personnel caused by removing and handling a guard's weapon would be
eliminated.
2. Requirements for Vehicle Escort (73.55(d)(4)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by requiring
fewer vehicle escorts which would allow personnel to be utilized more
effectively. Resources could be redirected to areas in which they would
be more cost effective. The decrease in security would be marginal
because unescorted access would be restricted to vehicles owned by the
licensee and driven by licensee employees with unescorted access.
Assuming the number of entries by licensee-owned vehicles driven by
personnel having unescorted access is 10-per-day per-site, the average
time needed for escort is 3 hours, and the cost per hour for security
personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough estimate of the potential savings
per site per year is about $330,000 (10 escorts/day/site x 365 days/
year x 3 hrs/escort x $30/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the
industry per year would be approximately $24,000,000.
3. Control of Contractor Employee Badges (Sec. 73.55(d)(5)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced by more
effective use of security personnel, who would no longer be needed to
handle badges for contractor personnel who have unescorted access.
There would be no reduction in plant security because adequate
safeguards would be in place to ensure that the security of the badge
is not jeopardized.
Assuming that one security person per working day (8 hours) is
relieved from the duties of controlling contractor employees badges and
that the cost per hour for security personnel is $30 (loaded), a rough
estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $88,000 (8
hours/day x 365 days/year x $30 hr). With 75 sites, the savings to
the industry per year would be approximately $6,600,000.
4. Maintenance of Access Lists for Each Vital Area
(Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)).
The regulatory burden on licensees would be reduced because
licensees would have to keep only one access list for all vital areas
and reapprove it quarterly, rather than keep individual access lists
for each vital area that must be reapproved monthly.
Assuming that the time to reapprove each of the individual lists is
1 hour per month, that a combined list would take 1.5 hours per month,
that the average number of vital areas per site is 10, and that the
cost of a clerk including overhead is $30 per hour (loaded), a rough
estimate of the potential savings per site per year is about $3,420
[(1 x 10 vital areas/month x 12 months/yr--1.5 x 1 combined vital
area/quarter x 4 quarters/yr) x $30/hr]. With 75 sites, the savings
to the industry per year would be approximately $256,500.
5. Key Controls for Vital Areas (Sec. 73.55(d)(8)).
The regulatory burden on the licensees would be reduced because
fewer resources would be needed to maintain the system.
Assuming that of the approximately 60 locks per year, half of them
had been changed for cause, leaving 30 locks unchanged which would take
a locksmith one day to change at a cost(including overhead) of $45 per
hour. A rough estimate of the potential savings per site per year is
about $360 (8 hrs/year x $45/hr). With 75 sites, the savings to the
industry per year would be approximately $27,000.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act as amended, 5 U.S.C.
605(b), the Commission certifies that this proposed rule, if adopted,
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. This proposed rule would affect only licensees
authorized to operate nuclear power reactors. These licensees do not
fall within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Business Size Standards
set out in regulations issued by the Small Business Administration Act,
13 CFR Part 121.
Backfit Analysis
The Commission has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109,
does not apply to this proposed amendment because this amendment would
not impose new requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The
proposed changes to physical security are voluntary and should the
licensee decide to implement this amendment, will be a reduction in
burden to the licensee. Therefore, a backfit analysis has not been
prepared for this amendment.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
1. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96
Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section
[[Page 7725]]
73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42
U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-
399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
2. Section 73.55 is amended by revising paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(4),
(d)(5), (d)(7)(i)(A), and (d)(8) to read as follows:
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities
in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle
access into a protected area. Identification and search of all
individuals unless otherwise provided herein must be made and
authorization must be checked at these points. The search function for
detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices must be
accomplished through the use of both firearms and explosive detection
equipment capable of detecting those devices. The licensee shall
subject all persons except bona fide Federal, State, and local law
enforcement personnel on official duty to these equipment searches upon
entry into a protected area. Armed security guards who are on duty and
have exited the protected area on official business may reenter the
protected area without being searched for firearms.
* * * * *
(4) All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, must be
searched for items which could be used for sabotage purposes prior to
entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched must
include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area. All
vehicles, except as indicated in this paragraph, requiring entry into
the protected area must be escorted by a member of the security
organization while within the protected area and, to the extent
practicable, must be off loaded in the protected area at a specific
designated materials receiving area that is not adjacent to a vital
area. Escort is not required for designated licensee vehicles or
licensee-owned vehicles entering the protected area and driven by
licensee employees having unescorted access.
(5) A numbered picture badge identification system must be used for
all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escort. Badges must be displayed by all individuals while inside the
protected area. An individual not employed by the licensee but who
requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may
be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he or
she displays a licensee-issued picture badge upon entrance into the
protected area which indicates:
(i) Non-employee--no escort required;
(ii) Areas to which access is authorized; and
(iii) The period for which access has been authorized.
* * * * *
(7) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) Establish a current authorization access list for all vital
areas. The access list must be updated by the cognizant licensee
manager or supervisor at least once every 31 days and must be
reapproved at least quarterly. The licensee shall include on the access
list only individuals whose specific duties require access to vital
areas during nonemergency conditions.
* * * * *
(d)(8) All keys, locks, combinations, and related access control
devices used to control access to protected areas and vital areas must
be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there
is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination, or related
access control devices may have been compromised, it must be changed or
rotated. The licensee shall issue keys, locks, combinations and other
access control devices to protected areas and vital areas only to
persons granted unescorted facility access. Whenever an individual's
unescorted access is revoked due to his or her lack of trustworthiness,
reliability, or inadequate work performance, keys, locks, combinations,
and related access control devices to which that person had access must
be changed or rotated.
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February, 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 97-4219 Filed 2-19-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
