[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 36 (Thursday, February 22, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6876-6882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-4204]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Emergency Order No. 20, Notice No. 1]
Commuter and Intercity Passenger Railroads, Including Public
Authorities Providing Passenger Service, and Affected Freight
Railroads; Emergency Order Requiring Enhanced Operating Rules and Plans
for Ensuring the Safety of Passengers Occupying the Leading Car of a
Train
Introduction
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that the safety of
passengers and railroad employees compels issuance of this Emergency
Order. Based on the historical record, rail passenger transportation in
the United States is an extremely safe mode of transportation. However,
recent train accidents in New Jersey and Maryland, which have claimed a
total of fourteen lives, have caused DOT, FRA, and the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) (also part of DOT) to have very serious concerns
about the safety of certain aspects of rail passenger transportation.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has the lead in
investigating both accidents. FRA is assisting in both investigations.
Although NTSB will not reach final conclusions as to probable cause of
either accident for some time, NTSB's preliminary conclusions and what
FRA has learned from the investigations (set forth in detail, below)
compel that certain steps be taken now to reduce the risks to
passengers and crew that apparently exist under certain operating
conditions.
Of particular concern are those operations that involve carrying
passengers in the lead car of a train over segments of track that do
not have either cab signal systems (which provide the engineer with an
on-board display of signal indications alongside the tracks) or
automatic train stop or automatic train control systems (which
automatically cause the train to stop or reduce speed where an engineer
fails to respond appropriately to a trackside signal). Both of the
recent accidents involved such operations. While thousands of such
operations occur daily without incident, the occurrence of two fatal
accidents in one week has caused DOT, FRA, and FTA to examine closely
the need for immediate enhancements in the safety of such operations.
Also of great concern, based
[[Page 6877]]
on the Maryland accident, is passenger and crew egress after an
accident.
In summary, this order requires that commuter and intercity
passenger railroads, including public authorities providing passenger
service through contracts with other railroads, and any other entities
(e.g., freight railroads with affected passenger service on their
lines) whose actions are necessary to effectuate this order, take
certain immediate steps with regard to any of their operations above 30
miles per hour that do not entail cab signal, automatic train stop, or
automatic train control protections and that permit passengers to
occupy the leading car (i.e., using either cab cars as the forward car
in the push-pull mode or self-propelled locomotives with passenger
seating (MU locomotives)). As set forth in detail below, those
railroads are required to: (1) adopt and comply with an operating rule
requiring that, when a passenger train stops for any reason, including
a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train
shall proceed under any speed limitations set forth in applicable
railroad operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop
before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed
speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal
displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear;
(2) adopt and comply with an operating rule requiring that a crew
member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab
car, or MU car, shall have a means to orally communicate and will
communicate to another crew member the indication and location of each
wayside signal affecting the movement of the train as soon as the
signal becomes visible, for all signals which require either that the
train be prepared to stop at the next wayside signal or that the train
be prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed; (3)
take certain measures to instruct and test employees on the
aforementioned operating rules; and (4) submit to FRA an interim system
safety plan for enhancing the safety of such operations that includes
(i) a description of circumstances in which the leading car is
permitted to be occupied by passengers; (ii) a review of operating
rules relevant to such operations; (iii) plans for any short-term
technology enhancements that would enhance train control; (iv) a review
of crew management practices to see what steps can be taken to improve
crew alertness; (v) a review of the hazards posed to passengers in the
forward car by vehicles using highway-rail grade crossings; and (vi) a
review of practices, in addition to marking exits, used by the railroad
to inform passengers of the location and operation of emergency exits,
specifying any plans for enhancing such information. In addition, each
of these commuter and intercity passenger railroads, regardless of the
speeds or equipment they use, is required to ensure that each emergency
window on every passenger car is clearly marked on the outside and
inside and that a representative sample has been inspected to make sure
they are operable.
FRA may amend this order at any time to require other actions to
ensure safety. For example, depending on what FRA learns from the
railroads' interim safety plans and other sources after issuance of
this order, it may decide that safety requires it to prohibit one or
more railroads from carrying passengers in the lead car in the absence
of a cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control
system.
