[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 41 (Thursday, February 29, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7825-7832]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-4683]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-029]
Yankee Atomic Electric Company (License No. DPR-3); Issuance of
Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has taken action with respect to a Petition, dated January
17, 1996, by Citizens Awareness Network and New England Coalition on
Nuclear Pollution (Petitioners). The Petitioners requested that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take action with regard to
operation by Yankee Atomic Energy Company (YAEC or Licensee) of its
Nuclear Power Station at Rowe, Massachusetts (Yankee Rowe).
Petitioners requested that the NRC comply with Citizens Awareness
Network Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Yankee
Atomic Electric Company, 59 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995) (CAN v. NRC).
Specifically, Petitioners requested that the Commission immediately
order:
(1) YAEC not to undertake, and the NRC staff not to approve,
further major
[[Page 7826]]
dismantling activities or other decommissioning activities, unless such
activities are necessary to assure the protection of occupational and
public health and safety; (2) YAEC to cease any such activities; and
(3) NRC Region I to reinspect Yankee Rowe to determine whether there
has been compliance with the Commission's Order of October 12, 1995
(CLI-95-14), and to issue a report within ten days of the requested
order to Region I.
The Petitioners' request for emergency action to cease
decommissioning activities was mooted in part by the Licensee's
completion of activities evaluated by the NRC staff in a letter of
November 2, 1995 to the licensee. Even if these activities have not
been completed, they would have been permissible under the Commission's
pre-1993 interpretation of its decommissioning regulations. By letter
dated February 2, 1996, Petitioners' request that shipments of low-
level radioactive be prohibited was denied, and Petitioners' request
for reinspection of the Yankee Rowe facility to determine compliance
with CLI-94-14 and to issue an inspection report was granted. The
Director has determined to be moot the request that four other
activities be prohibited. Additionally, he has granted the request for
inspection of Yankee Rowe to determine compliance with CLI-95-14 and to
issue an inspection report. The reasons for these decisions are
explained in the ``Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-
96-01), the complete text of which follows this notice and is available
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local
public document room located at the Greenfield Community College
Library, 1 College Drive, Greenfield, Massachusetts, 01301.
A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on
its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of February 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Appendix A to This Document: Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206;
Yankee Atomic Electric Company
I. Introduction
An ``EMERGENCY MOTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH CIRCUIT COURT
OPINION'' (Petition), dated January 17, 1996, was submitted by
Citizens Awareness Network and New England Coalition on Nuclear
Pollution (Petitioners). Petitioners requested that the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) take action
with respect to activities conducted by Yankee Atomic Electric
Company (YAEC or Licensee) at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
Rowe, Massachusetts (Yankee Rowe or the facility).
By an Order of the Commission dated January 23, 1996, the
Emergency Motion was referred to the NRC staff for treatment as a
petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations.
The Commission ordered the staff to respond to the emergency aspects
of the Petition in 10 days and to issue a decision on the Petition
as a whole within 30 days.
Petitioners request that the NRC comply with Citizens Awareness
Network Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
Yankee Atomic Electric Company, 59 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995) (CAN v.
NRC). Specifically, Petitioners request that the Commission
immediately order:
(A) YAEC not to undertake, and the NRC staff not to approve,
further major dismantling activities or other decommissioning
activities, unless such activities are necessary to assure the
protection of occupational and public health and safety;
(B) YAEC to cease any such activities; and
(C) NRC Region I to reinspect the Yankee Nuclear Power Station
in Rowe, Massachusetts (Yankee Rowe) to determine whether there has
been compliance with the Commission's Order of October 12, 1995
(CLI-95-14), and to issue a report within ten days of the requested
order to Region I.
As the bases for their requests, Petitioners state that:
(1) CAN v. NRC requires the cessation, and prohibits
commencement, of decommissioning activities at Yankee Rowe, pending
final approval of the licensee's decommissioning plan after
opportunity for a hearing. CLI-95-14 forbids YAEC from conducting
any further major dismantling or decommissioning activities until
final approval of its decommissioning plan after completion of the
hearing process;
(2) CAN v. NRC obliges the Commission and the staff to provide
an opportunity to interested persons for a hearing to approve a
decommissioning plan;
(3) CAN v. NRC requires the Commission to reinstate its pre-1993
interpretation of its decommissioning regulations, General
Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 FR 24,018,
24,025-26 (June 27, 1988), limiting the scope of permissible
activities prior to approval of a decommissioning plan to
decontamination, minor component disassembly, and shipment and
storage of spent fuel, if permitted by the operating license and/or
10 CFR Sec. 50.59. Under Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear
Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-90-08, 32 NRC 201, 207, n.3 (1990), this
means that the licensee may not take any action that would
materially affect the methods or options available for
decommissioning, or that would substantially increase the costs of
decommissioning, prior to approval of a decommissioning plan. Under
CLI-91-2, 33 NRC at 73, n.5, and CLI-92-2, 35 NRC at 61, n.7, other
decommissioning activities, in addition to major ones, are
prohibited, including offsite shipments of low-level radioactive
waste produced by decommissioning activities, until after approval
of a decommissioning plan;
(4) Decommissioning activities permitted by NRC Inspection
Manual, Chapter 2561, Sec. 06.06, ``Modifications or Changes to the
Facility'', before approval of a decommissioning plan are limited to
maintenance, removal of relatively small radioactive components or
non-radioactive components, and characterization of the plant or
site;
(5) YAEC is conducting decommissioning activities, with the
approval of the NRC technical staff, in flagrant violation of CAN v.
NRC and of CLI-95-14, thus threatening to render the decommissioning
process nugatory and to deprive Petitioners of their hearing rights
under Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act;
(6) By letter dated October 19, 1995, YAEC described nine
decommissioning activities in progress, and by letter dated October
24, 1995, interpreted permissible ``major'' dismantling as removal
of non-radioactive material required to support safe storage of
spent fuel and of those portions of the facilities which remain, or
to support future dismantlement;
(7) By letter dated November 2, 1995, the NRC staff approved the
activities described by the Licensee in its letter of October 19,
1995;
(8) Five of the nine activities approved by the NRC staff's
letter of November 2, 1995, are major dismantling or other
decommissioning activities, in the nature of Component Removal
Project activities, prohibited, until after approval of a
decommissioning plan, by CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-14. Petitioners
object to: (a) Completing removal of the remainder of the Upper
Neutron Shield Tank; (b) removal of Component Cooling Water System
pipes and components and Spent Fuel Cooling System pipes and
components; (c) Fuel Chute isolation; (d) Spent Fuel Pool electrical
conduit installation; and (e) radioactive waste shipments.
