[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 46 (Thursday, March 9, 1995)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 12859-12881]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-5850]
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 46 / Thursday, March 9, 1995 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 12859]]
Presidential Determination No. 95-15 of February 28,
1995
Certifications for Major Narcotics Producing and
Transit Countries
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section
490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, (``the Act''), I hereby determine and certify
that the following major drug producing and/or major
drug transit countries/dependent territories have
cooperated fully with the United States, or taken
adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance
with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances:
The Bahamas, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica,
Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Taiwan, Thailand,
Venezuela, and Vietnam.
By virtue of the authority vested in my by section
490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is
in the vital national interests of the United States to
certify the following countries:
Bolivia, Colombia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Paraguay, and
Peru.
Information on these countries, as required under
section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is attached.
I have determined that the following major producing
and/or major transit countries do not meet the
standards set forth in section 490(b):
Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.
I have made these determinations, taking into account
the factors set forth in section 490 of the Act, and
based on the information contained in the International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1995. Because the
performance of these countries varies, I have attached
an explanatory statement in each case.
You are hereby authorized and directed to report this
determination to the Congress immediately and to
publish it in the Federal Register.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 28, 1995.
STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION
The Bahamas
U.S.-Bahamian drug enforcement cooperation under
Operation Bahamas and Turks & Caicos (OPBAT) has been
excellent and resulted in a dramatic reduction in the
flow of drugs through The Bahamas into the United
States, as indicated by vastly reduced drug-seizure
levels over the last several years. Nevertheless, The
Bahamas remains a major transit country for U.S.-
[[Page 12860]] bound Colombian cocaine and Jamaican
marijuana. As a major financial center, The Bahamas is
vulnerable to money laundering. The Bahamas is a party
to the 1988 UN Convention. The Ingraham government has
taken a firm stand against drug trafficking, drug abuse
and money laundering and worked diligently during 1994
to fulfill the goals and objectives of the UN
Convention and U.S.-Bahamian bilateral counternarcotics
accords.
During 1994, Bahamian maritime cooperation with the
United States was excellent under the terms of several
bilateral agreements and arrangements. The Government
of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas (GCOB) moved to
improve cooperation with the Cuban government when
traffickers intensified their exploitation of Cuban
territory to avoid OPBAT enforcement efforts. The GCOB
generally responds positively to specific U.S. requests
under our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. In 1994, the
GCOB took judicial action against three public
officials for drug-related corruption: a prison
official, an immigration officer and a customs officer.
The GCOB took several strong steps to improve its
drug-trafficking-control tools. The new U.S.-Bahamas
extradition treaty entered into force in 1994. The GCOB
also adopted legislation, based on U.S. law, making it
a crime to engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
related to narcotics trafficking. Working closely with
the USG, the GCOB placed special emphasis on
strengthening its judicial system by increasing its
courts budget, implementing a court automation system,
and enacting stronger bail and sentencing legislation.
In 1994, the GCOB drafted stronger money laundering
legislation, which it expects Parliament to approve in
1995. When enacted, this legislation will criminalize
money laundering. The GCOB agreed to an evaluation of
its money laundering controls by the Caribbean
Financial Action Task Force, also expected to take
place during 1995. We urge continued vigilance by The
Bahamas on possible money laundering through shell
corporations and international business companies,
which are proliferating in The Bahamas and elsewhere in
the Caribbean. Although Bahamian law renders the assets
of a convicted drug offender subject to forfeiture, in
practice asset forfeiture has been difficult to
implement. No procedures exist for civil asset
forfeiture in narcotics cases.
Brazil
Brazil is a major transit country for cocaine from
Colombia destined for the United States and Europe.
Increased cocaine and precursor chemical trafficking
and money laundering contribute to Brazil's escalating
narcotics problem; corruption allegations against
counternarcotics officials in Brazil persist.
Despite these problems, Brazil endeavors to meet
the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, and
has succeeded in some significant interdiction efforts.
The government has made progress towards complying with
the UN Convention in law enforcement, asset forfeiture,
extradition, and anti-corruption. The Brazilian
government generally meets the goals of bilateral
counternarcotics agreements with the USG on enforcement
and demand reduction.
Brazil's increased seizure rate in 1994 of 11
metric tons of cocaine marks both heightened trafficker
use of Brazil and improved abilities of the Brazilian
Federal Police Counternarcotics Unit (DPF/DRE).
Brazilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) hosted
seminars by U.S. police in schools to voice the message
against drug abuse. The DPF/DRE has targetted and
disrupted major Cali-connected drug trafficking
organizations.
However, the Brazilian government has not hired new
police or provided increased funding for the DPF/DRE.
The Brazilians have not yet enacted legislation first
proposed in 1991 to implement effectively the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, nor has it
drafted a national drug control strategy. Brazil has
not yet proposed specialized anti-money
launder [[Page 12861]] ing legislation, but requires
reporting of cash transactions involving amounts over
$10,000.
The international consultative forum, the Dublin
Group, has focused worldwide donor attention on the
need for Brazil to pay greater attention to
counternarcotics issues and urged the GOB to take more
vigorous action against its growing drug problem.
Newly-elected President Cardoso is expected to take
such action to confront narcotics traffickers.
Brazil's former President Franco signed a decree
increasing the DPF's licensing and oversight
responsibility for chemicals. The DPF/DRE initiated a
sea/airport security program, and continued to seize
drugs by riverine and ground law enforcement methods.
Brazil continues to plan for a radar system (SIVAM),
financed by the Export-Import Bank, to detect narcotics
trafficking aircraft in the Amazon.
China
The Government of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) is committed to combatting narcotics trafficking
and use. China is a major transit route for heroin from
neighboring Burma, Laos and Vietnam to the United
States and other overseas markets. Drug addiction,
which was effectively stamped out following the
founding of the PRC in 1949, is once again on the rise.
Thanks to China's expanding economy and increasing
openness to the outside world, narcotics consumption
within the PRC is growing. In addition, opportunities
for investment in China provide greater potential for
money laundering.
Chinese enforcement efforts continue to be vigorous
and were stepped up in 1994. Strong laws based on a
national directive issued in 1990 call for the death
penalty for many drug-related crimes. Hundreds of drug
criminals are executed in accordance with these laws
annually. Narcotics trafficking in Yunnan province,
which borders Burma, decreased in the latter part of
1994. The Chinese arrested major figures in two drug
trafficking groups based in Burma, the Kokang and the
Wa. Better surveillance of the Burmese border, improved
intelligence work, and better control of precursor
chemicals have also contributed to at least a temporary
decrease in trafficking in Yunnan. PRC counternarcotics
officials project no increase in national trafficking
figures over 1993 levels. The PRC has taken a strong
stand against official corruption, and has laws dealing
specifically with government officials who are found
guilty of the use, manufacture or delivery of
narcotics.
The United States and China do not have a bilateral
counternarcotics agreement in place. China has met, or
is actively seeking to meet, the goals and objectives
of the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a party, by
continuing its efforts to enhance law enforcement
measures, public education, and international
cooperation.
Illicit opium cultivation exists in remote, often
roadless areas of Yunnan province and is suspected to
exist in scattered pockets in other parts of China. The
authorities are committed to eradicating opium
cultivation when it is detected. Yunnan province
cultivation is estimated at 1,965 hectares, capable of
yielding approximately 25 metric tons of opium gum.
Impediments to bilateral cooperation remain. The
Chinese frequently cite the 1993 U.S. court decision
blocking the forced return to China of a Chinese drug
trafficker (``goldfish case'') as an obstacle to U.S.-
China counternarcotics cooperation, but these same
officials state that they would like to expand
bilateral cooperation in the future.
