[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 21, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6633-6637]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-3884]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials at the Savannah River Site
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Supplemental Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented.
On December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300), DOE issued a Record of Decision
(ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives on the interim management of
several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. DOE is now issuing
its decisions on actions that will stabilize two additional categories
of materials at the SRS, which present environment, safety and health
vulnerabilities in their current storage condition or may present
vulnerabilities within the next 10 years. The decisions on the
stabilization of two additional categories of nuclear materials,
neptunium-237 solution and targets, and H-Canyon plutonium-239
solutions, are not being made at this time.
Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels
DOE has decided to stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels by
processing them in the SRS canyon facilities and blending down the
resulting highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU).
The LEU solution will be stored or converted to an oxide in the FA-
Line. Neptunium-237 separated during the stabilization processing of
the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels will be stabilized with the other SRS
neptunium. The Department is still considering which of the management
options for neptunium to implement.
Other Aluminum-Clad Targets
DOE has decided to stabilize the ``other aluminum-clad targets'' by
dissolving them in the SRS canyon facilities and transferring the
resulting nuclear material solution to the high level waste tanks for
future vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim
management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the
Final EIS, the Facility Utilization Strategy study, the initial ROD and
Notice, or this supplemental ROD contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA
Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River
Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031,
(800) 242-8259, Internet: drew.grainger@srs.gov.
For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials'', (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented.
The Final EIS identified continued storage (i.e., No Action) as the
preferred alternative for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the ``other
aluminum-clad targets'' until DOE could complete additional reviews of
costs, schedules, and technical uncertainties associated with dry
storage techniques for failed fuel.
On December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300), DOE issued a Record of Decision
(ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives on the interim management of
several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. At that time, DOE
announced new preferred alternatives for the management of the Mark-16
and Mark-22 fuels (processing and blending down to LEU) and the ``other
aluminum-clad targets'' (processing and storage for vitrification in
the DWPF). In addition, DOE indicated that neptunium-237 solution and
targets would be stabilized through either processing to oxide or
vitrification, and that plutonium-239 solutions in H-Canyon would be
stabilized through processing to metal, processing to oxide, or
vitrification. For each of these material categories, only one
stabilization method will be implemented. The stabilization alternative
chosen is dependent upon whether the materials would be stabilized in
the SRS's F- or H-Canyon, as discussed in a DOE staff study, Facility
Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River Site Chemical Separation
Facilities (December 1995). DOE is still considering the facility
utilization strategy study and other related information.
[[Page 6634]]
II. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS
DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the Mark-16
and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets at the SRS: (A)
Continuing Storage (i.e., ``No Action'' within the context of NEPA),
(B) Processing to Oxide, (C) Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, (D)
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF, and (E) Improving
Storage. The following is a brief description of the alternatives
evaluated.
A. Continuing Storage (No Action)
This alternative was evaluated for the fuels and targets considered
in this supplemental ROD. Under this alternative, DOE would continue to
store the materials in their current physical and chemical form. DOE
would relocate, repackage, or re-can materials stored in basins to
consolidate the material or to respond to an immediate safety problem.
Periodic sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination,
weighing, visual inspection and similar activities would continue in
order to monitor the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear
material. Repackaging would include removing materials from a damaged
storage container and placing them in a new container or placing the
damaged container in a larger container. Re-canning would primarily
entail placing damaged or degraded fuel or targets in metal containers,
sealing the containers, and keeping them in wet storage.
Many activities would be required by DOE irrespective of the
management alternative used. For example, DOE would maintain facilities
in good working condition and would continue to provide utilities
(water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and services
(security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each facility.
Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the skills
necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would continue
with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related vulnerabilities
associated with storage of the materials and projects to upgrade or
replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).
B. Processing to Oxide
For purposes of this supplemental ROD, this alternative is only
relevant to the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels. DOE would dissolve and
process the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing HEU in the H-Canyon
and would convert the resulting HEU solution to HEU oxide. To provide
conversion capability, DOE would complete the partially constructed
Uranium Solidification Facility (USF) in H-Canyon. The HEU oxide would
be packaged and stored in a vault in USF.
C. Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium
This alternative is only relevant to the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels.
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing HEU would be transported to H-
Canyon and/or F-Canyon by rail casks, and dissolved in nitric acid. If
processed through F-Canyon, due to criticality constraints, the
dissolved fuel material would be blended down to LEU prior to
separation from fission products and other materials. If processed
through H-Canyon, the dissolved fuel material would be separated from
fission products and other materials and subsequently blended down to
LEU. In either case, the HEU would be blended at the SRS with existing
depleted or natural uranium to produce LEU solutions. The LEU solutions
would be stored or converted to an oxide using FA-Line. The oxide would
be stored in drums in existing facilities or in a new warehouse to be
constructed at the SRS. Decisions on a potential new warehouse at the
SRS will be made after or coincident with the ROD for the disposition
of surplus HEU. The Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium
Final EIS is expected to be issued in mid 1996.
D. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF
This alternative could apply to both the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels
and the other aluminum-clad targets considered in this supplemental
ROD. DOE would perform research and development work to develop a
method for chemically adjusting solutions that would result from the
dissolution of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the other aluminum-
clad targets in order to transfer them to the high level waste tanks in
F- or H-Area. The research and development work would be to ensure
nuclear criticality safety due to the large amounts of uranium-235
contained in the fuels, and to evaluate the effects of the nuclear
materials on the systems and facilities used to store and treat the
liquid high level waste.
Upon completion of the studies, DOE would transport the fuel and
targets stored in the water-filled basins by rail casks to F- or H-
Canyon and would dissolve them in nitric acid. The resulting solutions
from dissolution would be chemically adjusted and transferred to the
high level waste tanks via underground pipelines. The solutions would
be mixed with the existing volume of high level waste stored in the F-
and H-Area tanks. The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would
eventually be immobilized in borosilicate glass by the DWPF. The glass
would be contained within stainless steel canisters that would be
stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending geologic disposal by
DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be immobilized by the Saltstone
facility into a grout containing very low levels of radioactivity. The
grout would be poured into concrete vaults located at the Saltstone
facility.
E. Improving Storage
This alternative could be applicable to both the Mark-16 and Mark-
22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets. For this alternative, DOE
would remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad
targets from the basins and place them in dry storage. Because of
technical uncertainties (e.g., potentially pyrophoric hydrides of
uranium, elimination of potential reactive material) associated with
the dry storage of failed fuel and targets, DOE would perform
additional research to demonstrate the feasibility of drying and
placing the materials into canisters for storage. Work related to the
dry storage of LEU and commercial spent nuclear fuel has already been
done in the United States and other countries. This work has not been
focused on the storage of aluminum-clad HEU fuels. In conjunction with
this work, DOE would design and construct a Dry Storage Facility at
SRS.
A typical dry storage facility would be a Modular Dry Storage
Vault. This facility would consist of four major components: a
receiving/unloading area, fuel storage canisters, a shielded container
handling machine, and a modular vault for storing the fuel in storage
canisters. As a variation, canisters could be stored in dry storage
casks rather than a vault. The degraded fuel and target materials would
be removed from the basins and dried, canned or placed directly in
canisters; the cans or canisters would be filled with an inert gas to
inhibit further corrosion; if cans were used they would be loaded into
storage canisters. This process could be varied as dictated by the
condition of the material. After the fuel or targets were loaded in a
canister, a machine would transport the canister to the modular storage
vault. The vault would consist of a large concrete structure with an
array of vertical tubes to hold the canisters. The canister
[[Page 6635]]
transport machine would move into the vault and load the canister into
a storage tube. A shielded plug would be placed on top of the tube. The
transport machine and the vault storage tubes would be heavily shielded
to reduce the effects of radiation from the canister. To use dry
storage casks, the machine would transport the canister to a cask
(horizontal or vertical) and discharge the canister into the cask, and
then the cask would be sealed.
DOE evaluated the potential environmental impacts associated with
two variations for implementing this alternative. The first involved
the use of a traditional project schedule for the design and
construction of the Dry Storage Facility, estimated to take about ten
years. The second was an accelerated schedule for design and
construction, estimated to take about five years. Until the Dry Storage
Facility was completed, DOE would store the materials in existing
basins, as described under Continued Storage (No Action).
