[Federal Register Volume 67, Number 43 (Tuesday, March 5, 2002)]
[Notices]
[Pages 9889-9893]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 02-5331]
[[Page 9889]]
Presidential Documents
Federal Register�1A/�1AVol. 67, No. 43�1A/�1ATuesday,
March 5, 2002�1A/�1APresidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3_
The President
Presidential Determination No. 2002-07 of
February 23, 2002
President's Report to Congress on Major Drug
Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries under
the FY 2002 Modification to the Annual Drug
Certification Procedures
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
This report is submitted under section 591 of the
Kenneth H. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L.
107-115) (the ``FY 2002 FOAA'').
Pursuant to section 591 of the FY 2002 FOAA, I hereby
identify the following countries as major drug-transit
or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan,
The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India,
Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. I
previously identified these same countries as major
drug-transit or major illicit drug producing countries
on November 1, 2001, pursuant to section 490(h) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the
``FAA'').
Pursuant to section 591 of the FY 2002 FOAA, I hereby
designate Afghanistan, Burma and Haiti as countries
that failed demonstrably, during the previous 12
months, to adhere to their obligations under
international counternarcotics agreements and to take
the counternarcotics measures set forth in section
489(a) (1) of the FAA. I have attached a justification
for each of the countries so designated, as required by
section 591.
Pursuant to section 591(3), I hereby also determine
that provision of United States assistance to
Afghanistan and Haiti in FY 2002 under the FY 2002 FOAA
is vital to the national interests of the United
States.
You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit this
report to the Congress and to publish it in the Federal
Register.
(Presidential Sig.)B
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 23, 2002.
Billing code 4710-10-M
[[Page 9890]]
STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION
Afghanistan
Afghanistan has failed demonstrably during the previous
12 months to make significant efforts to adhere to its
obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures
set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Provision of United
States assistance to Afghanistan in Fiscal Year 2002
under the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2002 (P.L. 107-115) is vital to the national
interests of the United States.
After the Taliban began enforcing a ban on the
cultivation of opium poppy in September 2000, the total
production of opium in Afghanistan dropped by 94
percent, thereby reducing the global annual supply by
nearly 75 percent. Although the Taliban successfully
prevented cultivation, opium trafficking and heroin
processing continued unabated through 2001, indicating
the existence of large stockpiles of opium in the
region used to control the opium market. At no point
did the Taliban take any steps to adhere to its
international obligations to interrupt opium
trafficking or trade. In addition, cultivation and
opium production increased in former Northern Alliance
territory of Afghanistan. Drug traffickers in
Afghanistan have switched allegiances from the Taliban
to local commanders and warlords and available
information indicates that poppy cultivation has
resumed in several areas of Afghanistan since last
fall.
Although the new Afghan Interim Authority led by Hamid
Karzai has made a commitment to fight the production
and trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan consistent with
the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, it will take
several months and significant assistance from the
international community before the Interim Authority
can take concrete measures to eradicate poppy and
counter drug trafficking in Afghanistan. In the coming
months, I will continue to monitor the Interim
Authority's counternarcotics efforts closely. In the
meantime, it is in the vital national interest of the
United States to provide the full range of U.S.
assistance to support the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. Afghanistan poppy farmers must have viable
alternatives to poppy cultivation that provide a
sustainable income. The Afghan Interim Authority will
need to establish rule of law and a basic law
enforcement capacity at the local and regional level
for its counternarcotics strategy to succeed. More
broadly, although the United States' military campaign
in Afghanistan has been successful, it is essential to
ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a haven
for terrorists. Stabilizing Afghanistan by providing
various forms of assistance, including economic and
military assistance in addition to counternarcotics,
anti-crime, and humanitarian assistance is essential.
STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION
Burma
Burma has failed demonstrably during the last 12 months
to make substantial efforts to adhere to its
obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures
set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. With the ban on
opium production in Afghanistan imposed by the Taliban
in 2001, Burma returned to its position as the world's
largest producer of illicit opium. Burma is also the
primary source of methamphetamines trafficked
throughout Southeast Asia and has done little to stop
the production of an estimated 800 million tablets
annually and trafficking of these drugs.
