[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 49 (Monday, March 14, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-5826]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: March 14, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-286]
Power Authority of the State of New York; Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
part 50, Appendix R, ``Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power
Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979,'' section III.G.2, to
the Power Authority of the State of New York the (licensee) for the
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3), located at the
licensee's site in Westchester County, New York.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of Proposed Action
Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, specifies measures
to be taken to ensure that one train of redundant equipment necessary
to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire
damage.
During a programmatic review of IP3's Fire Protection Program and
Appendix R compliance strategy, the licensee identified that safe
shutdown instrument sensing lines inside containment do not meet the
separation requirements of section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix
R. Specifically, in some areas the wide-range steam generator (SG)
water level and pressurizer level sensing lines are not separated by a
horizontal distance of 20 feet, nor are they separated by a radiant
energy shield. In addition, fire detection and suppression in the area
is limited. The licensee has, therefore, requested exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2, for the
wide-range SG water level and pressurizer level sensing lines within
the IP3 containment structure.
Need for the Proposed Action
The proposed exemption is needed to permit the licensee to operate
the plant without being in violation of the Commission's regulations
and to obviate the need for extensive modifications. Physical
modification of the plant to achieve literal compliance with 10 CFR
part 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2, would require many design
changes, for example: rerouting portions of the sensing lines,
installing additional barriers, and the installation of additional fire
suppression and detection. Given the location of the sensing lines, the
implementation of these changes would entail extensive scaffolding, as
well as engineering and financial resources. In addition, since these
modifications were not anticipated in the current outage scope, the
detailed development and implementation of such design changes could
significantly delay restart from the current outage, resulting in lost
revenue.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, requires that where
redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot
shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area inside
containment, fire protection must be provided by separation of cables
and equipment by a horizontal distance of 20 feet, noncombustible
radiant energy shields, or by installation of fire detectors and an
automatic fire suppression system in the fire area. The licensee has
determined that certain sections of the wide-range SG water level and
pressurizer level sensing lines within containment do not meet these
requirements. Therefore, the licensee has requested an exemption from
the requirement of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2, for
these sensing lines within the containment.
The likely result of a fire affecting the sensing lines would be
erroneous signals. The erroneous signals would not initiate until the
fluid inside the lines is heated by the fire and would terminate after
the fire was extinguished. The lines themselves would not experience
fire damage.
The capability to safely shutdown the unit would not be jeopardized
in the event that a fire results in erroneous wide-range SG water level
or pressurizer level indications. Specifically, a fire inside
containment would not necessitate control room evacuation (i.e.,
alternate shutdown), so operations personnel would have access to
numerous and diverse plant status indications. In addition, plant
operating procedures advise personnel that a fire may cause anomalous
equipment behavior. Erroneous wide-range SG water level or pressurizer
level indications resulting from a fire would be of short duration due
to low combustion loadings inside containment. The fixed combustible
loading in containment is very small and the locations of the redundant
sensing lines are remote from fixed combustibles. The largest fixed
combustible load, reactor coolant pump oil, is contained in a
collection system in accordance with 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R,
section III.O, and automatic smoke detectors are installed above each
reactor coolant pump. Personnel access to the containment is restricted
during power operation. As such, the potential for transient
combustible materials to accumulate in the containment is very low. The
containment is inspected by operations personnel prior to plant
startup.
Based on the considerations discussed above, the Commission
concludes that granting the proposed exemption will not increase the
probability of an accident and will not result in any post-accident
radiological releases significantly in excess of those previously
determined for IP3. The proposed exemption would not otherwise affect
radiological plant effluents, nor result in any significant
occupational exposure. In addition, the exemption does not affect
nonradiological plant effluents and has no other environmental impact.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
radiological or nonradiological environmental impacts associated with
the proposed exemption.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
As an alternative to the proposed action, the Commission considered
denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result
in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental
impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action are similar.
The alternative would also result in unwarranted expenditures of
engineering and financial resources, and could significantly delay
restart from the current outage.
Alternate Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the ``Final Environmental Statement for the
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 3,'' dated February
1975.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
The Commission consulted with the State of New York regarding the
environmental impact of the proposed action.
Finding of No Significant Impact
The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental
impact statement for the proposed license amendment.
Based upon the foregoing environmental assessment, the Commission
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for exemption dated November 30, 1993. This document is
available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC 20555, and
at the White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains,
New York.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of March 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert A. Capra,
Director, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor Projects I/II,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-5826 Filed 3-11-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