Dominican Republic
The United States Government and the Government of
the Dominican Republic (GODR) maintained close,
effective counternarcotics cooperation in 1994, despite
tensions over the disputed Dominican presidential
election and over Haiti. The Dominican Republic
intensified its counternarcotics effort and improved
interagency/inter-service cooperation under the
leadership of the new director of the National
Directorate of Drug Control (DNCD). [[Page 12862]] GODR
personnel, working with U.S. law enforcement, made
several multi-hundred kilo cocaine seizures in 1994.
The GODR was especially helpful in arranging the return
of several major drug figures who were fugitives from
U.S. justice.
Threat assessments indicate an increased flow of
narcotics into the Dominican Republic from Haiti,
especially since the September 1991 coup in Haiti.
Maritime shipments from Panama are also increasing. The
DNCD and Dominican Navy, working in concert with DEA,
interdicted one such maritime shipment on November 22,
seizing nearly a metric ton of cocaine and uncovering a
major smuggling operation.
During 1994, a wide range of USG-financed
professional training (law enforcement, drug abuse
prevention, financial investigations, and canine
handling assessment) was provided to DNCD personnel and
other military and civilian officials. The GODR
complied fully with its commitments under the bilateral
counternarcotics assistance agreement.
The Dominican Republic became a party to the UN
Convention in late 1993 and has taken action consistent
with the goals and objectives of the UN Convention.
Additional legislation, however, is needed in areas
such as money laundering and asset seizure to enable
the GODR to comply more fully with the Convention. The
GODR has been active in the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission and the United Nations Drug Control
Program. It hosted the 1994 United Nations Heads of
Narcotics Law Enforcement Agencies Conference for Latin
America and will host the Latin American International
Drug Enforcement Conference in April 1995. It has
established cooperative relationships with a number of
other governments in the hemisphere, most recently
signing a bilateral drug cooperation agreement with
Venezuela.
The GODR still faces many challenges in
establishing an effective national anti-drug effort.
While it has taken steps to address narcotics-related
and other official corruption, corruption continues to
undermine GODR law enforcement efforts. Anti-drug
legislation, while strengthened, has serious flaws; in
the area of money laundering control, for example, the
Dominican legislature removed prison sentences, leaving
only moderate fines for bankers convicted of
involvement in laundering activities. The GODR will
resubmit the package in 1995 to correct this.
Ecuador
Ecuador is a bridge between the world's largest
supplier of coca leaf, Peru, and the world's major
processor of cocaine hydrochloride, Colombia.
Traffickers use Ecuador as a transit point to ship 30-
50 metric tons (mt) of cocaine per year to the United
States and Europe, as well as to smuggle chemicals into
Colombia for cocaine processing. Money launderers take
advantage of Ecuador's loose banking laws and extensive
offshore banking system to conceal the illicit nature
of their proceeds.
Ecuadorian judges are subject to trafficker
intimidation and subornation, which has obstructed
efforts to bring Cali-connected kingpin Jorge Reyes
Torres to justice. Corrupt judicial practices have
precluded indictments in Reyes Torres-related cases,
specifically the Banco De Los Andes case. Stronger
resolve by the Government of Ecuador (GOE) to confront
judicial corruption will be necessary to successfully
conclude the Jorge Reyes Torres case and other
counternarcotics initiatives.
Ecuador made significant strides this year toward
complying with the 1988 UN Convention, to which it is a
party. The government has taken steps to generally meet
the goals of bilateral counternarcotics agreements with
the USG on enforcement, demand reduction, and
prosecutions of major narcotics traffickers. The GOE
enacted a law based on OAS model legislation on asset
sharing and completed a study to determine the amount
of licit chemical use in Ecuador. [[Page 12863]]
However, the Ecuadorians should strive to control
trafficking in precursor and essential chemicals by
creating an effective monitoring and control system
based on the results of the completed study. Ecuador is
making efforts to control money laundering by involving
the police, Superintendency of Banks, and the National
Drug Council (CONSEP) in collaborative investigations.
The USG has provided Thrush aircraft to identify
illicit crop cultivation in Ecuador. None was
discovered in 1994, but search flights will continue in
1995. Ecuador is progressing in implementing its
National Drug Strategy. Ecuador signed an asset-sharing
agreement with the USG in 1994. A limited amount of
asset-sharing has already taken place based on this
agreement. The Ecuadorians used the funds for law
enforcement purposes. Ecuador continues to work toward
sharing the remainder of $3 million in assets forfeited
in the Reyes Torres investigation.
The USG counternarcotics assistance program helps
Ecuador to reduce money laundering, control essential
chemicals, and buttress the judiciary's ability to
preserve democracy by enforcing the rule of law.
Guatemala
The Government of Guatemala (GOG) has successful
programs to reduce demand, cultivation, and transit of
illicit narcotics.
With USG technical support, specially trained units
of the Guatemalan Treasury Police conduct ongoing
eradication that has reduced opium poppy cultivation to
minimal levels. Persistent attempts to revive poppy
cultivation are the focus of a continuing suppression
program which includes detection and eradication.
Guatemala's hundreds of small, unmonitored
airfields connected by good roads appear to have almost
been forsaken by traffickers moving cocaine in small
planes to the United States from South America. In
response to DEA's Operation Cadence and GOG vigilance
in-country, traffickers are increasingly transporting
drugs overland and by sea. During 1994, over 1.5 metric
tons of cocaine were seized outside Guatemala as a
result of Guatemalan-based intelligence. Almost two
metric tons were seized in-country.
The GOG's aggressive investigation, interdiction
and eradication operations are consistent with the
goals of the 1988 UN Convention, to which Guatemala is
a party. However, Guatemala lacks legislation needed to
implement the Convention in areas such as money
laundering and essential chemical control. Money
laundering has not been criminalized in Guatemala and
is not considered a significant problem.
Corruption, especially in the judicial branch, is a
major problem in Guatemala. The GOG has begun to focus
attention on corruption, particularly in the courts
where several judges were relieved of their positions
for releasing prisoners under allegedly questionable
circumstances. The GOG does not, as a matter of policy
or practice encourage or facilitate illicit narcotics
production or distribution, or laundering of drug
proceeds.
Guatemala continues to accomplish the goals of its
bilateral narcotics agreements with the USG for drug
eradication, interdiction, and demand reduction. The
USG is working with the GOG to implement cost
reductions while retaining the high level of
effectiveness demonstrated by Guatemala's
counternarcotics programs.
Haiti
Because of its ideal geographic location for
smuggling, the island of Hispaniola has long been a
significant transit point for cocaine destined for U.S.
and European markets. The unstable political situation
and weak government institutions in Haiti facilitated
narcotics trafficking for many years. The opportunities
for traffickers to take advantage of these conditions
were even greater after the September 1991 coup which
ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide. Multi-hundred
kilo and multi-ton shipments of cocaine
[[Page 12864]] transited the country frequently. The
USG has received credible, but unsubstantiated, reports
for many years that the Haitian military was involved
in assisting traffickers. However, the USG was unable
to determine the veracity of reports that the de facto
regime or the military hierarchy secretly condoned such
activity.
Until the legitimate government of Haiti was
restored in September 1994, the USG maintained only
limited counternarcotics cooperation with the de facto
regime in Haiti, largely through the Haitian Center for
Information Coordination (CICC), which the United
States helped establish in 1987. The de facto
government undertook some drug enforcement efforts and
made a number of cocaine seizures in the 2-60 kg range
in 1993-1994, some in cooperation with USG law
enforcement personnel from the U.S. Embassy. However,
suspected multi-ton shipments transited Haiti unimpeded
until the country was subjected to an international
maritime blockade in April 1994.
