[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 21, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 6610-6616]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-4017]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 232
[FRA Docket No. PB-9, Notice No. 5]
RIN 2130-AA73
Power Brake Regulations: Two-way End-of-Train Telemetry Devices
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
ACTION: Notice of public regulatory conference.
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SUMMARY: FRA is scheduling a public regulatory conference to further
discuss issues related to two-way end-of-train telemetry devices (2-way
EOTs) previously developed in its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
on power brakes published on September 16, 1994. By earlier notice, FRA
indicated that it would defer action on the NPRM for a short period;
however, FRA also stressed that it did not intend to defer
implementation of the requirement for 2-way EOTs beyond the effective
date contemplated by Congress. Consequently, FRA has decided to
separate proposals regarding 2-way EOTs from the rest of the proposed
power brake revisions and proceed with this public regulatory
conference in order to clarify and resolve those issues related to 2-
way EOTs and issue a final rule on this subject as soon as practicable.
FRA urges railroads to immediately begin acquiring and equipping trains
with 2-way EOTs to enhance the safety of their operations rather than
waiting until issuance of the final rule.
DATES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments must be received no later
than April 15, 1996. Comments received after that date will be
considered to the extent practicable without incurring additional
expense or delay.
(2) Public Regulatory Conference: A public regulatory conference to
discuss issues related to 2-way EOTs will be held March 5, 1996
beginning at 8:30 a.m. in Washington, D.C. Any person wishing to
participate in the public regulatory conference should notify the
Docket Clerk at the address provided below at least five working days
prior to the date of the conference. This notification should identify
the party the person represents and the particular issues the person
plans to address. The notification should also provide the Docket Clerk
with the participant's mailing address. FRA reserves the right to limit
participation in the conference of persons who fail to provide such
notification.
ADDRESSES: (1) Written Comments: Written comments should identify the
docket number and the notice number and must be submitted in triplicate
to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 8201, Washington, D.C.
20590. Persons desiring to be notified that their written comments have
been received by FRA should submit a stamped, self-addressed postcard
with their comments. The Docket Clerk will indicate on the postcard the
date on which the comments were received and will return the card to
the addressee. Written comments will be available for examination, both
before and after the closing date for comments, during regular business
hours in room 8201 of the Nassif Building at the above address.
(2) Public Regulatory Conference: The public regulatory conference
will be held at the following location and date:
Location: Nassif Building, Conference Room 2230, 400 Seventh Street
SW, Washington, D.C. Date: March 5, 1996. Time: 8:30 a.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Peacock, Motive Power and
Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-9186),
or Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, FRA,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-
0628).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
certain statutory mandates related to power brake safety. See 49 U.S.C.
20141 (formerly contained in Section 7 of the Rail Safety Enforcement
and Review Act, Pub. L. No. 102- 365 (September 3, 1992), amending
Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970, formerly
codified at 45 U.S.C. 421, 431 et seq.). In these amendments, Congress
instructed the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to promulgate
regulations requiring the use of 2-way EOTs. Congress' mandate sets out
various minimum requirements that any promulgated rule must contain and
specifically lists various types of operations that are to be excluded
from the requirements, leaving the Secretary with discretion to exclude
other types of operations if it is in the public interest and
consistent with railroad safety. See 49 U.S.C. 20141. Congress mandated
that the rules be promulgated by the end
[[Page 6611]]
of 1993, and envisioned a date for implementation of the requirements
of no later than December 31, 1997. In addition to the statutory
mandate, FRA received recommendations from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and petitions from the United Transportation Union,
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Oregon Public Utilities
Commission, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, and
the Montana Public Service Commission to require 2-way EOTs on all
cabooseless trains operating in certain territories.
In response to the statutory mandate, the various recommendations,
and due to its own determination that the power brake regulations were
in need of revision, FRA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) on December 31, 1992 (57 FR 62546). A section of the
ANPRM was specifically designed to elicit comments, information, and
views on 2-way EOTs and a portion of the public hearings covered this
topic. See 57 FR 62550-62551. Based on the comments and information
received, FRA published an NPRM regarding revision the power brake
regulation which contained specific requirements related to 2-way EOTs.
See 57 FR 47700, 47713-14, 47731, 47734, and 47743.
