[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 52 (Friday, March 15, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10791-10796]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-6220]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[Docket No. 94-55]
Service Pharmacy, Inc.; Continued Registration
On June 14, 1994, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an
Order to Show Cause to Service Pharmacy, Inc., (Respondent) of Marion,
North Carolina, notifying it of an opportunity to show cause as to why
DEA should
[[Page 10792]]
not revoke its DEA Certificate of Registration, AS3172157, and deny any
pending applications for renewal, under 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4),
as being inconsistent with the public interest.
On July 8, 1994, the Respondent, through counsel, filed a timely
request for a hearing, and following prehearing procedures, a hearing
was held in Asheville, North Carolina, on April 18 through April 19,
1995, before Administrative Law Judge Paul A. Tenney. At the hearing,
both parties called witnesses to testify and introduced documentary
evidence, and after the hearing, counsel for both sides submitted
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and argument. On July 31,
1995, Judge Tenney issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommended Ruling, recommending that the Deputy Administrator take no
action against the Respondent's registration. Neither party filed
exceptions to his decision, and on September 1, 1995, Judge Tenney
transmitted his opinion and the record of these proceedings to the
Deputy Administrator.
The Deputy Administrator has considered the record in its entirety,
and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby issues his final order based
upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set forth.
The Deputy Administrator adopts, in full, the Opinion and Recommended
Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge, and his adoption is in no manner diminished
by any recitation of facts, issues and conclusions herein, or of any
failure to mention a matter of fact or law.
The Deputy Administrator finds that the investigation of the
Respondent was initiated in February of 1990 after an investigator
(Investigator) from the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy (Pharmacy
Board) received information from the attorney for the Estate of James
Toney that the Respondent had billed the Estate for prescriptions that
the deceased's family did not believe to be properly authorized by the
deceased's physicians. The Investigator interviewed Mrs. Toney, the
deceased's wife, who related that her husband had had a friendship with
John Lowder and Bill Jordan, the original owners of the Respondent
pharmacy. James Segars had purchased Bill Jordan's half ownership
interest in the pharmacy in 1984. Mrs. Toney also related an incident
when she had confronted her husband about whether he used Halcion, and
Mr. Toney had started that he did take Halcion, and that ``the
pharmacists were taking care of him.'' Halcion is a brand name for a
product containing triazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance
pursuant to 21 CFR 1308.14(c).
The Investigator also jointly interviewed Mr. Toney's adult son and
daughter, who corroborated the information received from Mrs. Toney.
The son lived adjacent to Mr. Toney's home, believed that he had ``a
good feel'' for his father's affairs, and did not believe that his
father had been to any physicians recently. Also according to family
members, Mr. Toney had been very depressed prior to his death. In
addition, the Investigator received from the family prescription vials,
receipts, and canceled checks, indicating that the Respondent was the
source of the medication dispensed to Mr. Toney.
Next, the Investigator apprised Mr. Segars of the information he
had received concerning Mr. Toney, and Mr. Segars denied any
wrongdoing. The Investigator then obtained various records and data
from the pharmacy, with the help of one of its employees, and using the
data, compiled a computer printout of prescriptions filled by the
Respondent for Mr. Toney from January 1986 until January 1990.
The Investigator then visited the offices of five physicians, Dr.
Van Blaricom, Dr. Croft, Dr. Hart, Dr. Larry Boyles, and Dr. Wayne
Boyles, who purportedly had issued prescriptions to Mr. Toney during
the time frame in question. He obtained an affidavit from Dr. Van
Blaricom, indicating that he had not authorized Mr. Toney's
prescriptions for Tylenol No. 3 on October 30, 1988, nor Valium, 5 mg.,
on October 30, 1988, or on May 24, 1989. The parties stipulated to the
fact that Tylenol No. 3 is a Schedule III controlled substance pursuant
to 21 CFR 1308.13(e), and Valium is a brand name for a product
containing diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance pursuant to 21
CFR 1308.14(c).
The Investigator also received an affidavit from Dr. Croft, stating
that the doctor had reviewed his record for Mr. Toney ``back to 1983'',
and from then until the date that he executed the affidavit, April 26,
1990, ``neither he nor any member of his staff prescribed or otherwise
authorized the Halcion .25 mg. or Amitriptyline 50 mg.'' to Mr. Toney.