Petitioners do not object to Waste Tank removal, Ion Exchange Pit
clean-up, removal of Emergency Diesel Generators, or the Brookhaven
National Laboratory Cable Sampling Project.
(9) Petitioners advocate the SAFSTOR decommissioning alternative
because it allows levels of radioactivity and waste volumes to
decrease, thus reducing
[[Page 7827]]
occupational and public radiation exposures, and lowering
decommissioning costs;
(10) NRC Inspection Report No. 50-29/95-05 (December 16, 1995)
concludes that the issue whether activities observed were in
compliance with CLI-95-14 is unresolved, but approves YAEC's
proposed activities, contrary to the requirements of NRC Inspection
Manual, Chapter 2561, Sec. 06.06, ``Modifications or Changes to the
Facility'' (March 20, 1992); and
(11) YAEC's criterion for permissible decommissioning
activities, that any activity involving less than 1 percent of the
on-site radioactive inventory is not ``major'' and may take place
before approval of a decommissioning plan, violates CAN v. NRC
because it would allow completion of decommissioning before any
decommissioning plan could be approved in hearing, and constitutes
unlawful segmentation under the National Environmental Policy Act.
By letter dated January 29, 1996, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
responded to the Petition. YAEC supplemented its response by letters
dated February 15, 1996, February 21, 1996, and February 22, 1996,
and by an E-mail message to the NRC staff on January 31, 1996.
By letter dated February 2, 1996, the NRC staff denied in part
and granted in part Petitioners' requests for emergency action. The
Petition was also found moot in part. Petitioners' requests that the
NRC take emergency action to order (A) YAEC not to undertake and the
NRC staff not to approve further major dismantling activities or
other decommissioning activities, unless necessary to assure the
protection of occupational and public health and safety and (B) YAEC
to cease any such activities were found moot in part and denied in
part. Petitioners' request for emergency action to require NRC
Region I to reinspect Yankee Rowe to determine whether YAEC has
complied with the Commission's Order of October 12, 1995 (CLI-95-
14), and to issue a report within ten days after the Commission
orders such an inspection, was granted.
Petitioners then requested the Commission to reverse the NRC
staff's February 2, 1996, decision on the emergency aspects of the
Petition. See ``Citizens Awareness Network's and New England
Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Motion for Exercise of Plenary
Commission Authority to Reverse NRC Staff 2.206 Decision, and
Renewed Emergency Request for Compliance with Circuit Court
Opinion.'' By Order dated February 15, 1996, the Commission declined
to grant the emergency relief requested, as there was no showing
that the Licensee would take any action before the issuance of a
Director's Decision on February 22, 1996. The Commission directed
the NRC staff to address the arguments advanced by Petitioners in
their February 9 motion in this Decision, with the exception of the
new issues raised on page 13 of the Motion, which are to be
addressed in a supplementary 10 CFR Sec. 2.206 decision.
For the reasons discussed below, Petitioners' requests that the
NRC prohibit YAEC from undertaking or continuing five of the nine
activities evaluated by the NRC staff's letter of November 2, 1995,
are moot in part and denied in part. Of the nine activities, all
with the exception of radioactive waste shipments were completed
before submission of the January 17, 1996, Petition. Accordingly,
Petitioners' request for relief with respect to: (1) Completing
removal of the remainder of the Upper Neutron Shield Tank; (2)
removal of the Component Cooling Water System pipes and components
and Spent Fuel Cooling System pipes and components; (3) Fuel Chute
isolation; and (4) Spent Fuel Pool electrical conduit installation
is moot. Petitioners' request for relief with respect to radioactive
waste shipments is denied. As explained below, all five contested
activities were permissible, before approval of a decommissioning
plan, under the pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations, and thus are in compliance with CAN v.
NRC and CLI-95-14. Petitioners' request that the NRC inspect Yankee
Rowe to determine compliance with CLI-95-14, and issue an inspection
report, was granted.
II. Background
On February 27, 1992, YAEC announced its intention to cease
operations permanently at Yankee Rowe. On August 5, 1992, the NRC
issued a license amendment to limit the license to a Possession-
Only-License. 57 FR 37558, 37579 (Aug. 19, 1992).
In late 1992, YAEC proposed to initiate a Component Removal
Project (CRP). On December 20, 1993, YAEC submitted a
decommissioning plan based on a phased approach, starting with
DECON, then SAFSTOR, and then finally dismantlement. Notice of
Receipt of Decommissioning Plan and Request for Comments was
published in the Federal Register. (59 FR 14689 on March 29, 1994).
On January 14, 1993, and on June 30, 1993, the Commission issued
two Staff Requirements Memoranda which, in pertinent part,
interpreted the Commission's regulations to permit many
decommissioning activities prior to approval of a decommissioning
plan, as long as the activities do not violate the terms of the
existing license or 10 CFR Sec. 50.59 with certain additional
restrictions. See ``Staff Requirements--Briefing by OGC on
Regulatory Issues and Options for Decommissioning Proceedings (SECY-
92-382), 10:00 A.M., Tuesday, November 24, 1992, Commissioner's
Conference Room, One White Flint North, Rockville, Maryland (Open to
Public Attendance)'' (January 14, 1993) and ``SECY-92-382-
Decommissioning--Lessons Learned'' (June 30, 1993).
On several occasions between late 1992 and early 1994, CAN asked
the NRC to offer an opportunity for an administrative hearing
regarding decommissioning activities conducted by YAEC at Yankee
Rowe. The Commission denied each such request. CAN sought judicial
review and challenged the denials and the January 14, 1993,
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
On July 20, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals held that
the Commission had: (1) Failed to provide an opportunity for hearing
to CAN, as required by Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act, in
connection with the Commission's decision to permit the CRP
decommissioning activities; (2) changed its pre-1993 interpretation
of its decommissioning regulations without notice to the public and
in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3)
impermissibly allowed the licensee to conduct CRP decommissioning
activities prior to compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act requirement to conduct an environmental analysis or
environmental impact statement. Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC
and Yankee Atomic Electric Company, 59 F. 3d 284, 291-2, 292-3, and
294-5 (1st Cir. 1995). The court remanded the matter to the
Commission for proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
In response, the Commission issued a Federal Register notice
advising: (1) That the Commission did not intend to seek further
review of CAN v. NRC; (2) that the Commission understood that
decision to require a return to the interpretation of NRC
decommissioning regulations that was in effect prior to January 14,
1993; and (3) that the Commission was requesting public comments on
whether the Commission should order YAEC to cease ongoing
decommissioning activities pending any required hearings and any
other matters connected with that issue. See 60 FR 46,317 (September
6, 1995).