Authority
Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been
delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal Railroad
Administrator. 49 CFR Sec. 1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety
jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws. 49 U.S.C.
Secs. 20101, 20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where
an unsafe condition or practice ``causes an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death or personal injury.'' 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104.
These orders may immediately impose ``restrictions and prohibitions
. . . that may be necessary to abate the situation.'' (Ibid.)
Background
New Jersey Transit Accident, Secaucus, NJ. On February 9, 1996, at
about 8:40 a.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey
Transit trains 1254 and 1107 at mile post 2.8, on the borderline of
Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Speed at the point of collision
was approximately 7 m.p.h. for train 1254 and 53 m.p.h. for train 1107.
Of the 325 passengers on both trains, one received fatal injuries and
162 reported minor injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the
nonfatal injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was
operating with the cab control car forward and the locomotive pushing.
In addition, the engineer was fatally injured. The cab control car
incurred substantial damage as a result of near-frontal impact with the
heavier locomotive of train 1107, operating in the ``pull'' mode. The
locomotive engineer on train 1107 was fatally injured as a result of
``cornering'' of the locomotive cab that bypassed the collision posts
in the short hood. Railroad property damage was estimated at more than
$3.5 million. Although the trains involved were equipped with cab
signal and automatic train control (ATC) apparatus, the wayside portion
of the signal system on the lines in question did not provide cab
signals. The method of operation was by wayside signal indication.
Based on preliminary information derived from the joint
investigation of the NTSB, FRA, and other parties, the accident appears
to have resulted from failure of train 1254 to observe signal
indications requiring that the train be stopped short of the junction
where the accident occurred. Agencies are investigating whether lack of
alertness on the part of the locomotive engineer, who was working the
second portion a night ``split shift,'' may have contributed to the
failure to observe signal indications. Since the accident, New Jersey
Transit has eliminated use of the night split shift, which had
previously been a longstanding practice on the railroad.
MARC accident, Silver Spring, MD. On February 16, 1996, at
approximately 5:40 p.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between
Maryland Rail Commuter Authority (MARC) train P28616 and National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train PO2916 on the CSX
Transportation line at Silver Spring, Maryland (milepost 8.3). The
Amtrak train consisted of two locomotives in the lead and 15 cars. The
MARC train consisted of a cab control car in the lead followed by two
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist.
The accident resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crew
members and 8 passengers who were located in the MARC cab car. Non-
fatal injuries were sustained by at least 13 additional passengers of
the MARC train. As this order was prepared, one passenger remained in
critical condition.
Early investigative findings by staff of the NTSB and FRA indicate
that the MARC train, proceeding eastbound toward Washington Union
Station on Track No. 2, passed an intermediate signal conveying an
approach indication (proceed prepared to stop at next signal), made a
scheduled station stop immediately past the signal, accelerated to
approximately 63 miles per hour (maximum timetable speed 70 miles per
hour), and then applied the train's emergency brakes upon rounding a
curve and establishing sight distance for the home signal governing a
crossover between the two main tracks, which is believed to have
displayed a stop signal.
[[Page 6878]]
The MARC train proceeded past the signal and struck the midpoint of the
lead locomotive of the Amtrak train, which was diverging from Track No.
2 to Track No. 1 through the crossover. The initial impact sheared off
the left collision post of the MARC cab car, together with a
substantial portion of the front, side, and roof structure on the left
side approximately one-third of the way back along the length of the
car. The impact also ruptured the left diesel fuel tank of the Amtrak
lead locomotive, discharging an undetermined amount of diesel fuel into
the MARC cab car. The MARC train continued substantially in line,
apparently raking the second locomotive and coming to rest
substantially parallel with the Amtrak train. Diesel fuel present in
the cab car ignited.
Both of these accidents involved casualties in so-called ``push/
pull'' operations with the consist being pushed by a locomotive at the
rear. Control of such operations is conducted from the front of a cab
control car, or ``cab car,'' where an engineer compartment is located.
Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical lines
providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes throughout the
train.
Cab cars provide passenger seating, as well as providing a location
from which the train is operated. Cab cars are built with the same
minimum longitudinal strength as locomotives and with substantial
collision posts at each end to prevent incursion of other vehicles into
the occupied volume. However, cab cars are lighter than powered
vehicles, and no combination of structural measures can wholly prevent
harm to persons in collisions involving substantial forces. Occupants
of cab cars may incur a significantly higher risk of serious injury
when compared with occupants of a locomotive-hauled consist, if the cab
car collides with a heavier rail vehicle or any highway or rail vehicle
transporting hazardous materials. Similar risks may obtain in the case
of electric multiple-unit (EMU) service and diesel multiple-unit (DMU)
service, because those vehicles have a structure similar to that of a
cab car.
FRA recognizes that cab cars have provided hundreds of millions of
miles of safe transportation since they were introduced in the late
1950s. EMU and DMU service has been provided with a high degree of
safety since the early decades of this century. However, the recent
accidents noted above compel FRA to review the safety of these
operations to determine whether means can be found to further reduce
the risk of serious injury in the subject service.
Prior accidents further illustrate the potential risk. For
instance, on August 1, 1981, at Beverly, Massachusetts, a commuter
train engineer was killed and 28 passengers were injured when a
commuter train in the push mode collided head-on with a freight train
due to dispatcher error. On January 2, 1982, at Southhampton,
Pennsylvania, a single rail diesel car commuter train collided with a
gas truck at a highway-rail crossing due to malfunction of the
automated warning device at the crossing (loss of shunt). On November
12, 1987, at Boston, Massachusetts, a train in the push mode struck the
locomotive at the back of a train proceeding in the same direction on
the same track, resulting in injuries to 3 crew members and 220
passengers, due in part to a wayside signal malfunction. At Gary,
Indiana, on January 18, 1993, two EMU consists struck in a cornering
collision at the approach to a gauntlet bridge, resulting in 7
fatalities and 95 persons injured, due to failure of one of the
engineers to observe signal indications.
Related FRA Rulemaking Actions
FRA is engaged in a broad range of actions designed to further
enhance the safety of passenger operations. In September of 1994, the
Secretary of Transportation announced that FRA would develop passenger
equipment safety standards in two phases: initial regulations dealing
with the most critical issues in three years, and final regulations
dealing with all related subjects in five years. In November 1994,
Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994,
section 215 of which requires the Secretary to issue regulations under
the timetable the Secretary had previously announced, as measured from
the enactment of the statute. FRA has begun a rulemaking concerning
comprehensive passenger equipment safety standards. A Passenger
Equipment Working Group, including representatives of passenger
operators, employee representatives, rail passenger organizations, and
States, assisted by railway suppliers, began work last summer on
proposed rules. An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking describing the
issues under consideration by the working group will be published this
spring, followed by one or more notices of proposed rulemaking on
issues such as the following:
Inspection, testing and maintenance of passenger
equipment;
Crashworthiness of passenger equipment, including cab car
and passenger coach structural strength;
Emergency features integral to the train (e.g., emergency
lighting, operation of doors, access points in the event equipment is
on its side);
Standards for high-speed equipment; and
Passenger car interiors.
The working group will also prepare a second Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) for passenger power brakes (which may be combined
with other subject matter). FRA anticipates publication of an NPRM on
passenger equipment safety measures in 1996, followed by a final rule
in 1997, as required by law. Issues requiring further research and
technology development may be included in a subsequent NPRM.
Under the same statutory authority, FRA has also established an
Emergency Preparedness Working Group for rail passenger service that is
broadly representative of interested parties. This effort builds on a
process of research and consultation initiated in 1993. The working
group is presently preparing an NPRM addressing issues such as on-board
emergency equipment, availability of first aid, liaison with emergency
responders, communication capability, and advance planning. Publication
of the NPRM is anticipated in early summer.