The Respondent pharmacy, however, had filled prescriptions for 120
units of Halcion (.25 mg.), and 900 units of Amitriptyline (50 mg.)
between 1986 and 1990, that were purportedly authorized by Dr. Croft
for Mr. Toney.
The Investigator also obtained an affidavit from Dr. Hart. He
denied authorizing prescriptions for 270 units of Tylenol No. 3 to Mr.
Toney, which were filled by the Respondents between November 1, 1987,
and June 13, 1988.
After interviewing Dr. Larry Boyles, the Investigator obtained an
affidavit regarding his treatment of Mr. Toney. Dr. Larry Boyles denied
treating or prescribing any controlled substances for Mr. Toney since
July 21, 1986. The Investigator also interviewed and obtained an
affidavit from Dr. Wayne Boyles, who denied ever treating Mr. Toney or
authorizing any prescriptions for him. The Respondent pharmacy had
dispensed from December of 1986 to January of 1990, 840 units of
Halcion (.25 mg.) to Mr. Toney without authorization from either of
these two physicians.
On April 6, 1990, the Investigator separately interviewed three of
the Respondent's pharmacy technicians. He testified that each
technician had ``characterized the pharmacist or pharmacy staff at the
Respondent pharmacy as being highly ethical. They estimated that the
pharmacy filled in excess of 300 prescriptions a day[,] and each denied
any knowledge of any illegal activity occurring at the store.''
On April 9, 1990, the Investigator interviewed and obtained written
statements from Mr. Lowder, Mr. Seagars, and Mr. Jordan, all
pharmacists associated with the Respondent pharmacy. It was undisputed
that Mr. Toney was suffering from several debilitating medical
conditions. Both Mr. Lowder's and Mr. Jordan's statements characterized
Mr. Toney as a trusted friend with legitimate medical problems. Also,
Mr. Jordan acknowledged that he had filled a ``call-in type
prescription without checking with the physician'' based simply on the
representation that the physician wanted Mr. Toney to continue using a
particular medication. According to Mr. Lowder's statement, he also had
filled prescriptions for Mr. Toney without physician authorization and
based solely on Mr. Toney's representations.
According to Mr. Segars' statement, he also had filled call-in type
prescriptions for Mr. Toney without checking with the physicians. He
wrote that, based on Mr. Jordan's and Mr. Lowder's trust in Mr. Toney,
he had relied on Mr. Toney's representation that the physician wanted
him to continue using the requested medication. Mr. Segars admitted
that ``where his name appears on the [prescription] profile [attached
to his written statement] as the dispensing pharmacist, he is
responsible for that dispening[,] and where his name appears as the
original dispensing pharmacist[,] he is responsible for creating that
prescription without
[[Page 10793]]
authorization of a physician and dispensing that product to Mr. Toney
at the normal fee for that product.''
On May 9, 1990, the Investigator conducted a drug accountability
audit at the Respondent pharmacy. Mr. Lowder did not contest the audit.
Employees of the Respondent assisted in conducting the audit, which
covered the seven products received by Mr. Toney. Based on his audit,
the Investigator prepared a computation chart. The pharmacy had either
an overage or a shortage of each product, with the discrepancies
ranging from a 0.99 percent shortage for Valium (5 mg.) to a 39.9
percent overage for Halcion (.125 mg.). The Investigator testified that
the discrepancies were significant enough to cause him concern.
The Investigator also testified that he had noticed, among other
problems, that there were ``numerous occasions where prescriptions had
been refilled beyond their authorized or lawful limits. There had been
numerous occasions of quantities of products dispensed in excess of
what had been authorized on the original prescription.''
Next the Investigator profiled and reviewed patient information for
eight customers of the pharmacy, for whom he had noted some
irregularities. Based on his review, the Investigator testified that he
had ascertained that there had been unauthorized dispensing to six of
the eight customers. For example, the Investigator's review revealed
that the Respondent had dispensed approximately 816 units of Valium (5
mg.) and 1620 units of Ativan (1 mg.) to a patient without a
physician's authorization. The parties have stipulated that Ativan is a
brand name for a product containing lorazepam, a Schedule IV controlled
substance pursuant to 21 CFR 1308.14(c).
On July 2, 1990, the Investigator conducted second interviews with
Mr. Segars and Mr. Lowder, to discuss the patients other than Mr.