After consideration of comments filed in response to that
notice, the Commission implemented CAN v. NRC by issuing Yankee
Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-95-14,
42 NRC 130 (1995). In CLI-95-14, the Commission reinstated its pre-
1993 interpretation of its decommissioning policy, required the
issuance of a notice of opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing on
the Yankee Rowe decommissioning plan, held that YAEC may not conduct
further ``major'' decommissioning activities at Yankee Rowe until
approval of a decommissioning plan after completion of any required
hearing, and directed YAEC to inform the Commission within 14 days
of the steps it is taking to come into compliance with the
reinstated interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning
regulations. Yankee Atomic Electric Company, CLI-95-14, 42 NRC 130
(1995).
Pursuant to CLI-95-14, a proceeding is now underway to offer an
opportunity for hearing on the Licensee's decommissioning plan for
Yankee Rowe. Petitioners have sought intervention and a hearing.
As of July 20, 1995, when the court issued CAN v. NRC, YAEC had
completed its Component Removal Project. In response to CLI-95-14,
by letters dated October 19 and 24, 1995, YAEC identified nine
ongoing activities which YAEC believed were permissible under CAN v.
NRC and CLI-95-14.
In its letter of November 2, 1995, the NRC staff evaluated those
nine activities and found them permissible under the Commission's
pre-1993 interpretation of its decommissioning regulations, and thus
under CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-14. The staff
[[Page 7828]]
also identified certain activities, although not proposed by the
Licensee, which may not be conducted before reapproval of a
decommissioning plan. Those activities include dismantlement of
systems such as the main reactor coolant system, the lower neutron
shield tank, vessels that have significant radiological
contamination, pipes, pumps and other such components and the vapor
container (containment). The staff also identified segmentation or
removal of the reactor vessel from its support structure as a major
dismantlement not to be conducted until after the decommissioning
plan is reapproved.
III. Discussion
A. The nine activities were permissible, prior to approval of a
decommissioning plan, under the Commission's pre-1993 interpretation
of its decommissioning regulations, and thus are permissible under
CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-14.
Petitioners contend that five of the nine activities evaluated
by the NRC staff's letter of November 2, 1995, are major dismantling
or other decommissioning activities prohibited until after approval
of a decommissioning plan, by CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-14.
Specifically, Petitioners object to: (1) Completing removal of the
remainder of the Upper Neutron Shield Tank; (2) removal of Component
Cooling Water System pipes and components and Spent Fuel Cooling
System pipes and components; (3) Fuel Chute isolation; (4) Spent
Fuel Pool electrical conduit installation; and (5) radioactive waste
shipments. Petitioners do not object to Waste Tank removal, Ion
Exchange Pit clean-up, removal of Emergency Diesel Generators, or
the Brookhaven National Laboratory Cable Sampling Project.
Petitioners acknowledge that completion of Waste Tank removal and
Ion Exchange Pit clean-up are required for safety reasons.
Petitioners also acknowledge that the removal of the Emergency
Diesel Generators is permissible because they are not radioactive,
and that the Brookhaven National Laboratory Cable Sampling Project
is a research project unrelated to decommissioning. Of the nine
activities, all with the exception of radioactive waste shipments
were completed before submission of the January 17, 1996, Petition.
Under the Commission's pre-1993 interpretation of its
decommissioning regulations, a licensee ``may proceed with some
activities such as decontamination, minor component disassembly, and
shipment and storage of spent fuel if the activities are permitted
by the operating license and/or Sec. 50.59'', prior to final
approval of a licensee's decommissioning plan, \1\, as long as the
activity does not involve major structural or other major changes
and does not materially and demonstrably affect the methods or
options available for decommissioning or substantially increase the
costs of decommissioning. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-90-8, 32 NRC 201, 207, n.3
(1990); Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-2, 33 NRC 61, 73. n.5 (1991); and
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear
Generating Station), CLI-92-2, 35 NRC 47, 61. n. 7 (1992).
\1\ Statement of Consideration, ``General Requirements for
Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities'', 53 FR 24018, 24025-26 (June
27, 1988).
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Under the pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations, examples of activities which were
considered permissible and which were conducted at various
facilities under a Possession-Only license before approval of a
decommissioning plan included:
Shoreham \2\
Core borings in biological shield wall
\2\ See letter dated December 11, 1991 from John D. Leonard,
Jr., Long Island Lighting Company, to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Docket No. 50-322.
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Core borings of the reactor pressure vessel
Regenerative heat exchanger removal and disassembly
Various sections of reactor water clean-up system piping
cut out and removed to determine effectiveness of chemical
decontamination processes being used
Removal of approximately half of reactor pressure vessel
insulation and preparation for disposal
Removal of fuel support castings and peripheral pieces
removed and shipment offsite for disposal at Barnwell, South
Carolina
Reactor water clean-up system recirculation holding pump
removed and shipped to James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Control rod drive pump shipped to Brunswick Nuclear Station
One full set of control rod blade guides sold to Carolina
Power and Light Company
Control rod drives removed, cleaned, and stored in boxes
for salvage
Process initiated for segmenting and removing reactor
pressure vessel cavity shield blocks
Process initiated for removal of instrument racks, tubing,
conduits, walkways, and pipe insulation presenting interferences for
decommissioning activities and/or removal of salvageable equipment
Fort St. Vrain \3\
Control rod drive and orifice assemblies and control rods
removed from core during defueling and shipped offsite for
processing or disposal as low-level waste
\3\ See letter dated September 4, 1992 from Donald M.
Warembourg, Public Service Company of Colorado, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Docket No. 50-267.
