[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 44 (Monday, March 8, 1999)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 11319-11343]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-5668]
[[Page 11317]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part XIII
The President
_______________________________________________________________________
Presidential Determination No. 99-15 of February 26, 1999--
Certification for Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug Transit
Countries
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 44 / Monday, March 8, 1999 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 11319]]
Presidential Determination No. 99-15 of February 26,
1999
Certification for Major Illicit Drug Producing
and
Drug Transit Countries
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (``the Act''), I hereby determine and certify
that the following major illicit drug producing and/or
major illicit drug transit countries/dependent
territories have cooperated fully with the United
States, or have taken adequate steps on their own, to
achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives
of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:
LAruba, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela,
and Vietnam.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is
in the vital national interests of the United States to
certify the following major illicit drug producing and/
or major illicit drug transit countries:
LCambodia, Haiti, Nigeria, and Paraguay.
Analysis of the relevant U.S. vital national interests,
as required under section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is
attached.
I have determined that the following major illicit drug
producing and/or major illicit drug transit countries
do not meet the standards set forth in section 490(b)
for certification:
LAfghanistan, Burma.
In making these determinations, I have considered the
factors set forth in section 490 of the Act. Given that
the performance of each of these countries/dependent
territories has differed, I have attached an
explanatory statement for each of the countries/
dependent territories subject to this determination.
You are hereby authorized and directed to report this
determination to the Congress immediately and to
publish it in the Federal Register.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 26, 1999.
[[Page 11320]]
STATEMENTS OF EXPLANATION
Afghanistan
According to U.S. Government (USG) estimates,
Afghanistan continued to be the world's second largest
producer of opium poppy in 1998. Poppy cultivation and
opium gum production increased by seven percent in
1998, despite poor weather, resulting in an estimated
1,350 metric tons (mts) of opium gum production.
Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention,
but neither of the warring political factions (Taliban
nor Northern Alliance) took steps to demonstrate that
they take Afghanistan's obligations under the
Convention seriously. Aside from Taliban authorities
burning a reported one ton of opiates in Jalalabad in
June, there is no evidence to indicate that any action
was taken by any faction to discourage poppy
cultivation, destroy morphine or heroin laboratories,
or arrest and prosecute narcotics traffickers. Numerous
reports indicated that members of all factions at all
levels continued to profit from the drug trade. UN Drug
Control Program (UNDCP) initiatives made very slow
progress, while a USG-funded non-governmental
organization (NGO) program achieved many of its
alternative development goals.
By the end of the year, the Taliban faction
controlled over 80 percent of Afghan territory and 96
percent of Afghanistan's opium-growing areas. The
Taliban's inaction and lack of political will, as well
as substantial drug trade involvement on the part of
some local Taliban authorities, also impede meaningful
counter-narcotics progress.
The Taliban condemned illicit drug cultivation,
production, trafficking and use in 1997. However, there
is no evidence that Taliban authorities took action in
1998 to decrease poppy cultivation, to arrest and
prosecute major narcotics traffickers, to interdict
large shipments of illicit drugs or precursor
chemicals, or to eliminate opiate processing
laboratories anywhere in Afghanistan. Opium is
Afghanistan's largest cash crop and, by many estimates,
narcotics remain a significant and perhaps the largest
source of income. Some Taliban authorities reportedly
benefit financially from the trade and provide
protection to heroin laboratories. There are numerous
reports of drug traffickers operating in Taliban
territory with the consent or involvement of some
Taliban officials.
In 1998, poppy cultivation increased and spread to
new areas. In an unverified policy statement published
by the Taliban's High Commission for Drug Control on
September 10, 1998, which appears to contradict the
Taliban's November 1997 commitment to UNDCP, the
Taliban indicated that they would not support a
strategy of forced eradication if farmers who
benefitted from alternative development failed to
comply with the requirement to abandon poppy
cultivation.
A USG-sponsored poppy eradication/alternative
development program in Helmand Province through Mercy
Corps International (MCI), an American NGO, continued
this year. It was originally funded in 1997 for
$772,000 and expanded in FY 99 to $1.04 million. It is
the only poppy reduction project being implemented by
an NGO in Afghanistan. MCI accomplished all but one of
its objectives during the year. The one objective not
accomplished--delivery of fruit trees to farmers--was
not met due to rainy weather. The trees were held for
the next planting season.
The USG strongly supports the UN Special Mission to
Afghanistan and its efforts to achieve peace and
facilitate the development of a broad-based government
that respects international norms of behavior on
narcotics, terrorism and human rights. The Afghan
Support Group (ASG) of major donors to Afghanistan met
twice during the year. At the meeting in Tokyo in
December, the ASG endorsed the principle that counter-
narcotics is a cross-cutting issue and should be
integrated wherever possible with other programs in
Afghanistan. UNDCP agreed to include gender and human
rights components in its counter-narcotics programs
wherever appropriate.
[[Page 11321]]
Denial of certification does not cut off USG
counter-narcotics assistance and would thus have
minimal effect in terms of implementation of this
policy. Continuation of large-scale opium cultivation
and trafficking in Afghanistan, plus the failure of the
authorities to initiate law enforcement actions,
preclude a determination that Afghanistan has taken
adequate steps on its own or that it has sufficiently
cooperated with USG counter-narcotics efforts to meet
the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, to which Afghanistan is a party.
Aruba
Aruba is a staging area for international narcotics
trafficking organizations, which transship cocaine from
Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname to Europe and the
United States. Drug traffickers are attracted to Aruba
by its key position near the Venezuelan and Colombian
coasts, its efficient infrastructure, its excellent air
and sea links to South America, Europe, Puerto Rico,
and other Caribbean locations, and its reputation for
relatively light prison sentences and good prison
conditions.
Aruba, the nearby Netherlands Antilles, and the
Netherlands comprise the three parts of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands. Since 1986, Aruba has had autonomy
over its internal affairs and independent decision-
making ability in a number of counter-narcotics areas.
The Government of the Netherlands (GON) is responsible
for the defense and foreign affairs of Aruba, and
assists the Government of Aruba (GOA) in its efforts to
combat narcotics trafficking. Aruba is a participant in
a joint Netherlands-Netherlands Antilles-Aruba Coast
Guard, which has anti-drug responsibilities. Although
the Netherlands is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, the other two parts of the Kingdom are not
covered by the Convention.
In late 1998, Aruba passed an international asset
seizure law, the final legislative prerequisite to
requesting that the Kingdom of the Netherlands extend
the 1988 UN Drug Convention to Aruba. In December,
Aruba formally requested that extension, which is
expected during 1999.
During 1998, the GOA continued to cooperate fully
with the USG on counter-narcotics goals and objectives.
Three Aruba nationals believed to be major drug
traffickers and money launderers were extradited to the
United States and are now awaiting trial. They include
two members of the Mansur family, one of the richest
and most powerful in Aruba, who are accused of
belonging to a large network that laundered some $40
million for Colombian drug traffickers operating in the
United States. These extraditions were the first under
a 1997 law permitting the extradition of Aruba
nationals.
Aruba law enforcement agencies, including the Aruba
Police and Customs, have a good working relationship
with USG law enforcement agencies. They cooperate with
the DEA on joint investigations and with the U.S. Coast
Guard on maritime law enforcement searches and
interdictions. Joint USG-GOA efforts contributed to an
increase in the number of arrests in 1998 of drug
couriers transiting Aruba. A proposed U.S.-Kingdom of
the Netherlands maritime drug enforcement agreement,
pertaining to the Caribbean, is currently under
negotiation.
The Bahamas
The Bahamas is a major transit point for South
American cocaine and Jamaican marijuana en route to the
United States. Very small amounts of cannabis are grown
on the islands for domestic consumption. The USG and
the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas
(GCOB) continue to enjoy a productive and positive
counter-drug working relationship. The GCOB places a
high priority on combating drug transshipments through
its archipelago, and is moving decisively to combat
money laundering and other drug-related crimes. The
GCOB cooperates very closely with the USG on our
combined law enforcement effort, Operation Bahamas and
Turks
[[Page 11322]]
and Caicos (OPBAT). The Bahamas was the first country
to ratify the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the GCOB
continues to take steps to implement its provisions.
Following passage of strong anti-money laundering
legislation in 1996, Bahamian authorities are closely
monitoring bank compliance and investigating suspicious
financial transactions.
U.S. and Bahamian law enforcement officials worked
very closely throughout the year to respond to notable
increases in air and maritime transshipment incidents.
The GCOB is strongly emphasizing money laundering and
asset forfeiture investigations and prosecutions. The
GCOB also continued in 1998 to strengthen its judicial
system, with assistance from the USG. However,
unreliable jury pools and weaknesses in the drug laws
resulted in several major Bahamian drug dealers
avoiding conviction in 1998. Despite committed and
talented judicial leadership, The Bahamas needs to
improve the effectiveness of its court system in
securing convictions against major dealers and
organizations by strengthening its drug trafficking
laws and improving the prosecutorial capabilities of
the police prosecutors. The USG will continue to work
with the GCOB in this area, both bilaterally and
through regional training and assistance projects.
In December 1998, the Royal Bahamas Police Force
(RBPF) Drug Enforcement Unit arrested two police
officers from the RBPF Drug Canine Unit at Nassau
International Airport for allegedly working with a
cocaine trafficking ring. The GCOB needs to continue to
move decisively against corruption at Bahamian ports of
entry.
Belize
Belize remains a significant narcotics transit
country. After taking office in August of 1998, the new
Government of Belize (GOB) made it clear it takes
seriously the problem of drug transit through its
territory, including the impact the trafficking
activity has on domestic crime. The new government has
created a national drug abuse council, which is in the
process of creating a comprehensive drug control
strategy. The Belize Police Force, the Belize Defense
Force and the rapid response force ``Dragon Unit'' will
remain important parts of the national drug control
strategy. Belize is party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention and the GOB works closely with the USG in
the fight against narcotics trafficking and
transnational crime.