Toney. In response to the ``excessive refills and excessive
quantities.'' Mr. Segars and Mr. Lowder asserted that ``they had
checked with the physicians before dispensing either the additional
prescription or the additional amount on a prescription.'' Other
accountability problems were attributed to a deficient computer system.
On August 7, 1990, the Investigator again interviewed pharmacy
technicians, who testified that out of the approximately 300
prescriptions filled per day by the Respondent pharmacy, the
technicians had witnessed Pharmacists Segars and Lowder fill
unauthorized prescriptions two to three times a week. The technicians
also stated that the pharmacy had received samples from two physicians,
and that these samples had been punched out of the manufacturer's
packaging and combined with the pharmacy's inventory. On August 29,
1990, Pharmacists Segars and Lowder admitted the conduct concerning the
samples, for they admitted that the pharmacy had received samples from
two physicians, and that non-outdated samples were combined with the
store's common stock and eventually sold to customers.
On May 17, 1991, the Pharmacy Board issued a written notice of an
administrative hearing to determine whether or not Pharmacists Jordan,
Lowder, and Segars, and the Respondent pharmacy, had violated North
Carolina law, and if so, what action to take. The Investigator had
compiled all of the information obtained during his investigation into
a chronological report, and he had submitted it to the Pharmacy Board.
On July 16, 1991, a hearing was held, the parties proposed that the
Pharmacy Board enter a consent order, and the Board agreed. In the
Consent Order, the Pharmacy Board found that (1) from March 1986
through January 1990, Pharmacists Lowder and Segars and ``dispensed
Schedules III and IV controlled substances to James Toney without a
physician's authorization;'' (2) that Pharmacist Jordan had dispensed
Tylenol No. 3 to Mr. Toney, also without physician's authorization, on
two occasions; (3) that unauthorized prescriptions had been filled for
the same specific patient identified by the Investigator, and that
excessive refills had been dispensed to that patient; (4) that
Pharmacists Lowder and Segars had dispensed Schedules III and IV
controlled substances to five patients in excess of the number of
refills shown on the prescription; (5) that the pharmacy's computer
system was lacking; (6) that samples had been combined with the normal
pharmacy stock; and (7) that a drug accountability audit had revealed
shortages of controlled substances. Based on its findings, the Pharmacy
Board concluded that the pharmacists and the Respondent pharmacy had
violated both Federal and State law. Therefore, the Pharmacy Board
ordered revocation of Mr. Lowder's and Mr. Segars' licenses, but stayed
that revocation for a period of ten years and imposed the following
conditions on each of their licenses: (1) An active suspension of their
licenses for 120 days each; (2) successful completion of the Board's
jurisprudence exam; (3) successful completion of the University of
Kentucky College of Pharmacy's course on prescribing and use of
controlled substances, or the equivalent thereof; and (4) no violations
of any laws governing the practice of pharmacy or the distribution of
drugs, nor of any regulations or rules of the Pharmacy Board, during
the ten-year stay period. Pharmacist Jordan's license was placed on
probation for five years.
In addition, the license of the Respondent pharmacy was actively
suspended for seven days, and revocation thereof was stayed for ten
years. The following conditions were imposed on the pharmacy by the
Consent Order: (1) During the seven-day active suspension, the pharmacy
was ordered to display signs provided by the Pharmacy Board, notifying
the public of the suspension; (2) the pharmacy was ordered to give 30
days' advance notice to its customers before the suspension went into
effect; and (3) the pharmacy was ordered not to violate any laws
governing the practice of pharmacy or the distribution of drugs, or any
regulations or rules of the Board, during the ten-year stay period.
Both the United States Department of Justice and the North Carolina
State authorities declined to prosecute the pharmacists. Although the
Investigator informed the DEA of the Pharmacy Board's findings and
provided a copy of his report and the consent order in August of 1991,
the DEA conducted no independent investigation of the pharmacy. In
February of 1993, a DEA Diversion Investigator visited the Respondent's
location and asked Mr. Lowder to voluntarily surrender the DEA
registration, but upon advice of counsel, Mr. Lowder refused. Before
Judge Tenney, the DEA Investigator testified that the sole basis for
the revocation of the Respondent's registration was the state
investigator's investigation and the resulting consent order of July
1991.
