[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 34 (Friday, February 20, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8697-8702]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-4325]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, 50-423, 50-213]
Northeast Utilities; Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3, Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has issued a director's decision with regard to a Petition
dated March 3, 1997, filed by Mr. Albert A. Cizek, hereinafter referred
to as ``Petitioner.'' The Petition pertains to the Millstone Nuclear
Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and the Haddam Neck Plant.
The Petitioner requested that the NRC:
1. Within 30 calendar days of receiving a total of three license
violations from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] during
any [3-year] period, irrespective of the violation level, the
operating license of the facility shall be suspended for a period of
not less than 90 days and not more than 180 days.
2. Within 30 calendar days of receiving a total of three
violations of 10 CFR Part 50, including all applicable appendices,
from the [NRC] during any [3-year] period, irrespective of the
violation level, the operating license of the facility shall be
suspended for a period of not less than 90 days and not more than
180 days.
3. Within 30 calendar days of receiving a total of three
violations of the UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] from
the [NRC] during any [3-year] period, irrespective of the violation
level, the operating license of the facility shall be suspended for
a period of not less than 90 days and not more than 180 days.
4. Within 30 calendar days of receiving any harassment,
intimidation and discrimination (``HI&D'') finding by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Labor, or any
[S]tate or [F]ederal court of competent jurisdiction, the operating
license of the facility shall be suspended for a period of not less
than 90 days and not more than 180 days.
5. If, within [5] years of a license suspension based on
paragraphs 1 through 4 above, the licensee receives a total of three
license violations from the [NRC], irrespective of the violation
level; receives a total of three violations of 10 CFR Part 50,
including all applicable appendices, from the [NRC], irrespective of
violation level;
[[Page 8698]]
receives a total of three violations of the UFSAR from the [NRC],
irrespective of violation level; or receives any HI&D finding by the
[NRC], the U.S. Department of Labor, or any [S]tate or [F]ederal
court of competent jurisdiction, the operating license of that
facility shall be permanently revoked within 90 calendar days.
6. In the event that the license of a facility is revoked
pursuant to paragraph 5, no operation of that facility for the
purpose of generating electric power shall be permitted during the
pendency of any administrative or judicial processes or appeals
related to such revocation.
7. In the event that the license of a facility is suspended or
revoked under paragraphs [1] through [5], the [NRC] shall designate
an appropriate licensee to maintain the facility in shutdown mode
for the duration of the suspension or until such time as a new
licensee is found to operate the facility. [Footnote omitted] NU
[Northeast Utilities] shall be responsible for all expenses related
to the operation of the facility during such shutdown. NU shall be
required to post a bond in the amount of $500,000,000 ([5] hundred
million) as reasonable assurance that it can fulfill this
requirement.
The Petitioner further requested that these license conditions be
imposed on the operating licenses of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 before
Commission approval to restart any of those plants, and further
requested that these license conditions be imposed on the operating
license of Haddam Neck before any decommissioning of that plant.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has denied
the Petition. The reasons for this denial are explained in the
``Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-98-01), the
complete text of which follows this notice and is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, at the local public
document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut,
and at the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,
Waterford, Connecticut, for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3; and at the
Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut, for the
Haddam Neck Plant.
A copy of the director's decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this
regulation, the decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on
its own motion, institutes a review of the decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
DD-98-01
Director's Decision Pursuant To 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On March 3, 1997, Ernest C. Hadley, Esq., filed with the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) a Petition pursuant
to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR
2.206), on behalf of Mr. Albert A. Cizek, hereinafter, referred to as
Petitioner. This submittal will hereinafter be referred to as the
Petition. The Petition was filed with the Executive Director for
Operations of the NRC. The Petition was referred to the Director of the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations for preparation of a response.
The Petitioner requested that the NRC impose the following license
conditions on the operating licenses of Millstone Nuclear Power
Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and the Haddam Neck Plant held by Northeast
Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO or Licensee):
1. Within 30 calendar days of receiving a total of three license
violations from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] during
any [3-year] period, irrespective of the violation level, the
operating license of the facility shall be suspended for a period of
not less than 90 days and not more than 180 days.
2. Within 30 calendar days of receiving a total of three
violations of 10 [CFR] Part 50, including all applicable appendices,
from the [NRC] during any [3-year] period, irrespective of the
violation level, the operating license of the facility shall be
suspended for a period of not less than 90 days and not more than
180 days.
