[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 43 (Friday, March 4, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-5026]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: March 4, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311]
Public Service Electric and Gas Co.; Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-70 and DPR-75 issued to the Public Service Electric and Gas Company
(the licensee) for operation of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1 and 2, located in Salem County, New Jersey.
The proposed amendment would increase the storage capacity of the
spent fuel pool (SFP) from its current 1170 storage cells to 1632
storage cells. This would be accomplished by replacing 9 out of twelve
of the existing high density fuel racks with 9 maximum density rack
modules constructed of stainless steel and a neutron absorber material
(boron carbide and aluminum-composite sandwich, product name
``boral''). The proposed change would extend the date when full core
discharge capacity is no longer available for Salem 1 from 1998 to
2008, and for Salem 2 from 2002 to 2012.
In addition, the proposed amendment would extend the decay time for
refueling operations from 100 hours to 168 hours.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. Do not involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
[Public Service Electric and Gas Company] PSE&G has evaluated
the following postulated accident scenarios:
1. A spent fuel assembly drop in the SFP.
2. Loss of SFP cooling.
3. A seismic event.
4. An installation accident during reracking.
The Salem SFP has been analyzed considering fuel handling
equipment, operating procedures, SFP cooling system, and seismic
events. Reracking involves replacing 9 out of the 12 existing high
density racks with 9 new maximum density racks. It does not require
any system modifications or modifications to the cask handling
crane, which by its physical location and design is prevented from
moving over the SFP. Results confirm that the proposed modification
does not increase the probability of the first three postulated
accident scenarios.
NUREG-0612, ``Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,''
sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2, and 5.1.6, provide guidance for heavy load
handling operations during spent fuel storage rack replacement.
Section 5.1.2 lists (4) alternatives for assuring safe heavy load
handling during a fuel storage rack replacement. Alternative (1)
satisfies the control of heavy loads guidelines through the
implementation of defense-in-depth measures. These measures ensure
that the potential for a heavy load drop is extremely small. PSE&G
intends to utilize the defense-in-depth concept during reracking
activities.
NUREG-0554, ``Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power
Plants,'' provides guidance for the design, fabrication,
installation, and testing of highly reliable new cranes. NUREG-0612,
Appendix C, ``Modification of Existing Cranes,'' provides guidance
for the implementation of NUREG-0554 at operating plants. We have
evaluated anticipated fuel handling crane movements for compliance
with the guidelines specified in alternative (1) of Appendix C, and
determined that alternative (1) was satisfied based on the extremely
small probability of a storage rack drop. The maximum weight of any
storage rack and its associated handling tool is 17 tons. The fuel
handling crane will be upgraded to a 20 ton lifting capacity and a
design safety factor, with respect to ultimate strength, of five
times the lifting capacity (i.e., 100 tons). The uprated fuel
handling crane has ample safety factor margin for storage rack
movement. This applies to non-redundant load-bearing components.
Special redundant lifting devices, which have a rated capacity
sufficient to maintain safety factors, will be utilized for storage
rack movements. Per NUREG-0612, Appendix B, the substantial safety
factor margin ensures that the probability of a load drop is
extremely low. Additionally, a load drop analysis was performed to
ensure the integrity of the pool structure. The analysis results
were acceptable.
Based on the actions discussed above, the proposed modification
does not increase the probability of an installation accident.
PSE&G evaluated the consequences of a spent fuel assembly drop
in the SFP and determined that the criticality acceptance criterion,
Keff less than or equal to 0.95, was not exceeded. The radiological
consequences of a fuel assembly drop did not change significantly
from those previously analyzed. The calculated doses are well within
10 CFR 100 requirements. A spent fuel assembly dropped on the racks,
will not cause rack distortion that would prevent the performance of
their safety function. Thus, the consequences of this postulated
accident are not significantly changed from those previously
evaluated.