Following publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register (59 FR
47676), FRA held a series of public hearings in 1994 to allow
interested parties the opportunity to comment on specific issues
addressed in the NPRM. Public hearings were held in Chicago, Illinois
on November 1-2; in Newark, New Jersey on November 4; in Sacramento,
California on November 9; and in Washington, D.C. on December 13-14,
1994. These hearings were attended by numerous railroads, organizations
representing railroads, labor organizations, and state governmental
agencies. Due to the strong objections raised by a large number of
commenters, FRA announced by notice published on January 17, 1995 that
it would defer action on the NPRM and permit the submission of
additional comments prior to making a determination as to how it would
proceed in this matter. 60 FR 3375. In the January notice, FRA also
stressed that it did not intend to defer implementation of the
requirement for 2-way EOTs beyond an effective date of December 31,
1997.
In the ANPRM and the NPRM, FRA identified eleven recent incidents
that might have been avoided had the involved trains been equipped with
2-way EOTs. See 57 FR 62550; 59 FR 47713-14. In addition, on December
14, 1994, in Cajon Pass, an intermodal train operated by The Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe) collided with the rear
end of a unit coal train operated by the Union Pacific Railroad Company
resulting in the serious injury of two crew members and total estimated
damages in excess of $4 million. After investigation of this incident,
the NTSB concluded that had the train been equipped with a 2-way EOT
the collision could have been avoided because the engineer could have
initiated an emergency brake application from the end of the train. On
December 15, 1995, based on the conclusion reached above, the NTSB made
the following recommendation to FRA:
Separate the two-way end-of-train requirements from the Power
Brake Law NPRM, and immediately conclude the end-of-train device
rulemaking so as to require the use of two-way end-of-train
telemetry devices on all cabooseless trains. (Class II, Priority
Action)(R-95-44).
Furthermore, on February 1, 1996, again in Cajon Pass, a westward
Santa Fe freight train derailed on a descending 3-percent grade. The
incident resulted in fatal injuries to two of the crew members, serious
injuries to a third, and the derailment of 45 of 49 cars and four
locomotives. Although investigation of this incident is currently in
progress, it appears as though it could have been avoided had the train
been equipped with a means for the train crew to have effected an
emergency brake application from the rear of the train. The two
aforementioned incidents resulted in FRA's issuance on February 6,
1996, of Emergency Order No. 18, 61 FR 5058, which requires the
affected railroad to ensure that its train crews have the ability to
effect an emergency brake application from the rear of the train on all
westward freight trains operating through Cajon Pass.
Consequently, based on these considerations and after review of all
the comments submitted, FRA has determined that in order to limit the
number of issues to be examined and developed in any one proceeding it
will proceed with the revision of the power brake regulations via three
separate processes. In light of the testimony and comments received on
the NPRM, emphasizing the differences between passenger and freight
operations and the brake equipment utilized by the two, FRA will
propose to separate passenger equipment power brake standards from
freight equipment power brake standards. As passenger equipment power
brake standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment safety
standards, the passenger equipment safety standards working group will
assist FRA in developing a second NPRM covering passenger equipment
power brake standards. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). In addition, it is FRA's
intention to have a second NPRM covering freight equipment power brake
standards developed with the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee, which FRA is in the process establishing, subject to
Administration approval. Furthermore, in the interest of public safety
and due to statutory as well as internal commitments, FRA intends to
separate the issues related to 2-way EOTs from both the passenger and
freight issues, address them in the public regulatory conference being
announced by this notice, and issue a final rule on the subject as soon
as practicable. FRA feels that an informal public regulatory conference
would prove advantageous in the development of regulations related to
2-way EOTs. FRA also believes that the quality of the agency's final
rule will be improved by facilitating an exchange of ideas that may
lead to solutions acceptable to all interested parties.
Methodology
In accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.), the public regulatory conference is a
continuation of the power brake rulemaking proceeding. A court reporter
will take a verbatim transcript of the conference which will be placed
in the public docket for this rulemaking. The format of the discussions
will be informal and will employ a topical, interactive approach. The
public regulatory conference is currently scheduled for one day. FRA
believes the time allotted for this conference will prove more than
adequate. Of course, the conference will conclude earlier than planned
if, based upon advice from the participants in attendance the agency
concludes that the major issues have been adequately addressed.