Drug trafficking was among the six issues President
Clinton listed in early 1994 as key areas of U.S.
concern relating to Haiti. Growing drug trafficker
influence in Haiti may well have impeded the return of
democracy, sound administration of justice and economic
recovery. The Aristide administration, working with the
international community, has initiated an extensive
administration of justice and police reform program.
Former military and police personnel suspected of
involvement in drug trafficking are being excluded from
the new civilian police corps and the reorganized
military.
This massive and critical reform is the most
important step that the Government of Haiti can take at
this stage to attack the narcotics problem at its core.
Since the restoration of the Aristide government, the
USG-led Multinational Force and the International
Police Monitors have played a large role in law
enforcement in Haiti. These efforts have included
control of the major ports and airfields, and
supervising and monitoring the interim Haitian police.
This, and all other relevant activity, is undertaken
with the full concurrence of the Haitian government.
The Aristide government cooperated completely with the
United States in all aspects of this effort.
In the future, the restored Aristide government
will need to take a number of other measures to address
drug trafficking more effectively: it should become a
party to the 1988 UN Convention, establish a national
council to coordinate Haitian counternarcotics
activities, implement money laundering controls, and
forcefully address the problem of narco-corruption
within the police and military forces.-
Hong Kong
Hong Kong is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention,
but the territory's counternarcotics efforts
effectively comply with most of the goals and
objectives of the agreement. Hong Kong takes serious
and effective measures to combat narcotics trafficking.
Nevertheless, Hong Kong remains an important
transshipment center for heroin from Southeast Asia.
Due to enforcement efforts and changes in trafficking
patterns, the volume of drugs passing through Hong Kong
seems to be dropping. The amount of heroin detected
transiting Hong Kong for Taiwan, Japan, and the United
States fell during 1994 and heroin arriving in Hong
Kong is increasingly intended for domestic consumption.
The USG is not aware of any narcotics-related
corruption among senior government or law enforcement
officials in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has a comprehensive
anti-corruption ordinance that is effectively enforced
by an independent commission that reports directly to
the Governor.
Hong Kong continues to serve as a major center of
money laundering of drug proceeds by local and regional
groups trafficking in heroin. Passage of the new
Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance improves the
Hong Kong Government's (HKG) ability to prosecute money
launderers. The HKG is in the final stages of drafting
amendments to the Financial Recovery [[Page 12865]] of
Proceeds Act to conform more fully with the Financial
Action Task Force recommendations and the UN
Convention.
There is a bilateral narcotics agreement, which
facilitates asset freezing and asset forfeiture. The
Hong Kong Government and the USG have worked closely
together on U.S. extradition requests, although there
is some concern that overly strict application of Hong
Kong evidentiary requirements has made extradition
difficult in some cases. Overall bilateral cooperation
on drug enforcement efforts is very good.
India
India is the world's largest producer of licit
opium and the largest supplier to the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry. Opium is diverted from legal
production, and there is substantial illicit opium
cultivation in certain districts. India is also a
transit route for heroin from nearby producing
countries, and an exporter of methaqualone and heroin
precursor chemicals en route to the Middle East,
Africa, Europe and North America.
As a licit producer of opium, India must meet an
additional certification requirement. In accordance
with Section 490(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, it
must maintain licit production and stockpiles at levels
no higher than those consistent with licit market
demand and take adequate steps to prevent significant
diversion of its licit cultivation and production into
illicit markets and to prevent illicit cultivation and
production.
The United States and India conducted an intensive
dialogue on narcotics issues, with meetings of a Joint
Working Group and a 1994 visit by Dr. Lee Brown. With
U.S. encouragement, India maintained during 1994 a
promising narcotics dialogue with Pakistan on cross-
border smuggling of heroin and precursor chemicals,
despite poor bilateral relations in other areas.
Over the past several years, the Government of
India (GOI) has taken steps to reduce licit opium
stockpiles and the potential for diversion of licit
opium to the illicit market. The total area licensed
for cultivation was kept at about 14,000 hectares (ha)
in the 1993/4 crop season and physical controls on
harvested opium were enhanced. In 1994, in the course
of taking the first physical inventory in many years,
it became clear that real stocks on hand were far lower
(by 800 metric tons) than official inventories and that
supplies were insufficient to fulfill 1994 contractual
requirements. An International Narcotics Control Board
audit described the failure to have maintained adequate
inventory records as a violation of the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotics Drugs. No adequate accounting
of several hundred tons of the discrepancy between book
stocks and real stocks has been made. New storage and
accounting controls put into place in 1994 should
reduce potential for diversion from licit stocks.
To combat large-scale diversion by growers, the GOI
has slowly increased minimum qualifying yields (MQY) on
licensed growers. MQY was raised from 40 kg per ha to
43 kg/ha for the 1994/5 growing season. An unreleased
GOI crop survey reportedly suggests that MQY could be
raised by a substantially greater amount. The United
States raised with India the need for a scientific crop
yield survey in the near future so that MQY can be
raised to a level high enough to prevent substantial
diversion to the illicit market.
To cope with the 1994 opium shortfall and rebuild
an appropriate reserve stockpile, the GOI decided in
1994/5 to expand the cultivated area to about 24,000
hectares, but to improve security by concentrating
production in a more limited region, granting
additional hectarage to farmers with a history of high
yields, and delicensing some 40,000 farmers whose opium
deliveries to the GOI fell below the MQY. This
expansion in cultivated area raises concern about the
potential for increased diversion.
The Government of India cooperates well with the
United States on individual cases of trafficking. There
has been little success, however, in cracking major
smuggling rings, pointing up a continuing lack of
resources and personnel, including lack of
intelligence-gathering capability and high-level
political [[Page 12866]] support, allocated to
narcotics enforcement. There were no seizures of heroin
laboratories in 1994. The United States has no specific
knowledge of any senior GOI officials encouraging or
facilitating trafficking or money laundering.
Allegations of corruption among lower-level judicial
and law enforcement personnel are widespread, but
successful prosecutions rare.
Illicit cultivation of opium is concentrated in the
state of Jammu and Kashmir, in remote areas of Uttar
Pradesh, and in other areas where political
disturbances and inadequate enforcement resources kept
GOI eradication efforts to a minimum. The GOI cited
bureaucratic difficulties in turning down a U.S. offer
of partial U.S. funding for an aerial crop survey in
1994. Illicit opium production is estimated to be in
the range of 80 metric tons on 5,500 hectares, with
reported eradication of about 100 hectares.
India is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has
made some progress toward precursor chemical control
and law enforcement cooperation. However, India has not
yet passed asset seizure legislation or implemented
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.
Although India did not sign a bilateral agreement with
the United States in 1994, the goals of a 1993
agreement aimed at improving security at the opium
factories are being achieved.
India fulfilled the requirement of FAA Section
490(c) to maintain licit production and stockpiles at
levels no higher than consistent with market demand.
The GOI addressed a number of the specific U.S.
concerns expressed in 1994 bilateral narcotics
consultations, which focussed on better controls on
licit opium production. For 1994, India's efforts to
impose necessary controls on licit opium and
cooperation with DEA and other endorsement agencies
justify continued certification. In 1995, significant
additional steps will need to be taken if full
certification is to continue. Areas of outstanding
concern include: quantifying real licit opium yields;
revising MQY to appropriate levels; eradicating illicit
cultivation; taking effective action against major
narcotics trafficking syndicates and kingpins; and
implementing effective measures on money laundering and
asset seizure.
Jamaica
Jamaica is both a major producer of marijuana and a
flourishing transshipment site for South American
cocaine en route to the United States, The Bahamas,
Canada and Europe. There is scant evidence of money
laundering at this point. Jamaica is not yet a party to
the 1988 UN Convention. However, the Government of
Jamaica (GOJ) took adequate steps during 1994 to
fulfill the goals and objectives of both the Convention
and U.S.-Jamaican counternarcotics agreements.