3. Within 30 calendar days of receiving a total of three
violations of the UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] from
the [NRC] during any [3-year] period, irrespective of the violation
level, the operating license of the facility shall be suspended for
a period of not less than 90 days and not more than 180 days.
4. Within 30 calendar days of receiving any harassment,
intimidation and discrimination (``HI&D'') finding by the [NRC], the
U.S. Department of Labor, or any [S]tate or [F]ederal court of
competent jurisdiction, the operating license of the facility shall
be suspended for a period of not less than 90 days and not more than
180 days.
5. If, within [5] years of a license suspension based on
paragraphs 1 through 4 above, the licensee receives a total of three
license violations from the [NRC], irrespective of the violation
level; receives a total of three violations of 10 [CFR] Part 50,
including all applicable appendices, from the [NRC], irrespective of
the violation level; receives a total of three violations of the
UFSAR from the [NRC], irrespective of violation level; or receives
any HI&D finding by the [NRC], the U.S. Department of Labor, or any
[S]tate or [F]ederal court of competent jurisdiction, the operating
license of that facility shall be permanently revoked within 90
calendar days.
6. In the event that the license of a facility is revoked
pursuant to paragraph 5, no operation of that facility for the
purpose of generating electric power shall be permitted during the
pendency of any administrative or judicial processes or appeals
related to such revocation.
7. In the event that the license of a facility is suspended or
revoked under paragraphs [1] through [5], the [NRC] shall designate
an appropriate licensee to maintain the facility in shutdown mode
for the duration of the suspension or until such time as a new
licensee is found to operate the facility. [Footnote omitted] NU
[Northeast Utilities] shall be responsible for all expenses related
to the operation of the facility during such shutdown. NU shall be
required to post a bond in the amount of $500,000,000 ([5] hundred
million) as reasonable assurance that it can fulfill this
requirement.
The Petitioner further requested that these license conditions be
imposed on the operating licenses of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 before
Commission approval to restart any of those plants, and further
requested that these license conditions be imposed on the operating
license of Haddam Neck before any decommissioning of that plant.
Additionally, the Petitioner requested that public hearings on the
Petition be scheduled in the immediate vicinity of the Millstone and
Haddam Neck reactors for the presentation of further evidence in
support of the Petition. The Petitioner specifically requested that
these public hearings be held and that a decision on this Petition be
issued before restart or decommissioning of any of these units.
The Petitioner sought the above license conditions on the basis of
the following contentions:
1. NU has knowingly, willingly and recklessly operated Millstone
Unit 1, Unit 2, Unit 3 at Waterford, [Connecticut], and its
Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Plant [i.e., Haddam Neck Plant] at
Haddam Neck, [Connecticut], in violation of their respective
operating licenses, the regulations of the NRC, and their respective
UFSARs for a prolonged period of time, which unnecessarily but
significantly compromised public health and safety by eroding the
required defense in depth philosophy.
2. NU has knowingly, willingly and intentionally harassed,
intimidated and discriminated against its employees who raise safety
concerns in violation of United States statutes and NRC regulations
for a prolonged period of time, which unnecessarily but
significantly compromised
[[Page 8699]]
public health and safety by eroding the required defense in depth
philosophy.
3. In the absence of express license conditions, there is no
reasonable assurance that NU will cease and desist from engaging in
these activities in the future.
A letter acknowledging receipt of the Petition was sent to the
Petitioner on April 8, 1997. In that letter, the NRC staff informed the
Petitioner that the NRC staff had decided not to hold a public hearing
as requested by the Petitioner. Instead, the NRC staff requested that
the Petitioner promptly supply, in writing, any additional information
relevant to the Petition. In letters of April 16 and July 19, 1997, the
Petitioner reiterated his request for an informal public hearing. In a
letter dated August 7, 1997, the NRC staff responded to the
Petitioner's letters of April 16 and July 19, 1997, and provided its
detailed basis for concluding that an informal public hearing as
requested by the Petitioner was not warranted. The NRC staff also noted
that the Petitioner had a public forum to raise his concerns through
the regularly scheduled public meetings held in the vicinity of the
Millstone site. The Petitioner did not provide the staff with any
additional evidence in support of the Petition.