The measures taken in this emergency order address matters of
immediate concern as identified in the investigation of recent
accidents. These measures will be integrated into the process of
dialogue and discussion already underway with respect to passenger
equipment safety and emergency preparedness. However, FRA believes that
public safety requires the actions called for by this order now rather
than waiting for the rulemaking process to run its course.
The Need for Action
Although definitive conclusions have not been reached, preliminary
indications are that both the Secaucus and Silver Spring accidents
could have been prevented had wayside signal indications been followed,
and the death tolls might have been reduced significantly had occupied
cab cars not been the lead cars. Additionally, the Silver Spring
accident indicates a need to ensure that emergency windows are clearly
marked and operable. FRA believes that certain immediate measures are
necessary to prevent a recurrence of these problems.
There is no evidence that push/pull or EMU operations are in any
way over represented in passenger train accidents. All rail passenger
operations, like other forms of transportation,
[[Page 6879]]
involve some risk of injury due to collision with other vehicles or
fixed structures. In certain accident scenarios (e.g., where the
passenger consist in question is impacted from the rear), push-pull
operations with the cab car forward actually offer greater protection.
However, in collisions involving the front of the passenger train, cab
car forward and MU operations do present an increased risk of severe
personal injury or death when compared with locomotive-hauled service.
This risk is of particular concern where operations are conducted at
relatively higher speeds, where there is a mix of various types of
trains, and where there are numerous highway-rail crossings over which
large motor vehicles are operated.
As the accidents of past two weeks illustrate, this potential for
accidents of greater severity warrants a review of measures taken to
prevent such accidents. Since most train collisions on the railroad
result from human factors, the most effective preventive measure is a
highly effective train control system. Cab signal systems serve an
important safety purpose because they provide a constant display of the
governing signal indication. This provides a corrective measure should
an engineer fail to note, forget, or misread a restrictive wayside
signal indication. Even greater security is provided by a train control
system capable of intervening should the engineer fail to observe
signals and operating rules for whatever reason (e.g., lack of
alertness due to fatigue, sudden incapacitation, loss of situational
awareness due to unusual events). Such systems are referred to as
automatic train control or automatic train stop systems. New
technologies currently under development and demonstration that can
prevent collisions and overspeed derailments are known as ``positive
train separation'' (PTS), ``positive train control'' (PTC), or advanced
train control (ATCS) systems.
1. Necessary Rule Changes
With regard to cab car forward and MU operations over territory
lacking at least cab signals, the immediate need is to ensure that
signal indications are followed. FRA believes that certain operating
rules, already in place on many railroads, will assist engineers in
remembering and adhering to signal indications. One rule will require
that signal indications for an approach or less favorable than an
approach be called out by the engineer as they are seen. A designated
crewmember elsewhere in the train will acknowledge the communication
and, in the absence of an appropriate response to a restrictive
indication that has been communicated, take action to ensure the
appropriate response. This will serve as a simple device to help the
engineer remember to abide by signal indications and will add safety
redundancy by involving other crew members in responsibility for safety
with regard to compliance with signals.
The second rule will require that, if a passenger train enters a
block on a signal indication and the train stops for any reason,
including a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the
train shall proceed under speed limitations set forth in existing
applicable operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop
before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed
speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal
displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear.
(For purposes of this order, a ``block'' is a length of track of
defined limits the use of which is governed by wayside signal
indications.) This will prevent situations where a signal displays an
aspect less favorable than ``clear'' prior to a station stop but the
engineer, after stopping and resuming movement, forgets that he or she
should be operating at a reduced speed. This very well may be what
happened in the Silver Spring accident. Under this rule, if the next
signal is clear, timetable speed may be resumed. However, if the next
signal requires a stop, the engineer will have the train under control
and be prepared to stop short of the signal. This rule will presumably
result in a certain amount of slowing of operations between station
stops and the next forward signal, but FRA believes such relatively
minimal delay is warranted to ensure safety.