Burma has taken some useful counternarcotics measures
in the last year, but these measures are too limited in
duration and scope to constitute a substantial effort
to meet the standards set forth under U.S. law.
[[Page 9891]]
Burma's 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Law conforms to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and
contains useful legal tools for addressing money
laundering, seizing drug-related assets, and
prosecuting drug conspiracy cases, but the Government
of Burma (GOB) has been slow to implement the law.
Burma has not enforced its existing money-laundering
laws. In 2001, Burma was placed on the Financial Action
Task Force's List of Non-Cooperating Countries and
Territories. To its credit Burma responded by drafting
new anti-money-laundering legislation, but its passage
has been delayed until sometime in 2002.
In 2001, the GOB took stronger, more aggressive law-
enforcement actions against some ethnic groups, notably
the Kokang Chinese, engaged in drug production and
trafficking and considerably improved counternarcotics
cooperation with China and Thailand. In areas
controlled by the United Wa State Army (the principal
drug-producing and drug-trafficking organization in
Burma) the government has been very cautious, only
slowly expanding its administrative presence, but not
yet attempting any aggressive law-enforcement
operations comparable to those it has staged elsewhere.
Although unwilling to risk confronting the Wa, a potent
organization with a well-manned and well-trained
military force, the GOB did take the modest steps of
establishing a police presence in the Wa territories in
2001 and, in December 2001, opening its first military
intelligence office in the Wa territories.
Seizures of opium in 2001 modestly exceeded the amounts
seized last year, but seizures of heroin declined for
the fourth straight year. Burmese law-enforcement
agencies seized approximately 1,629 kilograms of raw
opium and 98 kilograms of heroin during 2001. Heroin
seized in 2000 totaled 159 kilograms compared to 273
kilograms in 1999 and 404 kilograms in 1998.
The GOB has not yet taken effective action against
methamphetamine production and trafficking. Considering
that an estimated 800 million methamphetamine tablets
are produced in Burma each year, the amounts seized in
each of the past two years represent only small
fraction of the total produced and have no real effect
on the overall scope of the problem. In 2001, Burma
seized 32.4 million methamphetamine pills, compared to
26.7 million pills seized during 2000.
The GOB continued to refuse to transfer to U.S. custody
drug lord Chang Qifu (Khun Sa), who resides in Rangoon,
on grounds that he had not violated his 1996 surrender
agreement. The 1988 UN Drug Convention obligates
parties, including Burma, to prosecute such
traffickers.
While recognizing that Burma has intensified its
counternarcotics efforts in 2001, particularly during
the second half of the year, those efforts must be
sustained and expanded, if they are to have a
significant impact on the overall scope of the
production and trafficking problem. Burma has not yet
curbed involvement in illicit narcotics perpetrated by
the largest, most powerful and most important
trafficking organization within its borders, the United
Wa State Army.
On balance, the United States Government remains
concerned that the GOB's efforts are not commensurate
with the extent of Burma's illicit drug problem and
believes that Burma has failed demonstrably to make
substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under
international counternarcotics agreements and to take
the counternarcotics measures set forth in section
489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act. Large-scale
poppy cultivation and opium production continue and
enormous quantities of methamphetamines are produced in
and trafficked from Burma, having serious adverse
effects on neighboring countries and throughout the
region. Its toleration of money laundering, its
unwillingness to implement fully its counterdrug laws,
and its failure to transfer notorious trafficker Chang
Qifu (Khun Sa) under indictment in the United States
are all serious concerns.
[[Page 9892]]
Although the GOB's actions in 2001, particularly in
cooperation with China and Thailand, demonstrated a new
commitment to effective counternarcotics measures; the
GOB has failed to enforce its narcotics laws, to
eradicate systematically all forms of illicit drugs,
including methamphetamines, and to address meaningfully
the growing problem of drug abuse and HIV/AIDS.