II. Discussion
The NRC staff has reviewed the Petition and has not found any
information regarding either the Millstone or the Haddam Neck
facilities of which it was not already aware prior to receipt of the
Petition. As discussed below, these facilities have been the subject of
close NRC scrutiny for several years.
Millstone Facility
With regard to the Millstone units, the NRC staff has been
concerned for the last several years about the number and duration of
violations at the Millstone site in the broad programmatic areas of
design and licensing bases, testing, and radiological controls.
Programmatic concerns in these areas, along with concerns in other
areas, were major contributors to the decline in performance at the
Millstone site. In the cover letter to the most recent systematic
assessment of licensee performance (SALP) report of August 26, 1994,
the NRC staff stated that it had noted several performance weaknesses,
common to all three Millstone units. Among these were continuing
problems with procedure quality and implementation, the informality in
several maintenance and engineering programs (contributing to instances
of poor performance), and the failure to resolve several longstanding
problems at the site. In addition to these programmatic problems, the
Licensee has had significant problems in dealing with employee concerns
involving safety issues at the site.
On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for a
scheduled refueling outage. The NRC sent a letter to the Licensee on
December 13, 1995, requiring the Licensee, before restarting Millstone
Unit 1, to inform NRC, pursuant to Section 182a of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and 10 CFR 50.54(f), of the actions
taken to ensure that, in the future, the Licensee would operate that
facility according to the terms and conditions of the unit's operating
license, the Commission's regulations, and the unit's Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR).
In January 1996, NRC designated the three Millstone units as
Category 2 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants on the Watch List in this
category have weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention until the
licensees demonstrate improved performance for an extended period of
time.
On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when
it declared both trains of the high-pressure safety-injection (HPSI)
system inoperable because of a design issue. There was a potential that
the HPSI throttle valves could become plugged with debris when taking
suction from the sump during the recirculation mode.
On March 30, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 3 after
finding that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary feedwater
turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did not meet NRC
requirements. In response to a Licensee root cause analysis of
inaccuracies in the Millstone Unit 1 FSAR, identifying the potential
for similar configuration control problems at Millstone Units 2 and 3
and the existing design configuration issues identified at these units,
NRC sent 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to the Licensee on March 7 and April
4, 1996. These letters required that the Licensee inform the NRC of the
corrective actions taken regarding design configuration issues at
Millstone Units 2 and 3 before the restart of each unit.
In June 1996, the NRC designated the three units at Millstone as
Category 3 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants in this category have
significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining them in a shutdown
condition until the licensee can demonstrate to NRC that it has taken
adequate corrective actions to ensure substantial improvement. This
category also requires Commission approval before operations can be
resumed.
On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a confirmatory order directing
the Licensee to contract with a third party to implement an independent
corrective action verification program (ICAVP) to confirm the adequacy
of its efforts to reestablish the design basis and configuration
controls for each of the three Millstone units. The ICAVP is intended
to provide additional assurance, before a unit restart, that the
Licensee has identified and corrected existing problems in the design
and configuration control processes for that unit.
On April 16, 1997, the NRC sent another 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter,
which superseded the earlier 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and consolidated
its requests for information and periodic updates. The following
information was requested: (1) significant items that needed to be
accomplished before restart; (2) items that are to be deferred until
after restart; (3) NU's process and rationale for deferring items; and
(4) actions to be taken by NU to ensure that future operation will be
conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating
licenses, the Commission's regulations, and the FSARs. In a letter
dated May 29, 1997, the Licensee submitted the initial information
requested. Additional information and updates will be submitted in
accordance with the time intervals specified in the 10 CFR 50.54(f)
letter.
During eight NRC inspections conducted between October 1995 and
August 1996, more than 60 apparent violations of NRC requirements were
found at the Millstone site. These apparent violations were discussed
at a public predecisional enforcement conference held at the Millstone
site on December 5, 1996. During the meeting, the Licensee stated that
management had failed to give clear direction and oversight,
performance standards were low, management expectations were weak, and
station priorities were inappropriate. A notice of violation and
proposed imposition of civil penalties in the amount of $2,100,000 was
issued to the Licensee on December 10, 1997. This is the largest civil
penalty ever proposed by the NRC. In the enforcement action, the NRC
staff identified violations relating to inadequate engineering,
inadequate corrective actions, technical specifications violations, and
quality assurance violations.