The GOJ made progress during 1994 in strengthening
its narcotics control effort. Jamaica's Forfeiture of
Assets Act, which allows for criminal but not civil
forfeiture, went into effect in August. The GOJ also
amended its Dangerous Drugs Act to provide for tougher
fines and longer imprisonment for drug offenders. The
GOJ continued work on money laundering control
legislation and expects to present it to Parliament
before April 1995. With the adoption of money
laundering legislation, Jamaica will have the full
range of implementing legislation for the 1988 UN
Convention, which it then intends to ratify. In 1994,
the GOJ submitted to Parliament enabling legislation to
permit Jamaican ratification of the U.S.-Jamaica Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty, and the GOJ expects passage
soon.
Throughout 1994, the GOJ continued its excellent
cooperation on extradition. GOJ drug enforcement
agencies also continued to cooperate well with the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). These agencies
have recognized the need to bring major traffickers to
justice and break up trafficker networks and are taking
appropriate steps. Recognizing the necessity of prompt
prosecution and conviction, the GOJ has begun to work
with the USG on judicial reform, the objectives being
to improve the flow of cases through Jamaica's court
system and obtain more convictions. Although we know of
no GOJ prosecutions of officials for corruption in
1994, the GOJ, [[Page 12867]] and especially the Police
Commissioner, has attempted to de-politicize the police
force and control corruption, largely by transferring
suspect personnel. The Commissioner fully supported the
USG's revocation of the visas of several police
officers suspected of drug trafficking, as permitted
under U.S. law. The GOJ's major demand reduction
program, a UNDCP-funded project, is not making
appreciable progress at this time due to internal
problems within the National Council on Drug Abuse.
During 1994, the GOJ revitalized its marijuana
eradication program. In November, the Jamaica Defense
Force (JDF), Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) and DEA
cooperated to estimate the total amount of illegally-
grown marijuana. The JDF and JCF quickly organized a
task force to eradicate the marijuana detected during
the estimation exercise. During 1994, the GOJ
eradicated 692 hectares of marijuana, a 52 percent
increase over 1993 eradication.
Laos
Laos is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but
has drafted a comprehensive drug control program that
commits it to the goals of the Convention. As part of
this program, the government has pledged to become a
party to the Convention no later than the year 2000. A
letter of agreement on counternarcotics signed in 1989
is the basis for ongoing drug control projects funded
by the USG. These projects consist of an alternative
crop development project and a law enforcement support
project. In 1994, police units supported by the law
enforcement project became operational and began to
make arrests. Road building, dam site preparation and
other basic development work was undertaken in the crop
development project.
Based on USG estimates, Laos remains one of the
world's major producers of opium, although production
has been on a declining trend since 1990. Due primarily
to weather, opium cultivation and yield fell sharply
during the 1993/4 growing season. USG estimates for the
1994 crop show a decrease in cultivation of
approximately 29 percent, from 26,040 hectares in 1993
to 18,520 in 1994. Production of opium gum dropped even
more significantly, from about 180 metric tons in 1993
to only 85 metric tons in 1994, a decline of 53
percent. Opium cultivation is not illegal under
existing statutes.
In the past year, the Lao government has moved
forward in its anti-narcotics efforts through
continuation of both bilateral and multilateral
programs. Bilateral agreements signed with the USG
continued the crop control project in Houaphan Province
and the law enforcement project. An additional crop
control project has been approved, which will be
implemented by Norwegian Church Aid/UNDCP. An active
UNDCP program also operates an alternative development
program aimed at opium crop control. The Lao special
counternarcotics unit, which was formed as a result of
the 1992 bilateral USG-Lao law enforcement project
agreement, is now functioning and had some successes in
1994 in heroin interdiction efforts. Lao customs has
worked closely and effectively with the special unit in
several significant seizures of illicit drugs and in
follow-on investigations.
There have been allegations of military and
official collusion in narcotics production and
trafficking, but there is no solid evidence of official
corruption. Lao government employees receive low pay,
making them susceptible to corruption and low-level
corruption is assumed to exist. There is no clear
evidence that the Lao government as a matter of policy
encourages or facilitates the illicit production or
distribution of drugs or the laundering of drug money.
Malaysia
Malaysia ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1993
and has worked cooperatively with the USG, as well as
taking adequate steps on its own, to fulfill the
Convention's goals and objectives. The USG and the
Government of Malaysia (GOM) continue strong
antinarcotics cooperation. Several important steps
forward in bilateral cooperation were made this year.
The two govern [[Page 12868]] ments renewed efforts to
collect and analyze intelligence on international drug
trafficking, and the Drug Enforcement Administration
and the Royal Malaysian Police restored their
cooperative relations. A bilateral agreement to assist
in demand reduction programs is being implemented
effectively. Negotiations for a new U.S.-Malaysia
extradition treaty are proceeding.
The Government of Malaysia considers the narcotics
problem a priority issue. Malaysia pursues an
aggressive enforcement policy under one of the most
severe drug laws in the world. A well-funded
counternarcotics program emphasizes both enforcement
and demand reduction.
Illicit heroin processing, heroin trafficking, and
growing addiction continue to be serious problems in
Malaysia. Traffickers smuggle heroin base into Malaysia
from Thailand and Burma and refined heroin continues to
transit Malaysia en route to the United States and
other Western markets.
During 1994, there were no notable cases of
corruption involving narcotics. However, Penang, where
Chinese triad gangs control most narcotics trafficking,
is still considered to be vulnerable to corruption and
gang members are believed to be involved in attempts to
engage law enforcement officials in various forms of
corruption. Corruption continued to be addressed by law
enforcement agencies. The Royal Malaysian Police
continued to take precautions against potential
corruption by a careful selection of officers for its
anti-narcotics unit and frequent transfers within the
unit. Although some law enforcement officials have been
charged with corruption in the past, there has been no
evidence of corruption among senior officials.
Despite severe legal penalties for both drug use
and trafficking, drug trafficking remains a major
problem. Illicit narcotics generally continue to be
available at stable prices for the local addict
population.
There is no evidence that Malaysia is a significant
center for money laundering now, but the Malaysian
government is concerned that a new offshore financial
center may be vulnerable to money laundering activities
and is looking for ways to head off this threat.
Mexico
The United States Government and the Government of
Mexico (GOM) maintained close counternarcotics
cooperation in 1994, the final year of the Salinas
administration, in keeping with the commitments of the
bilateral agreement on cooperation in combatting
narcotics trafficking and drug dependency (Chiles
Amendment Agreement). Mexico continued its multi-
faceted national campaign against production,
trafficking and abuse of illegal drugs, meeting many of
the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.
However, the results of this campaign were mixed, with
cocaine seizures falling to the lowest level of
Salinas' tenure (about 21 mt) and few major traffickers
arrested and prosecuted. Narco-corruption remains a
serious impediment to effective drug law enforcement.
Eradication of opium poppy and cannabis also declined
substantially. One factor causing the decline may have
been the diversion of military personnel and resources
to handle the political uprising in the state of
Chiapas. On the positive side, heroin seizures
increased to about 300 kilograms, more than the
previous five years combined. Seizures of precursor and
essential chemicals and destruction of clandestine
laboratories likewise increased. Money laundering,
particularly the large-scale conversion of cash from
the United States, remains a major problem in Mexico,
which the GOM has not yet effectively curbed.