Participants
FRA invites all affected parties, including small entities, to
participate in the public regulatory conference. FRA believes that
extensive comment from all interested parties is necessary to develop
the most effective and reasonable final regulation. For this conference
to be successful, participants should be prepared to discuss, at a
minimum, the issues identified below and provide reasonable
alternatives, if necessary. FRA also encourages participants to bring
supporting documentation where appropriate.
[[Page 6612]]
Issues for Discussion
In 1992, Congress amended the Federal rail safety laws by adding
specific statutory mandates related to 2-way EOTs which state:
(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.
* * * * *
(3)(A) The Secretary shall require 2-way end of train devices (or
devices able to perform the same function) on road trains other than
locals, road switchers, or work trains to enable the initiation of
emergency braking from the rear of the train. The Secretary shall
promulgate rules as soon as possible, but not later than December 31,
1993, requiring such 2-way end of train devices. Such rules shall at a
minimum--
(i) Set standards for such devices based on performance;
(ii) Prohibit any railroad, on or after the date that is one year
after promulgation of such rules, from acquiring any end of train
device for use on trains which is not a 2-way device meeting the
standards set under clause (i);
(iii) Require that such trains be equipped with 2-way end of train
devices meeting such standards not later than 4 years after
promulgation of such rules; and
(iv) Provide that any 2-way end of train device acquired for use on
trains before such promulgation shall be deemed to meet such standards.
(B) The Secretary may consider petitions to amend the rules
promulgated under subparagraph (A) to allow the use of alternative
technologies which meet the same basic performance requirements
established by such rules.
(C) In developing the rules required by subparagraph (A), the
Secretary shall consider data presented under paragraph (1).
(4) The Secretary may exclude from the rules required by paragraphs
(1), (2), and (3) any category of trains or rail operations if the
Secretary determines that such an exclusion is in the public interest
and is consistent with railroad safety. The Secretary shall make public
the reasons for granting any such exclusion. The Secretary shall at a
minimum exclude from the requirements of paragraph (3)--
(A) Trains that have manned cabooses;
(B) Passenger trains with emergency brakes;
(C) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of
the general railroad system;
(D) Trains that do not exceed 30 miles per hour and do not operate
on heavy grades, except for any categories of such trains specifically
designated by the Secretary; and
(E) Trains that operate in a push mode.
Pub. L. No. 102-365, Sec. 7; codified with some differences in
language at 49 U.S.C. 20141 (formerly codified at 45 U.S.C. 431(r)).
FRA has already received a substantial number of comments on 2-way
EOTs, either through testimony provided or written comments submitted
in connection with the ANPRM and the NPRM that were previously issued.
This public regulatory conference is designed to afford interested
parties an opportunity to expand on those comments and further discuss
the issues related to 2-way EOTs. After review of the comments
received, FRA has identified seven major issues for discussion which
include: the definition of ``mountain grade territory''; the handling
of en route failures of the devices; the operations to which the
requirements will be applicable; initial terminal requirements; design
requirements; calibration requirements; and cost/benefit information.
The following discussion is intended to highlight FRA's proposals
regarding 2-way EOTs contained in the NPRM and to provide a brief
overview of some of the comments received on those proposals. For the
exact wording of any of the proposed requirements or for more detailed
discussion of the proposals, individuals should refer directly to the
NPRM. Furthermore, the listing of issues contained below is not
intended to be exhaustive; we solicit comments on all issues relevant
to 2-way EOTs.
A. Definition of ``Mountain Grade Territory''
In Appendix C of the NPRM, FRA proposed a definition of mountain
grade territory as a section of track of distance, D, with an average
grade of 1.5 percent or more over that distance which satisfies the
relationship:
(30/V)\2\G\2\D12
Where:
G=average grade x 100
D=distance in miles over which average grade is taken
V=speed of train
See 59 FR 47719,47753. FRA also provided a chart containing
mountain grade territory curves based on an application of the
definition. See 59 FR 47753. FRA developed this empirical relationship
based on most commenters' suggestions that some type of formula be
developed based on a variety of factors, including train tonnage,
speed, length of grade, percent of grade, and distance of grade. FRA
determined that the three most important variables in defining mountain
grade were: (i) The speed of the train (V); (ii) the steepness of the
grade (G); and (iii) the length of the grade (D).
