[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 61 (Tuesday, March 31, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15464-15465]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-8407]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328]
In the Matter of Tennessee Valley Authority; Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant Units 1 and 2; Exemption
I
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) is the holder
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79, which authorize
operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2,
respectively. The licenses provide, among other things, that the
licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the
licensee's site located in Hamilton County, Tennessee.
II
Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas
subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two
detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to
maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM
is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure
that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a
criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include
drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the
procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause
of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in
accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of
10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly
personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection
(b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel
decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician
and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies,
and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated
individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary.
Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the
requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be
used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any
licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted
an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the
Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the
relief requested.
[[Page 15465]]
III
The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at SQN is in
the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is
stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass.
The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an
inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel at SQN, and has determined
that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the
licensee meets the following seven criteria:
1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or
storage rack at one time.
2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%
confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and
flooded with pure water.
3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the
k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence
level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a
moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%
confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and
flooded with pure water.
5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63,
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight
percent.
By letter dated December 5, 1997, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the
seven criteria given above. The Commission's technical staff has
reviewed the licensee's submittals and has determined that SQN meets
the criteria for prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the
staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent
criticality to occur in SNM handling or storage areas at SQN.
The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of
SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that
such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation
monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage
and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive
radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions.
The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the
licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good
cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
IV
The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Tennessee Valley
Authority an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
environment (63 FR 14481).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of March 1998.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-8407 Filed 3-30-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