Additionally, the Licensee has had a chronic problem of not dealing
effectively with employee concerns at
[[Page 8700]]
the Millstone site. On December 12, 1995, the NRC set up a review group
to conduct an independent evaluation of the history of the Licensee's
handling of employee concerns related to licensed activities at the
Millstone facility. The review group determined that, in general, an
unhealthy work environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and
did not welcome or promote questioning attitudes, has existed at the
Millstone facility for the last several years. To address this problem,
the NRC issued an order on October 24, 1996, directing NU to devise and
implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by
Millstone employees and to ensure an environment free from retaliation
or discrimination. In addition, the order required NU to have an
independent third party oversee its employee concerns program. The
third-party is responsible for providing periodic reports to NU and NRC
detailing its findings and recommendations. The third-party findings
and the NU responses to them will be assessed by the NRC staff for any
restart issues.
The conduct of NRC regulatory oversight at the Millstone site is
based on the recognition that the Licensee bears primary responsibility
to demonstrate that corrective actions have been effectively
implemented. Thus, before the NRC staff can recommend that the
Commission approve the restart of any Millstone unit, the Licensee must
determine that a unit is in conformance with applicable NRC
regulations, its license conditions, and its FSAR, and that applicable
licensing commitments have been met. The Licensee's conformance with
NRC regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is
fundamental to NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed activities.
In short, the Licensee has the primary responsibility for the safe
operation of its facilities.
In a June 20, 1996, letter to NRC, the Licensee described its
Configuration Management Plan (CMP), which is its principal program to
provide reasonable assurance that weaknesses at the Millstone units
have been effectively corrected. The CMP includes efforts to understand
and correct the licensing and design-bases issues that led NRC to send
the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and order actions to prevent recurrence of
those issues. The Licensee stated that the objective of the CMP was to
document and meet the licensing and design-bases requirements of each
unit and to ensure that adequate programs and processes are in place to
maintain control of these requirements. The Licensee's CMP must either
correct each FSAR deficiency or evaluate it to ensure that the change
to the facility does not involve any unreviewed safety question or
change to the facility TSs. NU has documented a large number of
deficiencies, which vary in scope and safety significance for each
unit. These lists contain significant deficiencies that must be
corrected before restart and others that the Licensee is planning to
correct after restart. In its continuing reviews of the deficiency
lists, the NRC staff will determine whether the Licensee has
appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for completion before
restart and whether those items that the Licensee will defer until
after restart are appropriate for each unit. The results of these
efforts will be documented in NRC inspection reports.
The NRC's regulatory oversight of the Licensee's corrective actions
requires extensive planning and program integration. To focus more
regulatory attention on all of the restart issues related to the
Millstone units, NRC has established a Special Projects Office (SPO)
within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee these
activities. The SPO has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted
oversight program to verify the adequacy of NU's corrective actions,
programs, and processes. The breadth and significance of the problems
identified at the Millstone site require this program. The SPO has
developed a Restart Assessment Plan (assessment plan) for each of the
Millstone units, which includes (1) the appropriate aspects of NRC
Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, ``Staff Guidelines for
Restart Approval''; (2) oversight of NU's ICAVP; and (3) oversight of
NU's corrective actions relating to employee concerns involving safety
issues. The activities associated with the assessment plan are in
addition to the normal inspection and licensing activities being
carried out at the Millstone site.
MC 0350 establishes the guidelines for approving the restart of a
nuclear power plant after a shutdown resulting from a significant
event, a complex hardware problem, or serious management deficiencies.
The primary objective of the guidelines in MC 0350 is to ensure that
NRC's restart review efforts are appropriate for the individual
circumstances, are reviewed and approved by the appropriate NRC
management levels, and provide objective measures of restart readiness.
The assessment plan for each unit includes those issues listed in
MC 0350 that the NRC staff has identified as relevant to the shutdown
of the unit. Each assessment plan also includes additional issues
determined to be applicable to the specific situation. The assessment
plans include all actions the NRC expects NU to take before the NRC
staff recommends to the Commission that a unit be permitted to restart.
Accordingly, the staff will use the assessment plan for each Millstone
unit to track and monitor all significant actions necessary to support
a decision on restart approval of the unit.