Upgrading training, professionalism and equipment
in the Belize Defense Force continues as the focus of
the USG/GOB counter-narcotics program to combat violent
crime and drug trafficking. With the completion of
training of the money-laundering unit staff, the USG/
GOB effort is now focused on building and equipping a
Financial Investigations Unit to enforce money-
laundering regulations. The GOB is energetic in its
unilateral efforts to reduce drug trafficking through
its borders and to combat associated crime. It is a
strong supporter of regional and cooperative counter-
narcotics efforts.
Concern over corruption remains. The dismissals of
suspected corrupt police officials in 1998 and the new
government's efforts to rid itself of institutional
corruption appear to demonstrate the GOB's commitment.
Concerns were raised, however, by the government's
recent attempt to dismiss the Supreme Court's chief
justice over a case with political overtones.
Counter-narcotics efforts in Belize are hampered by
lack of manpower, training and equipment. The
relatively large expanse of uninhabited territory and
the thousands of coastal cays and inland waterways that
are used by traffickers as drop-off sites for drugs
contribute to the problem. Seizures in 1998 of just
under one metric ton of cocaine were significantly
lower than in 1997. Slightly more than 200,000
marijuana plants were eradicated.
Boliva
Boliva retains is position as the world's second
largest producer of cocaine even though it has less
coca under cultivation than either Peru or Colombia.
[[Page 11323]]
The cocaine industry in Bolivia is fragmented and
dominated by small to mid-level trafficking
organizations which manufacture, transport and
distribute cocaine base in hundred to multi-hundred
kilogram quantities per month. Successful law
enforcement efforts to prevent significant quantities
of chemicals utilized in processing coca leaf into
cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCL) from being
smuggled in from neighboring countries have negatively
impacted the quality of cocaine produced, with a
resulting decrease in marketability.
In an impressive show of resolve and political
will, the Government of Bolivia (GOB) achieved an
unprecedented level of coca eradication--a net
reduction of 17 percent, and a gross eradication level
of 11,621 hectares. Significant successes in increased
arrests of narcotics traffickers, as well as seizures
of cocaine, cocaine products and precursor chemicals,
were also realized.
The Banzer administration is the first to devise
and set forth a credible, formal strategy to eliminate
coca cultivation in Bolivia. Despite a shaky start last
spring and continuing violence against eradication and
counter-narcotics forces, the GOB showed its
determination to persevere with its five-year plan. USG
experts also credit 1998's success to the GOB's
abolition of direct compensation to coca growers, and
to devoting enough human resources to the eradication
and security effort. The Banzer administration's
embrace of alternative development has not only
provided farmers with licit, profitable alternatives to
growing coca, but has changed public opinion against
coca growing and cocaine production activities.
Three-fourths of Bolivia's judicial reform package
has been enacted, which should make the criminal
justice system faster, more transparent and accessible,
less politicized, and less corrupt. Currently being
debated in the legislature is the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the final part of the reform package. It
should include language that permits police to use
informants, controlled deliveries, undercover
operations, and other modern law enforcement tools.
Action on money laundering crime has been lacking,
although the GOB named a Director of the Financial
Investigations Unit of the Superintendency of Banks,
which is charged with enforcing the anti-money
laundering law.
If Bolivia is to realize its five-year goals, in
1999 the GOB should act to prevent new coca plantings
and continue eradication efforts in a sustained manner.
Other important objectives include initiation of
eradication operations, alternative development in the
Yungas, and prosecutions of those who plant new illicit
coca fields there and in the Chapare. The GOB should
also move forward to implement vigorously the law
criminalizing money laundering, and actively seek out,
investigate and prosecute public officials engaged in
corruption. Finally, if its efforts are to be fully
successful, the GOB should ensure that the new Code of
Criminal Procedures provides law enforcement
authorities with the tools they need to investigate and
prosecute narcotics offenders.
Brazil
Brazil is a major transit country for cocaine
shipped by air, river, and maritime routes from
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia to the United States and
Europe. Because of increased interdiction of trafficker
aircraft in Peru (along the Peru/Colombia air
corridor), traffickers have shifted illicit narcotics
flights into Brazilian air space. Brazil's vast and
sparsely populated Amazon region provides ample
opportunity for traffickers to transship drugs and
chemicals by air and riverine routes. A southern ``drug
route'' also exists along Brazil's borders with
Paraguay and Bolivia. While not a major drug
cultivation country, Brazil is a major producer of
precursor chemicals and synthetic drugs.
Several key legislative initiatives, including an
anti-money laundering law and legislation permitting
the military to interdict unauthorized civilian
aircraft (including those suspected of smuggling
narcotics), were passed
[[Page 11324]]
by the Congress in 1998. A two-year-old omnibus
counter-narcotics bill remained pending in the Congress
at year's end. Brazil's major counter-narcotics policy
initiative was formation of the National Anti-Drug
Secretariat (SENAD) which will coordinate counter-
narcotics efforts and activities nationwide.
Federal police continued their heightened
surveillance of the Amazon region, which resulted in
seizures of drugs, aircraft, boats and an assortment of
weapons. While seizures of cocaine in 1998 were about
the same as in 1997, and marijuana seizures were
slightly lower than in 1997, seizures in psychotropic
drugs increased tenfold over 1997 levels. Inadequate
staffing and resources continue to hamper activities of
the counter-narcotics unit of the Federal police.
Although Brazil does not extradite its own
citizens, the Government continues to cooperate with
the United States and other countries in the
extradition of individuals accused of narcotics-related
crimes.
Most of Brazil's demand reduction efforts are aimed
primarily at young people, who constitute the largest
group of drug users in the country. With the creation
of SENAD, the GOB will focus even more attention on
drug demand reduction, education, and treatment
programs. Over half of Brazil's 26 states conduct some
type of drug awareness program.
Top Brazilian counter-narcotics officials in SENAD
have expressed a strong interest in more active
cooperation and greater coordination with the United
States in narcotics law enforcement, including
interdiction activities.
Burma
Burma continues to be the world's largest source of
illicit opium and heroin. There was, however, a
significant decline in production and cultivation from
1997 levels. The 1998 crop estimates indicate there
were 130,300 hectares of opium poppy cultivation, down
16 percent from 1997. The potential yield from this
crop is up to 1,750 metric tons of opium gum. This is
the lowest potential production figure in ten years and
a drop of 26 percent from 1997 figures. Most of this
crop decrease was due to weather; however, the
Government of Burma (GOB) did engage in opium crop
eradication efforts.
During 1998, seizures of methamphetamine tripled,
although opium and heroin seizures were below last
year's record levels. While there were cases of
interdiction and arrests for narcotics trafficking of
members of some tribal groups located outside the
protected tribal areas, the GOB has been unwilling or
unable to take on the most powerful groups directly.
Cease-fire agreements with insurgent tribal groups
dependent on the narcotics trade involve an implicit
tolerance of continued involvement in illicit narcotics
for varying periods of time. Given the scale of the
problem in Burma, and what would be necessary to bring
about lasting improvement, the GOB's efforts remain
inadequate.
There is reason to believe that money laundering in
Burma and the return of narcotics profits laundered
elsewhere are significant factors in the overall
Burmese economy, though the extent is impossible to
measure accurately. Political and economic constraints
on legal capital inflows magnify the importance of
narcotics-derived funds in the economy. An
underdeveloped banking system and lack of enforcement
against money laundering have created a business and
investment environment conducive to the use of drug-
related proceeds in legitimate commerce. The GOB made
little if any effort against money laundering during
1998.
Despite some progress over the past year, the USG
remains concerned that Burma's counter-narcotics
efforts are in no way proportional to the extent of
narcotics cultivation and trafficking. Effective
toleration of money laundering by the GOB, failure to
turn over notorious traffickers under indictment in the
United States, and general lack of respect for the rule
[[Page 11325]]
of law are also concerns. The United States remains
prepared to cooperate with Burma in international
efforts against narcotics, when the Burmese regime
presents a consistent pattern of cooperation in all
aspects of that effort.
Cambodia
Throughout 1998, Cambodia was embroiled in internal
political strife and proactive counter-narcotics
efforts suffered. This failure is reflected in a
serious drop in the statistics for seizures and
narcotics arrests. Reports indicate that narcotics
traffickers, alien smugglers, and other criminals have
found refuge in Cambodia. Corruption and factionalism
among Cambodia's police are also a continuing problem--
one police unit attacked another earlier this year in
an effort to intimidate the unit attacked. Cambodia is
not a major producer of narcotics or a center for
narcotics-derived money laundering, although reports
that narcotics proceeds are in fact laundered there
persist. The country's principal involvement in the
international narcotics trade is as a transit route for
Southeast Asian heroin intended for overseas markets,
including the United States. Marijuana is cultivated
for export and the authorities have had only marginal
success at stemming this flow, though Cambodian
marijuana is not thought to have a major effect on the
United States. Reports persist about the involvement by
some elements of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and
the national police in narcotics trafficking.
Outward cooperation by Cambodian police officials
with the DEA on specific requests is excellent. Senior
government officials consistently responded to requests
to make available persons wanted on U.S. arrest
warrants, including in narcotics cases. The Royal
Government of Cambodia (RGC) has established a National
Authority for Combating Drugs and a special drug
enforcement unit in the Ministry of Interior; however,
the effectiveness of these bodies has been limited by a
lack of resources and training, corruption at various
levels of the RGC, and the country's geographical
location adjacent to major narcotics producing areas.