2. Interim Safety Plans
FRA believes there is a broader need to have railroads carefully
evaluate their passenger operations with a view toward enhancing the
safety of those operations, with particular attention given to the
safety of operations where passengers are in the lead car and to ways
that train control systems might be upgraded. FRA has concluded that
the safety of such operations can be enhanced by having each railroad
develop an interim system safety plan addressing these subjects. This
will both focus the attention of those railroads on avoiding
occurrences similar to the recent accidents and provide FRA with
detailed information allowing it to determine what further action may
be necessary.
Therefore, this order will require railroads operating scheduled
intercity or commuter rail service to conduct an analysis of their
operations and file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the
manner in which risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed.
Railroads are encouraged to implement identified opportunities for risk
reduction immediately. Upon review of these plans and the subject
operations, FRA will determine whether further action is warranted.
Plans will be reviewed with the following factors in mind:
Railroads operating trains with the benefit of cab signals
incur reduced risk. Augmentation of cab signals with ATC or PTC further
reduces risk.
Lower speed operations (e.g., not to exceed 30 miles per
hour) involve less risk because of lower potential collision forces.
The presence of automated warning devices, particularly
flashing lights with gates, reduces risk of highway-rail crossing
accidents involving heavy vehicles, particularly if crossing surfaces
and approaches do not create a ``hump'' capable of hanging up a long,
low truck or trailer.
Moreover, each interim safety plan will address these specific
issues:
Passenger occupancy of cab/MU cars in lead. Each interim safety
plan must include a review of the use of leading cab cars and MU cars
for transportation of passengers. In the Silver Spring accident, most
train occupants were located in the cab car, even though two very
lightly loaded passenger coaches were available for occupancy. Some
operating authorities limit access to cab cars when seating capacity is
not required. This order asks other authorities to review this
potential for risk reduction. For instance, an operator whose service
gathers small numbers of passengers on branch lines, with heavier
loadings at stops on a cab-signal-equipped main line, might direct
passengers to trailing coaches until the train arrives on the main
line.
Operating rules. As noted above, this order requires early
amendment of operating rules to make passenger operations subject to
the ``delayed in block'' provisions of most existing rule books and to
require engineer-to-train crew communication of certain signals. These
steps will enhance safety by adding a layer of redundancy in safety
procedures where presently none exists. In addition to these steps, the
order requires passenger railroads to review other operating rules
applicable to their particular methods of operation to determine if
enhancements in safety can be achieved consistent with provision of
efficient rail passenger service.
[[Page 6880]]
Adverse operating conditions. Crew performance and other aspects of
operational safety can be affected by unusual conditions such as heavy
snow, fog, high water, and other unusual conditions. This order
requires a review of existing procedures to determine if reasonable
enhancements in safety can be made by compensating for the challenges
these conditions pose to system performance.
Short-term technology enhancements. Where the railroad and all
trains are not already cab signal/ATC-equipped, positive train control
systems will offer the most secure means of preventing train
collisions. However, PTC systems remain under development and will be
deployed over a period of several years. The order requires review of
possible technology enhancements that can be achieved over a short time
period. For instance, FRA believes that virtually all passenger
operations include the use of an alerting device that will stop the
train should the engineer become incapacitated. However, certain
freight operations on the same railroad may be conducted without such a
device. Depending upon the number of units involved, equipping
remaining trains with alerting devices (a readily available item) could
close a gap in accident prevention at relatively low cost.
Crew management. Following the accident of February 9, New Jersey
Transit found that it was able to eliminate night split shifts without
adversely affecting operations. Night split shifts present special
problems because of the effect of biological rhythms and fatigue on
human performance. This order requires other passenger operators using
cab car/MU forward trains to review their management of operating crews
to determine if opportunities exist for risk reduction similar to the
action taken by New Jersey Transit. FRA emphasizes that the issue of
on- and off-duty periods is governed by the hours of service law, as
codified at 49 U.S.C. 21102-21108, 21303-21304. The order requires
passenger operators to consider safety improvements that may be
undertaken voluntarily in a manner that is consistent with statutory
law. FRA is also authorized to approve pilot projects involving
variances from the periods specified by the statute upon petition by
the railroad and designated representatives of the employees involved.