The decline in cocaine seizures was due to a number
of factors. Much of the Mexican Attorney General's
Office was devoted to investigating the assassinations
of the leading Presidential candidate and the Secretary
General of the ruling PRI party. Also, to avoid
detection by U.S. and Mexican air interdiction systems,
traffickers increased the use of fast moving cargo
jets, each transporting huge quantities of cocaine into
Mexico. Only one of these aircraft was seized; the U.S.
and Mexican governments are sharing intelligence and
upgrading equipment to address this
situation. [[Page 12869]]
Despite commendable efforts by the Salinas
administration to tackle endemic corruption with the
Mexican police and judicial systems, including hundreds
of dismissals and numerous prosecutions, the measures
taken did not turn the tide. Anti-corruption actions,
as well as efforts to build strong anti-drug
institutions, were undermined by narco-influence (and
money) and frequent personnel turnovers, especially in
1994.
The actions taken by newly-inaugurated President
Ernesto Zedillo are encouraging. Zedillo stated
publicly that narcotrafficking presented the single
greatest threat to the national security of Mexico.
Within a few weeks of taking office, he promulgated a
sweeping judicial reform package, which was
overwhelmingly approved by the Mexican Congress. The
Zedillo administration has also pledged to pursue
institutional reform of Mexican law enforcement
agencies to counter official corruption and to
strengthen legal controls over money laundering and
precursor chemicals.
Panama
Panama is a major money laundering center, a
producer of coca leaf, and a transit point for cocaine
destined for the United States.
For most of 1994, Panama was preoccupied by
election year politics and the transition of
administration from President Endara to President Perez
Balladares. Nonetheless, there were significant policy
and legislative initiatives on the counternarcotics
front.
Two important counternarcotics achievements were
enacted by the Endara administration before it left
office: the establishment of cross-border currency
controls and the passage of Law 13 which expanded the
Government of Panama's (GOP) ability to investigate and
prosecute narcotics-related crime.
Since taking office in September 1994, the
administration of Perez Balladares acknowledged that
narcotrafficking and narcotics-related money laundering
threaten Panama's political and economic stability. In
an effort to prevent abuse of incorporation laws, the
new President issued a decree mandating attorneys to
follow ``know-your-customer'' practices. He then
established a special commission to develop money
laundering controls. The resulting policy statement
prescribed a number of far-reaching changes. For
example, it criminalized drug-related money laundering,
mandated suspicious transaction reporting, and extended
cash transaction reporting obligations to non-financial
institutions. Moreover, Panama's new controls include
strengthening the regulatory authority of the National
Banking Commission and developing a financial analysis
center, an investigations unit, and a prosecutor's
office to develop cases of financial crime.
Panama was generally successful in meeting the
goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention and
bilateral counternarcotics agreements with the United
States. The GOP's aggressive eradication efforts
continued, and interdiction operations showed a marked
improvement. To combat money laundering and corruption,
the administration of Perez Ballardares moved rapidly
on the policy front but was unable to begin
implementation of controls before the end of the year.
Several middle- and low-level officials were
investigated for corruption and, in a few cases,
dismissed. The GOP does not, as a matter of policy or
practice, encourage or facilitate illicit narcotics
distribution, corruption, or laundering of drug
proceeds.
In 1994, Panama developed a framework on which it
can wage a campaign against traffickers and money
launderers. In 1995, the measure of the GOP's
counternarcotics programs will be the degree to which
it builds upon that framework by implementing controls,
seizing assets, and prosecuting offenders.
Taiwan
Changing drug trafficking patterns in East Asia
have created a growing heroin trafficking problem in
Taiwan. Domestic demand for heroin has risen sharply,
and Taiwan has also emerged as an important center for
the transshipment of heroin. Over the past three or
four years, Taiwan authorities [[Page 12870]] have made
drug enforcement a priority and heroin seizures have
risen sharply, climbing to over one metric ton in 1993.
Taiwan is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention,
but the vigorous drug enforcement campaign mounted by
the Taiwan authorities demonstrates substantial
progress toward meeting some of the goals of the
Convention, and shows Taiwan is taking adequate steps
on its own to address the problem of heroin
trafficking. However, legislation and agreements do not
yet exist to implement the provisions of the Convention
regarding asset forfeiture, controlled delivery,
extradition, mutual legal assistance and illicit
traffic by sea. Taiwan authorities have expressed an
interest in developing agreements in some of these
areas. There were no reported incidents of police
corruption involving drugs. There is no evidence of
senior Taiwan officials being involved with the illegal
drug trade.
Working cooperation between the Drug Enforcement
Administration and both the Taiwan National Police and
the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau has been
good. Efforts are being made to enhance enforcement
cooperation and Taiwan authorities have expressed
interest in entering into a bilateral counternarcotics
agreement under the auspices of the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Representative Office in the United States and
the American Institute in Taiwan.
Thailand
Thailand is the main transit route for the illicit
drug production from the Golden Triangle. Successful
eradication and development efforts have reduced opium
cultivation far below the amounts grown in the
neighboring countries of Burma and Laos. Due to the
efforts of the Thai Government authorities, 1994
cultivation of illicit opium was only 2,110 hectares,
yielding 17 metric tons of opium.
Drug enforcement cooperation is very good and
improved even further in 1994. In a precedent-setting
cooperative law enforcement operation, the Royal Thai
government in November 1994 arrested ten major
traffickers under indictment in the United States who
form part of drug lord Khun Sa's Shan United Army (SUA)
infrastructure and proceedings to extradite the
fugitives to the United States are now pending in Thai
courts. During 1994, Thailand also took action to close
off its northern border, reducing the flow of supplies
and other logistical support to the SUA in Burma.
Efforts continue to enhance judicial cooperation and
the Thai Cabinet has just moved to permit the courts to
consider the extradition of a former Thai Member of
Parliament under indictment in the United States on
large-scale marijuana smuggling charges.
Thailand is a leader in regional drug control
programs and shares its expertise through agreements
with neighboring countries and the United Nations and
through training and cooperative enforcement
activities.
Thailand remains vulnerable to money laundering due
to the relatively low level of sophistication of the
Thai banking system and the presence of an active
quasi-legal non-bank financial system. Thailand is now
in the process of drafting money laundering
legislation. Drug-related corruption of some
politicians and police officials remains a problem.
A bilateral agreement with the United States
supports law enforcement cooperation and crop control,
including eradication of opium poppies and Thailand has
performed well under that agreement. Thailand is not a
party to the 1988 UN Convention, but is a party to the
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972
Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances.
Venezuela
Venezuela is a major drug transit country.
Traffickers ship an estimated 100-200 metric tons (mt)
of cocaine annually through Venezuela. Precursor and
essential chemical trafficking and money laundering are
also serious problems in Venezuela. The Venezuelan
judiciary's marginal ability to resist
[[Page 12871]] the corruptive influence of traffickers
has hampered counternarcotics efforts in that country.
Venezuela has taken adequate steps to meet the
goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, to
which it is a party, especially in its vigorous
response to illicit crop cultivation. Venezuela quickly
eradicated in 1994, with USG assistance, over 1,000
hectares of coca and opium poppy cultivation in Zulia
state near its western border with Colombia. The
government generally meets the goals of bilateral
counternarcotics agreements with the USG. In addition,
the Venezuela-Colombia border agreement to keep
Venezuela free of narcotics traffickers and the
successful eradication effort indicates serious
Government of Venezuela (GOV) interest in preventing
traffickers from making incursions into Venezuela.
Seizures of cocaine increased in 1994 to 5.0 mt,
indicating both more trafficker use of Venezuela and
better interdiction of cocaine by Venezuelan
counternarcotics forces. Venezuela's bilateral
agreement with the United States to conduct
counternarcotics air interdiction operations reflects
invigorated cooperation on strategic initiatives.