In the latter part of 1998, competing factions in
Cambodia finally formed a coalition government,
resulting from elections. We believe that at this
crucial time, imposition of counter-narcotics sanctions
would undermine U.S. interests in democracy and
regional stability as well as limit anti-narcotics
efforts. The ability to provide strategically placed
U.S. aid at the appropriate time can help strengthen
Cambodian institutions, with the objective of promoting
greater official accountability and adherence to the
rule of law. Furthermore, it is in the U.S. interest
for Cambodia to contribute to the political and
economic stability of the region, which should be
furthered by Cambodia's anticipated accession to ASEAN
membership in 1999. Thus, on balance, the consequence
for the United States related to the counter-narcotics
setbacks are far outweighed by the risks of being
unable to support the new coalition government now in
place at this critical juncture.
China
China continued to take strong and effective
measures to combat the use and trafficking of narcotic
drugs in 1998. China is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, as well as to the 1961 UN Single Convention
and its protocols, and the 1971 UN Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. The Chinese government is
committed to achieving the goals of the 1988
Convention, implementing several new initiatives to
strengthen its counter-narcotics efforts at all levels,
from apprehending and prosecuting traffickers to
counteracting drug addition and abuse.
Preliminary figures indicate that during 1998
Chinese police seized record amounts of heroin, other
illicit drugs, and precursor chemicals. The Chinese
government sponsored a nationwide education campaign
aimed primarily
[[Page 11326]]
at reducing drug use by youth. Narcotics enforcement
cooperation between the United States and China
continued to expand in 1998, with increased levels of
training, professional exchanges, and tactical-level
enforcement cooperation. The United States and China
established a Joint Liaison Group on Law Enforcement
Cooperation, and are taking steps to further enhance
mutual legal assistance; in general, however, China's
response to U.S. requests could have been more
forthcoming. The DEA anticipates the assignment of
permanent staff for its new office in Beijing sometime
in 1999.
China is a major producer of precursor chemicals.
The ephedra plant, from which the precursor chemical
ephedrine is extracted, grows wild in northern China.
China produces and legally exports potassium
permanganate, which can be used in cocaine production.
The Chinese government vigilantly monitors precursor
chemical exports and has in place a system of pre-
export notification. Yunnan, the province most directly
affected by China's growing drug problem, goes further
than the 22 chemicals on the 1988 Convention Watch List
by monitoring exports of 28 chemicals. According to
press reports, in the first ten months of 1998, Yunnan
provincial law enforcement authorities seized more than
300 metric tons of precursor chemicals destined for
illegal use, more than the amount confiscated
nationwide in all of 1997. China supports a law
enforcement program to increase interdiction in Yunnan
Province under the auspices of the UNDCP and funded by
the USG.
Although Chinese law prohibits laundering the
proceeds from illegal narcotics trafficking, China's
legal system and banking regulations generally have not
kept pace with the country's rapid economic
internationalization. Consequently, China is vulnerable
to possible exploitation by drug traffickers,
particularly from Burma, seeking to launder money.
Colombia
Colombia developed a solid record of success in
meeting the 1998 certification criteria, with several
notable exceptions. A new counter-narcotics strategy,
developed by the incoming Pastrana administration
earlier in the year, establishes a solid platform to
frame efforts in the coming years. Such strategic
planning was almost totally lacking in Colombia before
then. The USG is working closely with the Government of
Colombia (GOC) to refine and improve that strategy.
Pastrana administration officials have been very
receptive to U.S. offers of advice and assistance, and
expressed a commitment in the Joint Alliance Against
Drugs, signed during President Pastrana's visit in
October 1998, to continue close cooperation as we
advance our joint counter-narcotics goals. This
willingness to cooperate closely is the greatest
difference between the current status of efforts in
Colombia and the checkered history of the last four
years. While political will is difficult to measure and
can only be tested by time, it appears that a corner
has been turned in Colombia that will allow for much
closer cooperation and greater results in the near
future.
The Colombian National Police (CNP), under the
leadership of General Rosso Jose Serrano, added to its
record of outstanding performance in counter-narcotics.
This year the CNP received more and better support from
the Colombian armed services, and joint operations in
southern Colombia began to show success. Such joint
operations will be an important factor in the future of
the program, given the increasing threat to counter-
narcotics operations from heavily armed traffickers and
the guerrillas and paramilitaries who are involved in
many aspects of narcotics trafficking. For the third
straight year, record levels of illicit crops were
eradicated, although this eradication did not offset
the continuing expansion of cultivation by the
traffickers as part of their effort to concentrate the
entire drug industry within Colombia. The CNP also had
a strong year in terms of seizures and arrests of
important traffickers.
[[Page 11327]]
Another key criterion was fully met when the GOC
set up a successful program to register and regulate
privately owned aircraft in Colombia, which has the
effect of discouraging their use in narcotics
trafficking. The GOC has also begun to take action on
prison reform, a long-standing problem.
The biggest disappointment of 1998 was the 5-4
decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court in
August to uphold the new Colombian extradition law as
passed by Congress. The court rejected the claim
advanced and supported by both the Samper and Pastrana
administrations that procedural irregularities in the
congressional votes resulted in the passage of a law
which does not apply retroactively. The lack of
retroactivity in the law severely limits its
effectiveness. As a result, the law places the
imprisoned Cali cartel kingpins beyond the reach of
U.S. justice, at least with regard to crimes committed
before passage of the extradition law in December 1997.
The judicial system continues to be the weakest
link in Colombia's counter-narcotics performance. 1998
saw little progress in resolving the endemic problems
in a system that is plagued by corruption, incompetence
and inefficiency. Asset forfeiture laws and money-
laundering laws are still not enforced to any
meaningful extent, and needed legislative reforms such
as stiffer prison sentences for narcotics trafficking
and establishment of legislation to deal with ongoing
criminal enterprises have not been advanced.
Overall, however, Colombian counter-narcotics
performance improved in 1998, and the arrival of the
new Pastrana administration gives grounds for optimism
about the future.
Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is a major transshipment
point for drugs destined for the United States and
Europe. Traffickers smuggle narcotics from Colombia,
Venezuela, and Panama into Dominican territory by air
and sea, and from Haiti by land routes. The drugs are
then moved onward by air and sea to Puerto Rico and the
United States.
The Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR)
demonstrated strong counter-narcotics law enforcement
and interdiction efforts in 1998. The GODR continued to
cooperate fully with the USG on counter-narcotics goals
and objectives, including expanded cooperation under
the 1997 bilateral maritime interdiction agreement.
Cocaine and heroin seizures increased dramatically in
1998. The GODR initiated a new border patrol unit to
control the flow of drugs into the Dominican Republic
from Haiti. For the first time ever, the Dominican
Republic and Haiti cooperated on an anti-drug smuggling
border operation. The GODR and the USG signed an
agreement to establish a canine drug detection program
at Dominican airports and seaports. Despite recent
improvements, however, a weak judicial system continues
to hamper law enforcement efforts.
In 1998, the GODR enacted legislation repealing a
prohibition on the extradition of Dominican nationals
and explicitly authorizing the extradition of
nationals. The Dominican Republic subsequently
extradited one of its nationals to the United States in
1998. We will continue to urge the GODR to act on a
number of other U.S. extradition requests and to adopt
a National Counter-Narcotics Master Plan.
Ecuador
Ecuador continues to be a major transit country for
the shipment of cocaine from Colombia to the United
States and Europe. Traffickers also use Ecuador for
money laundering of drug profits and to transit
precursor chemicals destined for Colombian drug labs.
Some poppy and coca fields have been found within
Ecuador, but there are no indications that significant
amounts of heroin or cocaine are produced.
[[Page 11328]]
Although lack of adequate governmental funding for
counter-narcotics programs and little interagency
coordination are weak points, the Government of Ecuador
(GOE) continued to demonstrate its cooperation and
willingness to work closely with the USG in countering
narcotics trafficking and transshipments, chemical
diversions, money laundering, and judicial corruption/
inefficiency. The GOE has also stated its willingness
to improve bilateral cooperation in maritime
interdiction.
The GOE has increased the effectiveness of its
anti-narcotics activities by randomly deploying mobile
road interdiction teams along Ecuadorian highways, a
tactic which accounted for 40 percent of the drugs
seized by the police. Successes for the national police
included seizures of 42 kilograms of heroin and the
seizure of 7.6 tons of cocaine from the Fishing Vessel
DON CELSO. The GOE also deployed drug detector dogs at
airports; inaugurated a Joint Information Coordination
Center (JICC) in the major port city of Guayaquil; and
passed legislation to combat corruption and
inefficiency in the Customs Service. The Superintendent
of Banks indicated strong interest in creating a joint
task force to expedite interagency coordination in
pursuing financial investigation regarding control of
money laundering.
To improve the professionalism and efficiency of
its enforcement efforts, the GOE has created a judicial
police unit to foster closer coordination with
prosecutors. The GOE also plans to create a separate
anti-narcotics police unit within the judicial police
system to allow greater concentration of efforts in
this field.
Guatemala
President Arzu has taken Guatemala well down the
road to reconciliation of its 36-year internal
struggle. His efforts are now focused on combating
violent crime, organized crime and other domestic
issues. He has fully cooperated with the United States
in combating counter-narcotics trafficking in Guatemala
and in the region.
Guatemala's location and scarce law enforcement
resources facilitate its continued use by traffickers
as a transshipment and storage point for cocaine
destined for the United States via Mexico. Along with
increased use of motor vehicle and container shipments,
there has been an increase in airdrops of illicit drugs
over Guatemalan territory for consolidation and
transshipment. With USG assistance, the Department of
Anti-Narcotics Police (DOAN) has stepped up training to
react to air shipments and efforts to develop air
interdiction capabilities. The expanding self-funded
port security program and the trained DOAN agents made
impressive seizures in the past year.
The consolidation of the National Civilian Police
(PNC) continues on track with full integration of the
DOAN. The USG-trained DOAN seized almost 10 metric tons
of cocaine in 1998. The drug prosecutor assistance
program maintained its 90 percent conviction rate, with
some traffickers receiving sentences of up to 20 years.