Highway-rail crossings. Cab-forward and MU operations pose a
somewhat heightened risk of severe injury for passengers should an
accident occur, in comparison to locomotive-hauled passenger coaches.
Operators should give consideration to closer interface with private
crossing holders that use the crossings for truck access, give greater
attention to liaison with law enforcement authorities, and explore
other means that may reduce risk at both public and private crossings.
Accelerated application of locomotive alerting lights (already
authorized by regulation and required by statute) may offer another
opportunity for risk reduction. This order requires that each
railroad's interim safety plan address these grade crossing issues in
the context of cab-forward and MU operations. FRA is very concerned
about the safety of such operations in absence of a plan to address
grade crossing hazards.
Information on emergency exits. The Silver Spring accident has
raised serious concerns about whether the MARC passengers had
sufficient information about the location and operation of emergency
exits to enable them to find and use those exits in a crisis. FRA
believes it would be very useful for all commuter and intercity
passenger railroads to review their practices, in addition to marking
the exits, for providing this information.
3. Emergency Exits
Finally, there is a need to ensure that emergency exits are clearly
marked and in operable condition on all passenger lines, regardless of
the equipment used or train control system. FRA's regulations generally
require that all passenger cars be equipped with at least four
emergency opening windows, which must be designed to permit rapid and
easy removal during a crisis situation. The investigation of the Silver
Spring accident has raised some concerns that at least some of the
occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to exit through
the windows. Whether those same people eventually were among those who
exited safely, or whether those persons were attempting to open windows
that were not emergency windows is not known at this time. However,
there is sufficient reason for concern to require that measures be
taken to ensure that such windows are readily identifiable and operable
when they are needed. Accordingly, the order requires that any
emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the
inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of
all such windows be examined to ensure operability. (FRA Safety Glazing
Standards, 49 CFR Part 223, require that each passenger car have a
minimum of four emergency window exits ``designed to permit rapid and
easy removal during a crisis situation.'')
Finding and Order
FRA concludes that certain current conditions and practices on
commuter and intercity passenger railroads pose an imminent and
unacceptable threat to public and employee safety. Of greatest concern
are push-pull and MU operations lacking the protection provided by cab
signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control systems. I
find that the unsafe conditions discussed above create an emergency
situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons.
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104,
delegated to me by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR Sec. 1.49),
it is hereby ordered that each commuter and intercity passenger
railroad, and any other entity (e.g., freight railroads over whose
lines affected passenger operations are conducted) whose actions are
necessary to effectuate the directives in this order, take the
following actions:
(1) Delayed in Block Rule.
Note: This rule applies to all push-pull and MU operations
unless cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control
is in operation, speeds do not exceed 30 m.p.h., or within yard or
terminal limits as specified for this purpose by the railroad.
(A) Within 10 days of this order, have in effect, publish
in its code of operating rules, and comply with a rule that requires:
If a passenger train enters a block on a signal indication and the
train stops for any reason, including a station stop, or its speed is
reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train shall proceed under speed
limitations set forth in existing applicable railroad operating rules,
and in addition, must be prepared to stop before passing the next
signal. The train must maintain the prescribed speed until the next
wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal displays a proceed
indication, and the track to that signal is clear. A copy of the rule
will be provided to the FRA Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance
in care of James T. Schultz, Staff Director, Operating Practices.
(B) Within 30 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,
a railroad operating supervisor shall personally contact each engineer
and conductor in passenger service and inform them in a face-to-face
meeting of the requirements of that rule. Such briefing shall be
documented and such documentation shall be available for FRA review
upon request, including date, time, location, crew members contacted,
and supervisor making the contact.
[[Page 6881]]
(C) Within 60 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,
each engineer/conductor in such passenger service shall receive an
unannounced operational (``efficiency'') test on the rule which
requires a full stop at the signal ahead; and, within 90 days of rule
publication, an on-board operational monitoring ride shall be conducted
by an operating supervisor of the railroad to ensure a complete
understanding of rule provisions. Such tests and operational monitoring
checks shall be documented and such documentation shall be available
for FRA review upon request, including date, time, location, crew
members involved, and supervisor making the test/monitoring ride.
