[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 52 (Friday, March 15, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10736-10740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-6291]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From the K
Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, WA
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
ACTION: Notice of Record of Decision (ROD).
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SUMMARY: DOE has prepared and issued a final environmental impact
statement (FEIS) on the ``Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel from the K
Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington'' (DOE/EIS-0245F,
January 1996). A notice of availability of the FEIS was published in
the Federal Register on February 2, 1996 (61 FR 3932). The FEIS
evaluates the potential environmental impacts of alternatives for
managing the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) located in the K-East (KE) and K-
West (KW) SNF storage basins at the Hanford Site located in
southeastern Washington State.
Based on the analysis in the FEIS and after careful evaluation of
environmental impacts, costs, compliance requirements, engineering
considerations, worker and public health and safety, and public, agency
and tribal comments, DOE has decided to implement the preferred
alternative evaluated in the FEIS with two modifications and is
documenting that decision in this ROD. The preferred alternative
consists of removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying,
conditioning and sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry
vault storage in a new facility, to be built at Hanford, for up to 40
years pending decisions on ultimate disposition. The K Basins will
continue to be operated during the period over which the preferred
alternative is implemented. The preferred alternative also includes
transfer of the basin sludge to Hanford's double-shell tanks for
management, disposal of non-SNF basin debris in a low-level burial
ground at the Hanford Site, disposition of the basin water, and
deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning. The two
modifications in the ROD are with respect to management of the sludge,
and the timing of placement of the SNF into the transportation casks.
The modification for management of the sludge is that should it not be
possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will
either continue to be managed as SNF, or disposed of as solid waste.
The modification regarding placement of the SNF into the transportation
casks would reduce the radiation exposure to the workers by placing the
multicanister overpacks (MCOs) inside the transportation casks before
the SNF is loaded into the MCOs, instead of loading the SNF into the
MCOs prior to placing them inside the transportation casks.
ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Requests for copies of the FEIS and
for further information on the FEIS or ROD should be directed to: Dr.
Phillip G. Loscoe, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, M/S S7-41,
Richland, Washington 99352-0550. Dr. Loscoe may be contacted by
telephone at (509) 376-7434 or at (800) 321-2008.
[[Page 10737]]
For further information on the DOE NEPA process please contact: Ms.
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, D.C. 20585-0002. Ms. Borgstrom may be reached by telephone
at (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
This ROD was prepared in accordance with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts
1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021).
The ROD is based on the analysis of environmental impacts identified in
the FEIS, consideration of project costs, compliance requirements,
engineering considerations, worker and public health and safety, and
public, agency and tribal comments.
This ROD covers the management of approximately 2,100 metric tons
(2,300 tons) of U.S. Government-owned SNF stored in the KE and KW
storage basins at DOE's Hanford Site (about 80% of DOE's total
inventory). Most of the SNF is from the N Reactor at Hanford, which
operated from December 1963 until January 1987 producing materials for
the U.S. national defense program and also producing steam that was
used for generation of electricity. This SNF consists primarily of
metallic uranium, but also contains about five metric tons (six tons)
of plutonium and about one metric ton (1.1 ton) of radioactive fission
products within the uranium fuel elements.
The KE and KW storage basins are concrete basins constructed in
1951 to temporarily store SNF from the adjacent KE and KW Reactors
(nominally 0.5 to 1.5 years prior to reprocessing). The basins are
located in the 100-K Area at the Hanford Site about 420 m (1,400 ft)
from the Columbia River. The volume of each basin is about 4,900
m3 (1.3 M gallons) and each basin is filled to about 93% of
capacity with water. The water level in each basin is maintained at a
depth of about 5 m (16 ft) to absorb heat from the radioactive decay of
the fuel rods and to provide a radiation shield for protection of
facility workers. SNF from the N Reactor has been stored in the KE
Basin since 1975 and the KW Basin since 1981.
Prior to receiving N Reactor SNF the KW Basin was drained, cleaned
and refurbished. The bare concrete surfaces were given an epoxy coating
which helps keep radioactive elements such as cesium-137 from being
absorbed into the concrete. The KW Basin has remained relatively clean
because of this refurbishment and also because only sealed canisters of
SNF have been stored there. The KE Basin did not receive refurbishment
prior to receiving N Reactor SNF. In addition, the SNF in the KE Basin
is in open canisters which allows water to come in contact with the
fuel elements inside the canisters.