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All helium circulators removed and shipped offsite for
disposal
Core region constraint devices (internals) removed and
approximately one-half shipped offsite for disposal
About 50 core metal-clad reflector blocks (top layer of
core) removed and stored in fuel storage wells
Removal of remaining hexagonal graphite reflector elements,
defueling elements, and metal-clad reflector blocks begun
Pre-stressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV) top cross-head
tendons and some circumferential tendons detensioned
Some detensioned tendons removed from PCRV
Work initiated to cut and remove PCRV liner cooling system
piping presenting interferences to detensioning of PCRV tendons, and
Asbestos insulation completely removed from piping under
PCRV
Activities such as normal maintenance and repairs, removal of
small radioactive components for storage or shipment, and removal of
components similar to that for maintenance and repair also were
permitted prior to approval of a decommissioning plan under the
Commission's pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations. See NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter
2561, Section 06.06. (Issue Date: 03/20/92).4
\4\ ``Examples of modifications and activities, that are allowed
during the post-operational phase [the interval between permanent
shutdown and the NRC's approval of the licensee's decommissioning
plan] are (1) those that could be performed under normal maintenance
and repair activities, (2) removal of certain, relatively small
radioactive components, such as control rod drive mechanism, control
rods, and core internals for disassembly, and storage or shipment,
(3) removal of non-radioactive components and structures not
required for safety in the post-operational phase, (5) shipment of
reactor fuel offsite, and (6) activities related to site and
equipment radiation and contamination characterization.''
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Of course, licensees are also permitted to complete or to
conduct activities required for compliance with safety requirements
before approval of a decommissioning plan. In addition, special
consideration must be given to activities required to comply with
other federal and state safety requirements. See Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, ``Worker Protection
at NRC-licensed Facilities'' (October 21, 1988), 53 FR 43950
(October 31, 1988). See also NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 1007,
``Interfacing Activities Between Regional Offices of NRC and OSHA''.
Petitioners concede that completion of activities already underway
is permissible if completion is required for immediate safety
purposes.
The staff's November 2, 1995 letter evaluated the nine
activities identified in YAEC's letter of October 19, 1995, based on
the Commission's pre-1993 interpretation of its decommissioning
regulations,5 and determined that the nine activities were
permissible before approval of a decommissioning plan.
\5\ Petitioners claim that YAEC's ``1 percent'' criterion for
determining what constitutes major structural or other major change
(and thus what activities are permissible before approval of a
decommissioning plan) would allow completion of decommissioning
before any decommissioning plan could be approved in hearing. The
staff does not accept or approve, and has not used this criterion to
determine whether any YAEC activities, including the nine
activities, are permissible before approval of a decommissioning
plan.
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Upon review of the Petition and its supplement of February 9,
1996, the staff took a fresh look at the nine activities and again
found them to be permissible before approval of a decommissioning
plan, under the pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations, and thus under CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-
14:
[[Page 7829]]
(1) Completion of Removal of the Remaining Portions of the Upper
Neutron Shield Tank
As stated in the NRC staff's letter of November 2, 1995,
completion of this activity was necessary to avoid a significant
lead hazard to plant personnel due to lead dust or powder deposits
on surfaces of the structure (particularly if the plant were to go
into an extended SAFSTOR configuration, as desired by Petitioners).
That contamination, if disturbed during licensee maintenance
activities or NRC inspections would pose a significant health hazard
to Licensee and NRC personnel.
Petitioners object that this safety rationale is unsupported by
factual information regarding actual lead levels in the tank and
whether the lead levels violated OSHA standards.
Dismantlement of the Upper Neutron Shield Tank required cutting
sections of the tank that had lead shielding. Cutting was completed
before November 2, 1995 and lead cleanup was completed by November
8, 1995. Lead dust was created by dismantlement of the tank, already
underway and completed before issuance of the November 2, 1995 staff
letter. Surface lead residue measurements in those areas ranged
between 13,000 micrograms/ft 2 and 390,000 micrograms/ft
2.
The Licensee's operating procedures require the Licensee to
implement industrial hygiene control methods as specified by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in areas where there
is potential for employee exposure to lead. Procedure No. AP-0713,
``Lead Control Program'', Revision 1 Major, Section C
(``Discussion''), p. 3. The target for removable lead contamination
is 200 micrograms/ft 2. Id., ``Discussion'', Section C.,
``Decontamination'', p. 4.
Lead dust resulting from dismantlement of the Upper Neutron
Shield Tank was at a concentration such that surface lead
contamination exceeded the target for removable lead
contamination.6 Licensee personnel were and are required to
enter the area in order to conduct surveillances to monitor
radioactive contamination and for compliance with fire protection
requirements.
\6\ The use of respiratory protection by workers would not have
satisfied the Licensee's operating procedures. Until a determination
is made that any employee working with lead will not be exposed to
lead at the action level, respiratory protection is required.
Procedure No. AP-0713, ``Procedure'', Section C (``Lead Work
Practices''), p. 11. The action level is employee exposure, without
regard to use of respirators, to an airborne concentration of lead
of 30 micrograms per cubic meter of air calculated as an 8-hour
time-weighted average, and the permissible exposure limit is 50
micrograms per cubic meter of air over an 8-hour time weighted
average, and 30 micrograms per cubic meter of air over a 10-hour
time weighted average. Id., ``Definitions'', p. 1. Between October
5, 1995 and October 11, 1995, airborne lead concentrations in the
areas affected ranged between 3 micrograms/m3 and 2500
micrograms/m3. Between October 12, 1995 and October 26, 1995,
airborne lead concentrations ranged between 1 microgram/m3 and
250 micrograms/m3.
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In view of the above, this activity was permissible for safety
reasons, and, therefore, would have been allowed in a comparable
situation before approval of a decommissioning plan, under the pre-
1993 interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
(2) Waste Tank Removal (Activity Decay and Dilution Tank)
Petitioners concede that completion of this activity was
required for safety reasons.
(3) Removal of Component Cooling Water System Pipes and Components
and Spent Fuel Cooling System Pipes and Components
Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the staff's February 2,
1996, letter did not ``abandon'' the November 2, 1995, rationale for
finding this activity permissible. The staff's February 2 letter
repeated the November 2 rationale and provided a more detailed
explanation for the staff's conclusion that this activity is
permissible under the pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations.
The Licensee had installed a self-contained spent fuel pool
cooling system, isolated from the fluid components and installed
conduit to allow future electrical isolation from other systems, in
order to enhance safety and integrity of the spent fuel pool for
prolonged storage of fuel. As a result, the Component Cooling Water
System pipes and components and Spent Fuel Cooling System pipes and
components were rendered redundant and were no longer useful.