According to the empirical relationship proposed by FRA, no one of
these variables determines mountain grade operating conditions; it
takes a combination of the three. The (30/V)\2\ term is the ratio of
the train's speed to the reference speed of 30 mph, and it is squared
because the speed of the train is a dominant variable in the
relationship. The V term is in the denominator because as the speed of
the train increases the ratio decreases, which makes satisfying the
overall inequality defining mountain grade operating conditions more
likely. The G term is squared because the steepness of the grade is a
dominant variable. The G term is in the numerator because a steeper
grade makes satisfying the overall inequality more likely. The D term
is not squared because the length of the grade is less dominant than
either the speed of the train or the steepness of the grade. The D term
is in the numerator because a longer distance of grade makes satisfying
the overall inequality more likely. The number 12 was selected because
it yields a range of reasonable results for the definition.
Many commenters stated that FRA's definition was confusing,
inaccurate, and impractical. These commenters suggested that the
definition would result in known mountain grades not being covered by
the 2-way EOT requirement, while other areas never before believed to
be mountain grades would fall within the requirement. Several
commenters also recommended that the definition be eliminated and that
the 2-way EOT requirements apply solely to trains operating in excess
of 30 mph. The California Public Utilities Commission suggested that
short of requiring the devices on every train, the fundamental
criterion should be the ability of the train to stop within a safe
distance. Other commenters suggested that other criteria be used to
define mountain grade territory and that the formula be simplified. One
commenter recommended that the proposed definition be eliminated, and
that the 2-way EOT requirements be applied to trains operating over 30
mph and to heavy tonnage and long trains as defined in the proposal.
(1) FRA recognizes that the definition contained in the NPRM may be
somewhat confusing and may lead to anomalous results. FRA also
recognizes that a definition of mountain grade that uses speed as a
variable may be inappropriate because if a significant portion of the
braking system becomes
[[Page 6613]]
inoperative on a long, steep grade a runaway can occur regardless of
the speed that the train started down the grade. Consequently, FRA is
open to alternate suggestions to simplify or clarify the definition of
mountain grade territory. However, FRA does not believe discarding the
concept of mountain grade territory would be consistent with the safety
objectives of the statute.
(2) FRA is interested in any alternative methods or formulas for
defining mountain or heavy grade territory. For example:
Mountain grade territory could be defined as: any portion of a
railroad with an average grade of 1% or greater where the product of
the average percent grade (as a decimal) and the distance over which
the grade persists (in miles) is greater than or equal to .03. Thus
a 1% (.01) average grade for 3 miles or a 2% (.02) average grade for
1.5 miles would meet the definition for mountain grade territory.
FRA encourages all interested parties to develop and be prepared to
discuss their alternatives for defining mountain grade territory.
(3) Several railroads include definitions of mountain grade
territory in their operating rules, for example, Burlington Northern
Railroad Company's Air Brake and Train Handling Rules define mountain
grade as 1.8 percent grades and greater. For what purpose do railroads
use these definitions of mountain grade, and could these definitions be
used as a basis for defining mountain grade territory in this rule?
B. En Route Failures
In the NPRM, FRA proposed that if a 2-way EOT or equivalent device
becomes incapable of initiating an emergency brake application from the
rear of the train while the train is en route, then the speed of that
train would be limited to 30 mph. See 59 FR 47714, 47743. FRA's
rationale for this limitation was that two-way EOT devices are not
required on trains that travel less than 30 mph. Thus, operating with a
non-functional two-way EOT device is the same as not having a device;
consequently, trains operating with failed two-way EOT devices should
be subjected to this same limitation. Furthermore, FRA suggested that
the concerns raised by several railroads regarding train delays, missed
deliveries, and safety were not justified. The Association of American
Railroads (AAR) as well as several railroads commented that these
devices are very reliable and have an extremely low failure rate, if
properly maintained. Consequently, FRA believed that the concerns of
the railroads were outweighed by the potential harm to both the public
and railroad employees caused by trains being allowed to operate
without the devices at speeds which Congress and FRA feel require the
added safety benefits provided by these devices.
Several railroads commented on FRA's proposal reinforcing the view
that such a limitation could cause serious train delays and missed
deliveries and would actually produce additional safety hazards due to
the bunching of trains. Commenters also suggested that FRA failed to
include the cost of this limitation in its analysis. Other commenters
noted that subsequent to the drafting of the NPRM, Canada eliminated
its speed restriction for failure of a 2-way EOT en route.