The assessment plan for each Millstone unit includes the
requirement to review the NU Operational Readiness Plan, the deficiency
lists associated with the assessment plan, including restart and
deferred items, the corrective action program, work planning and
controls, the procedures upgrade program, the nuclear oversight
function (quality assurance), outstanding enforcement items, and a
Significant Issues List (SIL), which includes issues identified by both
NU and NRC as issues requiring resolution before restart. NRC MC 93802,
``Operational Safety Team Inspection'' (OSTI), provides the framework
for a team inspection to be performed during the later stages of the
restart process. The inspection will be structured to focus on the
pertinent issues at each of the Millstone units.
Within the SPO, a Millstone Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) has been
formed in accordance with MC 0350. The RAP meets to assess the
Licensee's performance and its progress in completing the designated
restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO
(chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and
Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight; the
project managers for the three Millstone units; the Inspection Branch
Chief; the senior resident inspectors for the three Millstone units;
and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The RAP
holds periodic meetings with the Licensee to discuss the Licensee's
corrective actions and schedules of each Millstone unit. Notices of the
meetings with the licensee are issued and the meetings are open to the
public. Additionally, NRC holds frequent meetings with the public near
the Millstone facility that include a summary of the latest meeting
with the Licensee, updates on NRC activities, and questions and
comments from the public.
The purpose of the ICAVP, as stated in the confirmatory order, is
to confirm that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are
in conformance with its licensing and design bases. The ICAVP audit
required by NRC is expected to provide independent verification, beyond
NU's quality
[[Page 8701]]
assurance and management oversight, that the Licensee has identified
and satisfactorily resolved existing nonconformances with the design
and licensing bases; documented and utilized the licensing and design
bases to resolve nonconformances; and established programs, processes,
and procedures for effective configuration management in the future. NU
has started programs to identify and understand the root causes of the
licensing and design-bases issues that led to NRC issuance of the 10
CFR 50.54(f) letters to NU and to implement corrective actions to
ensure that NU maintains the design configuration and that each unit is
in conformance with its licensing basis. NU has indicated that the
scope of its corrective programs will include those systems that it has
categorized as either Group 1 (safety-related and risk-significant) or
Group 2 (safety-related or risk-significant). The ICAVP audit must
provide insights into the effectiveness of NU's programs so that the
results can be reasonably extrapolated to the structures, systems, and
components that were not reviewed in the audit.
The NRC staff has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted
oversight process to provide a high level of confidence that the
Licensee has implemented required corrective actions and that all of
the issues on the SILs have been resolved. The independent third-party
evaluations required by NRC will be used to enhance NRC confidence that
the Licensee's corrective action programs have been effectively
implemented at each unit.
NRC activities (including oversight of the ICAVP) to ensure that
effective corrective actions are being taken by the Licensee will
provide additional assurance that the Licensee's corrective action
programs have been effectively implemented. These activities will
include in-process reviews of the ICAVP contractor's activities,
reviews of the ICAVP results, and additional independent reviews of
compliance with the design and licensing bases of selected systems. The
State of Connecticut's Nuclear Energy Advisory Council has provided
input to the NRC staff for selecting the systems that will be reviewed
by the ICAVP contractor and has been invited to observe the NRC staff's
ICAVP inspections.
When the restart review process has identified, corrected, and
reviewed relevant issues regarding each Millstone unit, a restart
authorization process will be initiated for that unit. Upon receipt of
an NRC staff recommendation and a briefing on any ongoing
investigations, the Commission will meet to assess the recommendation
and vote on whether to allow the restart of the unit. The same process
will be followed for the remaining units.
It is important to note that the Licensee and NRC are continuing to
identify problems at the Millstone site, as documented in inspection
reports issued after this Petition was filed. These findings indicate
that the corrective actions required to restart the Millstone units
have not yet been fully implemented. The NRC staff will not recommend
that the Commission allow the restart of a Millstone unit until the NRC
staff has determined, in accordance with the assessment plan, that the
necessary corrective actions have been effectively implemented for the
unit. Following any positive Commission vote for restart, the unit will
remain on NRC's watchlist, in Category 2, and will continue to be
subject to a high level of NRC oversight. The unit will remain as a
Category 2 watchlist plant until the NRC determines that the Licensee's
performance warrants a normal level of NRC oversight.