The principal environmental and safety concerns are associated with
the KE Basin and arise from the presence of broken and corroding SNF,
buildup of radioactive sludge on the bottom of the basin, deteriorating
concrete with vulnerability to earthquake damage, leakage of
contaminated water to the soil below the basin, and the presence of
cesium-137 contamination of the concrete at the water line which,
unshielded, can contribute to worker exposure to radiation. Conditions
in KW Basin are not as serious because the SNF stored there is in
sealed canisters.
In a November 1993 report entitled ``Spent Fuel Working Group
Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel
and other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and their Environmental,
Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities,'' DOE identified K Basins storage
problems as requiring priority attention. Similarly, the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in its recommendation 94-1 to the
Secretary of Energy dated May 26, 1994, recommended ``That the [DOE's]
program be accelerated to place the deteriorating reactor fuel in the
KE Basin at Hanford in a stable configuration for interim storage until
an option for ultimate disposition is chosen. This program needs to be
directed toward storage methods that will minimize further
deterioration.''
Purpose and Need
The purpose of and need for DOE's action to which this ROD applies
is to reduce risks to human health and the environment, specifically
(1) to prevent the release of radioactive materials into the air or the
soil surrounding the K Basins and the potential migration of
radionuclides through the soil column to the nearby Columbia River, (2)
to reduce occupational radiation exposure, and (3) to eliminate the
risks to the public and to workers from the deterioration of SNF in the
K Basins.
Alternatives Considered
Preferred Alternative
The preferred alternative is referred to in the FEIS as ``drying/
passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage''. In addition to
construction of a staging/storage building at the Canister Storage
Building (CSB) site, the proposed series of operations to achieve the
preferred alternative is presented below. The details of the processes
and perhaps their order are expected to change somewhat as the designs
evolve and as the results of ongoing testing become available. However,
the impacts of the following steps bound those necessary to place the K
Basins SNF in safe dry storage:
continue K Basin operations until the removal of SNF,
sludge and debris, and disposition of the water is completed. Make
modifications to the K Basins, as necessary, for maintenance,
monitoring and safety, and provide systems necessary to support the
activities described below
remove K Basin SNF from existing canisters, clean and
desludge
repackage the SNF into fuel baskets designed for multi-
canister overpack (MCO) dimensions, that would include provision for
water removal, SNF conditioning requirements, and criticality control
after loading SNF into the MCOs and draining the MCOs, dry
the SNF under vacuum at approximately 50 deg.C (120 deg.F), flood the
MCOs with inert gas, seal penetrations, and place in transportation
casks
transport the SNF (in MCOs) in these casks via truck to
the Canister Storage Building (CSB) site in the 200 East Area, and
provide for temporary vented staging, as necessary
further condition the SNF in MCOs, as soon as practicable,
heating the SNF in a vacuum to about 300 deg.C (570 deg.F) to remove
water that is chemically bound to the SNF and canister corrosion
products, and to dissociate, to the extent practicable, any reactive
uranium hydride present.
following conditioning, weld-seal the SNF in an inert gas
in the MCOs for dry interim storage in a vault for up to 40 years (a
storage period of 40 years was used in estimating impacts)
collect and remove the sludge from the basins and
disposition as waste in Hanford's double-shell tanks
collect the non-SNF debris from the basins and dispose of
as low-level waste in Hanford's existing low-level waste burial grounds
remove and transport basin water to the 200 Area Effluent
Treatment Facility
[[Page 10738]]
for disposal at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site.
prepare the K Basins for deactivation and transfer to
decontamination and decommissioning program
Principal advantages of the drying/passivation (conditioning) with
dry vault storage alternative are that it would accelerate removal of
SNF from aging facilities in proximity to the Columbia River, would
result in passive vault storage of dry SNF requiring only minimal
surveillance, would retard continued degradation of the SNF and would
reduce or eliminate reactive uranium hydrides in the SNF.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the
construction of new facilities would be required, and some uncertainty
exists in the chemical state of the SNF and sludge and, therefore, in
the extent to which drying and passivation processes would be required.
However, defense-in-depth measures will be engineered to assure safety
of the process. Moreover, characterization of K Basins SNF is presently
being conducted to address these uncertainties which may result in a
more cost-effective conditioning process.