(1) Are there alternative operating limits that could be imposed
when a failure of a 2-way EOT occurs en route providing a degree of
safety similar to the proposed speed limitation?
(2) Can the costs of train delays and missed deliveries
attributable to the proposed speed limitation be quantified? What are
they?
(3) Has Canada's elimination of a similar speed restriction
resulted in a reduction in safety? What has been the result of the
elimination?
(4) To what extent should failures en route in mountain grade
territory trigger special restrictions?
C. Applicability
Based on the statutory mandate and after review of the comments
received and the accidents relied on for support of the use of 2-way
EOTs, FRA in the NPRM proposed that the devices be required equipment
on trains that operate at speeds in excess of 30 mph and on trains that
operate in mountain grade territories. See 59 FR 47743. (A discussion
of FRA's definition of ``mountain grade territory'' is contained in
Section A). In addition to those operations specifically excluded from
2-way EOT requirements by the statute (49 U.S.C. 20141), FRA found
sufficient safety justification for excluding two other types of
operations: (i) freight trains equipped with a locomotive capable of
initiating a brake application located in the rear third of the train
length; and (ii) trains equipped with fully independent secondary
braking systems capable of safely stopping the train in the event of
failure of the primary system. In order to provide the industry with
time to acquire a sufficient number of 2-way EOTs and to ease the
economic impact of acquiring the devices, FRA proposed that the
requirement that all road trains not specifically excepted be equipped
with either a 2-way EOT or an alternate technology device performing
the same function not become effective until December 31, 1996. See 59
FR 47713, 47743. FRA also proposed that all 2-way EOTs purchased prior
to the effective date of the final rule would be deemed to meet the
design requirements contained in the proposal. See 59 FR 47713, 47743.
Other than FRA's definition of ``mountain grade territory,'' there
were very few comments specifically addressing the applicability
requirements contained in the NPRM other than stylistic suggestions.
One commenter did recommend that the exception for trains operating in
a push mode be amplified to require that the control cab on the rear of
train be occupied, display a reading of the brake pressure, and be
capable of making an emergency application.
(1) Is there a safety justification for excluding other types of
operations not currently contemplated? What are they?
(2) As it has been over three years since Congress issued the
statutory mandate regarding 2-way EOTs and because the data relied on
by FRA in developing the NPRM is close to two years old, FRA would like
updated information regarding the number of 2-way EOTs currently in
use, the number currently on order with manufacturers, the current cost
of 2-way EOTs meeting the proposed design requirements, and the
reliability of the devices currently in use.
(3) Subsequent to the drafting of the NPRM, FRA has learned that
some traditional passenger operations are considering the operation of
mixed passenger and freight trains. How should these types of
operations be handled with regard to the use of 2-way EOTs? Is there a
safety justification for excepting these operations from the
requirements?
D. Initial Terminal Requirements
At the ANPRM stage, FRA received several comments regarding the
batteries used in 2-way EOTs. Several commenters suggested that the
most frequent cause of failure of 2-way EOTs is battery failure. These
commenters also indicated that this problem could be cured by replacing
batteries at initial terminals. Other commenters suggested that some
minimum charge be required at initial terminals and that inspections be
performed at all brake tests and crew change points. Several commenters
also suggested that interchangeable battery packs were necessary
because some railroads were unable to charge the devices that come onto
their lines from other railroads.
[[Page 6614]]
Based on these comments, FRA proposed that any train equipped with
a 2-way EOT or its equivalent shall not depart from the point where the
train is originally assembled unless (i) the device is capable of
initiating a brake application from the rear of the train and (ii) the
batteries of the device are charged to at least 75 percent of watt-hour
capacity. See 59 FR 47734. Although FRA did not receive any comments on
this provision subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM, FRA feels this
was due to most commenters focusing on some of the broader issues
contained in the NPRM.
Due to the period of time since hearings on the ANPRM were
conducted, FRA requests the following:
(1) Information regarding the operating life of batteries currently
used in 2-way EOTs;
(2) Information regarding the reliability and interchangeability of
these batteries; and
(3) Opinions on whether the proposed requirements are necessary
based on the experiences of those parties currently using 2-way EOTs on
a regular basis.