Haddam Neck Facility
The Licensee shut down the Haddam Neck facility on July 22, 1996,
as required by the facility's TSs, because of concerns that service
water piping for the air recirculation fans in the containment may
exceed design loads during certain accident scenarios. The Licensee
determined that these concerns and other hardware and programmatic
problems identified before and during the forced outage should be
resolved before restarting the plant. Thus, the Licensee decided to
begin Refueling Outage 19 on August 17, 1996. On October 9, 1996, the
owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that a permanent shutdown of the
plant was being considered by the Board of Trustees as a result of an
economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the cost of replacement
power. Subsequently, all fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor
and placed in the spent fuel pool.
From November 21, 1995, to November 22, 1996, NRC conducted
numerous inspections at the Haddam Neck Plant to review several facets
of plant performance. These inspections included a special team
inspection by NRC headquarters staff focused on engineering
performance; a special augmented inspection team (AIT) inspection of a
reactor vessel nitrogen intrusion event in late August and early
September 1996, which lowered the reactor vessel water level; a special
radiation protection inspection of a significant contamination event in
November 1996; an emergency preparedness inspection to observe the
Licensee's response during an emergency exercise held in August 1996;
and several resident inspections. Numerous violations, as well as
several significant regulatory concerns, were identified during these
inspections. Most of the violations were discussed at a transcribed
public predecisional enforcement conference at the Millstone training
building in Waterford, Connecticut, on December 4, 1996. That
conference was open to the public and focused on the broader
programmatic deficiencies underlying the violations that contributed to
the problems at Haddam Neck. A notice of violation and proposed
imposition of civil penalties in the amount of $650,000 was issued on
May 12, 1997, and was subsequently paid by the Licensee.
By letter dated December 5, 1996, the Licensee certified to the
NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that
it had decided to permanently cease operations at the Haddam Neck Plant
and had permanently removed the fuel from the reactor. The Licensee
further noted that a post-shutdown decommissioning activities report
(PSDAR) and a site-specific decommissioning cost estimate would be
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82, ``Termination of License.''
Therefore, the NRC's restart process oversight described for the three
Millstone units is not applicable to the Haddam Neck Plant. However,
the NRC staff has taken pertinent actions at the Haddam Neck Plant.
A confirmatory action letter (CAL) was issued to the Licensee on
March 4, 1997, concerning radiological-control problems at the Haddam
Neck Plant to ensure that the limited activities at the site will be
conducted in a safe manner and in accordance with regulatory
requirements. The CAL confirms the Licensee's commitment to not perform
any radiological work, except that required to maintain the plant in a
safe configuration until the corrective actions identified in the CAL
have been implemented.1
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\1\ In a November 17, 1997, letter, the NRC staff confirmed
certain modifications of the Licensee's commitments on the conduct
of radiological work at the Haddam Neck Plant. The modification
allows the Licensee to remove an 8-foot section of piping associated
with the reactor coolant system to allow vendors to determine the
best method for eventual decontamination of the entire reactor
coolant system.
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As with the Millstone site, it is important to note that the
Licensee and NRC continue to identify problems at the Haddam Neck
Plant, as documented in inspection reports issued after this
[[Page 8702]]
Petition was filed. These findings indicate that the corrective actions
required to be completed before conducting significant decommissioning
activities have not yet been fully implemented. The NRC staff will
continue to closely monitor the Licensee's activities until the staff
has determined that the necessary corrective actions have been
effectively implemented for the unit.
III. NRC Response to Requested Actions
The Petitioner requested that a mechanistic enforcement approach be
used at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants to preclude recurrence of
the problems.
The NRC's enforcement policy, which has been revised many times
since the March 9, 1982, policy was first issued, continues to
recognize that the regulation of nuclear activities does not lend
itself to a mechanistic treatment. The NRC staff's extensive experience
shows that judgment and discretion must be exercised in determining the
severity levels of the violations and the appropriate enforcement
sanctions.