Other Alternatives Considered
The FEIS analyzed six other alternatives for the management of SNF
from the K Basins at the Hanford Site. The other alternatives examined
in detail were:
No action alternative: Under this alternative DOE would
continue SNF storage in the KE and KW Basins for up to 40 years with no
modifications except for maintenance, monitoring, and ongoing safety
upgrades. Consideration of the no action alternative is required by CEQ
regulation [40 CFR 1502.14(d)].
The principal advantage of the no action alternative is that it
would require no movement of SNF and no construction of new facilities.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the K Basins
were not designed for an 80-year life (40 years to date and up to an
additional 40 years) and would require increasing maintenance of aging
facilities with associated potential for increased radiological impacts
on workers, would not place the SNF in a safer storage configuration,
would not preclude leakage of radionuclides to the soil beneath the
basins and near the Columbia River, and would fail to alleviate
concerns expressed by regulatory agencies, advisory bodies and the
public relative to environmental impacts induced by seismic events.
Enhanced K Basins storage alternative: Under this
alternative DOE would perform facility life extension upgrades for KW
Basin, containerize KE Basin SNF and sludge, and consolidate with KW
Basin SNF for up to 40-year storage.
Principal advantages of the enhanced K Basins storage alternative
are that it would remove degrading SNF from the KE Basin, permit
deactivation of the KE Basin, and would require no construction of new
facilities.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the KW Basin
was not designed for an 80-year life and would require increasing
maintenance of the aging facility. Despite completion of practical
upgrades, this alternative would not arrest continued fuel degradation,
might result in conditions favorable to the production of reactive
uranium hydrides in the repackaged KE Basin SNF transferred to the KW
Basin, and would fail to alleviate concerns expressed by regulatory
agencies, advisory bodies and the public relative to environmental
impacts potentially induced by seismic events.
New wet storage alternative: Under this alternative DOE
would remove SNF from the K Basins and provide for up to 40 years of
new wet storage in a new facility located on the 200 Areas plateau that
meets current design criteria.
Principal advantages of the new wet storage alternative are that it
would accelerate removal of SNF from aging facilities in the proximity
to the Columbia River, would make use of a proven storage technology
(at least for commercial fuel) coupled with design to modern seismic
criteria, and would maintain flexibility for preparing SNF for ultimate
disposition.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that it would
require construction expense and continued maintenance, would not
prevent the continuation of SNF degradation, and would not eliminate
the potential for further hydriding of the SNF.
Calcination with dry storage: Under this alternative DOE
would remove SNF from the K Basins, calcine it, and provide for up to
40-year dry storage of SNF-oxides in a new cask or vault facility.
The principal advantages of the calcination with dry storage
alternative are that it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near
the Columbia River and that it would convert the SNF into stable
oxides, which are readily storable in a dry form and may be suitable
without further processing for ultimate disposal in a geologic
repository.
The principal disadvantage of this alternative is the need to
construct and operate a relatively expensive calcining facility.
Onsite processing: Under this alternative the DOE would
remove and chemically process K Basins SNF and provide for up to 40-
year dry storage of the recovered uranium (as uranium trioxide) and
plutonium (as plutonium dioxide), and manage fission product waste in
tanks with other wastes under Hanford's Tank Waste Remediation System
program.
Principal advantages of the onsite processing alternative are that
it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near the Columbia River,
convert uranium (the major constituent of SNF) into uranium trioxide
that is readily storable in dry form and for which future use
(constituent of power reactor fuel) might be found, convert plutonium
to a stable oxide for which a future use (constituent of power reactor
fuel) might be found or for which storage in a geologic repository may
be suitable without further processing, and convert fission products
into a form suitable for storage in a geologic repository.
Principal disadvantages of this alternative are the need to
construct and operate a relatively expensive separations facility, the
plutonium dioxide product would no longer be self-protecting and would
require special storage and accountability that in turn may require
construction of additional storage capacity, and no immediate need
exists for either the separated uranium or plutonium.
Foreign processing: Under this alternative, the DOE would
remove K Basins SNF, ship overseas for processing, provide for up to
40-year dry storage of returned uranium (as uranium trioxide) and
plutonium (as plutonium dioxide), and store vitrified fission product
waste, pending ultimate disposition.
With the exception that foreign processing would obviate the need
for construction of additional processing facilities at Hanford, the
principal advantages of the foreign processing alternative are
essentially the same as those for onsite processing.