E. Design Requirements
In order to maintain uniformity in the performance of 2-way EOT
devices, FRA proposed basic performance and design requirements for
these devices in the NPRM. As 2-way EOTs that are currently in
production meet the design requirements already established for one-way
devices contained at 49 CFR 232.19, FRA intended to retain those
requirements, apply them to 2-way EOTs and establish other specific
requirements to ensure two-way communication and the ability to make an
emergency brake application from the rear of the train. The additional
proposed requirements include the following:
(a) An emergency brake application command from the front unit
shall activate the emergency air valve at the rear of the train within
one second.
(b) The rear unit shall send an acknowledgment message to the front
unit immediately upon receipt of a brake application command. The front
unit shall listen for this acknowledgment and repeat the brake
application command if the acknowledgment is not correctly received.
(c) The rear unit, on receipt of a properly coded command, shall
open a valve in the brake line and hold it open for a minimum of 15
seconds. This opening of the valve shall cause the brake line to vent
to the exterior.
(d) The valve opening and hose diameter shall have a minimum
diameter of 3/4 inch to effect an emergency brake application.
(e) Restoring of the braking function (recharging the air brake
system) shall be enabled automatically by the rear equipment, no more
than 60 seconds after it has initiated an emergency.
(f) The front unit shall have a manually operated switch which,
when activated, shall initiate an emergency brake transmission command
to the rear unit. The switch shall be labeled ``Emergency'' and shall
be protected so that there will exist no possibility of accidental
activation.
(g) The availability of the front-to-rear communications link shall
be checked automatically at least every 10 [seconds]*.
(h) Means shall be provided to confirm availability and proper
functioning of the emergency valve.
(i) Means shall be provided to arm the front and rear units to
ensure the rear unit responds only to an emergency command from its
associated front unit.
See 59 FR 47731. *(Section 232.117(g) of the NPRM inadvertently
contained ``10 minutes'' for this requirement; it should have read ``10
seconds.'' See 59 FR 47731). FRA recognizes that currently available
2-way EOTs have several optional features that could prove beneficial
to railroads and although FRA recommends that railroads obtain as many
of the optional features as they can when purchasing the devices, FRA
does not intend to mandate their use and feels each railroad is in the
best position to determine which features benefit its operation.
Several commenters suggested that the provision requiring the
automatic restoration of the brake function after 60 seconds should be
eliminated. These commenters stated that the brake function should not
be restored until the train has come to a complete stop and/or that the
locomotive engineer should retain control of the restoration. One
commenter recommended that a separate labeled and protected emergency
switch should not be mandated if the EOT's emergency application could
be integrated into the existing emergency brake controls.
(1) Are the proposed design requirements sufficient to ensure
uniformity in the devices' design? Do they unduly restrict
technological advances?
(2) FRA is interested in any information regarding any
technological advancements or design changes, that may have been made
in the area of 2-way EOTs in the last two years, that would necessitate
a change in or addition to the proposed design requirements.
(3) FRA is also interested in any information from railroads
currently using 2-way EOTs regarding the procedures or practices they
have adopted for testing and inspecting the devices to ensure that the
devices are armed and operational prior to a train's departure. Could
or should these practices and procedures form the basis of such
requirements in this rule?
(4) Based on information obtained in investigating the recent
accident near Cajon Pass, FRA is interested information regarding
problems with maintaining communication between the front and rear
units. What procedures or operations have been developed to overcome
these communication problems? Could or should these be incorporated in
this rule? Are there additional design requirements that could cure
these communication problems? Minimum wattage requirements? Requiring
repeater stations where necessary?
F. Calibration Requirements
In the NPRM, FRA proposed to extend the calibration period for all
EOTs from 92 days to 365 days. See 59 FR 47700, 47731. FRA based this
proposed extension not only on its own experience but also on the
comments received from several parties that the devices are fairly
reliable and can operate for years without calibration. Furthermore,
FRA believes that the 92-day calibration period was established at a
time when there was little experience with the devices. Since that
time, not only has calibration of the devices not proven to be a
problem, but technology has further improved the reliability of the
devices. Although several commenters, both at the ANPRM and NPRM stage,
commented on the unreliability of the devices, these comments generally
addressed either the failure of the railroads to properly perform the
calibrations or the misuse of the devices.
(1) FRA is interested in information and operating experiences
regarding the reliability and accuracy of recently manufactured EOTs.