In 1994, the Guardia Nacional (GN) seized 5.0 mt of
cocaine and 15 kilograms (kg) of heroin. However, the
recent arrests of two GN members for trafficking 250 kg
of cocaine through Maiquetia Airport evinces corruption
problems at lower levels in the organization. The GN
quickly removed the two soldiers and began an
investigation of the unit.
Although President Caldera has spoken out strongly
against narco-corruption, most recently at the December
Summit of the Americas, corruption in Venezuela remains
a serious problem. A convicted trafficker, Larry Tovar
Acuna, fled to Colombia after fraudulently obtaining a
pardon, and the Venezuelan government made an
extradition request to Colombia for Tovar. In addition,
a corrupt judge released members of the Sinforoso
Caballero money laundering organization. The Venezuelan
Supreme Court reopened the case and investigated the
judge.
Venezuela has not yet approved its draft national
counternarcotics strategy and has not begun to control
precursor and essential chemicals. With more attention
from President Caldera, Venezuela's compliance with
bilateral agreements on chemical control and money
laundering measures should improve.
Vietnam
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has a significant
opiate abuse problem and is emerging as a location for
drug trafficking. Illicit opium production exceeded
1,000 hectares, but the precise extent of cultivation
remains unclear. Estimates have ranged as high as
14,000 hectares during the 1992/3 growing season. The
government is undertaking a serious eradication effort
and has pledged to eliminate opium cultivation, which
exists primarily in relatively inaccessible regions of
the north.
Opiate addiction in urban areas is a serious
problem. The government, with the aid of the United
Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), is
formulating a drug control plan to combat both
production and consumption in Vietnam. Economic reforms
and the growing overall volume of the Southeast Asian
heroin trade have made Vietnam an emerging transit
point for heroin destined for Taiwan, the United States
and other locations.
Corruption is a complicating factor in domestic
enforcement efforts, but there is no evidence that the
government tolerates, condones or profits from drug
trafficking activity.
The government is not a party to the 1988 UN
Convention, but is developing a program to work toward
fulfillment of the goals and objectives of the
Convention. This program is embodied in the drug
control plan being drafted with the assistance of
UNDCP. In coordination with UNDCP, the government is
drafting legislation that meets the goals of the
Convention. [[Page 12872]]
There is no bilateral counternarcotics agreement
between the United States and Vietnam. However,
informal discussions have begun between representatives
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the USG about
counternarcotics cooperation and the Vietnamese
response has been positive.
VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS JUSTIFICATION
Bolivia
Bolivia is the world's second largest producer of
coca leaf after Peru and the second largest producer of
cocaine after Colombia. Most of the cocaine refined
from Bolivian coca leaf is consumed in the United
States.
Bolivia was highly successful in counternarcotics
law enforcement operations during 1994. The Government
of Bolivia (GOB) conducted four major operations
designed to block trafficker movements, seized two
large cocaine HCl laboratories, and arrested major
traffickers with links to the Medellin drug mafia. GOB
forces foiled Colombian traffickers and their Bolivian
accomplices attempting a prison break at a maximum
security facility and arrested the prison warden for
complicity in the plot. Throughout 1994, the GOB
continued its probe of alleged trafficker ties to
former President Jaime Paz Zamora and members of his
Movement of the Left (MIR) political party. In June,
the Bolivian Congress removed two Supreme Court
justices for corruption.
President Sanchez de Lozada is seeking to develop a
strategy to eliminate illegal coca from the country
without the use of measures he considers to be
divisive, such as forced eradication. In 1994, however,
the GOB made no measurable progress toward creating a
plan to carry out this strategy.
In February 1994, the GOB briefly undertook a
campaign of forced eradication which resulted in a
violent reaction by coca growers. Voluntary,
compensated eradication dropped off sharply and new
plantings increased, resulting in a net increase in the
area of coca under cultivation.
The Sanchez de Lozada administration has supported
USG efforts to extradite drug traffickers, but such
efforts stalled in the Bolivian Supreme Court in 1994.
In early 1995, however, prominent trafficker Jose
Faustino Rico Toro was declared extraditable. Thirty-
five other extradition requests by the United States
are pending with Bolivia. The GOB has declined to sign
an extradition treaty negotiated in 1990, but in early
1995, the Sanchez de Lozada administration proposed a
new draft treaty, which USG officials are reviewing.
It is in the vital national interests of the United
States to maintain and increase the level of
cooperation with Bolivia, the world's second largest
coca and cocaine producer. Denial of certification
would likely terminate much of Bolivia's multilateral
development bank assistance, which would have an
extremely harmful effect on the Bolivian economy. It
would reduce significantly the resources available to
the GOB to combat narcotics trafficking and would
foster conditions in which more Bolivians would be
driven to engage in illicit coca cultivation and
trafficking.
Because the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank are Bolivian's largest aid donors, USG
opposition to loans to Bolivia by those institutions
would result in strident calls within Bolivia for the
GOB to cease its counternarcotics cooperation with the
USG. Economic instability could lead to a loss of
confidence throughout the country and thereby serve to
undermine Bolivia's still-fledging democratic
institutions. Should Bolivia's current democratically-
elected government be followed by an authoritarian
regime, narcotraffickers might gain a strong foothold,
as they did in the corrupt dictatorships of the early
1980's. Preserving and promoting democracy in Bolivia
is in the U.S. national interest of enhancing democracy
throughout the Western Hemisphere.
In 1994, although the GOB's efforts and cooperation
with the USG on interdiction and on broader political
issues were substantial, its overall
[[Page 12873]] counternarcotics efforts were not
adequate to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988
UN Convention. Nevertheless, the risks posed to vital
U.S. national interests from the possible consequences
of terminating U.S. assistance, as noted above, greatly
outweigh the risks posed by the lack of complete GOB
cooperation on counternarcotics. With recent positive
signs of action from the GOB, the USG will enter into
further discussions to secure commitments for action in
key areas.
Colombia
In 1994, Colombia remained the world's largest
supplier of cocaine and the source of virtually all the
cocaine imported into the United States. There are
currently more than 111,000 acres (45,000 hectares) of
coca being cultivated, a 13.3 percent increase over
1993 and, if such cultivation is not contained and
crops are not eradicated, Colombia could soon surpass
Bolivia as the second largest source of coca after
Peru. Colombia is also a significant supplier of heroin
and one of the largest cultivators of opium poppy in
the world, along with Burma, Afghanistan and Laos.
Recent data indicate that after having been suppressed
over the last few years, Colombia's marijuana
cultivation and export to the United States is again
increasing. The expected diminution in the movement and
flow of narcotics originating in Colombia as a result
of the destruction of the Medellin syndicate in 1993
did not materialize. It is apparent that the removal of
Pablo Escobar and his drug empire from the Colombia
narcotics scene only benefited the now-dominant
syndicate headquartered in the city of Cali.
During 1994, the USG and the Government of Colombia
(GOC) collaborated on a number of fronts against the
scourge of narcotics trafficking in both countries. The
GOC had some successes. GOC performance on a number of
critical issues, however, was inadequate. Among the
successes attained by the GOC were ratification of the
1988 UN Convention which entered into force for
Colombia in September 1994, the legalization of the
herbicide glyphosate for use against coca cultivation,
the defeat of a bill in Congress supported by narco-
traffickers that would have diluted the existing
illicit enrichment law, the indictment of Miguel
Rodriguez Orejuela, and an aerial eradication campaign
against illicit cultivation, which the GOC has pressed
in the face of large-scale protests by the cultivators.
Colombia remains the only producer of coca currently
permitting aerial eradication of illegal crops.