At the hearing before Judge Tenney, Mr. Segars admitted that he had
violated the law prior to 1991, that information was handled poorly at
the pharmacy, and that the pharmacists did not confirm medication
prescriptions as required by law. He also testified that he, the other
pharmacists, and the pharmacy have carried out all of the terms and
conditions of the consent order. Both Mr. Segars and Mr. Lowder had
attended and completed a five-day course at the University of Kentucky
in compliance with the order. Judge Tenney noted in his opinion:
Mr. Segars volunteered that the course at the University of
Kentucky, which focused on doctors with abuse problems, ``was not as
beneficial'' as he had hoped it would be * * *. This candid
statement, among others,
[[Page 10794]]
leads me to conclude that Mr. Segars was honest and forthright in
his testimony. In addition, Mr. Segars' positive attitude regarding
present and future compliance, and his conduct since 1990, are
deemed representative of the Respondent pharmacy. Pharmacist
[Lowder] is too sick to work now, and Pharmacist Jordan has retired
and only works occasionally.
Also, according to the testimony of the Investigator, a relief
pharmacist had ``characterized the computer system at the store [as of
September 1990] as being confusing.'' However, Mr. Segars testified
that immediately after the consent order was executed, a new computer
system was acquired for the pharmacy to ensure better record-keeping.
Further, Mr. Segars attended seminars on how to use this computer
equipment. The pharmacy's software has been updated to make internal
reports easier, and Mr. Segars now knows how to utilize the software
features.
However, when asked what had caused the problems that were not
attributable to the pharmacy's prior computer system, Mr. Segars also
testified:
``We--I believed too many things, I accepted too many people's
word and I'm not sure that they were actually misleading me or lying
to me trying to get unauthorized medicines, but until I placed the
call and got it on a patient's record that I did call and did get a
refill authorized, then it is an illegal prescription. I was
negligent in not following up on things as I should have.''
Mr. Segars also related an instance when he had received a doctor's
request for a controlled substance, and unsure of the propriety of the
request, he had called the Pharmacy Board for assistance. He testified
that he now calls the Pharmacy Board whenever he is in doubt about
dispensing a particular medication in a particular situation. Mr.
Segars also testified that he had physically rearranged the interior of
the pharmacy to ensure greater supervision therein, and to insure that
no ``mistakes'' would be made at the Respondent pharmacy.
The investigator testified that he had no information of wrongdoing
by the Respondent pharmacy since the entry of the consent order in
1991. Also, the Investigator's supervisor, by affidavit, wrote that the
pharmacy and its pharmacists appear to be in full compliance with the
consent order, and that his office has received no new reports of any
violations of the laws governing the practice of pharmacy or the
distribution of drugs by any of the individual pharmacists ``or the
Pharmacy itself.'' Also, to renew their pharmacist licenses each year,
Mr. Segars, Mr. Lowder, and Mr. Jordan must complete 10 hours annually
of continuing education.
Numerous witnesses from Marion, North Carolina, and its surrounding
areas, testified before Judge Tenney on behalf of the Respondent and
its pharmacists. The witnesses, including a Sheriff's Detective, the
President of the McDowell Technical Community College, a Pastor, and a
customer, testified to the good character of the pharmacists and to the
excellent reputation of the Respondent pharmacy. As noted by Judge
Tenney, ``[s]ome of the witnesses emphasized the importance of the
pharmacy's free-delivery policy and the fact that it sells products on
store credit. The pharmacists' familiarity with customers' allergies
and their concerns over drug interactions were also identified as
important safeguards provided by the pharmacy. [The] Pastor [ ]
testified about the pharmacy's role in providing medicine to indigents
in affiliation with the First United Methodist Church.'' Also, several
of the Respondent's character witnesses expressed the opinion that the
pharmacists are the type of people who learn from their mistakes and
correct their ways. Even the Investigator testified that the
pharmacists exhibited a receptiveness to changing their ways.
The Respondent also submitted twenty additional affidavits by
medical doctors who serve or served the community, and the affiants
attested to the good reputation of the pharmacy and its pharmacists.
The pharmacy's free-delivery policy was cited as providing a valuable
service to the community's elderly and shut-ins.
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(4), the Deputy
Administrator may revoke or suspend a DEA Certificate of Registration
if he determines that the continued registration would be inconsistent
with the ``public interest.'' Section 823(f) requires that the
following factors be considered in determining the ``public interest:''
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting
research with respect to controlled substances.
(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled
substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health or
safety.