G. Cost/Benefit Information
Based on information collected and additional research conducted
subsequent to the issuance of the NPRM, FRA has updated its Regulatory
Impact Analysis regarding 2- way EOTs. See FRA's Regulatory Impact
Analysis: Two-way End-of-Train Devices. (This document will be
distributed to all interested parties at the public regulatory
conference, or copies may be
[[Page 6615]]
obtained by contacting the individuals previously identified.) FRA
currently estimates that the proposed requirements regarding 2-way EOTs
would cost the industry approximately $214 million over 20 years at a 7
percent discount rate. This estimate is based on the following
assumptions: (i) unit purchase and installation cost of $7,000 per unit
(front and rear); (ii) annual maintenance and calibration cost of
Sec. 415 per unit; (iii) Class I railroads would be required to
purchase 16,375 units; and (iv) Class II and Class III railroads would
be required to purchase 1,096 units.
Although FRA did not quantify the safety benefits that would be
achieved by requiring 2-way EOTs in its original Regulatory Impact
Analysis of the NPRM, FRA is in the process of developing an analysis
to include safety benefits of the proposed requirements. See FRA's
Regulatory Impact Analysis: Two-way End-of-Train Devices. FRA currently
estimates that the quantifiable safety benefits from the proposal would
be approximately $46 million over 20 years at a 7 percent discount
rate. However, it should be noted that the benefits currently estimated
by FRA are extremely conservative and are based on a limited number of
cost factors arising as a result of an accident. FRA's conservative
benefit estimate does not capture many of the costs associated with an
accident such as: wreck clearance; damage to lading; train delay,
emergency response, or enviromental clean-up. FRA looks forward to
receiving information and suggestions from commenters on methods for
capturing or estimating these additional costs. FRA's Office of Safety,
Accidents Reports Division, has identified 26 accidents since 1990
which potentially could have been prevented had the trains been
equipped with 2-way EOTs. The accidents and railroad property damages
associated with the potentially preventable accidents are contained in
Table 1 below.
Table 1--Potentially Preventable Accidents*
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RR Property Accidents
Date Place Listed Cause** Injuries Fatalities updated to Rate of preventable
12/95 $ effectiveness Benefit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
900429............................. Yardley, WA........... Automatic Brake, other 1 0 $46,560 0.9 $41,904
improper use.
901004............................. Devore, CA............ Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 7,857 0.9 7,071
901022............................. Esbon, KS............. use of brakes, other.. 1 0 90,016 0.9 81,014
900517............................. Nampa, WY............. Obstructed brake pipe. 0 0 151,319 0.9 136,187
910918............................. Spague, WA............ Obstructed brake pipe. 0 1 4,275,873 0.9 3,848,286
910304............................. Waterfall, WY......... Use of brakes, other.. 2 0 980,075 0.5 882,068
910304............................. Waterfall, WY......... Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 646,407 0.5 581,767
911021............................. Vernon, IA............ Other brake defects, 0 0 24,755 0.5 22,280
cars.
920307............................. Kansas City, MO....... Obstructed brake pipe. 2 0 430,432 0.9 387,389
920307............................. Kansas City, MO....... Obstructed brake pipe. 0 0 61,875 0.9 55,688
920611............................. Money, MS............. Improper operation of 0 0 224,778 0.5 202,300
line air.
920611............................. Money, MS............. Improper operation of 2 0 452,334 0.5 407,101
line air.
920913............................. Benton, WY............ Other brake defects, 0 0 15,579 0.5 14,021
loco.
921016............................. Sterling, IL.......... Other brake defects, 0 0 148,998 0.5 134,098
loco.
921203............................. Hillcrest, ID......... Automatic brake, 2 0 7,071 0.5 6,364
insufficient.
921203............................. Hillcrest, ID......... Automatic brake, 0 0 71,819 0.5 64,638
insufficient.
931001............................. Keystone, NB.......... Obstructed brake pipe. 0 0 10,572 0.9 9,515
931001............................. Keystone, NB.......... Obstructed brake pipe. 2 0 2,642,466 0.9 2,378,219
931004............................. Faust, UT............. Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 14,801 0.9 13,321
931011............................. Fulton, KY............ Improper operation of 0 0 3,172 0.5 2,854
line air.
931011............................. Fulton, KY............ Improper operation of 0 0 11,418 0.5 10,276
line air.
931221............................. Wood, IA.............. Improper operation of 0 0 321,600 0.5 289,440
line air.