Removal of the no-longer useful pipes and components was not
decommissioning, but maintenance that would have been allowed,
before approval of a decommissioning plan, under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning
regulations.7 Petitioners erroneously contend that removal of
this equipment is not maintenance. Removal of replaced equipment (as
opposed to removal of dismantled equipment not intended to be
replaced) is a normal maintenance activity.
\7\ Petitioners assert that the staff provided no factual
support for its conclusion that leaving the Component Cooling Water
System and Spent Fuel Cooling System pipes and components in place
would pose a safety hazard. Upon further review, the staff has
determined that removal was not necessary to prevent a safety
hazard.
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In view of the above, this activity was permissible, before
approval of a decommissioning plan, under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
(4) Ion Exchange Pit Clean-up
Petitioners concede that completion of this activity was
required for safety reasons.
(5) Fuel Chute Isolation
The Licensee made a commitment to NRC to complete a Fuel Chute
isolation project, needed to enhance spent fuel pool integrity and
long-term reliability, in response to NRC Bulletin 94-01,
``Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate Maintenance
Practices at Dresden Unit 1'' (April 14, 1994). NRC Bulletin 94-01
explicitly identified potential siphon or drainage paths and
freezing failures as hazards that could lead to drainage of the
spent fuel pool.8 NRC Bulletin 94-01 required licensees to
identify which of the suggested actions that the licensees would
take to prevent such hazards, or to identify an alternative course
of action, if the licensees needed to take such measures to bring
themselves into compliance as described in NRC Bulletin 94-01.
\8\ Requested action number 2 was: ``Ensure that systems for
essential area heating and ventilation are adequate and appropriate
maintenance so that potential freezing failures that could cause
loss of SFP water inventory are precluded.'' Requested action number
3 was: ``Ensure that piping or hoses in or attached to the SFP
cannot serve as siphon or drainage paths in the event of piping or
hose degradation or failure or the mispositioning of system
valves.''
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YAEC's Fuel Chute isolation project eliminated a potential
freezing threat and siphon path that could lead to drainage of the
spent fuel pool. The NRC staff determined actions taken to prevent
potential siphon paths and freezing hazards connected with the Fuel
Chute to be adequate. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-029/94-80
(December 9, 1994).
Petitioners erroneously maintain that isolation of the upper
Fuel Chute is not necessary to prevent a risk of siphoning or
freezing, because the upper Fuel Chute lies above the fuel pool and
cannot serve as a siphon for liquid in the pool. The fuel chute pipe
originally ran from the lower lock valve at the outside wall at the
bottom of the spent fuel pit (SFP) on a diagonal path to the outer
shell of the vapor container (VC), through the shell and into the
VC. During former plant operations a blank flange was inserted in
the pipe, outside the VC shell, in order to maintain VC leak tight
integrity.
As part of the NRC Bulletin 94-01 project, one 8-foot length of
this 12 inch diameter fuel chute pipe was removed from the top of
the lower lock valve and a blank flange placed over the lower lock
valve so that the valve could be encased in concrete. This, in
effect, made the valve part of the SFP wall. The removal of this
section of pipe also eliminated a potential leak path through the
pipe out of the SFP wall.
Isolation of the Fuel Chute, accomplished by removing the lowest
flanged pipe section and sealing the lower portion of the Fuel Chute
with concrete, eliminated a freezing and siphon hazard. Sealing the
Fuel Chute with concrete prevents accumulation of water in the Fuel
Chute. Accumulated water could freeze during severe winter weather
and possibly damage the lower lock valve outside the spent fuel pool
wall, thus opening a leak path near the bottom of the spent fuel
pool.
Petitioners incorrectly maintain that the Licensee did not need
to remove the upper Fuel Chute in order to comply with NRC Bulletin
94-01. The licensee did not remove the upper fuel chute. The
licensee has fastened a blank flange at the wall of the VC by
wedging open a flanged joint. This was a maintenance activity. This
blank flange is normally in place and was removed, in the past, when
fuel transfer operations took place. These transfers are now
prohibited by the POL. The Fuel Chute isolation project was
necessary to prevent potential siphon
[[Page 7830]]
and freezing risks, was one of the actions determined to be an adequate
response to NRC Bulletin 94-01, and brought the Licensee into
compliance with NRC requirements.
In any event, this activity is not decommissioning, but
maintenance and a safety upgrade that would have been allowed under
the pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning
regulations.
In view of the above, this activity was permissible, before
approval of a decommissioning plan, under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
(6) Removal of Emergency Diesel Generators
Petitioners acknowledge that removal of the emergency diesel
generators is a permissible activity prior to final approval of a
decommissioning plan.
(7) Spent Fuel Pool Electrical Conduit Installation
This activity involved underground installation of a power cable
and its protective covering and did not involve the removal of
radioactive material. The modification also enhanced the integrity
and long-term safe storage of spent fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool, by
isolating Spent Fuel Pool power supplies from potential problems
that could be caused by power circuits in other systems or heavy
load impacts at the plant. The activity was part of the Licensee's
overall project to enhance the safety of the Spent Fuel Pool by
establishing independent systems dedicated to Spent Fuel Pool
reliability.
The conduit installation was also consistent with NRC Bulletin
94-01, specifically the first requested action, which involves
ensuring the integrity of structures and systems, necessarily
including electrical systems, required for containing, cooling,
cleaning, level monitoring and makeup of water in the Spent Fuel
Pool. The conduit installation project enhanced integrity of the
spent fuel pool by ensuring operability and adequacy of structures
and systems required for spent fuel pool integrity, specifically the
electrical system.
Petitioners object that the November 2, 1995 letter implies that
this activity is a decommissioning activity because it will provide
a separate power supply for future decommissioning activities.
Petitioners contend that there is no present threat to the integrity
of the spent fuel pool, and that as long as the Licensee performs no
major dismantlement activities, there is no immediate need for
conduit installation.
While it is true that conduit installation will isolate the
spent fuel power supply from potential problems associated with
future decommissioning of other systems, conduit installation also
serves the larger purpose of isolating spent fuel pool power
supplies from potential problems that could be caused by power
circuits in other systems at the plant, wholly apart from the
conduct of any decommissioning activities. This activity represents
a safety enhancement.
In view of the above, this activity was permissible, before
approval of a decommissioning plan, under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
(8) Brookhaven National Laboratory Cable Sampling Project
Petitioners acknowledge that this activity is a research project
unrelated to decommissioning.