The consequences of a loss of SFP cooling were evaluated. The
evaluation concluded that sufficient time is available to establish
an alternate means of cooling following a complete failure of the
normal SFP cooling system. Calculations show that under a normal
discharge scenario, if all indirect forced cooling paths (i.e., heat
removal by heat exchangers) are lost at the instant the pool water
reaches its maximum value, the pool will not begin bulk boiling for
at least 4.61 hours. This time interval is sufficient to allow plant
personnel to establish alternate heat removal methods. A piped
cross-connection exists between Unit 1 and Unit 2's SFP heat
exchangers. This allows for use of the opposite Unit's heat
exchanger during emergencies, or when a given Unit's Service Water
header or Component Cooling System are out-of-service. Thus, the
consequences of this postulated accident are not significantly
changed from those previously evaluated.
The new racks are designed and fabricated to meet applicable NRC
requirements and industry standards. Seismic analyses were performed
on the new racks and the existing racks using 3-D single rack
(opposed phase motion) and Whole Pool Multi-Rack (WPMR) models.
Kinematic and shear analyses conclude the existence of large margins
of safety. The kinematic margin against rack-to-rack or rack-to-wall
impact is at least 1.5 for all SFP racks. Maximum rack primary
stresses, under [Safe Shutdown Earthquake] SSE conditions, are less
than 50% of the allowable ASME Code value. Maximum supporting pool
structure bending moments and thru-thickness shear, under factored
load conditions, are less than 80% of the allowables. All racks (new
and existing) are designed as free-standing racks, to ensure that
rack and pool structure integrity is maintained during and after a
seismic event. Thus, the consequences of a postulated seismic event
are not increased from previously evaluated events.
The consequences of an installation accident were considered.
All fuel in the SFP will have decayed for a minimum of (3) months
prior to any heavy load movement in the SFP area. This allows
sufficient time for decay of gaseous radionuclides in the fuel (gap
activity). A postulated accidental gaseous release from all stored
fuel assemblies would result in a potential offsite dose less than
10% of 10CFR100 limit. No equipment essential to safe reactor
shutdown or employed to mitigate the consequences of an accident is
located beneath, adjacent to, or within the area of influence of any
load handling to support the SFP modification. Thus, the
consequences of a postulated installation accident are not
significantly increased from those previously evaluated.
The only postulated accident affected by decay time is a Loss of
SFP cooling. The proposed increase in decay time prior to refueling
operations is conservative and decreases the decay heat removal
requirements. All thermal-hydraulic calculations used 168 hours as
the assumed decay time and concluded that adequate heat removal
capability existed. Thus, the probability and consequences of a loss
of SFP cooling accident are not significantly increased from those
previously evaluated.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the proposed changes do not
increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed modification has been reviewed and analyzed for
possible accidents. The criteria used in the analyses, design, and
installation of the new spent fuel racks account for anticipated
loadings and postulated conditions that may be imposed upon the
structure during its lifetime, and is in conformance with
established codes, standards, and specifications acceptable to the
NRC.
Factors that could affect the SFP neutron multiplication factor
have been addressed conservatively. PSE&G concluded that the maximum
SFP neutron multiplication, with the addition of the maximum density
racks, will not exceed the subcritically limit of Keff less than or
equal to 0.95.
The increase in decay time prior to refueling operations reduces
the initial heat load and SFP cooling equipments. The addition of
new racks and associated spent fuel will produce an incremental heat
load in the SFP. However, analysis has shown that the existing SFP
cooling system is sufficient to absorb this incremental heat load.
The peak bulk pool temperature will be maintained below the
threshold value to preclude bulk boiling. The incremental heat load
does not alter SFP cooling safety considerations from those
previously reviewed and found acceptable.
Rack impact analysis was performed to investigate possible
impact during seismic events (i.e., rack-to-rack and rack-to-wall
impacts). The analysis concluded that the proposed SFP modification
does not result in rack-to-rack impact in the cellular region or
rack-to-wall impact during postulated seismic events.
The basic SFP reracking technology has been reviewed and
approved by the NRC in numerous applications for spent fuel capacity
increases. The safety function and operation of the SFP cooling
system, makeup, and structural systems are unchanged by the
modification. No new failure modes are created.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the proposed changes do not
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any previously evaluated.