The new drug prosecutor's field office in
Quetzaltenango accounted for 110 successful
prosecutions in 1998.
Guatemala is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention
and most GOG law enforcement activities are fully
consistent with its goals and objectives. However, some
of the Convention's provisions have not been codified
into law and regulations, including provisions on
extradition and money laundering. President Arzu has
also been unsuccessful in gaining legislative support
for ratification of a full maritime counter-narcotics
agreement.
In 1998, the Government of Guatemala (GOG) began
implementation of its national drug policy, the anti-
drug master plan, and national strategy which
incorporates both demand and supply reduction
objectives to be accomplished by specified ministries.
The GOG provided additional funding to plan
implementers to attack the alarming increase in drug
abuse docu
[[Page 11329]]
mented last year. The GOG also took major steps in
implementing assets seizure and precursor chemicals
regulations.
Haiti
Haiti in 1998 made significant progress in a number
of areas of counter-narcotics performance and
cooperation, but a political impasse spanning the
entire year precluded passage by Parliament of key
antidrug laws and other important steps. Resource
constraints--Haiti is the hemisphere's poorest
country--and the lack of an effective judiciary also
reduced the effectiveness of Haitian counter-narcotics
efforts. As a result, Haiti fell short of agreed-upon
counter-drug goals and cannot be certified as having
fully cooperated with the United States or on its own
to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, to which Haiti is a party. However, the
vital national interests of the United States require
that foreign assistance continue to be provided to
Haiti.
Haiti is a significant transshipment point for
drugs, primarily cocaine, moving through the Caribbean
from South America to the United States. The increased
flow through Haiti is directly related to the success
of interdiction operations in other parts of the region
and the perception that the Government of Haiti (GOH)
is ill-prepared to respond.
The certification goals set, in consultation with
GOH, for 1998 were: to present to Parliament for
passage a set of anti-drug trafficking laws, including
money laundering and asset forfeiture, which were
drafted in 1997; to begin implementing the ``National
Master Plan for Combating Drugs in Haiti'' drafted in
1997; and to target at least one major international
narcotics organization for significant enforcement
action.
Haiti did not meet two of these three goals,
principally because of the prolonged political impasse
between the executive and legislative branches, funding
shortfalls, and insufficiencies in institutional
structures. The political stalemate prevented the
parliamenary ratification of a Prime Minister with
executive authority throughout 1998. This meant that,
in accordance with the constitution, no new
legislation, including the anti-drug laws and the
National Master Plan, could be presented to the
Parliament for enactment. (Indeed, the Parliament
failed to act even on legislation clearing the way for
significant new international loans, in which all
Haitian parties presumably had an interest.)
Although there was some implementation of elements
of the Master Plan, GOH efforts to investigate, arrest,
prosecute, or convict members of international drug
trafficking organizations were lacking. This lack of
success, however, must be understood in the broader
context of Haiti's pervasive poverty, its dysfunctional
judicial system, the still limited capabilities of the
four-year-old Haitian National Police (HNP), and the
inexperience and inadequacy of the two-year-old police
anti-narcotics unit (BLTS).
Although most of the specific goals set during the
year were not achieved, Haiti's performance and
cooperation with the United States improved
significantly in a number of key areas. Haiti signed a
Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) agreement
with the United States. The entire staffs of the JICC
and BLTS were polygraphed. Under a DEA-mentored task
force concept, the flow of cocaine from Panama through
Port-au-Prince airport has been reduced. Port-au-
Prince's seaport is now the target of periodic
inspections, including by U.S. Customs Service sniffer
dogs in November. The HNP has indicated it will
cooperate on the expulsion to the United States of
third country nationals who are the subjects of U.S.
indictments. The Haitian Coast Guard fully cooperated
with the USCG ``ship rider'' program, and is
increasingly demonstrating independent initiative at
sea. The HNP counter-narcotics unit increased the
quantity of drugs seized without direct USG assistance.
The GOH also initiated the first joint Haitian-
Dominican drug monitoring effort at the Malpasse-Jimani
border crossing.
[[Page 11330]]
A vital national interests certification is
appropriate and necessary. A cutoff of U.S. bilateral
assistance mandated by denial of certification would
adversely affect vital U.S. national interests in
Haiti, including ending the ongoing political crisis,
promoting economic stability and democracy, and
stemming the flow of illegal drugs and migrants to the
United States.
Denial of certification would terminate USG
programs that provide critical support for Haiti's
fragile economy. Without external assistance and the
police mentoring that accompanies it, economic
stability and growth would be jeopardized, with
consequent renewed pressure on illegal immigration to
the United States.
USG and other international programs that go beyond
counter-narcotics assistance also address underlying
problems in the Haitian law enforcement and judicial
systems, especially endemic corruption and the lack of
a strong professional tradition, that contribute to a
weak anti-drug performance. A cutoff of USG programs
and the votes against multilateral development bank
funding would undermine USG efforts and reduce the
incentive for Haitian counter-narcotics entities to
improve that performance.
The risks posed to all of these U.S. interests by a
cutoff of bilateral assistance outweigh the risks posed
by Haiti's failure to cooperate fully with the USG or
to take adequate steps on its own to combat illicit
narcotics. Haiti's inability to fulfill key counter-
narcotics commitments in 1998 precludes full
certification, but decertification would deny GOH many
of the desperately needed resources to make progress in
the counter-narcotics and other arenas.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong traffickers continue to control large
portions of Southeast Asian narcotics traffic,
arranging both the financing and shipping of narcotics
through Asian ports. In 1998, none of the heroin
seizures in Hong Kong appeared destined for the U.S.
market. No major heroin seizures in the United States
had clearly transited Hong Kong. However, historical
precedent, geographic location, transportation
infrastructure, and trade activity suggest that Hong
Kong remains an important factor in heroin supply to
the United States.
Hong Kong uses a multi-pronged strategy in
combating drug trafficking and abuse, incorporating
legislation and law enforcement, treatment and
rehabilitation, preventive education and public
awareness, and international cooperation. Money
laundering, which often stems from drug trade proceeds,
is a serious issue for the Hong Kong authorities. The
Financial Action Task Force reviewed Hong Kong's
financial system in April 1998. Hong Kong played an
active role in reducing illicit trafficking of
narcotics and precursor chemicals, another major
concern, through its participation in the UN Commission
on Narcotic Drugs as part of the People's Republic of
China delegation. During 1998, a new extradition treaty
between the United States and Hong Kong entered into
force. Hong Kong also signed mutual legal assistance
agreements with several countries and, in December
1998, the United States ratified a Mutual Legal
Assistance Agreement and a Prisoner Transfer Agreement
with Hong Kong. Both agreements await legislative
approval in Hong Kong.
While trafficking and money laundering remain
issues for Hong Kong, the authorities of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region have launched serious
efforts in all areas of enforcement and have been
exemplary partners with the United States in the battle
against narcotics.
India
India, an important producer both of licit and
illicit narcotics, is also a crossroads for
international narcotics trafficking. There was no USG
illicit
[[Page 11331]]
poppy survey in India in 1998. Indian authorities
claimed there were less than 100 hectares of illicit
cultivation, but the last available USG surveys in 1996
and 1997 identified 3,100 and 2,000 hectares of illicit
opium poppy, respectively.
India's location between the two main sources of
illicit opium, Burma and Afghanistan, as well as its
relatively well-developed transportation
infrastructure, make it an ideal heroin transit point.
There was credible evidence of large amounts of Burmese
heroin being trafficked through India's northeastern
border with Burma. However, there is no evidence at
this time to indicate that opiates transshipped through
India reach the United States in significant amounts.
The Government of India (GOI) continues its
progress in controlling the production and export of
narcotics chemical precursors produced by India's large
chemical industry. The GOI controls restrict access to
acetic anhydride (AA), a chemical used to process opium
into heroin. Nevertheless, there were unauthorized
exports of essential chemical precursors and
methaqualone (mandrax), a popular drug in Africa.
Despite GOI precautions, in late 1998, there was
growing evidence of AA entering Burma via India's
porous Northeastern border for use in Burmese heroin
refining. The GOI has a cooperative relationship with
the DEA. However, there has been limited success in
prosecuting major narcotics offenders because of the
lack of enforcement funding and weaknesses in the
intelligence and judicial infrastructure.
In 1998, India took concrete steps to deter
trafficking and control chemicals. The GOI
systematically combatted illicit opium cultivation by
combining remote sensing information with raids and the
destruction of illicit crops. The Narcotics Control
Board (NCB) continues to monitor industry manufacture
and sales of controlled and precursor chemicals
carefully, resulting in a price rise of precursor
chemicals for illicit use. The NCB fully staffed three
new zonal offices opened in 1996 along the border with
Pakistan, and they are now fully operational. The zonal
office in Imphal, Manipur, is also being fully staffed
to add a greater enforcement presence in the northeast.
GOI counter-narcotics officials increased their
cooperation with drug liaison officers from countries
in Europe, the Middle East and Africa to undertake a
successful series of controlled delivery operations in
1998. These operations, many through parcel post,
resulted in the arrest of more than 18 persons and the
seizure of quantities of heroin, hashish, and
methaqualone. The GOI has created the position of Joint
Secretary for Narcotics in the Ministry of Finance
reporting directly to the Revenue Secretary in order to
tighten licit and illicit narcotics controls. This
position has also increased the flow of information to
Mini-Dublin Group countries and other bilateral and
multilateral donors. Finally, to decrease the backlog
of cases, the GOI continues to work with special state
courts for narcotics matters, and federal narcotics
enforcement officials continue to meet quarterly with
their state government counterparts to share
information and provide training. Federal efforts have
spurred the formation of specialized narcotics units in
state and metropolitan police agencies.