Principal disadvantages of the foreign processing alternative are
the need to transport the K Basins SNF to a U.S. shipping/receiving
port, transload the SNF to ocean vessels, ship the SNF to a foreign
port, transport the SNF to an operating reprocessing plant, and ship
the uranium and plutonium products and vitrified high-level waste back
to Hanford or elsewhere, as appropriate. Additional disadvantages
include issues associated with the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
policy, unfavorable agency and public opinion regarding
[[Page 10739]]
shipping the degraded fuel off the Hanford Site, costs of new shipping
casks, and construction of a new head-end facility at the processing
plant. The need for special storage for plutonium product would be the
same as in the onsite processing alternative.
In all but the no action alternative, sludge, debris, and
contaminated water would be removed from the basins and managed
appropriately.
DOE considered, but did not analyze in detail, four additional
alternatives identified during the public scoping process. DOE
determined that these alternatives were not reasonable in the sense of
satisfying the purpose and need for this action. These alternatives,
which involved relocation of the K Basins SNF to existing facilities
that were in most cases adjacent to the Columbia River, would not meet
the Department's objectives of expeditious removal of K Basins SNF and
management of the SNF at a location away from the Columbia river.
Comments Received
DOE received comments on the draft EIS from six individuals and
representatives of BNFL, Inc., the State of Washington Department of
Fish and Wildlife, the State of Washington Department of Ecology, the
Oregon Department of Energy, the Nez Perce Tribe, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of the
Interior (DOI).
Responses to individual comments are provided in the FEIS (which
consists of the draft EIS and an Addendum to the draft EIS).
Reproductions of the as-received comment letters and the transcript of
oral comments received are presented in Appendix A to the FEIS.
Comments from EPA and DOI were received after the close of the public
comment period and publication of the FEIS; these comments and DOE's
responses will be made available in the public reading rooms listed in
the FEIS.
Several representative comments and DOE's responses are paraphrased
below.
Comment. Some commentors voiced concern about the pyrophoricity of
the SNF, the potential for ignition and sustained combustion, and the
potential for releases of radionuclides to the atmosphere.
Response. The concern for uncertainties in the potential for
ignition of SNF is one of the principal drivers for both the DOE's
defense-in-depth approach, which includes conditioning of the SNF
followed by dry vault storage in sealed, inert-gas filled canisters,
and the SNF characterization effort which is currently underway. The
characterization work is intended to confirm the efficacy of planned
process steps to assure safe SNF management via laboratory analyses of
samples of the K Basins SNF.
Comment. Some commentors contended that SNF as packaged would not
meet geologic repository requirements, hence the SNF should be
processed so that the SNF and high-activity fission products could be
put in a form acceptable to repository disposal.
Response. Acceptance criteria for the proposed geologic repository
have not yet been determined. In the absence of the criteria for
accepting defense SNF or high-level waste into the repository, it is
not prudent to base currently needed SNF management decisions too
heavily on the criterion of suitability for ultimate geologic
disposition.
Comment. The EPA expressed concern that estimates of some accident
probabilities were given without describing how the probabilities were
derived.
Response. Except in a few instances, such as crane drops, there is
no actual experience on which to base estimates of the probability of
occurrence of accidents in SNF management as presented in the EIS. As a
consequence, engineering judgement is used to qualitatively assess the
likelihood of a postulated accident occurring. These qualitative
judgments are then expressed as a numerical range of annual frequency
of occurrence to permit development of some quantitative estimate of
accident impacts that may be compared among the alternatives. While
imprecise, these estimates represent the best information available to
DOE at this time.
Comment. DOI acknowledged that radiological and nonradiological
exposure risks to humans and consideration for special habitats
occurring on the Hanford Site were addressed, but expressed concern
that environmental impacts in terms of other biota were not addressed
in the EIS and thus comparison among alternatives was not complete.
Response. As may be noted in the EIS, impacts on humans (including
onsite noninvolved workers, which may be taken as representative of
other onsite biota) from normal operations associated with any
alternative were estimated to be very small. As a consequence,
exposures to other biota and the consequences therefrom are also
believed to be trivial to very small. Thus, while zero impact to other
onsite biota cannot be claimed, scrutiny of environmental impacts to
levels expressed by DOI is believed to be of minimal value in forming a
basis for making decisions among the alternatives.