(9) Radioactive Materials Shipments
Under the pre-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations and 10 CFR Sec. 50.59, the NRC has
permitted shipment of radioactive waste and contaminated components
prior to approval of a decommissioning plan, as long as it does not
materially and demonstrably affect the methods or options available
for decommissioning or substantially increase the cost of
decommissioning, and because such shipments do not constitute a
``major'' activity.
NRC staff practice prior to 1993 permitted activities such as
shipment of waste or contaminated components at a permanently
defueled facility pursuing decommissioning. Prior to approval of a
decommissioning plan, the licensee may dismantle and dispose of
nonradioactive components and structures not required for safety in
the shutdown condition. After issuance of a possession-only license,
the licensee also may dismantle and dispose of radioactive
components not required for safety in the shutdown condition,
provided that such activity does not involve major structural or
other major changes and does not foreclose alternative
decommissioning methods or materially affect the cost of
decommissioning. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear
Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-08, 33 NRC 461, 471 (1991), approving
staff recommendations in SECY-91-129, ``Status and Developments at
the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station'' (May 13, 1991). See also NRC
Inspection Manual, Chapter 2561, Secs. 06.06 and 06.07 (March 20,
1992); Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Amendment No. 82 to
Facility Operating License No. DPR-34 (Possession-Only License, May
21, 1991); and Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Amendment No.
117 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 (Possession-Only
License, March 17, 1992).
Petitioners contend that the February 2, 1996, letter of the NRC
staff applied the post-1993 interpretation of the Commission's
decommissioning regulations to determine that shipment of low-level
radioactive waste is permissible,\9\ based on the staff's citation
to SECY 92-382 and the associated June 30, 1993 SRM. The particular
language Petitioners point to is:
\9\ Petitioners incorrectly contend that the staff's conclusion,
that the methods or options available for decommissioning will not
be materially or demonstrably affected because the Licensee's
activities involve approximately 2.3 curies of residual activity,
constitutes application of the Licensee's one percent criterion. The
Licensee had proposed in its letter of October 24, 1995, that
decommissioning activities involving less than one percent of the
total curies of non-fuel components not including greater than Class
C components, are not ``major'' decommissioning activities and thus
are permissible under the pre-1993 interpretation of the
Commission's decommissioning regulations. As previously stated, the
NRC staff does not accept or approve, and did not use, this
criterion in its February 2, 1996 (or its November 2, 1995) letter
to determine whether activities proposed by the Licensee, including
shipping, are ``major'' activities for purposes of permissible
decommissioning before approval of a decommissioning plan. See,
e.g., note 5, supra. The staff in fact stated that since the
Licensee's activities involve only 2.3 curies out of a total 4448
curies residual activity which must be decommissioned, shipment of
low-level radioactive waste will not demonstrably affect the methods
or options available for decommissioning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shipment of contaminated reactor internals needed for operation
could proceed after issuance of a possession-only license because
such components are not ``major'': i.e., they are not needed to
maintain safety in the defueled condition. See SECY 92-382,
``Decommissioning--Lessons Learned'' (November 10, 1992) and Staff
Requirements Memorandum, ``SECY-92-382--Decommissioning--Lessons
Learned'' (June 30, 1993).
The staff's February 2, 1996, letter derived this language from a
discussion at pages 22-24 of SECY-92-382, ``Decommissioning--Lessons
Learned''.
The Commission had in fact permitted shipment of low-level waste
prior to approval of a decommissioning plan under its pre-1993
interpretation of its decommissioning regulations, as explained
above. SECY 92-382 accurately stated that the Commission had in fact
permitted shipment of not only low-level radioactive waste and some
components, but also some reactor internals, before approval of a
decommissioning plan.\10\ The particular reference to ``major''
components in SECY 92-382 was in the context of permissible shipment
of waste; that language did not define ``major'' for the purpose of
determining what components may be dismantled or removed prior to
approval of a decommissioning plan. No component can be shipped
unless it is first removed or dismantled, and authority to ship a
component already removed or dismantled does not ipso facto
constitute authority to remove or dismantle the component in the
first place. Likewise, the citation in the NRC staff's February 2,
1996, letter to Petitioners was not intended to define ``major'' for
the purpose of determining what components could be dismantled or
removed prior to approval of a decommissioning plan, but referred to
what could be shipped. The staff's reference to SECY 92-382 was made
in the context of permissible shipments only, not permissible
component dismantling or removal. Regrettably, the staff's February
2, 1995, reference to SECY 92-382 may have been insufficiently
detailed to make the purpose of the reference clear.
\10\ See Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461, 471 (1991). See also SECY-
91-129, ``Status and Developments at the Shoreham Nuclear Power
Station (SNPS)'', p. 3 (May 13, 1991) (contaminated fuel support
castings and peripheral pieces).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case at hand, the Licensee's proposal was to ship low-
level radioactive waste.\11\
[[Page 7831]]
The NRC staff's conclusion that the Licensee's proposal to ship
radioactive waste\12\ is permissible under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations was
based on the understanding that the proposal was to ship low-level
radioactive waste, and was not intended to be and was not a
determination that the removal or dismantling of major components
was permissible under the pre-1993 interpretation of the
Commission's decommissioning regulations,\13\ under CAN v. NRC, or
under CLI-94-14.
\11\ Petitioners contend that there is no basis to determine the
accuracy of the Licensee's estimate that it will make 54 shipments
of low-level radioactive waste between October 1995 and July 1996.
Petitioners, however, fail to set forth any facts or rationale which
raise a question as to the reasonableness of the Licensee's estimate
of the number of shipments.
\12\ Petitioners state that neither YAEC nor the NRC staff
provided any information about the radioactivity levels in the 54
shipments that YAEC estimates it shipped and will ship between
October 1995 and July 1996, and that the Licensee's January 29,
1996, estimate of 2.3 curies involved in activities already
completed does not provide information about radioactivity levels of
the 54 shipments that YAEC estimates it will have shipped before the
end of July 1996. The Licensee has now provided that information and
estimates the total radioactivity involved in the packaging and
shipment of low-level radioactive waste between November 1, 1995 and
July 1996, to be 1817 curies. See letter dated February 21, 1996,
from K. J. Heider, YAEC, to Morton B. Fairtile, NRC. The four
contested activities, other than shipping, amounted to only
approximately 8.2001 curies of residual radioactivity.