India is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention,
but has not yet enacted supporting legislation on money
laundering or asset seizure under civil law. This
supporting legislation is now being prepared for
resubmission to the Parliament. However, with the
cooperation of UNDCP, the GOI hosted a regional
conference on money laundering in New Delhi in March
1998. The conference focused on harmonizing regional
efforts to fight money laundering and brought together
experts from all over South Asia.
In order to build on this progress, the USG will
encourage GOI to take several important law enforcement
steps in 1999. India needs to increase seizures of
drugs sharply and to investigate and dismantle
smuggling rings. The GOI should give increased priority
to combating trafficking on the Indo/Burma border,
which may be at least five metric tons of heroin per
[[Page 11332]]
year. The GOI should pass the amendments to the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS)
of 1985, introduced into Parliament in August 1997,
which would modernize the criminal justice system.
India is the world's largest producer of licit
opiates for pharmaceutical use and the only producer of
licit gum opium. The GOI continues to tighten its
control over diversion of licit opium. However, some
opium continues to be diverted from the country's legal
production. The GOI estimates diversion at about 10
percent, although it may be as high as 30 percent. As a
licit producer of opium, India must meet an additional
certification requirement. In accordance with Section
490(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, India may not be
certified unless it maintains licit production and
stockpiles at levels no higher than those consistent
with licit market demand and has taken adequate steps
to prevent significant diversion of its licit
cultivation and production into illicit markets and to
prevent illicit cultivation and production.
Production and stockpile of licit opium in India
has clearly not exceeded licit market demand. Indeed,
India's stockpile has been barely adequate for some
time and disastrous weather during the 1997-1998 poppy
growing season, combined with a cultivator's ``strike''
which delayed planting, led to a 1998 harvest that is
one of the smallest on record: about 260 metric tons
(MT), well under even initial GOI estimates. To meet
domestic and international licit demand, the GOI now
concedes that it has been forced to ``completely
exhaust'' its licit opium stockpile, leaving no
carryover stock from 1998 whatsoever. This precarious
situation makes an adequate 1999 harvest extremely
important, and the USG is thus encouraging increased
licit production.
To meet India's share of anticipated world demand
for licit opium in 1999, and begin rebuilding domestic
stockpiles to about 750 MT, the GOI plans to produce a
licit opium harvest of at least 1300 MT in 1999, just
below the 1997 record harvest. To meet this goal, the
GOI has decided to reverse years of reductions in
acreage (to improve control of diversion) and to
sharply increase both the area under cultivation and
the number of licit opium cultivators. Acreage will be
increased by 32 percent; licit cultivators will more
than double.
In 1998, India took six important steps to increase
licit opium production to meet market demand and
rebuild the stockpile while curtailing the diversion of
licit opium. These steps included: (1) sharply raising
the number of hectares to be cultivated for the 1998-
1999 poppy growing season; (2) retaining the highest-
ever minimum qualifying yield at 52 kilograms/hectare
to discourage diversion from the licit crop; (3)
raising the prices paid to opium cultivators to
increase incentives for declaring and selling to GOI
all licit opium; (4) expanding licit opium diversion
controls to include re-surveys of plots after the
planted crop reaches a particular stage of growth to
ensure that the area under cultivation matches the
amount of land licensed; (5) destroying cultivation
more than five percent above the licensed amount with
the cultivator liable for prosecution; and (6) raising
licit opium diversion-related offenses by licensed
cultivators to the level of trafficking offenses, with
convictions resulting in 10 to 20 years imprisonment
and fines up to U.S. $6,000.
While these are important steps to curb diversion,
the USG believes even more must be done, given the
significant planned increase in hectarage and farmers.
The USG will work with the GOI to increase diversion
controls. Despite the assent of a high-ranking GOI
official in February 1998 to undertake a comprehensive
joint opium yield survey with the USG, the GOI has not
yet signed the necessary formal agreement. A joint
licit opium survey would provide a firmer scientific
basis for the GOI to set minimum qualifying yields
(MQY) for licit opium farmers. More realistic MQYs
would facilitate governmental controls on diversion and
forecasting the supply of licit opiates.
[[Page 11333]]
Jamaica
Jamaica is a major transit point for South American
cocaine en route to the United States and is also the
largest Caribbean producer and exporter of marijuana.
During 1998, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) made some
progress toward meeting the goals and objectives of the
1988 UN Drug Convention, to which it became a party in
1995. At regional meetings, GOJ officials actively
supported counter-drug initiatives. Bilateral counter-
drug cooperation is good and improving, especially in
the area of maritime law enforcement. The U.S.-Jamaica
bilateral maritime agreement, proposed by the USG in
July 1995, came into force when Jamaica passed enabling
legislation in February 1998. Jamaican forces
participated in several combined operations under the
new agreement.
During 1998, the GOJ removed four persons to the
United States, three by extradition and one under a
waiver of extradition, compared to three removals in
1997. The USG and GOJ worked together to remove from
the list of pending extradition requests all non-active
cases, leaving 17 pending requests for which the United
States seeks early resolution.
GOJ's cannabis eradication during 1998 was down
only slightly from 1997, despite a lack of helicopter
and fixed wing air support. Marijuana and cocaine
seizures and drug-related arrests increased
significantly over 1997; hash oil seizures were down.
The GOJ made a valuable contribution to regional anti-
drug efforts by assuming funding of operating costs of
the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training
Center, located near Kingston and built with USG
funding under a UNDCP project.
In 1998, the Lower House of Parliament passed
amendments to the existing anti-money laundering
legislation; Senate action is pending. If passed by the
Senate, the proposed amendments would raise the
threshold for mandatory transaction reporting from U.S.
$10,000 to U.S. $50,000 equivalent, but would also
introduce a new requirement that suspicious
transactions in any amount be reported. Further GOJ
action is required to bring its anti-money laundering
law in line with international standards, especially
extending the law to cover the laundering of the
proceeds of all serious crime.
Current Jamaican law requires the conviction of a
criminal drug defendant prior to commencing a
forfeiture action. The GOJ forfeited the house of a
convicted drug trafficker in 1998. However, Jamaica's
current asset forfeiture regime does not permit the GOJ
to take full advantage of the forfeiture mechanism to
augment the resources of its anti-drug agencies and
deprive criminals of the proceeds of their crime.
In 1998, the GOJ did not table in Parliament a
precursor and essential chemical control law, despite
stated commitments to do so for the last several years.
However, the GOJ has budgeted for implementation of
chemical controls, and the USG has already provided
training to Jamaican precursor chemical control
personnel. The GOJ did table in Parliament anti-
corruption legislation, which is currently under
debate. Corruption, especially among members of the
security and law enforcement forces remains a serious
problem in Jamaica, and the GOJ should take stronger
action to prosecute corrupt individuals.
In 1998, the GOJ arrested 7,352 drug offenders, and
the Supreme Court reported 10,290 convictions of drug
offenders. However, even though GOJ counter-drug
cooperation with DEA continued to be good, no Jamaican
drug kingpins were arrested or convicted during 1998.
The GOJ has agreed to develop in the coming year, with
USG assistance, special units to target drug kingpins
and apprehend fugitives from justice.
The GOJ has in place a comprehensive national drug
control strategy which covers both supply and demand
reduction; the GOJ should add to its strategy specific
goals and objectives and measures of effectiveness. The
GOJ also should ratify the Inter-American Convention
against Corruption,
[[Page 11334]]
and, as it mandates, put in place legislation that
requires financial disclosure by public officials. The
GOJ also needs to take stronger steps to strengthen
internal controls and investigate and prosecute corrupt
members of the security and law enforcement forces.
The USG will continue to provide technical
assistance, training, and equipment to the GOJ to help
strengthen its anti-drug, anti-money laundering and
anti-corruption laws and enforcement capabilities. In
addition, the USG will continue to assist the GOJ to
address port security problems identified in a 1997
comprehensive assessment.
Laos
Laos remains the world's third largest producer of
illicit opium, trailing only Burma and Afghanistan.
However, because small-scale subsistence farmers,
without fertilizer, irrigation, or other agricultural
improvements grow opium, Lao yields average less than
half those found in neighboring Burma.
For the 1998 growing season, although opium
cultivation fell only seven percent, adverse weather
conditions, which also affected opium production in
Burma and Thailand, dramatically affected production
levels. The United States estimates Lao potential opium
production for 1998 at 140 metric tons, down 33 percent
from the previous year. Significant decreases in
production can also be attributed to lower productivity
per hectare due to crop substitution in project areas
funded by foreign donors. These areas continued to show
only low levels of opium cultivation, none of which was
for commercial distribution, but rather was restricted
to small amounts for local use.
In January 1998, a heroin laboratory was seized in
Bokeo province, the first such seizure this decade. In
July, the position of Chairman of the Lao National Drug
Commission was raised to ministerial rank. A DEA agent
was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane for the
first time since 1975. Laos is not yet a party to the
1988 UN Drug Convention, but the government of Laos
(GOL) has set a goal of ratification by the year 2000.
Laos' location next to the world's largest producer
of opium and heroin (Burma), and its land borders with
countries that combine important opium markets and
ports on trade routes to Europe and the United States
(China, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia), make it an
important route for drug trafficking. The GOL does what
it can to combat trafficking and has shown itself ready
to work very closely with the international donor
community to attack the socio-economic problems
underlying poppy cultivation in Laos. The GOL has
already opened four Drug Control Units, and is
determined to open one in each of the country's
provinces.
Mexico
Mexico made significant counter-narcotics progress
in 1998. Building on presidential commitments made in
May 1997, the United States and Mexico developed a Bi-
National Drug Strategy--released in February 1998--
which identified sixteen areas for cooperation in
reducing the illicit consumption, production and
trafficking in drugs. Later in 1998, the two countries
developed Performance Measures of Effectiveness for the
Strategy to guide its implementation and to provide a
means of monitoring progress. The Measures were
formally adopted during President Clinton's trip to
Mexico in February 1999. The U.S.-Mexico High-Level
Contact Group on Narcotics Control (HLCG) and the
Senior Law Enforcement Plenary continued to serve as
the principal fora for coordination of bilateral
counter-narcotics cooperation.