Comment. EPA noted that contrary to Section 6.10 of the draft EIS,
DOE must apply for permission to construct any facility, regardless of
emission projections expressed in Appendix D of the regulation.
Response. It is DOE's intent to comply with the letter and spirit
of all applicable environmental requirements, and DOE will file for
permission to construct the facilities associated with the preferred
alternative. Although, as indicated by EPA, the requirement was
misstated in Section 6.10, the requirement and intent to comply was
correctly stated elsewhere in the EIS.
Comment. DOI commented that DOE should provide compensatory
mitigation for habitat lost in the initial development of the canister
storage building site.
Response. DOE does not plan to provide mitigation for the CSB site
per se. However, DOE is committed to implementing the Hanford
Biological Resources Management Plan (BRMP) when it is completed. This
plan is intended to provide for responsible management of the Hanford
ecosystem.
Environmentally Preferred Alternative
CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require identification of the
environmentally preferred alternative(s). Overall environmental impacts
under normal operating conditions were found to be neither large nor to
vary markedly among the alternatives. Since the no action alternative
would involve the least handling of SNF and require no new facilities,
under normal operating conditions it would have the lowest overall
impacts. Hence, the no action alternative is the environmentally
preferred alternative under normal operating conditions.
However, over the long term, implementation of the no action
alternative is not prudent because it does not address the continuing
degradation of the SNF, the increasing accumulation of radioactive
sludge, the further contamination of the basin water and the unlikely,
but not impossible, occurrence of an earthquake releasing substantial
quantities of radionuclides to the air, ground and possibly the
Columbia River.
Decision
Based on consideration of environmental impacts, costs, compliance
requirements, engineering practicability, worker and public health and
safety, and on comments received on the draft EIS, DOE will implement
the preferred alternative, as described
[[Page 10740]]
above, with two modifications. The preferred alternative will involve
removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying, conditioning and
sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry vault storage for
up to 40 years pending decisions on its ultimate disposition. The
preferred alternative also calls for transfer of the basin sludge to
Hanford's double-shell tanks for management, disposal of non-SNF basin
debris in a low-level burial ground at Hanford, disposition of the
basin water at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site (SALDS),
and deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning.
The first modification is with respect to sludge management. In the
preferred alternative, sludge is to be dispositioned as waste in
Hanford's double-shell tanks. However, while in the basins, the sludge
will continue to be managed as spent nuclear fuel. Should it not be
possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will
either continue to be managed and treated as SNF, or grouted and
packaged to meet the Solid Waste Burial Ground waste acceptance
criteria. The impacts of alternate sludge management were analyzed in
the FEIS and are small. By mass the sludge is about 0.5% of the SNF and
impacts of continuing to manage the sludge as SNF would be negligible
by comparison.
The second modification is with respect to the timing of the
placement of the MCOs into the transportation casks. In the preferred
alternative, the fuel baskets would be loaded into the MCO's, then
drained and vacuum dried prior to placement in the transportation
casks. However, placing the MCOs in the transportation casks prior to
loading the fuel baskets into the MCOs will reduce the exposure of the
workers to radiation during draining and vacuum drying.
The DOE selected the preferred alternative principally because it
will alleviate concerns for protection of workers, public health and
safety, and the environment (by expeditious removal of the SNF from the
vicinity of the Columbia River), will utilize a partially completed
existing facility (the CSB), will have few, if any, impacts on the
physical environment (minimal new construction) and will be implemented
at a cost on par with or substantially less than that of the other
alternatives.
Mitigation
Implementation of the preferred alternative, which is drying/
passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage at the CSB site, is
not expected to result in adverse impacts. As a consequence,
preparation of a Mitigation Action Plan (10 CFR 1021.331) in the event
of adverse impacts is not planned. Nevertheless, DOE is responding to
Executive Order 12856 (58 FR 41981) and associated DOE Orders and
guidelines by reducing the use of toxic chemicals, improving emergency
planning, response and accident notification, and encouraging the
development of clean technologies and the testing of innovative
pollution prevention technologies. The pollution prevention program at
the Hanford Site is formalized in a Hanford Site Waste Minimization and
Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan. Moreover, DOE aggressively
applies the principle of reducing exposure to both radioactive and
toxic chemicals to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) throughout
its operations.
Issued
This Record of Decision for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel
from the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington is issued
by the Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland,
Washington on March 4, 1996.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, DOE Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 96-6291 Filed 3-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