The latest staff assessment of the NRC's enforcement policy was
completed in 1997 (NUREG-1622 2). This assessment also
contained a discussion of a suggestion from the public 3
recommending that the enforcement policy be modified to eliminate what
was viewed as subjective enforcement based on performance issues. In
particular, the commenter recommended that the NRC staff consistently
impose a civil penalty every time a licensee fails to meet a
requirement, regardless of a licensee's performance or ability to meet
requirements in other areas. The NRC staff's assessment concluded, in
part, that ``the staff does not believe that the enforcement policy
should be reduced to a formula for rigid application. Few cases are
entirely straightforward, and the NRC must always apply judgment in
determining whether to give credit for the licensee's actions.'' The
Petitioner requested that mechanistic enforcement-related license
conditions be added to the Millstone and Haddam Neck licenses. As noted
above, the NRC staff has long experience in the enforcement of its
requirements. That experience shows that judgment and discretion based
on the facts at hand are key elements in any enforcement decision. A
fair and reasonable enforcement decision cannot be made without an
understanding of the nature of the violations involved and the context
in which the violations occurred. The Petitioner's approach calls for
specific and severe sanctions based on unknown future events of unknown
significance occurring in an unknown context. Such an approach is
unreasonable and could very well be found as arbitrary and capricious
and thus legally unsound. It is not an approach that the NRC staff
would apply in any case and so it would not be applied in the case of
the Millstone and Haddam Neck units as requested by the Petitioner.
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\2\ As of the date of this Director's Decision, this NUREG has
not been issued. It is expected to be issued shortly.
\3\ September 9, 1997, letter from David A. Lochbaum of the
Union of Concerned Scientists.
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As noted in the Discussion section above, the NRC staff is aware of
the significant performance problems at the Licensee's facilities.
These performance problems have led the NRC staff to increase its
oversight activities at these facilities. The Millstone plants will not
be allowed to restart until the NRC staff is satisfied that sufficient
corrective action has taken place and until Commission approval is
granted. After restart, the plants will continue to be subject to a
high level of NRC oversight until the NRC determines that the
Licensee's performance warrants a normal level of NRC oversight. The
decommissioning of the Haddam Neck Plant will not be allowed to proceed
until the NRC staff determines that the applicable performance problems
noted there have been corrected. The Licensee has also made significant
management changes at each of these facilities. In the NRC staff's
judgment, the scope of actions taken by the Licensee and the NRC
regarding these facilities is extensive.
Furthermore, the NRC staff has had significant experience in
overseeing licensees that have either been ordered to or have
volunteered to shut down their facilities because of performance
problems. For example, in NRC's Region I alone, the Pilgrim, Peach
Bottom, Nine Mile Point, Calvert Cliffs, FitzPatrick, and Indian Point
Unit 3 plants have been shut down while significant problems were
corrected. Despite their significant problems, these plants have been
able to perform corrective actions that have significantly improved the
performance of these facilities. On the basis of the special
circumstances involved with overseeing the restart of plants shut down
for performance problems, the NRC staff developed MC 0350 (for more
detail about this document, see Discussion section). Thus, the NRC
staff has a considerable amount of experience overseeing facilities
shut down because of significant enforcement problems; the NRC staff
has seen numerous examples of licensees that have successfully improved
their performance to a level acceptable for restart and continued
operation; and, the NRC staff has a tested procedure in place to safely
oversee the restart of such facilities.
Regarding the Haddam Neck Plant, the risks to the public from a
permanently shutdown facility are significantly less than those from an
operating power plant. Additionally, as noted in the preceding
discussion, the NRC staff is closely observing the Licensee's actions
until confidence in the Licensee is restored.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, a mechanistic enforcement approach will not be applied
by the NRC staff in this matter. Such an approach is neither necessary
nor appropriate to assure regulatory compliance and safe conduct of
activities at the Millstone and Haddam Neck facilities. Extensive
efforts have been and are being taken by the Licensee to assure that
future operation of the Millstone units and decommissioning of the
Haddam Neck Plant are accomplished safely. The NRC staff has in place
an extensive oversight program to assure that the Licensee meets its
objectives. The NRC staff also has extensive experience with other
facilities in assessing major corrective action programs providing
assurance that its oversight of the Licensee's corrective action
efforts will be sound and will assure that the Commission receives a
sound NRC staff recommendation before the Commission itself determines
whether restart of the Millstone units is warranted. After restart, the
plants will continue to be subject to a high level of NRC oversight
until the NRC determines that the Licensee's performance warrants a
normal level of NRC oversight. Accordingly, the Petitioner's request
for specific enforcement-related license conditions at the Millstone
and Haddam Neck facilities is denied.
As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.
This director's decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes review of the decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of February 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-4325 Filed 2-19-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
