98-2854. Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1); Exemption  

  • [Federal Register Volume 63, Number 24 (Thursday, February 5, 1998)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 5973-5974]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 98-2854]
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    
    [Docket No. 50-352]
    
    
    Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 
    1); Exemption
    
    I
    
        The Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) is the holder of 
    Facility Operating License No. NPF-39, which authorizes operation of 
    the Limerick Generating Station (LGS), Unit 1. The license provides, 
    among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, 
    regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
        The facility consists of two boiling-water reactors at the 
    licensee's site located in Montgomery and Chester Counties, 
    Pennsylvania.
    
    II
    
        Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
    ``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee 
    authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a 
    criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material 
    is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR 
    70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these 
    monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas 
    subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two 
    detectors.
        Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain 
    emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is 
    handled, used, or stored and provides that: (1) The procedures ensure 
    that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a 
    criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include 
    drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the 
    procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause 
    of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in 
    accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of 
    10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly 
    personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection 
    (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel 
    decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician 
    and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, 
    and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated 
    individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. 
    Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the 
    requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be 
    used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any 
    licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted 
    an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the 
    Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the 
    relief requested.
    
    III
    
        The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at LGS, Unit 
    1, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel 
    that is stored on site in any given location is small enough to 
    preclude achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff 
    has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the 
    nuclear fuel at LGS, Unit 1, and has determined that it is extremely 
    unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the 
    following seven criteria:
        1. Only three new fuel assemblies are allowed out of a shipping 
    cask or storage rack at one time.
        2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
    confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are 
    filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
    flooded with pure water.
        3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the 
    k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence 
    level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with 
    fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a 
    moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
        4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% 
    confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are 
    filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and 
    flooded with pure water.
        5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than 
    nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than 
    the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
        6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, 
    are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive 
    radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
        7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight 
    percent.
        By letter dated December 23, 1997, the licensee requested an 
    exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the 
    seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical staff has 
    reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that LGS, Unit 1 
    meets the applicable criteria. Criteria 2 and 3 are not applicable to 
    LGS, Unit 1 since it has no fresh fuel storage racks, for prevention of 
    inadvertent criticality; therefore, the staff has determined that it is 
    extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to occur in SNM 
    handling or storage areas at LGS, Unit 1.
        The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is 
    to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of 
    SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate 
    action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that 
    such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation 
    monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage 
    and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive 
    radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions. 
    The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the 
    licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good 
    cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a).
    
    IV
    
        The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this 
    exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or 
    the common defense and security, and is otherwise
    
    [[Page 5974]]
    
    in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the 
    Philadelphia Electric Company, an exemption from the requirements of 10 
    CFR 70.24(a) for Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1.
        Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
    granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
    quality of the human environment (63 FR 4497).
        This exemption is effective upon issuance.
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of January 1998.
    
        For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Samuel J. Collins,
    Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    [FR Doc. 98-2854 Filed 2-4-98; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
02/05/1998
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
98-2854
Pages:
5973-5974 (2 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 50-352
PDF File:
98-2854.pdf