These factors are to be considered in the disjunctive; the Deputy
Administrator may rely on any one or a combination of factors and may
give each factor the weight he deems appropriate in determining whether
a registration should be revoked or an application for registration
denied. See Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., Docket No. 88-42, 54 FR 16422
(1989).
In this case, all five factors are relevant in determining whether
the Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent with the
public interest. As to factor one, ``recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board, * * *'' the Pharmacy Board, through the consent
order, reviewed the thorough investigation report of the Investigator,
and determined, despite the documented violations, that the pharmacy
and the pharmacists should continue in operation, after a short
suspension period and with stringent rehabilitative requirements. The
Investigator's supervisor affirmed that the pharmacy and the
pharmacists have complied with the consent order, and that his office
has received no new reports of any violations of the laws governing the
practice of pharmacy or the distribution of drugs. Despite the
Investigator's statement of his opinion, that the Respondent's
continued registration would be inconsistent with the public's
interest, Judge Tenney noted:
In light of the incongruous nature of [the] Investigator ['s] [
] personal opinion and the actions and mandate of the North
Carolina Board of Pharmacy, together with a perceived lack of
conviction with which [the] Investigator [ ] stated his opinion.
Little weight is assigned to his opinion that continued registration
of the pharmacy is inconsistent with the public interest.
Thus, although no formal recommendation has been made by the
North Carolina Board of Pharmacy, the fact that the Board has
permitted the Respondent to continue dispensing controlled
substances to the public amounts to an assessment by the Board that
the pharmacy no longer ``present[s] a danger to the public health,
safety and welfare.'' This fact weighs in favor of the Respondent.
The Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge Tenney's findings regarding
this factor.
As to factor two, the Respondent's ``experience in dispensing * * *
controlled substances,'' the Respondent's pharmacists knowingly
dispensed a significant quantity of controlled substances without
physician authorization during the timeframe of 1983 to 1990. The
pharmacists also refilled prescriptions beyond their authorized or
lawful limits, and
[[Page 10795]]
dispensed excess quantities. Further, sample products were illegally
combined with the pharmacy's common stock for sale to the public, and
inaccurate records were maintained, as evidenced by the overages and
shortages revealed by the Investigator's May 1990 audit.
However, the Respondent's conduct since 1991 is also relevant under
factor two. Specifically, after entry of the Consent Order in 1991,
steps were taken to insure better record-keeping, to include the
purchase, installation, and use of a new computer system. Also, the
pharmacists took remedial training in handling controlled substances.
The Investigator testified that he had no information of any wrongdoing
by the pharmacy or its pharmacists since the entry of the Consent Order
in 1991. He also testified that the pharmacists were receptive to
changing their ways.
As to factor three, ``the applicant's conviction record under
Federal or State laws * * *'', it is uncontradicted that neither the
Respondent nor any of the pharmacists has been convicted under Federal
or State laws relating to the dispensing of controlled substances.
As to factor four, the Respondent's ``[c]ompliance with applicable
State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled substances,'' the
Deputy Administrator concurs with Judge Tenney's finding that ``[m]ost
of the conduct discussed under factor (2) is indicative of
noncompliance with State and Federal laws relating to controlled
substances. For instance, by dispensing Schedule III and IV controlled
substances without physician authorization, the Respondent pharmacy
violated 21 CFR 1306.21(a) (requiring practitioner authorization either
via written, facsimile, or oral prescription).'' Further, the
Respondent's acts of combining and selling samples as common stock
violate the Federal Prescription Drug Marketing Act. See 21 U.S.C. 301,
331(t) and 353(c)(1). In the Consent Order, the Pharmacy Board also
concluded that the Respondent's actions violated Federal and State law.
As to factor five, ``[s]uch other conduct which may threaten the
public health or safety,'' Judge Tenney noted that the Government
contended that ``[w]here, as in this case, a pharmacist abdicates [his
responsibility to use common sense and professional judgment], either
intent[ional]ly or negligently, it jeopardizes the public health and
welfare * * *.'' However, Judge Tenney concluded, and the Deputy
Administrator concurs, that ``[a]pparently the Government is
reiterating the same conduct under factor (5) that has been discussed
at length under factors (2) and (4). As this does not constitute `other
conduct,' the discussion under factors (2) and (4) shall suffice.
Factor (5) is not deemed significant in assessing the public interest
in this case.''