USG agencies enjoy productive working relationships
with Government of Mexico (GOM) counterparts across a
broad range of counter-narcotics programs. The two
governments have established numerous mechanisms, both
formal and informal, to promote good communication and
coordination.
[[Page 11335]]
The most serious obstacles to both bilateral
counter-narcotics cooperation and the effectiveness of
Mexican agencies in combating the major drug cartels
relate to institutional weaknesses, such as lack of
adequate resources and training and widespread drug-
related corruption. The GOM took a number of important
steps in 1998 to address these problems. For example,
for the first time ever, the Office of the Attorney
General (PGR) implemented an intensive screening
process for recruits to law enforcement as well as for
all personnel assigned to sensitive positions. This
level of screening will eventually be expanded to all
PGR personnel. These kinds of reforms, along with
bilateral training activities, are helping to build
confidence between USG and GOM authorities, resulting
in improved bilateral cooperation.
The GOM also took steps during 1998 to implement
important legislative reforms designed to enhance
efforts against drug trafficking and organized crime.
Among these steps were introduction of legislation
regulating seized property to allow for asset
forfeiture and sharing, streamlining the Mexican code
of criminal procedure to facilitate prosecution of drug
traffickers, and reducing the ability of employees
dismissed for corruption to be reinstated upon appeal.
In an effort to enhance professionalism and increase
capabilities, Mexican law enforcement and judicial
officials participated actively during 1998 in various
bilateral training programs designed to improve
management of evidence, electronic surveillance, asset
forfeiture, drug detection, and fraud investigation.
During 1998, Mexican authorities arrested numerous
drug traffickers, including Jesus and Luis Amezcua
(major methamphetamine traffickers wanted for
extradition to the United States), twenty members of
the Amado Carrillo Fuentes Organization (the Juarez
Cartel), the former military commander of Baja
California, and two Federal Judicial Police chiefs.
Notable convictions and sentences for drug-related
crimes in 1998 include former Drug Czar Army General
Gutierrez Rebollo (sentenced to almost 14 years for
offenses involving illegal possession and
transportation of firearms and abuse of authority), and
Ernesto ``Don Neto'' Fonseca Carrillo (sentenced on
drug charges to 11 years, in addition to time he is
serving for the 1985 murder of a DEA agent). Over
10,000 Mexican nationals and 255 foreign nationals were
arrested on drug-related charges.
On the basis of legislation and regulations adopted
in 1996-97, the GOM made progress last year in
detecting and prosecuting instances of money
laundering. The Financial Investigative Unit
established in 1997 in Mexico's Finance Ministry
continued to work closely with USG counterparts on
money laundering investigations, providing leads,
follow-up and access to witnesses. With informational
assistance and technical support from the USG, the GOM
increased seizures of drug traffickers' assets in 1998,
including a $250 million seizure of assets connected to
Alcides Ramon-Magana in Cancun. Mexico's first
successful prosecution for money laundering
demonstrated encouraging progress in 1998.
The GOM sustained its massive interdiction and
eradication programs throughout 1998. For example,
Mexican law enforcement and military personnel seized
22.6 metric tons of cocaine and over 1,000 metric tons
of marijuana. They eradicated for an entire growing
season approximately 9,500 hectares of opium poppy and
9,500 hectares of cannabis. The GOM continued
cooperation with the USG in interdicting drug shipments
throughout 1998. For example, during one major event,
the GOM seized three tons of cocaine from a trafficking
vessel forced to land by coordinated action by the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Mexican Navy. In addition,
bilateral cooperation in using U.S. air assets to
detect and monitor drug flights increased in 1998.
Both governments recognize that much remains to be
done to dismantle the major international drug cartels,
which pose such a serious threat to both nations. The
criminal organizations based in Mexico are well
financed and violent, placing Mexican law enforcement
and military personnel at grave risk. The persistent
corrupting influence of these groups is also an
important concern for the GOM.
[[Page 11336]]
President Zedillo has publicly underscored his
commitment to combat drug trafficking and to strengthen
Mexico's law enforcement institutions. He reaffirmed
this commitment to U.S. officials, including in a June
1998 meeting with President Clinton at the UN General
Assembly Special Session on Drugs. In February 1999,
the GOM announced a major public security initiative
which will significantly intensify the national anti-
drug effort. Despite an austere budgetary situation,
President Zedillo has directed the GOM to invest up to
$500 million over the next three years on enhancements
to the nation's capabilities to interdict drug
shipments, to combat the major drug trafficking
organizations, and to counter the corrupting influences
that these organizations exert in both the public and
private sectors. the initiative also calls for a major
effort to address street crime and violence.
The USG and the GOM have carefully nurtured
positive working relationships, and the goodwill
resulting from those efforts will remain essential as
both Governments continue to confront the shared threat
of international drug trafficking.
Nigeria
Nigeria has failed to fully meet the criteria for
cooperation with the United States on counter-narcotics
matters and has not taken adequate steps on its own to
meet the goals of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The
vital national interests of the United States, however,
require that Nigeria be certified in order that
assistance, otherwise withheld, might be provided to
support the transition to democratic civilian rule and
the increased efforts to improve cooperation on
counter-narcotics and other crime evident during recent
months.
Nigeria remains the hub of African narcotics
trafficking. Nigerian criminal organizations operate
global narcotics trafficking networks. They control
sub-Saharan African drug markets, transport heroin from
Asia to Africa, Europe and the United States, and
transport cocaine from South America to Europe, Africa
and Asia. Nigerian smugglers are responsible for a
significant portion of the heroin used in the United
States. Marijuana, the only narcotic grown in Nigeria,
is exported to Europe and other African nations, but
has little impact on the United States.
Nigerian counter-narcotics efforts remain unfocused
and lacking in material support. New head of state
General Abubakar's strong public stand against
narcotics trafficking and other crimes was a welcome
change from past indifference, but has not yet resulted
in new policies or action. The Government of Nigeria
(GON) reaffirmed the existing bilateral basis for
extraditions, but had not yet concluded any
extraditions by the end of 1998. The 1995 National Drug
Strategy remains unimplemented; wage increases that
would have given law enforcement personnel a living
wage for the first time in more than a decade were
announced, but have not yet been implemented. Nigerian
law enforcement continues to suffer from lack of
material support, insufficient training, and widespread
corruption.
In 1998, there was some progress with the
interdiction of low level couriers, gradual
improvements in the capabilities of the National Drug
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the intensification
of basic demand reduction efforts. The NDLEA made a
number of seizures from individual couriers, but no
major drug traffickers were prosecuted or convicted;
total heroin seizures decreased. The increasingly
sophisticated bulk and mail concealment methods of drug
traffickers are moving beyond the capabilities of
Nigerian law enforcement to detect them. The GON did
not share counter-narcotics intelligence with the USG.
A limited number of asset seizures were made, none
against major traffickers or money launderers, and no
asset seizures were prosecuted to conclusion. Nigeria
has only just begun to acknowledge the depth of its own
drug abuse problem. Demand reduction efforts have
intensified with the opening of anti-drug clubs at
Nigerian universities, and their endowment with anti-
drug literature and videos. Most of these
[[Page 11337]]
efforts, however, are nascent and are hindered by the
continuing misperception that drug abuse is a
``foreign'' problem.
Nigerian money launderers operate sophisticated
global networks to repatriate illicit proceeds from
narcotics trafficking, financial fraud and other
crimes. Efforts to enforce the well-drafted money
laundering decree were uneven and superficial, and did
not result in any convictions or asset seizures that
were prosecuted to conclusion.
Nigeria is one of the most important countries in
Africa. What happens in Nigeria politically and
economically will, to a large degree, determine whether
there is stability and progress toward democracy and
economic reform in West Africa. If Nigeria's ongoing
transition fails, it could easily result in an
implosion of government and the collapse of the
economy, triggering a humanitarian disaster in Africa's
most populous country, with over 100 million people,
and a destabilizing exodus of Nigerians to neighboring
states. Such an upheaval could also disrupt the
movement of high-quality Nigerian oil, which accounts
for more than seven percent of total U.S. petroleum
imports.
If, on the other hand, Nigeria's transition
succeeds, it will be an example to all of Africa, and
has the potential to lead to economic growth and
greater transparency in government. Nigeria could
become an engine for growth in West Africa. A stable
and democratic Nigeria will permit greater cooperation
between law enforcement agencies, and the opportunity
to reduce the impact of Nigerian criminals who prey on
the American people.
The military's acceptance of its appropriate role
in a functioning democracy, and the new civilian
government's ability to govern, will be critically
impaired if Nigeria if deprived of the full range of
U.S. support. Building a political consensus and
meeting the challenges of a collapsing economy will
also depend in no small part on outside assistance and
expertise.
Denial of certification would block assistance the
new democratically-elected government will need to meet
these challenges, seriously damaging the prospects for
success of stable, transparent democracy in Nigeria.
U.S. vital national interests require providing
humanitarian, economic and security assistance to
Nigeria as well as counter-narcotics assistance from
all sources. The risk of not doing so now would
jeopardize not only Nigeria's transition to democracy,
but also Nigeria's attempts to reinvigorate its failing
economy and support for democracy and peacekeeping
throughout the region. Further, any new civilian
government's ability to work with the United States on
all issues, including counter-narcotics and other law
enforcement, will depend on its access to multilateral
lending and U.S. technical and economic assistance. The
risks posed by the cutoff of assistance clearly
outweigh the risks associated with GON's inadequate
counter-narcotics performance over the past year.
Pakistan
In 1998, Pakistan advanced toward its goal to
eliminate opium poppy in the year 2000, by reducing
opium poppy cultivation by 26 percent. The atmosphere
for cooperation on drug control between Pakistan and
the United States also improved significantly. Pakistan
extradited two narcotics fugitives to the United
States, whereas none were extradited in 1997.