Individual police and other officials operating at
the ground level show considerable determination to
bring narcotics traffickers to justice. Sporadic and
ambivalent support by some quarters of the Colombian
political establishment prevents significant damage to
the Colombian drug syndicates. In 1994, the GOC took no
legislative steps to reverse the 1993 revision of the
criminal procedures code which made it more difficult
to bring mid-level and senior syndicate heads to
justice. As a result, following the trend set in 1993,
there were no arrests, incarcerations, or fines imposed
on such traffickers. In addition, a number of
previously convicted traffickers were able to benefit
from significant reductions in their sentences pursuant
to Colombia's woefully lenient sentencing laws. The
GOC's inability to protect and use information provided
to them by the U.S. Justice Department has made
impossible a full resumption of our previous law
enforcement evidence-sharing relationship. The GOC has
been informed that evidence obtained in the United
States will not be provided for any new criminal cases
pending a successful resolution of old cases for which
we have provided evidence.
In 1994, total drug seizures through interdiction
efforts were above those of 1993 but did not reach the
levels accomplished in 1991 (86.35 mt) as the USG had
recommended to the GOC. Performance on eradication has
improved, but results to date have not met
expectations. Even with increased USG-provided air and
herbicide assets, the amount of opium poppy eradicated
was almost 50 percent less than in 1993. As for coca
the numbers are impressive (4,500+ hectares vs. 793 ha
in 1993). They might have been [[Page 12874]] greater
had not local grower protests temporarily brought the
program to a near halt in December.
In excess of 15,000 active criminal corruption
investigations have been filed by the Attorney General
against government officials, including 21 Colombian
members of Congress. In 1994, there were no senior
government officials indicted for corruption. Although
Colombia and the United States in 1980 signed a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty, Colombia has failed to ratify
the treaty, and it has not entered into force. The
Colombian Congress did not pass bills introduced by the
Samper administration to counter money laundering
activities and asset retention by illegal enterprises
and those who participate in them. There was
insufficient progress to detect and remove those
corrupt officials primarily involved in
counternarcotics efforts. There continues to be a
problem with drug syndicate control of sovereign
territory, such as San Andres Island.
The performance of two successive governments of
Colombia during 1994 on the counternarcotics front did
not meet the expectations agreed upon between our
governments in numerous official and non-official
meetings on the subject. Certain performance criteria
were set out with the GOC in order to advance our joint
commitments to this problem. Despite a national
election and promises by the new government, Colombia
did not meet these performance criteria nor did it take
adequate steps on its own to achieve full compliance
with the goals and objectives established by the 1988
UN Convention. As a result, the activities of the
Colombian drug syndicates continue to ensure that the
flow of cocaine, heroin and marijuana from Colombia to
the United States remains undiminished.
There was a demonstrable absence of support by some
quarters of the political establishment to buttress the
gains achieved by GOC institutions operating at the
ground level. There were no efforts made in the areas
of judicial reform, capture and incarceration of
syndicate heads, or the strengthening of executive
institutions to counter the successful efforts of the
trafficking syndicates. Lack of action by the Congress
on GOC-introduced legislation also remains a problem.
Vital U.S. national interests would be at risk if
we were to deny Columbia certification. As Colombia is
the primary source of cocaine to the United States,
continued cooperation with the GOC is very important to
this country. A vital national interest certification
will ensure that USG policy and assistance remain
focused on developing more effective Colombian anti-
drug efforts, while acknowledging that GOC actions to
date have not had the desired impact on the flow of
illegal narcotics to the United States. Further, such a
certification allows the United States to continue
working closely with Colombia on the other important
issues on our bilateral agenda: promoting human rights,
advancing free trade, and cooperating in international
fora.
If Colombia were not certified, the USG would be
required to vote against multilateral development
lending. Termination of such assistance would have an
adverse effect on the Colombian economy, reducing the
resources available to the GOC to combat narcotics
trafficking and fostering conditions in which more
Colombians would be encouraged to engage in illicit
coca cultivation and trafficking. Moreover, Colombia
would find it more difficult to get international
donors to help fund its projected alternative
development scheme. Columbia's planned purchase of a
U.S. radar system using Export-Import Bank financing
would be cancelled, further reducing Colombia's
interdiction capabilities.
While the GOC needs to do more in its efforts
against drugs, the decrease in narcotics cooperation
that would likely attend denial of certification would
result in even more narcotics entering this country.
Decertification would result in strident nationalistic
calls on the GOC to cease its CN cooperation with the
USG. In short, the risks associated with denying
certification to Colombia are greater than the risks
associated with Colombia's failure in the last year to
cooperate fully with the United States, or to
[[Page 12875]] take adequate steps on its own, to
combat narcotics. Continued cooperation with the GOC
will serve our drug control interests. Contrary to our
national interests, the net result of decertification
would be an increase in the flow of narcotics from
Colombia to the United States and in the number of
deaths among American drug victims.
Lebanon
Lebanon remained a major nexus for narcotics
production and trafficking in 1994. Lebanese success in
dramatically reducing the cultivation of both opium and
cannabis in 1994 was offset by the continued processing
of imported narcotics. Lebanese production facilities
maintained pre-eradication levels of output. The
Syrians have been cooperative in facilitating some
advances in the Lebanese counternarcotics effort.
However, no processing laboratories in Lebanon were
dismantled in 1994 and the number of heroin and cocaine
laboratories increased significantly. The volume of raw
opium and cocaine flowing into Lebanon for processing
and reexport offset the decreased volume of opium and
cannabis cultivated in the Biqa' Valley.
In addition to significant successful eradication
efforts, positive developments in Lebanon during 1994
include the lifting of immunity to permit prosecution
of a legislator alleged to be corrupt, and the
initiation of investigations of other public figures.
There was also a marked increase in the number of small
seizures and arrests reported in Lebanon, a major
seizure of cocaine base in the port of Beirut was
recorded, and a major importer of pharmaceuticals was
also arrested on suspicion of diverting chemicals to
illicit laboratories.
Although Lebanon has signalled its intent to
accede, it is not yet a party to the 1988 UN Convention
and has not met some of the goals and objectives of the
Convention. Lebanon does not have a bilateral narcotics
agreement with the United States.
The threat posed to the United States by drug
trafficking and processing in Lebanon remains real.
However, Lebanon's inability to confront in a wholly
successful manner the narcotics threat, or to cooperate
fully with the United States reflects, in part, the
weakness of its institutions and regional political
dynamics. Moreover, the stability, peace, and economic
development of Lebanon are important to the stability
of the Middle East region. The United States' vital
national interests in continuing assistance to Lebanon
and in furthering regional stability outweigh the
threat posed by drug trafficking through Lebanon to the
United States.
Pakistan
Pakistan is both a producer and an important
transit country for opiates destined for international
drug markets. Laboratories in Pakistan's Northwest
Frontier Province process opium grown there and in
neighboring Afghanistan. The USG estimates that about
one-tenth of heroin consumed in the United States
originates in Southwest Asia, much of it produced in
the illegal labs in Pakistan. During the 1993-94 crop
year, Pakistan produced about 160 metric tons of opium
from about 7,300 hectares of poppy.
Despite limited progress in some areas, in 1994 the
Government of Pakistan laid the foundation for
significant progress in early 1995.
The GOP extended, by decree, the 1930 Narcotics Law
to the tribal areas, increased significantly seizures
of opium and heroin, increased financial resources
devoted to combatting illicit narcotics processing and
trade, and in several meetings with Government of India
officials agreed to expand counternarcotics
cooperation. It also initiated twelve new asset seizure
cases in 1994 and used the media to alert the public to
the GOP counternarcotics efforts and the dangers of
narcotics.
There was limited progress in other areas. Despite
the GOP extension of the 1930 Narcotics Law to the
frontier areas, few major drug traffickers were
arrested or prosecuted during calendar year 1994. None
of the new asset seizure cases has been prosecuted.