In viewing these factors as a whole, the Deputy Administrator finds
that the Government has established a prima facie case that continued
registration of the Respondent by the DEA is inconsistent with the
public interest. However, also relevant is the Respondent's evidence of
rehabilitation. First, at the hearing before Judge Tenney and before
the Pharmacy Board, the pharmacists took responsibility for their
misconduct. They have also acted in compliance with the consent order,
and actually have exceeded those requirements by installing a new
computer system and taking classes to more competently operate the
system to improve their defective record-keeping. Further, Mr. Segars
testified that when he now has doubts about dispensing a medication, he
calls the Pharmacy Board for guidance. He also acknowledged that
``until [he] placed the call [to the physician] and got it on a
patient's record that [he] did call and did get a refill authorized,
then it is an illegal prescription.''
Further, there is no evidence of wrongdoing after 1991 by the
pharmacy or its pharmacists. In fact, the Investigator testified that
the pharmacists were receptive to changing their ways, and the
Respondent's character witnesses testified that the pharmacists are
individuals who learn from their mistakes and do not repeat them. Judge
Tenney concluded that ``[a]ll of the foregoing rehabilitation evidence
leads to the conclusion that notwithstanding the illegal conduct prior
to 1991, the Respondent can now be trusted with a DEA Certificate of
Registration. It follows that continued registration by the DEA is not
inconsistent with the public interest under 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824.''
Judge Tenney also noted that there ``was never any evidence that
the pharmacy [had] filled unauthorized prescriptions to facilitate the
illegal resale of drugs by customers, nor any evidence that the
pharmacy's motivation was monetary gain. For instance, Mr. Toney, the
principal recipient of unauthorized prescriptions, had numerous medical
ailments, and the medications at issue were legitimately prescribed on
occasion. Although this does not diminish the seriousness of the
pharmacists' behavior, it does evidence a humanitarian motive rather
than greed or hedonism.'' Further, the Respondent presented evidence of
its community service, to include free delivery and credit policies
which benefit the public by assisting the elderly and the poor.
As Judge Tenney rightly noted, ``[a]lthough these services are
commendable, they would not prohibit revocation or suspension of the
Respondent's Certificate of Registration if a threat still existed that
the Respondent would fill unauthorized prescriptions or otherwise
violate the law.'' However, the Deputy Administrator agrees with Judge
Tenney's conclusions, that ``notwithstanding [that] the Respondent's
past conduct would justify outright revocation in the absence of
credible rehabilitation evidence, such evidence is present in this
case. Pharmacist Segars' understanding of the Respondent's illicit
behavior, his remorse for that past conduct, the rehabilitative steps
taken, and the Respondent's `apparent commitment to a more responsible
future lead to the conclusion that revocation would not be
appropriate.' '' Steven W. Patwell, M.D., 59 FR 26814 (1994).
Further, safeguards already exist to monitor the Respondent's
future conduct, for the Respondent, Mr. Segars, and Mr. Lowder remain
on probation by the North Carolina Board of Pharmacy. The Deputy
Administrator agrees with Judge Tenney's observation that, ``in light
of the thoroughness with which the Board conducted its investigation
and the Board's mandate to protect the `public health, safety and
welfare,' the Board reasonably can be expected to lift the stay of
revocation in the highly unlikely event that the Respondent's past
violations recur. Under such circumstances, the pharmacy would lack
State authority to handle controlled substances, and the DEA would not
have the authority to maintain the pharmacy's registration under the
Controlled Substance Act.''
Again, the Deputy Administrator emphasizes that the conclusion to
continue the Respondent's registration in no way endorses the past
misconduct of the Respondent. Rather, in determining whether continuing
the Respondent's registration would be inconsistent with the public's
interest, the Deputy Administrator has determined that, (1) given the
commitment of the Respondent's pharmacists to future compliance, (2)
the evidence of consistent compliance since 1991, and (3) the other
rehabilitative actions taken, the public's interest is best served in
this case by
[[Page 10796]]
continuing the Respondent's registration.
Therefore, the Deputy Administrator finds that the public interest
is best served by continuing the DEA Certificate of Registration,
AS3172157, issued to Service Pharmacy, Inc. Accordingly, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the
authority vested in him by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824, and 28 C.F.R.
0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby orders that the Respondent's DEA Certificate
of Registration be, and it hereby is, continued. This order is
effective March 15, 1996.
Dated: March 4, 1996.
Stephen H. Greene,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-6220 Filed 3-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M