(D) The railroad's program of operational tests and
inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to
include this rule, and shall specifically include a minimum of two such
tests per year for each passenger engineer.
(2) Crew Communications Rule
Note: This rule applies to all push-pull and MU operations
unless cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control
is in operation, speeds do not exceed 30 m.p.h., or within yard or
terminal limits as specified for this purpose by the railroad.
(A) Within 10 days of this order, have in effect, publish
in its operating rules, and comply with a rule that requires: A crew
member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab
car, or MU car, shall have means to communicate orally and shall
communicate the indication and location of each wayside signal
affecting the movement of the train as soon as the signal becomes
visible, for all signals which require either (1) that the train be
prepared to stop at the next wayside signal, or (2) that the train be
prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed. In
multiple track territory, the crew member shall include the affected
track number. A copy of the rule shall be provided to the FRA Office of
Safety Assurance and Compliance in care of James T. Schultz, Staff
Director, Operating Practices.
(B) A designated crew member located on a trailing unit or
car shall immediately acknowledge the transmission, and confirm the
information to the crew member(s) on the controlling locomotive by
repeating the message. If the designated crew member fails to
acknowledge the communication, the engineer must ascertain at the next
scheduled stop why the message is not being confirmed. If necessary due
to radio equipment failure, alternative means shall be established by
the operating crew (e.g., via intercom, cellular telephone, etc.) to
accomplish the procedure.
(C) If the engineer fails to control the train movement in
accordance with either a wayside signal indication or other
restrictions imposed upon the train, the designated crew member in a
trailing unit or car shall at once communicate with and caution the
engineer regarding the restriction, and, if necessary, take appropriate
action to ensure the safety of the train, including stopping the
movement if appropriate.
(D) Within 30 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,
a railroad operating supervisor shall personally contact each engineer
and conductor in passenger service and inform them in a face-to-face
meeting of the requirements of this rule. Such briefing shall be
documented and such documentation shall be available for FRA review
upon request, including date, time, location, crew members contacted,
and supervisor making the contact.
(E) Within 60 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule,
each engineer/conductor in such passenger service shall receive an
unannounced operational ``efficiency'' test on the rule; and, within 90
days of rule publication, an on-board operational monitoring ride shall
be conducted by an operating supervisor of the railroad to ensure a
complete understanding of rule provisions. Such tests and operational
monitoring checks shall be documented and such documentation shall be
available for FRA review upon request, including date, time, location,
crew members involved, and supervisor making the test/monitoring ride.
(F) The railroad's program of operational tests and
inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to
include this rule, and shall specifically include a minimum of two such
tests per year for each passenger engineer.
(3) Emergency Egress: Marking and Inspecting Exits
(A) Within 60 days of this order, ensure that each
emergency exit location is marked both inside the car for passenger and
crew information and, with regard to emergency window exits, on the
exterior of the car as well for emergency responders. Markings for
egress from inside the car shall be accompanied by clear and legible
instructions for operation of the exit. Such markings must be clearly
visible and legible at egress locations. This paragraph does not
require action where reasonably conspicuous and fully legible markings
and instructions already exist.
(B) Immediately begin, and within 60 days of this order
complete, a program to test a representative sample of emergency window
exits on cars in its fleets to verify proper operation. Defective units
will be repaired before the car is returned to service. Additionally,
when a defective exit is discovered, all exits on that specific series/
type of car will be tested and every defective exit replaced. Railroads
must report to FRA when such action is necessary, and shall include a
timetable for window inspection and replacement on the car series to
remedy the problem in the most expedient manner.
(C) Records of the date, car number, and verification of
proper exit operation shall be maintained and available for FRA review
upon request. Each railroad shall also verify emergency exit operation
as part of routine vehicle maintenance cycles.
