[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 61 (Monday, March 31, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15205-15207]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-8053]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[IA 97-001]
Darryl D. McNeil; Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed
Activities (Effective Immediately)
I
Darryl D. McNeil was employed by SBI as a Security Lieutenant at
Florida Power Corporation's (FPC) Crystal River site. SBI is a
contractor to FPC and provides security services for the site. FPC
holds License No. DPR-72 for Crystal River Unit 3, issued by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR
Part 50 on January 28, 1977. The license authorizes FPC to operate
Crystal River Unit 3 in accordance with the conditions specified
therein.
II
10 CFR 73.55(d) requires, in part, that nuclear power plant
licensees control all points of personnel access into a protected area.
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that a numbered picture badge
identification system be used for all individuals who are authorized
access to protected areas without escort. The objective of the
regulation is to provide high assurance that only individuals who
require access and have been found to be trustworthy and reliable and
do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the
public are allowed to enter the protected area. The Crystal River Unit
3 Operating License Section 2.D, Physical Security, requires FPC to
maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved Physical
Security Plan. FPC's Physical Security Plan, Revision 6-9, Section
5.4.3 states: ``When badges/key cards are allowed to leave the
Protected Area, they will be under the observation and control of
Security Force personnel. * * * Lost and missing badges/key cards are
immediately removed from the Security Computer as soon as Security
Supervision is made aware of the loss. Prior to removal from the
Security Computer, an investigation is conducted to determine any
unauthorized use.''
On February 9, 1996, a Quality Assurance employee at Crystal River
Unit 3 left the site while wearing his security badge. During the
period of March 6, 1996, through December 13, 1996, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) conducted an
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the loss of control of
the security badge at the Crystal River site. From its investigation,
the NRC concludes that contract security employees intentionally and
deliberately conspired to cover up the loss of the security badge.
Specifically, the evidence revealed that, prior to the return of the
employee to the site, two security officers became aware that this
event had occurred, and notified their supervisor, Darryl D. McNeil, of
the event. Although Mr. McNeil admitted to the OI investigator that he
was aware of the requirements to deactivate a missing badge in the
security access computer, and to initiate an investigation upon being
informed of the mistake, he did not comply with these requirements.
Instead, he permitted the security officers: (1) to retrieve the
individual's badge when he returned to the site later that day; (2) to
card the badge out as if it had been processed properly upon the
individual's exit from the plant; and (3) to return the badge to the
badge rack.
On January 16, 1997, the NRC sent a certified letter to Mr. McNeil
advising him that his actions appeared to have violated 10 CFR 50.5,
Deliberate Misconduct, and offering him the opportunity to attend a
predecisional enforcement conference. By letter dated February 10,
1997, Mr. McNeil provided a written response to the January 16, 1997,
letter in lieu of participation in an enforcement conference. Mr.
McNeil's letter indicated that he was aware an employee had left the
facility with his badge and that he had been informed that the security
officer planned to retrieve the badge and return it to the badge rack.
Mr. McNeil stated that in his
[[Page 15206]]
judgement, these actions posed no security risk to the plant.
III
Based on the above, it appears that Mr. McNeil engaged in
deliberate misconduct in that, although he was aware of badge security
requirements, he deliberately allowed security officers to improperly
retrieve, card out, and return a badge which had been taken off-site to
the badge rack, and deliberately failed to remove the employee's badge
from the security access computer or initiate an investigation of the
incident. These actions were not authorized by plant procedures. Mr.
McNeil's deliberate misconduct caused the Licensee to be in violation
of Section 5.4.3 of its Physical Security Plan and is, therefore, a
violation of 10 CFR 50.5(a)(1). The NRC must be able to rely on
licensees, contractors and their employees to fully comply with NRC
requirements. This is essential with respect to access authorization
programs at nuclear power plants because the NRC relies on members of a
nuclear facility's security force to ensure that all individuals who
are allowed to access the facility meet high standards of
trustworthiness and reliability. Mr. McNeil's deliberate misconduct
raises serious doubt as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with
NRC requirements.
Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that
licensed activities can be conducted in compliance with Commission
requirements and that the health and safety of the public will be
protected if Mr. McNeil were permitted at this time to be involved in
NRC-licensed activities. Therefore, public health and safety and the
public interest require that Mr. McNeil be prohibited from any
involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year from
the date of this Order and, if he is currently involved with another
licensee in NRC-licensed activities, he must immediately cease such
activities, and inform the NRC of the name, address and telephone
number of the employer, and provide a copy of this Order to the
employer. Additionally, Mr. McNeil is required to notify the NRC of his
first employment in NRC-licensed activities for one year following the
prohibition period. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that
the significance of Mr. McNeil's conduct described above is such that
the public health, safety and interest require that this Order be
immediately effective.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR 50.5 and 10 CFR 150.20, it is
hereby ordered, effective immediately, that:
A. Mr. Darryl D. McNeil is prohibited for one year from the date
of this Order from engaging in or exercising control over
individuals engaged in NRC-licensed activities. If Mr. McNeil is
currently involved in NRC licensed activities, he must immediately
cease such activities, inform the NRC of the name, address and
telephone number of the employer, and provide a copy of this Order
to the employer. NRC-licensed activities are those activities that
are conducted pursuant to a specific or general license issued by
the NRC, including, but not limited to, those activities of
Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the authority
granted by 10 CFR 150.20.
B. For a period of one year following the period of prohibition
set forth in Paragraph IV.A. above, Mr. Darryl D. McNeil shall,
within 20 days of his acceptance of his first employment offer
involving NRC-licensed activities as defined in Paragraph IV.A
above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name,
address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where he
is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed activities. The notice
shall include a statement of his commitment to compliance with
regulatory requirements and the basis why the Commission should have
confidence that he will now comply with applicable NRC requirements.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may relax or rescind, in
writing, any of the above conditions upon demonstration by Mr. McNeil
of good cause.
V
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Mr. McNeil must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within 20 days of the
date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be
given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for
extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555,
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may
consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the
answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically
admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall
set forth the matters of fact and law on which Mr. McNeil or other
person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order
should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall
be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Chief, Docketing and Service Section, Washington, DC 20555.
Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant
General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address, and
to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 101 Marietta Street, NW,
Suite 2900, Atlanta, Georgia 30323 and to Mr. McNeil if the answer or
hearing request is by a person other than Mr. McNeil. If a person other
than Mr. McNeil requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.714(d).
If a hearing is requested by Mr. McNeil or a person whose interest
is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating
the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be
sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. McNeil, or any other person
adversely affected by this Order, may, in addition to demanding a
hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding
officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the
ground that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness,
is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded
allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions
specified in Section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
[[Page 15207]]
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of March 1997.
Edward L. Jordan,
Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, Program
Oversight, Investigations and Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 97-8053 Filed 3-28-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