III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
The Final EIS for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials
analyzed the potential environmental impacts that could result from
implementation of the candidate management alternatives. DOE has
concluded that there would be minimal environmental impact from
implementation of any of the alternatives for any of the material
groups in the areas of geologic resources, ecological resources
(including threatened or endangered species), cultural resources,
aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land use. Impacts in these
areas would be limited because facility modifications or construction
of new facilities would occur within existing buildings or
industrialized portions of the SRS. DOE anticipates that the existing
SRS workforce would support any construction projects and other
activities required to implement any of the alternatives. As a result,
DOE expects negligible socioeconomic impacts from implementation of any
of the alternatives.
Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical
separations facilities (the canyons) would have greater environmental
impacts (e.g., radiological, waste generation) during the time
dissolving, processing or conversion activities are underway than when
these facilities are storing nuclear materials. After materials have
been stabilized, impacts of normal facility operations related to
management of those materials would decline, and potential impacts of
accidents associated with those materials would be reduced with certain
kinds of accidents eliminated (e.g., solution spills or releases).
Potential health effects from normal operations from any of the
alternatives, including those involving the operation of the canyon
facilities, would be low and well within regulatory limits.
Alternatives requiring the use of the canyons are: Processing to Oxide,
Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, and Processing and Storage for
Vitrification in the DWPF.
The Improving Storage alternatives generally have lower impacts in
the near term because they involve only heating, drying and repackaging
the nuclear materials. These alternatives involve the use of new
facilities, such as a Dry Storage Facility. New facilities would
incorporate improved designs for remote handling, shielding,
containment, air filtration, etc.; these improvements could reduce
worker exposures and releases to the environment below levels
associated with existing storage basins and vaults.
Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents
associated with nuclear material storage would be reduced after
material stabilization alternatives are implemented. Due to the
substantial influence actively operating facilities have upon potential
environmental impacts, stabilization alternatives requiring longer
periods of time to complete are estimated to have relatively higher
impacts from normal operation and potential accidents than alternatives
requiring less time to complete.
Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives would result in
low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts would continue for an
indefinite period of time. Stabilization alternatives typically would
result in slightly higher annual environmental impacts than ``No
Action'' in the near-term, but upon completion of the stabilization
action would result in lower annual impacts. Under Continuing Storage
alternatives, no actions would be taken to chemically or physically
stabilize the storage conditions and reduce the potential for
accidents. All of the stabilization alternatives, upon completion of
the actions required, would reduce the potential for accidents and
associated consequences. Several of the stabilization alternatives
would involve a short-term increase in the risks from accidents until
the required actions are completed.
Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous
liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable
federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS
facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste,
mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by
implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing
waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are
within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities
for storage, treatment or disposal.
SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear
materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential
impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the
environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls
are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the
facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified;
therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.
IV. Other Factors
In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing
the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in making the
decisions announced in this supplemental ROD. These other factors
included: (1) the need to construct and operate modified or new
facilities (e.g., a Dry Storage Facility) and the reliability of old
facilities, (2) nonproliferation concerns, involving potential impacts
to U.S. nonproliferation policy as affected by both the operation of
certain facilities and the attractiveness of the managed nuclear
materials for potential weapons use, (3) implementation schedules, (4)
technology availability, (5) labor availability and core competency,
(6) level of custodial care for the continued safe management of the
nuclear materials, (7) cost and budget considerations, (8) technical
uncertainty (i.e., dry storage of failed HEU fuels), and (9) comments
received during the scoping period for the EIS on the Interim
Management of Nuclear Materials, and comments received on the Draft and
Final EISs.
V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives
As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in
lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative
was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental
factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an
[[Page 6636]]
alternative might be expected to result in lower releases of hazardous
pollutants to air or water than the other alternatives, but might
generate slightly higher amounts of radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the
environmental impacts estimated for the alternatives evaluated for the
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets, and
identified the following as the environmentally preferable alternative
for each material category. The health and environmental effects from
any of the alternatives are all low and well within regulatory limits.
Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels and Other Aluminum-Clad Targets--Improving
Storage (Accelerated Schedule)
Improving Storage, on an accelerated schedule, is the
environmentally preferable alternative for the fuels and targets. This
alternative is estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to
the offsite public with doses to the SRS workers comparable to the
other alternatives; has the lowest estimates of air and water
emissions; and, results in the generation of the least amount of high
level, transuranic, mixed, and low level waste.
VI. Decision
As indicated in the ROD and Notice issued December 12, 1995, DOE
received several comments from stakeholders on issues related to the
interim management of nuclear materials at the SRS. These comments
dealt principally with: (1) The method to be used for the management of
spent nuclear fuel, and (2) the operational status and potential plans
for the F- and H-Canyon processing facilities. Subsequent to issuing
the initial ROD and Notice, DOE received a letter from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region IV, on the Final EIS
offering additional comments for consideration in making the decisions
on the stabilization of the SRS nuclear materials. EPA identified, as
did the Final EIS, processing to oxide as the preferred alternative for
stabilizing the neptunium-237 and plutonium-239 materials. EPA stated
that the principal advantage over the environmentally preferable
vitrification alternative is that shipping nuclear material solutions
across the SRS would not be required. For the Mark-16 and Mark-22
fuels, EPA recommended that the fuels be blended to LEU and processed
to an oxide. EPA recommended that DOE proceed with the construction of
a dry storage facility on an accelerated basis for storing the other
aluminum-clad targets because this alternative would take a shorter
time to implement.
After careful consideration of the issues and public comments,
along with the analyses of environmental impacts and other factors, DOE
has made the following decisions for the interim management of Mark-16
and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets:
Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels--Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium
DOE has decided to stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels through
processing in the canyon facilities, blending down the HEU to LEU. DOE
will dissolve depleted uranium oxide in the FA-Line as necessary to
blend down the HEU to LEU.
DOE will remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels from the water-filled
basins in which they are stored and transport them to the canyon
facilities using the existing SRS rail casks. All of the cask shipments
will be confined within the boundaries of the SRS, occurring near the
center of the site. The fuel assemblies will be dissolved in nitric
acid. If processed through the F-Canyon, the resulting HEU solution
will be blended down to LEU and then separated from fission products
and other materials. If processed through the H-Canyon, the resulting
HEU solution from dissolution will be separated from fission products
and other materials and then blended down to LEU. DOE will transfer
depleted or natural uranium solutions to the canyon facilities for
blending with the HEU from the fuels. The LEU solution will be stored
or converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The LEU solution or oxide will be
stored at the SRS until disposition decisions are made. Dependent upon
the timing of future DOE decisions, the uranium from the Mark-16 and
Mark-22 fuels could be dealt with in conjunction with the disposition
of other HEU (by commercial sale, etc.).
Neptunium-237 will be separated from the fuel during the
stabilization process. This material will be managed in conjunction
with the other neptunium at the SRS. The Department is still
considering which of the management options for neptunium-237 and
plutonium-239 to implement.
DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons.
Stabilization of the fuels with their removal from basin wet storage
and elimination of the wet storage vulnerabilities through processing
can be accomplished two to seven years earlier than the improved
storage alternative. Improving storage on an accelerated schedule is
the environmentally preferable alternative. Blending down to LEU
reduces the HEU inventory and eliminates nonproliferation and security
issues associated with the indefinite storage of HEU fuel which is not
self-protecting. (Self-protecting fuel is highly radioactive, so that
substantial shielding (or distance) is required to prevent unhealthy
radiological effects from handling or storage conditions; non self-
protecting fuel could be contact-handled and therefore is of greater
theft or sabotage concern.) Cost and cost uncertainties also have
played a significant role in the selection of this stabilization
action. Near-term annual costs to process and blend down the HEU to LEU
are estimated at $20 million to $95 million less than for the improved
storage alternatives. Substantial uncertainty exists concerning the
disposition of dry-stored (improved storage) HEU spent fuel, while less
uncertainty exists with the stabilization of the fuels through blending
down to LEU and the storage and disposition of the resulting waste
through the DWPF. Life-cycle cost evaluations favor blending down to
LEU ($38 million to greater than $1 billion advantage)[Facility
Utilization Strategy, Attachment 2]. Although potential safety, health
and environmental impacts evaluated in the Final EIS are lower in the
interim period for the improved storage alternatives than the selected
blending down to LEU alternative, the potential impacts from any of the
stabilization alternatives are shown to be very low and well below any
regulatory or management control limits. It is anticipated, however,
that the secondary impacts associated with the eventual or periodic
need to handle stored spent fuel for management or disposal purposes
may increase over time the potential impacts of the improved storage
alternatives.