(4) Interim System Safety Plans
Each authority operating or contracting for the operation of push-
pull, EMU or DMU service (including Amtrak) shall, not later than 45
days from this order, submit to FRA an interim system safety plan for
the purpose of enhancing the safety of such operations. In developing
such plans, the authority shall provide opportunity for the riding
public and designated representatives of railroad employees to comment
on proposed actions that may affect the quality of service, including
passenger safety.
The plan shall address the following hazards associated with
passenger occupancy of lead units:
Train-to-train collisions.
Derailments giving rise to the hazard of impact with fixed
structures.
Collisions with heavy vehicles at highway-rail crossings.
The plan shall take into consideration the overall safety of all
passengers and crew members and shall, at a minimum, address the
following opportunities for risk reduction:
(A) Use of cab car/MU car. The authority shall specify the
circumstances under which occupancy of a cab or MU car in the lead
position is permitted, by route and train assignment. The authority
shall propose or report appropriate modifications in such practices,
taking into consideration service needs (e.g., equipment capacity,
passenger loadings) and safety issues (e.g., train densities, method of
operation, availability of cab signals and automatic control, issues
related to standing passengers, grade crossing exposure, and other
relevant factors).
(B) Operating rules. The authority shall review railroad operating
rules and
[[Page 6882]]
practices pertinent to the hazards listed above to determine if further
enhancements in safety are warranted and advise FRA as to what action
is necessary to enhance the level of safety. Changes in existing rules
shall be specified. In conducting this review, the operating authority
shall analyze the measures imposed in sections 1 and 2 of this order
and may propose alternative approaches that ensure the same
enhancements in safety associated with those measures.
(C) Adverse conditions. In conducting the review of railroad
operating rules and practices, consideration shall be given to adverse
or unusual operating conditions such as weather (e.g., fog, heavy rain
or snow, flooding, etc.).
(D) Short-term technology enhancements. The authority shall
consider short-term enhancements in technology that may improve the
safety of train operations, such as use of alerting devices, equipping
of additional locomotives with cab signal/ATC apparatus (where in
effect on the territory), or other available enhancements to enhance
engineer performance or provide warning of operation in excess of
authority provided by the wayside signal system. In addition, the
authority shall consider whether the installation of additional signals
on any particular line would appreciably reduce the risk of train
collisions.
(E) Crew management. The authority shall review crew management
practices in light of contemporary literature regarding shift work and
cumulative fatigue to determine if the alertness and performance of
employees can be promoted by changes in those practices. Special
attention shall be given to the issue of night split shifts.
(F) Highway-rail grade crossings. The authority shall review risks
to passengers associated with occupancy of cab or MU cars in the lead
while passing over highway-rail crossings, particularly crossings
utilized by heavy vehicles and vehicles transporting hazardous
materials, and shall address measures that can reduce these risks.
(G) Emergency exit notification. The authority shall review methods
it uses, in addition to marking emergency exits, to inform passengers
of the location and operation of those exits, such as flyers dropped on
seats, announcements to passengers, explanations on the face of
passenger tickets, etc. The authority shall specify any plans it has to
increase passenger awareness of the location and operation of emergency
exits.
Upon receipt of plans responsive to the above-referenced
requirements, the Administrator, in consultation with the FTA
Administrator, will determine whether other mandatory action appears
necessary to address hazards associated with the subject rail passenger
service.
Relief
Petitions for special approval to take actions not in accordance
with this order may be submitted to the Associate Administrator for
Safety, who shall be authorized to dispose of those requests without
the necessity of amending this order.
Penalties
Any violation of this order shall subject the person committing the
violation to a civil penalty of up to $20,000. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1301. FRA
may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to
enforce this order. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20112.
Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons
This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m on February 21, 1996.
This notice will be published in the Federal Register as soon as
possible. Prior to publication, copies of this notice will be delivered
by overnight mail or facsimile to the affected passenger railroads,
public authorities, and railroad labor organizations.
Review
Opportunity for formal review of this Emergency Order will be
provided in accordance with 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104(b) and section 554 of
Title 5 of the United States Code.
Administrative procedures governing such review are found at 49 CFR
Part 211. See 49 CFR Secs. 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 20, 1996.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-4204 Filed 2-21-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