The Government of Pakistan (GOP) undertook an
unprecedented poppy eradication campaign in some of its
most inaccessible territory, which reduced cultivation
by 26 percent and production by 24 percent and
decreased the cultivation level to significantly below
that of 1996. Despite financial constraints, the GOP
ensured that wheat for planting alternative crops
arrived in poppy-growing areas in time for the October
planting, to forestall a return to poppy cultivation.
Narcotics seizures were down, with heroin seizures
down 48 percent. The GOP did, however, prevent the re-
emergence of heroin/morphine labora
[[Page 11338]]
tories in Pakistan, although some labs moved across the
border into still chaotic Afghanistan. In November, the
Prime Minister pledged to take steps to strengthen
Pakistan's law enforcement agencies, particularly the
Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF).
To meet law enforcement goals, a number of
important arrests were made in 1998, including three
individuals arrested in conjunction with heroin
shipments that exceeded 100 kilograms. The GOP also
arrested Faheem Babar, a major Lahore trafficker, whose
arrest led to the discovery of an important drug
trafficking organization operating with the alleged
collaboration of at least one mid-level government
official. Assets of drug traffickers totaling $5.8
million were frozen in 1998, and for the first time, a
High Court ruled in favor of forfeiture of the assets
to the government.
The GOP took several important steps to strengthen
law enforcement in 1998. The Control of Narcotics
Substances Act and the Anti-Narcotics Forces Act were
extended to the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier
Province, a major drug trafficking area. For the first
time, Pakistan's anti-narcotics laws can be legally
enforced in Pakistan's tribal areas. The GOP also
approved cooperation with DEA for the establishment of
a special vetted unit within the ANF.
To meet extradition goals, the GOP extradited two
drug traffickers on the extradition list and arrested
three more. Many extradition requests remain
problematic, as neither DEA nor the GOP have addresses
for many extraditables within Pakistan. The GOP also
requested certification that the cases were still
pending in U.S. courts. To meet anti-corruption goals,
in 1998, ANF removed 70 corrupt officials from its
ranks.
Pakistan's counter-narcotics performance improved
in many aspects from last year's record. Independent of
USG assistance, the GOP took a number of steps on its
own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
Drug Convention, including: extending the Control of
Narcotics Substances Act and the Anti-Narcotics Act to
tribal areas in the Northwest Frontier Province;
freezing significant drug trafficking assets; arresting
several major drug traffickers; and dismissing corrupt
counter-narcotics officials.
The GOP also actively and fully cooperated with the
USG beginning in April to meet a number of important
mutual counter-narcotics goals, including: an agreement
with DEA to establish the special vetted unit;
increased extraditions; arrests of some major drug
traffickers; and the location of illicit poppy fields
for the spring poppy eradication program.
The GOP should take immediate steps to improve its
performance in a number of areas, including:
significantly improved narcotics seizures; convictions
of major drug traffickers; closure of pending cases
against two prominent drug offenders, Sakhi Dost Jan
Notezai and Munawar Hussain Manj; concentration of law
enforcement resources in investigations, arrests,
prosecutions and convictions of drug kingpins; and
steps to enact and implement the narcotics-related
money laundering provisions of the Control of Narcotics
Substances Act and to approve formally the Drug Abuse
Control Master Plan.
Panama
Panama is a major transit point for Colombian
cocaine and heroin en route to the United States.
Cocaine passes through Panamanaian territorial waters
concealed in fishing boats, ``go-fast'' boats and ocean
freighters. Some of it is offloaded on the Panamanian
coast and then transported by truck up the Pan American
highway bound for the United States, or carried by
couriers travelling by air to the United States and
Europe.
There is no evidence that any senior officials of
the Government of Panama (GOP) are involved in drug
smuggling. Nor does government policy encourage or
facilitate drug-related criminal activity. However, the
amount of drugs seized by Panama's neighbors to the
north on the Pan American highway
[[Page 11339]]
suggests either inadequate inspections or corruption on
the part of GOP border officials. The judiciary, with
its traditional susceptibility to political influence
and threats, remains a concern because of plans for it
to assume control of the Judicial Technical Police, the
principal partner of USG counter-narcotics operations.
The GOP continued implementation of its national
counter-narcotics plan and its excellent cooperation
with USG counterparts in 1998. Collection of
information by the Financial Investigations and the
Financial Analysis Units also improved during 1998.
However, very little progress was made on bringing
cases to prosecution. Panama remained active in
international fora and associations targeting money
laundering including the Egmont Group, the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Basel
Committee's Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors, and the
Commission Against Addiction and Illicit Drug
Trafficking (CICAD) of the Organization of American
States.
In 1998, GOP officials seized 11.771 metric tons of
cocaine and 22 kilos of heroin. Although the lack of
resources for counter-narcotics police remains a
problem, with USG assistance, the facilities and
equipment of the Panamanian National Maritime Service
have been upgraded, facilitating the highest level of
cooperation on maritime interdiction in the region.
Maritime operations included several shiprider
operations and numerous occasions of information
sharing and cooperation on maritime drug interdiction.
Highest priority in the coming year will be signing
a maritime counter-narcotics agreement, achieving
greater success in prosecuting money launderers,
expanding money laundering legislation to include the
profits of all crimes, and increasing interdiction
capabilities of the Panamanian counter-narcotics
police.
Paraguay
Up to 40 metric tons of primarily Bolivian cocaine
are estimated to transit Paraguay annually, en route
through Argentina and Brazil to the United States,
Europe and Africa. Paraguay is also a source country
for high-quality marijuana. Significant money
laundering occurs, but it is unclear what portion is
drug-related.
In 1998, Paraguay signed a new bilateral
extradition treaty with the United States that includes
extradition of nationals. Modest improvements in
counter-narcotics performance were achieved after the
inauguration of the Cubas administration in August,
such as the seizure of 215 kilograms of cocaine (more
than the previous two years combined) and arrests of
numerous low-level narcotics traffickers.
However, the Government of Paraguay (GOP) failed to
accomplish the majority of the agreed-upon counter-
narcotics goals for 1998 in a manner sufficient for
full certification. Paraguay did not implement its
national drug control strategy through effective
investigations leading to the arrest and prosecution of
major drug traffickers, corrupt officials and their
associates; drafted, but did not pass a revised anti-
drug statute which includes provisions authorizing
controlled deliveries and undercover operations, and
criminalizes drug-related conspiracy; failed to
effectively implement the new money-laundering statute;
and failed to develop an effective anti-drug and
organized crime investigative and operational
capability for the tri-border area. In part, these
shortcomings stem from the country having been
distracted by the May elections and later by continued
political turmoil over the status of former Army
Commander, and unsuccessful 1996 coup plotter, Lino
Oviedo.
Denial of certification would, however, cut off
assistance programs designed to meet the priority USG
goal of strengthening Paraguay's democratic
institutions and civil-military relations. This would
reduce USG support for Paraguay's democracy at a time
when it is being tested by conflict
[[Page 11340]]
between the executive branch and the legislative and
judicial branches, and calls by some Paraguayans for
extraconstitutional measures. Denial of certification
would also jeopardize ongoing cooperation and
assistance programs with the GOP against other key
areas such as intellectual property piracy and
terrorism. Moreover, vital national interests
certification would help promote the political will and
positive action against narcotics trafficking that we
continue to seek from the new Cubas administration.
The risks posed to the totality of U.S. interests
(i.e., promoting democracy, cooperation against
intellectual piracy and continued counter-terrorism
cooperation) by a cutoff of bilateral assistance
outweigh the risks posed by GOP's failure to cooperate
fully with the USG, or to take fully adequate steps to
combat narcotics on its own.
For 1999, Paraguayan counter-narcotics and anti-
money laundering institutions need to be strengthened
and given independence from political institutions and
intrigue. With strong civilian leadership and
cooperation among the President, congress and the
courts, as well as adequate resources and legal
authorities, the GOP could achieve all of its stated
goals.
Peru
Peru achieved a 26 percent decline in coca
cultivation in 1998, yielding a total reduction of 56
percent since 1995. Eradication of illegal coca
cultivation reached an all-time record of 7,825
hectares, nearly doubling the Government of Peru (GOP)
target goal of 4,000. In terms of hectarage, an
estimated 51,000 hectares of coca cultivation remains,
down from an estimated 115,300 hectares in 1995. In the
past two years, a strong law enforcement program
focused on trafficking organizations and transportation
infrastructure, combined with an efficient coca
eradication program, led to a collapse in coca leaf
prices. The reduction in coca leaf prices prompted
greater numbers of farmers to accept the economic
alternatives to coca offered by the USG-Peru
alternative development project, which continued to
expand in 1998. However, coca leaf prices began to rise
throughout Peru in August. This trend may reflect
multiple factors, including new transportation methods,
new markets for Peruvian drugs, natural market forces,
and possibly increased cocaine hydrochloride (HCl)
production in Peru.
As traffickers have adapted and developed new
smuggling methods on Peru's rivers, land borders and
maritime routes, Peruvian counter-narcotics agencies,
the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and the Peruvian
Coast Guard established several riverine counter-
narcotics bases and increased resources for riverine
operations. Cooperating with U.S., Colombian and
Brazilian law enforcement personnel, PNP exchanged
counter-narcotics intelligence and participated in
joint law enforcement operations in the Amazonian tri-
border area. The PNP, working in close cooperation with
U.S. and other Andean counter-narcotics agencies, also
pursued and arrested major drug trafficking
organizations with both U.S. and international cocaine
trafficking connections.