Other Aluminum-Clad Targets--Processing and Storage for Vitrification
in the DWPF
DOE has decided to implement the processing and storage for
vitrification in the DWPF alternative for the other aluminum-clad
targets stored in the reactor disassembly basins at the SRS. DOE will
remove the targets stored in the reactor disassembly basins and
transport them to the canyon facilities by SRS rail casks. The targets
will be dissolved in a canyon, the resulting solutions chemically
adjusted and transferred to the adjacent underground high level waste
tanks. The solutions will be stored in the high level waste tanks until
they are processed in conjunction with the other high level waste in
the tanks. The high level waste will eventually be vitrified in the
DWPF. The resulting stainless steel
[[Page 6637]]
canisters of glass produced from the DWPF process will be stored in a
facility adjacent to the DWPF pending geological disposal by DOE.
DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons.
These targets are in a variety of physical forms and shapes and contain
no or small amounts of fissile materials; primarily they contain such
materials as thorium, cobalt, and thulium. Their dissolution and
transfer for vitrification in the DWPF will place these physically and
chemically diverse materials into a uniform medium suitable for future
emplacement in a geologic repository. Improved storage (the
environmentally preferable alternative) would require the development
of one or more packaging configurations for repository emplacement.
Although vitrification in the DWPF will not occur for several years,
processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF can be implemented
one to six years earlier than the improved storage alternatives. This
will remove the targets in their deteriorating condition from the
reactor disassembly basins, precluding further release of radioactivity
to the basin water. Near-term costs are considerably less for the
processing alternative as compared with the improved storage
alternative. As with the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, potential safety,
health and environmental impacts for the improved storage alternatives
are lower than the selected stabilization alternative of processing and
storage for vitrification in the DWPF. However, the potential impacts
from any of the stabilization alternatives are acceptable and well
below any regulatory or management control limits.
VII. Conclusion
While the Final EIS focuses on the interim management of nuclear
materials at the SRS, the decisions associated with the safe management
of these materials directly affect the operational status of the
nuclear material processing facilities at the Site. The decisions in
this supplemental ROD and the initial ROD and Notice are structured to
effect the earliest completion of actions necessary to stabilize or
convert nuclear materials into forms suitable for safe storage and
prepare the facilities for subsequent shutdown and deactivation. The
actions being implemented will support efficient, cost-effective
consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials and, to a great
extent, will result in stabilization of the nuclear materials and
alleviation of associated vulnerabilities within the timeframe
recommended by the DNFSB.
The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and
processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected
budget constraints and with minimal additional training to required
personnel; rely upon proven technology; use an integrated approach; and
represent the optimum use of facilities to stabilize the materials in
the shortest amount of time. Only minor modifications of the canyon
facilities will be required, and these were also supported by the
decisions made in the initial ROD and Notice.
Several years will be required to achieve stabilization of the
nuclear materials within the scope of this and the initial ROD.
Stabilization of the candidate nuclear materials at SRS will entail the
operation of many portions of the chemical processing facilities.
Consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, this will preserve DOE's
capabilities related to the management and stabilization of other
nuclear materials until programmatic decisions are made.
In summary, the Department has structured its decisions on interim
actions related to management of the nuclear materials at SRS to
achieve stabilization as soon as possible.
Issued at Washington, DC, February 8, 1996.
Thomas P. Grumbly,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 96-3884 Filed 2-20-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