3. Do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The safety function of the SFP and the racks is to preclude
inadvertent criticality in a safe, specifically designed, underwater
storage location for spent fuel assemblies that require shielding
and cooling during storage and handling. The NRC Staff has
established that the issue of margin of safety, when applied to
reracking modifications, should address the following areas:
1. Nuclear criticality considerations.
2. Thermal-hydraulic considerations.
3. Mechanical, material, and structural considerations.
Assessment in these areas assures that the SFP and racks will
withstand specified design conditions, without impairment of the
structural integrity or performance of required safety functions.
The criticality analysis confirms that the new and existing rack
designs meet the NRC acceptance criterion of Keff less than or equal
to 0.95 under all conditions. The criticality analysis methods
conform to applicable industry codes, standards, specifications and
NRC guidance.
Keff calculations include uncertainties at a 95%/95% probability
confidence level. Thus, the proposed amendment does not involve a
significant reduction in the nuclear criticality margin of safety.
Conservative methods and assumptions were used to calculate the
maximum fuel temperature and the increase in SFP water temperature.
The thermal-hydraulic evaluation employed methods previously used to
evaluate existing spent fuel racks. The results demonstrate that the
temperature margins of safety are maintained. The proposed
modification, with the fuel inventory, will increase the heat load
in the SFP. However, the decay time prior to refueling operations
was increased from 100 to 168 hours to reduce the initial SFP
cooling requirements. Evaluation results indicate that the existing
SFP cooling system can maintain the bulk pool water temperature at
or below 149 F under normal discharge scenarios. The maximum
allowable temperature for bulk boiling is not exceeded for the
calculated increase in pool heat load. Maximum local water
temperatures, along the hottest fuel assembly, remain below the
nucleate boiling condition. While no nucleate boiling is indicated
for the standard storage condition, an assumption of 50% cell
blockage results in a possible highly localized two-phase condition
near the top of the fuel. Fuel clad thermal stresses remain less
than 7000 psi, which is considerably lower than the endurance limit
of the clad material. Thus, there is no significant reduction in the
margin of safety for thermal-hydraulic or SFP cooling.
Maintaining the spent fuel assemblies in a safe configuration
during normal and abnormal loadings is the primary safety function
of the SFP and racks. Abnormal loading associated with an
earthquake, a spent fuel assembly drop, or the drop of any other
heavy object were considered. The mechanical, material, and
structural design of the new spent fuel racks complies with
applicable portions of the NRC OT Position Paper. Rack materials are
compatible with the spent fuel pool environment and the spent fuel
assemblies. The structural assessment of the new racks concluded
that tilting and deflection or movement will not result in impact in
the active fuel region during postulated seismic events. In
addition, the spent fuel assemblies remain intact with no
criticality concerns. Thus, there is no significant reduction in the
margin of safety for mechanical, material and structural
considerations.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the proposed changes do not
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be
delivered to room P-223, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue,
Bethesda, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC
20555.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By April 4, 1994, the licensee may file a request for a hearing
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the local
public document room located at the Salem Free Public Library, 112 West
Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services
Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room,
the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, by the
above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the
notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform
the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-
(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the
following message addressed to Charles L. Miller: petitioner's name and
telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication
date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the
petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Mark J.
Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20005-3502, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d)
The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on
an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of
section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C.
10154. Under section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of
any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with
respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in
controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in section 134
provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by
discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following
argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and
substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to
be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings
are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of
section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.
The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are
found in 10 CFR part 2, subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for
Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear
Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41662, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR
2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may
invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding
officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be
timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a
request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the
Commission's rules in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G, and 2.714 in
particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or
petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The
presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The
presiding officer shall grant an untimely request for oral argument
only upon showing of good cause by the requesting party for the failure
to file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to
respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a
request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be
conducted in accordance with hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,
those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require
that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must
be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. If no party to the proceedings
requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument
are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G,
apply.
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated April 28, 1993, and revisions to this
submittal dated August 12, 1993, November 17, 1993 and February 2,
1994, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's
Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20555 and at the local public document room located at
the Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey
08079.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of February 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James C. Stone,
Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Reactor
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-5026 Filed 3-3-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
