94-4220. Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 38 (Friday, February 25, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-4220]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: February 25, 1994]
    
    
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    DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
    
     
    
    Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest
    
        The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has identified 
    and resolved a potential conflict of interest situation related to its 
    contractor, MPR Associates, Incorporated (MPR). This notice, which is a 
    summary of the facts related to this decision, satisfies the 
    requirements of 10 CFR 1706.8(e) with respect to publication in the 
    Federal Register. Under the Board's Organizational and Consultant 
    Conflicts of Interests Regulation, 10 CFR part 1706 (OCI Regulations), 
    an organizational or consultant conflict of interest (OCI) means that 
    because of other past, present or future planned activities or 
    relationships, a contractor or consultant is unable, or potentially 
    unable, to render impartial assistance or advice to the Board, or the 
    objectivity of such offeror or contractor in performing work for the 
    Board is or might be otherwise impaired, or such offeror or contractor 
    has or would have an unfair competitive advantage. While the OCI 
    Regulations provide that contracts shall generally not be awarded to an 
    organization where the Board has determined that an actual or potential 
    OCI exists and cannot be avoided, the Board may waive this requirement 
    in certain circumstances.
        The Board was advised of a potential safety issue at the Department 
    of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) regarding a tank containing 
    Curium and Americium in a nitric acid solution. Specifically, sampling 
    of the tank, which is 10 feet in diameter by 11 feet in height, and is 
    made of Type 304 L stainless steel, demonstrated a high concentration 
    of iron in the tank's contents, indicative of corrosion of the tank's 
    stainless steel structure. Based on a standard calculational method for 
    determining corrosion, DOE's Management and Operating contractor for 
    SRS reached a preliminary conclusion that corrosion of the tank's 
    stainless steel structure had resulted in a uniform wall thickness 
    reduction of 0.011 inches from an original thickness of 0.5 inches. The 
    Board was concerned that the corrosion might potentially be nonuniform 
    or localized in areas of the tank such as crevices, or welds, and under 
    sludge. The primary question was whether the extent of corrosion had 
    the potential to breach the integrity of the tank, thereby increasing 
    the probability of a release of radioactive material, threatening site 
    workers and the general public's health and safety. Consequently, the 
    Board determined that the accuracy of the analysis of the tank needed 
    to be verified through the collection and evaluation of additional data 
    to determine the degree of the corrosion problem and whether the tank's 
    integrity is intact.
        As the Board did not have expertise readily available to conduct an 
    in-depth evaluation of these findings, the Board decided to engage 
    outside technical experts from MPR based on their extensive relevant 
    experience, expertise, and immediate availability. However, MPR advised 
    the Board that it had entered into a contractual relationship with a 
    DOE contractor to provide assistance to DOE in the analysis of 
    deactivation plans for the PUREX Plant, a DOE facility at the Hanford 
    Reservation in Richland, Washington, and provide written 
    recommendations and advice to DOE regarding these analyses. While MPR's 
    contractual work for the Board and the DOE would not necessarily create 
    an actual overlap of work at this time, and hence no direct OCI, a 
    potential OCI would exist due to MPR's concurrent relationships with 
    DOE and the Board, as the PUREX plant is a defense nuclear facility 
    under the Board's jurisdiction. Consequently, as a result of its 
    relationship with DOE, the ability of MPR to provide objective advice 
    to the Board could be questioned.
        After considering these concerns, the Board concluded that the 
    award of the task to MPR for a review of the tank in question at SRS 
    was in the best interest of the Government and that a waiver of any OCI 
    arising from the relationship described above, and the pertinent 
    provisions of the OCI Regulations, was warranted. The reasons 
    underlying these conclusions were as follows:
        1. MPR possessed extensive relevant technical expertise gained from 
    previous long-term work on similar problems with the commercial nuclear 
    industry and through performance of safety-related activities at SRS 
    for the Board. The Board did consider whether there was a source other 
    than MPR that had the caliber of qualified staff capable to responding 
    to the Board's needs without having potential OCI situations. However, 
    without exhaustive research, which would have caused unwarranted delay, 
    the Board was not aware of any other firm with the level of background 
    knowledge and experience of MPR, which is essential to the successful 
    accomplishment of the Board's requirement.
        2. MPR advised the Board's staff that the expected revenues from 
    its work related to the PUREX Plant at the Hanford Reservation in 
    Richland, Washington, represented less than one percent of its total 
    revenues. In the Board's view, such a low percentage of revenues from 
    DOE-related projects should not make MPR financially dependent on DOE.
        3. In an attempt to mitigate any potential OCI related to this 
    situation, MPR agreed to create an internal partition between MPR staff 
    working on the Board project and MPR staff working on the DOE-related 
    project. Further, MPR's efforts for the Board will be overseen by 
    experienced technical staff of the Board to ensure that all resultant 
    work products are impartial and contain full support for any findings 
    and recommendations issued thereunder.
        Accordingly, on the basis of the determinations described above and 
    pursuant to the applicable provisions of 10 CFR part 1706, the Chariman 
    of the Board granted a waiver of any conflicts of interests (and the 
    pertinent provisions of the OCI Regulations) with the Board's contract 
    with MPR that might arise out of its existing contractual arrangement 
    with a DOE contractor.
    
        Dated: February 18, 1994.
    Kenneth M. Pusateri,
    General Manager.
    [FR Doc. 94-4220 Filed 2-24-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6820-KD-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
02/25/1994
Department:
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Document Number:
94-4220
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: February 25, 1994