The successful ``airbridge denial'' program has
significantly shaped trafficking patterns in Peru and
has caused the traffickers to develop alternative
methods of transport to export drugs. While traffickers
continue to fly large quantities of coca products out
of Peru, particularly through Brazil, river and
overland routes are increasingly used as intermediate
steps in the export process. Overland routes,
particularly north into Ecuador and south into Chile
and Bolivia, are complementing maritime conveyance of
drugs through Peru's coastal ports. The GOP is
responding to the change by developing riverine and
other counter-narcotics transit control strategies,
using USG assistance and training.
In 1998, the joint USG-GOP alternative development
program operated in five valleys of Peru to strengthen
local governments, provide access to basic services and
promote licit economic activities, thereby establishing
the social and economic basis for the permanent
elimination of coca. A
[[Page 11341]]
total of 239 communities have signed coca reduction
agreements to reduce coca by approximately 16,300
hectares over a five-year period. Two hundred more
agreements are expected to be signed by the end of
1998. Licit economic activities involving assistance
for more than 25,000 hectares of licit crops are
focused on rehabilitating coffee and cocao plantations
abandoned during the ``coca boom.'' One hundred thirty
kilometers of rural roads and four bridges have been
constructed. Other donors are expected to provide
additional resources for infrastructure development.
Donors participating in the November 1998 Peru
Consultative Group in Brussels described Peru as a
model of effective counter-narcotics policy, balancing
interdiction with alternative development and
demonstrating a willingness to make tough decisions
required to achieve sustained illicit coca reduction.
Of the $277 million for Peru's overall alternative
development and demand reduction programs,
approximately $127 million represents funding by non-
USG donors. This support will enable the GOP to
undertake major programs in six new coca-producing
valleys.
Effective drug interdiction--especially
strengthening ``airbridge denial''--and law enforcement
remain the keys to maintaining coca leaf prices at
unprofitable levels. The USG expects that low coca leaf
prices will convince more farmers to abandon coca in
favor of new crops or economic activities. Meanwhile,
Peru's alternative development programs are designed to
provide long-term, sustainable alternative economic
opportunities which will discourage farmers from
returning to coca cultivation. The GOP will need to
increase security in areas still known for guerrilla
activity and undertake a strong counter-narcotics
effort to keep traffickers from interfering with
alternative development efforts. Internal drug
consumption is likely to increase, and the USG will
continue to support the GOP's efforts to counter this
growing problem.
Taiwan
Given its role as a regional transportation/
shipping hub in Asia, Taiwan is considered a
significant transit point for drugs affecting the
United States. Its geographical location also
facilitates Taiwan nationals' involvement in
international narcotics trafficking. Taiwan authorities
make every effort to restrict this role, however, and
routinely cooperate with U.S. enforcement activities.
Although Taiwan's aggressive domestic counter-
narcotics program continued, with an increase of 19
percent in the number of new cases investigated and the
implementation of new counter-narcotics laws, the
amount of drugs seized and the number of prosecutions
in 1998 decreased substantially from 1997. Taiwan
cannot be a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention
because it is not a UN member. Nevertheless, over the
last several years, Taiwan passed and implemented laws
unilaterally bringing it into compliance with the
Convention's goals and objectives. Taiwan also
continued to expand counter-narcotics cooperation with
U.S. law enforcement agencies through the American
Institute in Taiwan.
Taiwan is not a significant cultivator or producer
of illegal narcotics, but the illegal consumption of
both heroin and methamphetamine remains a serious
internal social problem. Amphetamines were produced in
Taiwan in the past, but aggressive police efforts in
1998 and shifting market forces within the drug trade
have forced producers to move their facilities to
Mainland China. About 68 percent of the methamphetamine
and 42 percent of the heroin seized on Taiwan during
the first eleven months of 1998 originated in Mainland
China.
Kaohsiung Harbor, the world's third busiest
container port, is a major center for shipping to and
from Southeast Asian ports. Monitoring this traffic for
smuggling is a difficult task. A significant percentage
of the nearly six million TEU (twenty foot equivalent
unit) shipping containers at Kaohsiung port last year
were ``in transit'' and, according to standard inter
[[Page 11342]]
national practice, not subject to routine inspection by
Taiwan Customs. Of the nearly 3 million containers
legally entering and leaving Taiwan, Customs examined
approximately 2 percent--a percentage comparable to
that of other ports.
Thailand
Throughout 1998, despite a serious domestic
methamphetamine abuse problem and deep government
budget cutbacks, Thailand continued its long tradition
of cooperation with the United States and the
international community in narcotics law enforcement
and drug control efforts. Thailand cemented its role as
a leader in regional drug control programs by co-
establishing the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) with the United States in Bangkok. In 1998,
legal and judicial cooperation also became more
streamlined, additional defendants arrested in 1994's
Operation ``Tiger Trap'' were extradited to the United
States, and new cooperative law enforcement programs
were initiated. Extradition to the United States of
Thai citizens and residents who claim Thai citizenship
continued to expand.
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) has one of the most
effective narcotic crop control programs in the world.
USG analysts estimated that Thailand's opium production
in the 1998 growing season declined 36 percent to 16
metric tons. Cultivation decreased by 18 percent.
Reflecting trends of previous years, opium farmers
continue to cultivate smaller, more isolated fields and
engage in multiple cropping to avoid eradication. A
drought last year adversely affected the production of
all agricultural commodities, including opium. The 1999
eradication campaign was inaugurated in mid-November
1998. Concentrated efforts will be necessary to destroy
the poppy before it can be harvested. Activities
related to heroin production, such as the refining of
raw opium into morphine base, continued in northern
border areas where drug producers often combined heroin
operations with the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Thailand has yet to become a party to the 1988 UN
Drug Convention due to its lack of anti-money
laundering legislation. A draft bill is currently in a
legislative committee where differences over the types
of predicate crimes covered are being debated. The RTG
remains committed to the passage of a law with as broad
application as possible. Seizures and court actions
under the asset seizure law continued. In 1998, with
DEA support, the Thai Police established the first in a
series of specially trained narcotics law enforcement
units to target major trafficking groups. RTG programs
aimed at treatment, epidemiology of substance abuse,
and demand reduction were maintained and continue to be
effective.
Venezuela
Venezuela is a major transit country for over 100
metric tons of cocaine shipped annually from South
America to the United States and Europe. Venezuela is
also a transit country for chemicals used in the
production of drugs in source countries. Venezuela is
not a significant producer of illegal drugs, but small-
scale opium poppy cultivation occurs near the country's
border with Colombia.
In recent years, Venezuela's relatively vulnerable
financial institutions and other sectors of the
government have become targets for money laundering of
illegal drug profits. U.S. Customs Operation
``Casablanca'' identified Venezuela as one of the
routes by which Colombian narco-traffickers launder
drug proceeds through Venezuelan banks. Following
arrests in May of Venezuelan bankers implicated in this
case, the Government of Venezuela (GOV) expressed
concern over the vulnerability of its financial sector
and indicated a willingness to cooperate with the USG
on follow-up investigations.
In 1998, Venezuela sustained its efforts to combat
narcotics trafficking and consumption. The National
Anti-Drug Commission was instrumental
[[Page 11343]]
in coordinating better implementation of existing
legislation and lobbying for new, tougher counter-
narcotics legislation.
Actions by the GOV to intensify counter-narcotics
efforts included: programs to implement a major reform
of the judicial system due to take effect in July 1999;
establishment of a central Financial Intelligence Unit;
adoption of a unified regulatory system for chemical
precursors; and passage of a new Customs law.
Regrettably, efforts to gain passage of a Comprehensive
Anti-Organized Crime bill were unsuccessful when the
senate failed to pass the bill before congress
adjourned for elections.
The Venezuelan military continued cooperation with
the USG in an aggressive campaign against small-scale
opium cultivation that occurs in the Sierra de Perija
area near Venezuela's northern border with Colombia.
Two eradication operations in this area conducted in
1998 reduced opium cultivation to less than 50
hectares.
In October 1998, the GOV moved to reorganize the
customs sector--a major element in controlling
narcotics smuggling through ports and airports. The
reform addresses all aspects of customs procedures and
is expected to result in better control measures.
Corruption in law enforcement and the judicial
system continues to be a major problem. The GOV's
judicial reform program is designed to reduce the
opportunities for corruption in the judicial sector.
Venezuela's new President, Hugo Chavez Frias, has
included fighting corruption and combating drug transit
as priorities for his new administration.
Vietnam
Narcotics flow into Vietnam from drug-producing
areas in Burma, Thailand, Laos, and China along
Vietnam's long mountainous borders. Its location close
to the ``Golden Triangle'' renders Vietnam an important
transit route for heroin and more recently for
amphetamines. Drugs entering the country are used
locally and transshipped to other destinations.
Increased availability of heroin and methamphetamine
has fueled a sharp increase in domestic drug abuse.
Trafficking through Vietnam continued at a high
level in 1998, and may be increasing, but has been
accompanied by a steady increase in arrests. Constant
vigilance is necessary to assure corruption does not
make the problem worse. The country is poor and suffers
from a growing problem of trafficking, especially to
school-aged children. Within the constraints of its
limited resources, the Government of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam (GOSRV) has endeavored to stem the
flow of narcotic drugs to its own population and to
work cooperatively with the world community, including
the United States, in the counter-narcotics effort.
Opium poppy cultivation appears to have declined in
1998, after an increase in 1997. In 1998, Vietnam began
staffing its Drug Control Committee secretariat and
approved a drug control action plan. Vietnam is highly
supportive of bilateral and international cooperation
to stem the flow of drugs into the country and
sponsored two international conferences in Hanoi during
the year. GOSRV also sent capable delegations to other
international conferences.
The USG and the GOSRV are expanding bilateral
cooperation, including negotiating a counter-narcotics
agreement and exchanging information on drug
trafficking cases. The DEA will open an office in Hanoi
in 1999.
Vietnam is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention,
as well as the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972
Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic
Substances.
[FR Doc. 99-5668
Filed 3-5-99; 8:45 am]
Billing code 4710-10-M