\13\ Petitioners assert that the NRC staff's February 2, 1966,
letter states that the shipment of low-level radioactive waste is
permitted under the pre-1993 criteria because the radioactivity of
the shipments amounts to 2.3 curies or less out of the remaining
4448 curies of residual radioactivity to be decommissioned in the
form of Class C or less waste. What the staff said was that because
the Licensee's activities involve approximately 2.3 curies of the
remaining 4448 curies of residual radioactivity to be decommissioned
in the form of Class C or less waste, shipment of low-level
radioactive waste produced by the activities evaluated in the
staff's November 2, 1995 letter will not materially or demonstrably
affect the methods or options available for decommissioning the
Yankee Rowe site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission's decisions in Long Island Lighting Company
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-92-1, 33 NRC 61, 73,
n. 5 (1991) and Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco
Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-92-2, 35 NRC 47, 61, n. 7 (1992) do
not, as Petitioners contend, prohibit shipment of low-level
radioactive waste. No issue concerning such shipments was addressed
in those decisions. The language cited by Petitioners paraphrases
the general guideline, that ``major dismantling and other activities
that constitute decommissioning under the NRC's regulations must
await NRC approval of a decommissioning plan'', and is derived from
the 1988 Statement of Consideration, ``General Requirements for
Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities'', supra. As explained above, it
was agency practice before 1993 to permit shipment of low-level
radioactive waste and contaminated components before approval of a
decommissioning plan.
Rather than store low-level radioactive waste on-site for
extended periods, it has long been agency policy that such waste
should be shipped to disposal sites if the ability to dispose of
waste at a licensed disposal site exists. Shipping of waste at the
earliest practicable time minimizes the need for eventual waste
reprocessing due to possibly changing burial ground requirements and
reduces occupational and non-occupational exposures and potential
accident consequences. NRC Generic Letter 81-38, ``Storage of Low-
Level Radioactive Wastes at Power Reactor Sites'' (November 10,
1981).
Petitioners contend that YAEC may not ship low-level radioactive
waste because the Yankee Rowe Possession-Only-License does not
permit it.14 Although Petitioners are correct that no language
in the Yankee Rowe POL explicitly states that shipment of low-level
radioactive waste is authorized, the Yankee Rowe POL does authorize
that activity. Section 1.H. of the POL, issued August 5, 1992,
authorizes Yankee Rowe to receive, possess and use byproduct, source
and special nuclear materials in accordance with the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70. Authority to ship low-
level radioactive waste is conferred upon all byproduct material,
source material and special nuclear material licensees by NRC
regulations at 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70. Byproduct materials
licensees, source materials licensees, and special nuclear materials
licensees, including Yankee Rowe, are authorized to transfer such
material, as long as the recipient is authorized, see 10 CFR
Secs. 30.41, 40.51, and 70.42, and as long as preparation for
shipment and transport is in accordance with the requirements of 10
CFR Part 71. See 10 CFR Secs. 30.34(c), 40.41(c), 70.41(a). In
particular, Section 2.C. of the Yankee Rowe POL states that the POL
is deemed to contain and is subject to 10 CFR Secs. 30.34 and 40.41.
Accordingly, the POL authorizes the transport of low-level
radioactive waste from Yankee Rowe.
\14\ Petitioners claim that the Commission's decommissioning
regulations prohibit low-level radioactive waste shipments that are
not authorized by YAEC's license, citing the 1988 Statement of
Consideration. See ``General Requirements for Decommissioning
Nuclear Facilities'', 53 FR 24025-26 (June 27, 1988). The Statement
of Consideration makes no mention of shipment of low-level
radioactive waste. The language cited gives examples of activities
which licensees may conduct before approval of a decommissioning
plan, but does not state or imply that the list is inclusive:
``Although the Commission must approve the decommissioning
alternative and major structural changes to radioactive components
of the facility or other major changes, the licensee may proceed
with some activities such as decontamination, minor component
disassembly, and shipment and storage of spent fuel if these
activities are permitted by the operating license and/or
Sec. 50.59''. (Emphasis added)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners state that the ``cardinal consideration'' which
determines whether a decommissioning activity is ``major'' should be
the radiation dose it yields, not the radioactivity of the component
involved 15, and thus the NRC staff's February 2, 1996, letter
erroneously relied upon the number of curies shipped rather than the
radioactive doses involved in shipping low-level waste to determine
whether the activity is permissible.16
\15\ The Commission has not articulated as a criterion, for
determining what constitutes a ``major'' decommissioning activity,
the radiation dose yielded by the activity, and Petitioners cite no
authority for this argument. Nor has the Commission articulated the
radioactivity involved as a criterion for determining what
constitutes ``major'' decommissioning activity.
\16\ The staff mistakenly understood the License's letter of
January 29, 1996 to mean that the activities evaluated by the
staff's November 2, 1995 letter involved 2.3 curies. The
radioactivity involved in the four contested activities, other than
shipping of low-level radioactive waste, amounted to approximately
8.2001 curies of residual radioactivity. (Removal of the Upper
Neutron Shield Tank involved less than 5 curies, and removal of the
Component Cooling Water System pipes and components and Spent Fuel
Cooling System pipes and components involved 1.2001 curies. See
letter dated October 19, 1995, from Russell A. Mellor, YAEC, to
Morton B. Fairtile, NRC. Fuel Chute Isolation involved 2 curies, and
spent fuel pool electrical conduit installation involved no curies.
See letter dated February 21, 1996, from K. J. Heider, YAEC, to
Morton B. Fairtile, NRC.) In addition, the Licensee estimated that
since completion of the activities described in the NRC letter,
activities have been authorized by the Licensees' Manager of
Operations which remove components containing a total of 2.3 curies
of radioactive material. See letter dated January 29, 1996, from
Andrew C. Kadak, YAEC, to William T. Russell, NRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The criteria for determining whether shipments of low-level
radioactive waste will demonstrably affect the methods or options
available for decommissioning have not been well-defined. During
review of the Petition and its supplement, the NRC staff has
continued to examine the question of whether the Licensee's
shipments of low-level radioactive waste will demonstrably affect
the methods or options available for decommissioning. In this case,
the staff has now also compared the radiation dose involved in the
packaging and shipping of the low-level radioactive waste with the
radiation dose estimated for decommissioning of the Licensee's
facility. This is because, under Petitioners' theory regarding the
choice of the decommissioning option, as we understand it, it seems
that adoption of a different decommissioning option would most
likely be required to reduce dose. The Licensee estimates that the
radiation dose involved in the packaging and shipment of low-level
radioactive waste between November 1, 1995 and July 1996 to be 17
person-rem.17 The estimated total radiation exposure for
decommissioning the facility is 755 person-rem.18 The estimated
dose from packaging and shipping is approximately 2% of the total
dose from decommissioning. As can be seen, most of the dose will be
incurred in activities other than shipment of low-level radioactive
waste. As the Commission has previously held in this case, even
potential dose reductions on the order of 900 person-rem, unless
there is some extraordinary aspect to the case not apparent, cannot
have ALARA significance such that one decommissioning option
[[Page 7832]]
would be preferable to another.19 Accordingly, the staff concludes
that the Licensee's shipment of low-level radioactive waste will not
demonstrably affect the methods and options available for
decommissioning.