931221............................. Wood, IA.............. Improper operation of 0 0 106,936 0.5 96,242
line air.
931223............................. Grenada, MS........... Improper operation of 0 0 5,815 0.5 5,233
line air.
931223............................. Grenada, MS........... Improper operation of 0 0 5,286 0.5 4,757
line air.
940909............................. Cajon, CA............. Automatic brake other 0 0 73,331 0.9 65,998
improper use.
940909............................. Cajon, CA (San B)..... Automatic brake, 0 0 2,353 0.9 2,117
insufficient.
941214............................. Cajon, CA............. Obstructed brake pipe. 1 0 1,293,484 0.9 1,164,135
941214............................. Cajon, CA............. Obstructed brake pipe. 2 0 2,765,060 0.9 2,488,554
950209............................. Nelsons, WI........... Use of brakes, other.. 0 0 25,025 0.9 22,522
950209............................. Nelsons, WI........... Use of brakes, other.. 1 0 5,702 0.9 5,132
950406............................. Argonne, MI........... Improper operation of 0 1 268,798 0.9 241,918
line air.
960201............................. Cajon, CA............. Unknown............... 1 2 Unknown ............. Unknown
TOTAL........................ ...................... ...................... 17 4 16,540,459 ............. 14,886,413
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* A double entry showing more than one accident on the same date and at the same location indicates that the equipment or other property of two
railroads were involved.
** Cause listed in the Rail Equipment Accident/Incident Report filed with FRA, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 225, by the railroad involved.
The accidents range in severity from those having very little
monetary damages to those involving death, serious injury, the release
of hazardous materials and the subsequent closure of a major federal
highway and evacuation of a nearby town. The values for railroad
property and track damages are shown updated to December 1995 dollars
using the Engineering News Record index for heavy machinery and
equipment.
[[Page 6616]]
Furthermore, there is a wide variety of qualitative safety benefits
which could be gained from prevention of accidents by using 2-way EOTs.
These types of qualitative benefits would include risk reduction of
accidents involving hazardous materials and the associated costs, as
well as reduced anxiety for residents of communities along railroad
tracks, a safer environment for their families, and improved quality of
life. Unfortunately, we do not have the type of information necessary
to quantify the safety impact of many of these elements.
(1) Are the assumptions used by FRA in its updated Regulatory
Impact Analysis valid?
(2) What is the current purchase and installation cost of a 2-way
EOT required by FRA's proposal?
(3) Are the estimated annual maintenance costs accurate?
(4) Is FRA's estimate of the number of units required to be
purchased accurate? How many 2-way units are currently in operation?
How many are currently on order with a manufacturer?
(5) What is the en route failure rate of 2-way devices currently in
use?
(6) What is the average useful life of currently available 2-way
EOTs? Front units? Rear units?
(7) What is the estimated cost per hour of delay for a given train?
(8) On average, how long does it take to calibrate newer (post-
1992) 2-way EOTs?
(9) Should any of the accidents/incidents identified in Table 1 not
be considered potentially preventable? Why? Are there other accidents/
incidents, not identified in Table 1, occurring since 1990 that should
be added to the list of potentially preventable accidents/incidents?
Provide specifics.
(10) FRA's ability to analyze accident/incident costs contained in
Table 1 has been limited to data supplied by the industry. This
information does not include costs such as wreck clearance, damage to
lading, train delay, emergency response, and environmental cleanup.
Consequently, FRA encourages commenters to provide any suggestions or
information they have for capturing, or estimating, these additional
costs.
H. Compliance Plans
Unlike most FRA safety rulemaking proceedings, this proceeding is
principally concerned with defining exceptions to an otherwise absolute
statutory command. Thus, whatever the final rule may provide, railroads
must plan well in advance of December 31, 1997 (the date by which the
statute requires all covered trains to be equipped with 2-way EOTs) to
procure large numbers of 2-way EOTs, equip their trains with them, and
train their employees to install, maintain, and use them. FRA,
therefore urges railroads to immediately begin acquiring and equipping
trains with 2-way EOTs to enhance the safety of their operations rather
than waiting until the issuance of the final rule. FRA is interested in
knowing in the greatest detail available what plans railroads currently
have in place for complying with the statute.
Issued in Washington, D.C., on February 15, 1996.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-4017 Filed 2-20-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