The GOB must aggressively pursue drug traffickers,
including the most prominent trafficking groups and
organizations, most particularly the United Wa State
Army. The GOB should continue and expand its
cooperation with other countries in the region,
particularly those most seriously affected by drugs
trafficked from Burma. Although Burma's
counternarcotics record in 2001 is noticeably improved
over that of prior years, its efforts need to be
sustained, expanded, and intensified over the next
year.
STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION
Haiti
Haiti has failed demonstrably during the last 12 months
to make substantial efforts to adhere to its
obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements and to take the counternarcotics measures
set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. However, it is in
the vital national interests of the United States to
continue to provide assistance to the Government of
Haiti (GOH) under the Kenneth M. Ludden, Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act,
2002 (P.L. 107-115). Haiti remains a significant
transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine,
moving through the Caribbean from South America to the
United States.
Although tactical cooperation by the GOH modestly
improved, Haiti's overall counterdrug commitment
remined weak, in part due to political instability and
low levels of assistance. Such instability coupled with
economic degradation has led to an increase in criminal
and political violence and compromised internal
security. Aristide has attempted to shore up his
personal and political security by politicizing the
police. Continued politicization of the Haitian
National Police, in contravention to one of President
Aristide's commitments to the United States Government,
bodes ill for an effective counternarcotics effort.
Amid political and economic instability and in spite of
limited resources, the GOH made some efforts to
cooperate with counternarcotics initiatives. Due
largely to the efforts of the Haitian Minister of
Justice, the GOH made efforts to curb corruption in the
judiciary, joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF), and formed a Financial Intelligence Unit
to combat money laundering. The GOH also, with the
assistance of U.S. law enforcement, increased the
amount of cocaine seized in 2001 over that seized in
2000. The GOH honored all United States Government
requests for expulsion and extradition in 2001 by
expelling two non-Haitian drug traffickers. The GOH
cooperated with U.S. and Dominician Republic law
enforcement by participating in a two-week
counternarcotics operation and maintaining subsequent
contact with U.S. and Dominican anti-drug units.
Finally, the GOH honored the terms of a Bilateral
Maritime Counternarcotics Interdiction Agreement
pending formal official acceptance by the GOH since
1997.
However, Haiti failed to take many other significant
counterdrug actions. These actions can be categorized
into the areas of anti-corruption, anti-money
laundering, law enforcement, prosecution, and
international cooperation: the GOH did not deposit an
instrument of ratification of the OAS Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption; introduce anti-
corruption legislation; prosecute drug-related public
(including police) corruption; put into force the anti-
money laundering law passed in January 2001; enforce
existing anti-money laundering guidelines issued by the
Central Bank; require cross-border currency
declarations and provide penalties for noncompliance;
increase the number of arrests of major traffickers;
increase the size of the antidrug squad (BLTS) to 75
officers; establish a permanent BLTS office
[[Page 9893]]
outside Port au Prince; take steps to ensure the
integrity of the BLTS; provide training to judges,
prosecutors, and law enforcement officials; waive
Haiti's primary right to exercise prosecutorial
jurisdiction over non-Haitian flag vessels interdicted
by the U.S. Coast Guard in Haitian waters; or put into
force the 1997 U.S.-Haiti Bilateral Maritime
Counternarcotics Interdiction Agreement. The GOH did
not sign a counterdrug Letter of Agreement with the
United States Government.
Despite Haiti's demonstrable failure on
counternarcotics issues, U.S. vital national interests
require that U.S. assistance to Haiti continue. Because
Haiti is the hemisphere's poorest country, there is
need for continued assistance to programs that
alleviate hunger, increase access to education, combat
environmental degradation, fight the spread of HIV/
AIDS, and foster the development of civil society.
These programs create an environment conductive to
building democracy and reducing illegal migration. They
also address the root causes of poverty and
hopelessness in Haiti, which are important contributing
factors behind Haitian involvement in the drug trade.
Additionally, suspension of assistance to Haiti would
result in the further deterioration of Haitian
institutions essential to combat increasing
criminality.
[FR Doc. 02-5331
Filed 3-4-02; 8:45 am]
Billing code 4710-01-M