\17\ See letter dated February 21, 1996, from K. J. Heider,
YAEC, to Morton B. Fairtile, NRC.
\18\ Order Approving the Decommissioning Plan and Authorizing
Decommissioning of Facility (Yankee Nuclear Power Station),
``Environmental Assessment by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Related to the Request to Authorize Facility Decommissioning'', p.
22.
\19\ Yankee Atomic Electric Company, CLI-96-01 (January 16,
1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In view of the above, the shipments of low-level radioactive
waste between October 1995 and July 1996, before approval of a
decommissioning plan, is permissible under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
B. The five contested activities will neither individually nor
collectively substantially increase the costs of decommissioning.
YAEC estimates the cost of shipment and disposal of all low-
level radioactive waste between the October 1995 issuance of CLI-95-
14 and the scheduled date of completion of the hearing in mid-July
1996, to be $6.5 million, or approximately 1.75 percent of the
estimated $368.8 million total decommissioning cost. It would be
speculative to conclude that the decommissioning method proposed by
Petitioners, SAFSTOR, would be less expensive. There is no evidence
that the Licensee's shipments will increase decommissioning costs or
that continued storage of the waste will decrease the ultimate
costs. Thus, the staff concludes that YAEC's shipment of low-level
radioactive waste will not substantially increase the costs of
decommissioning.
Petitioners erroneously contend that the cost of shipments of
low-level radioactive waste could be reduced by postponing the
packaging and shipment of low-level waste, presumably because some
waste may decay to levels such that the volume of waste which will
require shipment would decrease. Delay will not significantly reduce
the volume of waste shipped because the waste is not segregated by
the radioactive isotope involved, and some of the radioactive
isotopes involved have very long half-lives, i.e., nickel-63 has a
half-life of 100 years. Cobalt-60, which has a half-life of 5.27
years, was the isotope selected by the Petitioners to postulate a
reduction in waste volume. Moreover, delay could possibly increase
decommissioning costs because shipping and burial costs may
increase.
The Licensee estimates costs for the five activities contested
by Petitioners to be $6.5 million for shipments of low-level waste
between October 1995 and July 1996 and $2.4 million for the four
other contested activities,20 for a total of $8.9 million, or
2.1% of the $368.8 million estimated total decommissioning costs.
There is no evidence that these activities will give rise to
consequences that will increase the total cost of decommissioning.
Accordingly, the five contested activities will not substantially
increase decommissioning costs, either individually or collectively.
\20\ The Licensee spent $610,000 on the four activities in the
fourth quarter of 1995, which is approximately 25 percent of the
estimated total cost for these four activities. See Letter dated
February 15, 1996, from Russell A. Mellor to Morton B. Fairtile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Petitioners' Request for an Inspection and Inspection Report
Was Granted.
Petitioners' request for reinspection of Yankee Rowe to
determine compliance with CLI-95-14 and for issuance of an
inspection report was granted. NRC Region I inspected the Yankee
Rowe facility for a second time on December 5-18, 1995, to determine
compliance with CLI-95-14. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-029/95-07
was issued January 31, 1996. The Inspection Report concludes that
the Licensee's activities were conducted in accord with the
specifications of the staff's November 2, 1995 letter. The first
inspection was conducted in October 1995, before the provision of
technical guidance or criteria to assist the Region in determining
compliance with CLI-95-14. Subsequently, the NRC staff issued its
letter of November 2, 1995, evaluating the nine activities, all of
which are permitted by CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-14, as explained above.
Petitioners claim that the January 31, 1996 Inspection Report
merely repeats the staff's erroneous interpretation of the
Commission's decommissioning standards, and thus constitutes no
relief. The inspection report explicitly states that the nine
activities evaluated by the staff's November 2, 1995 letter were
inspected and that the Licensee limited the scope of its work to
those activities. Petitioners' disagreement with the staff's
conclusion that the nine activities are in compliance with CAN v.
NRC and CLI-95-14 does not constitute denial of Petitioners' request
for an inspection and an inspection report to determine compliance
with CAN v. NRC and CLI-95-14.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons given above, Petitioner's request that shipments
of low-level radioactive waste be prohibited is denied, and
Petitioners' request that four other activities be prohibited is
moot.21 Additionally, Petitioners' request for an inspection of
Yankee Rowe to determine compliance with CLI-95-14 and an inspection
report was granted.
\21\ Petitioners claim that the NRC erroneously found on
February 2, 1996, that the request for emergency relief was moot in
part. Petitioners assert that the Licensee continues to unlawfully
ship low-level radioactive waste and that on January 29, 1996, the
Licensee stated that it is considering whether to conduct seven
activities, in addition to the nine evaluated by the staff's
November 2, 1995, letter. The February 2, 1996, letter of the staff
and this Decision explicitly denied Petitioner's request to prohibit
shipment of low-level radioactive waste, and made no finding that
this request is moot. The February 2, 1996, letter and this Decision
explicitly state that Petitioners' request for emergency relief
regarding the remaining four contested activities was moot because
those activities had been completed before the submission of the
Petition. Nonetheless, both the February 2, 1996 letter and this
Decision found that those four activities were permissible, prior to
approval of a decommissioning plan, under the pre-1993
interpretation of the Commission's decommissioning regulations.
Neither the staff's February 2, 1996, letter, nor this decision
address the seven activities which the Licensee states it is now
considering. The staff will address those activities in a
supplemental Director's Decision, as required by the Commission's
order of February 15, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As provided by 10 CFR Sec. 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision
will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the
Commission's review. The Decision will become the final action of
the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the Commission on its
own motion institutes review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 22nd of February, 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William. T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-4683 Filed 2-28-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P