Pakistan marginally extended the [[Page 12876]] opium
cultivation ban while eradication equaled only 1993's
total eradication. Poppy cultivation was up 16 percent
in 1994, although the overall level of cultivation has
remained more or less constant over the last five
years.
By year end, Pakistan had drafted and vetted
legislation to bring Pakistani law into conformance
with the 1988 UN Convention, to which Pakistan is a
party, and to prevent drug money laundering. President
Leghari promulgated the legislative package as a
temporary decree January 9, effective for 120 days
after disagreements in the cabinet precluded submission
to the National Assembly. Legislative action will be
required to make it permanent. Politically difficult
efforts to curb corruption in GOP law enforcement
agencies and the courts have been modest.
Building on the foundation laid in 1994, Pakistan
intensified its anti-narcotics efforts in 1995. The
government began an eradication campaign in Bajaur
Agency in January 1995 and created a demand reduction
office. It also announced on January 25 that it had
frozen $68 million in assets of narcotics traffickers.
In a late January raid on a drug warehouse in the
Northwest Frontier Province, 132 metric tons of drugs,
primarily hashish, were seized. Recently, the GOP
indicated a willingness to proceed expeditiously on
outstanding extradition requests. Pakistan recently
expanded the poppy ban in the NWFP.
Vital U.S. national interests could be damaged if
Pakistan were to be denied certification. Pakistan is a
strategically-located, moderate Islamic state with a
nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan has provided
troops for UN peacekeeping operations, most recently in
Bosnia and Somalia, and has cooperated in the
international fight against terrorists. The Government
of Pakistan has also used its moderating influence with
other Islamic countries. Decertification would be
viewed in Pakistan as abandonment of a loyal ally and
would endanger U.S./Pakistani dialogue and cooperation
on these vital issues. It could also undermine
Pakistan's ongoing efforts to address the drug problem,
including cooperation by Pakistani anti-narcotics
forces with DEA and the embassy narcotics affairs
section.
The risk to these vital U.S. interests, and
particularly our narcotics cooperation efforts,
outweighs the potential gain from decertifying Pakistan
for its inadequate efforts to combat narcotics.
Pakistan is the conduit for opium and morphine base
from Afghanistan, the second largest opium producer in
the world. If the surge of Afghan drugs is to be
stemmed, we need more Pakistani cooperation. Morale in
Pakistan's anti-narcotics organizations could be
adversely affected by decertification.
Although Pakistan is currently prohibited from
receiving many forms of aid by the Pressler Amendment,
denial of certification would add a requirement to vote
against Pakistan in multilateral development banks.
Access to such loans is vital to Pakistan. During the
period of national interest certification, the USG will
redouble its efforts to assist the GOP in improving its
anti-narcotics performance to meet the criteria for
full certification.
Paraguay
Paraguay is used as a transit route for cocaine
shipped primarily from Bolivia, and perhaps
increasingly from Colombia, to Argentina and Brazil for
onward shipment to the United States and Europe. High-
quality marijuana is exported to Argentina and Brazil
and consumed within Paraguay. Paraguay is potentially a
major money laundering center, based on its extensive
re-export trade and its expanding and poorly regulated
financial sector.
President Juan Carlos Wasmosy, Paraguay's first
democratically-elected civilian President in over five
decades, has stressed his personal commitment to
combatting narcotics trafficking. He has continued
authorization to stage USG counternarcotics
surveillance aircraft in Paraquay and submitted to
Congress legislation to control money laundering.
Nevertheless, he failed in 1994 to act decisively when
brought information relating to corruption within the
GOP's counternarcotics leadership. As a result,
Paraquay's co [[Page 12877]] operation in drug law
enforcement was weak in the first half of the year, and
one criminal investigation was very probably
compromised due to corruption. A lack of political will
to uncover what is widely believed to be extensive
official corruption led to an overall weak drug control
program. Given this situation, Paraguay cannot be
considered to be in compliance with the goals of the
1987 bilateral counternarcotics agreement with the USG,
which seeks to eliminate the illicit production,
processing, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics
in Paraguay and the transit of narcotics through
contiguous territorial waters.
Cooperation briefly improved in mid-year, resulting
in a successful joint investigation with the Drug
Enforcement Administration that netted 756 kilos of
cocaine, the largest seizure ever in Paraguay. In
October, the head of the anti-narcotics secretariat
(SENAD) was assassinated, apparently in a personal
dispute, disrupting further drug enforcement
investigations for the remainder of the year. The new
head of SENAD has expressed commitment to a cooperative
drug control effort and has promised to carry out
widespread changes in the composition of SENAD and the
national anti-narcotics police. The USG remains
concerned, however, that the Paraguayan military's
control over SENAD will cloud any efforts to change the
organization fundamentally.
The Government of Paraguay (GOP) made some progress
toward meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
Convention when the Paraguayan Congress ratified a
financial information exchange agreement with the USG.
However, until the GOP takes credible action to
investigate allegations of corruption and to promote an
aggressive investigative stance against those aiding
drug trafficking, it cannot be considered to be fully
cooperating with the United States, or to be taking
adequate steps on its own, to comply with the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention.
Despite its concerns about the GOP's lack of
political will to seriously address drug trafficking,
the USG is cognizant that Paraguay remains a young,
fragile democracy. The consequences of decertification
would likely have a significant adverse impact on
Paraguay's ability to consolidate and sustain its
fledgling democracy. The USG believes that its long-
term counternarcotics goal for Paraguay, the promotion
of strong, independent, credible institutions of
government able to defeat drug trafficking, is best
served by fully supporting the continued growth of
democracy. Such support is in the vital national
interest of the United States. Therefore, the vital
U.S. national interest of promoting democracy outweighs
the risks posed by the lack of full GOP cooperation on
counternarcotics.
Peru
Vital U.S. national interests would be harmed if we
deny certification to Peru. Peru remains the largest
source of coca leaf in the world, making continued
cooperation with the Government of Peru very important
to the United States. In 1994, there was no measurable
reduction in the flow of coca base from Peru to
Colombia and no systematic mature coca eradication.
While the amount of coca under cultivation remained the
same, coca leaf production increased by six percent due
to new, more productive coca plantings in expanded new
areas that are superseding older areas, such as the
Huallaga Valley. A vital national interests
certification will ensure that U.S. Government policy
and assistance remain focused on reducing the
cultivation of coca and implementing the Peruvian drug
strategy promulgated in 1994. Further, such a
certification will allow the United States to continue
working closely with Peru on other important issues
such as democracy, economic reform and human rights.
In September, the Government of Peru (GOP) approved
a national drug plan that defines measures to eliminate
illegal drug production, trafficking and abuse,
including eliminating all coca cultivation destined for
illicit uses. It also established timetables and
assigned responsibilities for implementing sectoral
plans and programs, including a national alternative
development program. In June, the GOP passed a
stringent law with strict penalties [[Page 12878]] for
any aspect of opium poppy cultivation trafficking or
use, which requires destruction of any poppy found in
Peru. The GOP cooperated on most counternarcotics
matters contained in its bilateral narcotics agreement
with the United States, and took some steps to comply
with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN
Convention. However, it made no progress toward the
critical goal of reducing mature coca cultivations.
In 1994, there was concrete evidence of refined
cocaine HCl processing and shipment from Peru to Mexico
by Peruvian trafficking organizations, raising the
specter of Peru as a potentially large-scale cocaine
refining and shipping center, similar to Colombia.
Police and armed forces seized over 9 mt of cocaine
base through November 1994, exceeding the 1993 total.
Nearly 6 mt were seized by the armed forces, using
police intelligence. In January 1994, at GOP request,
Colombia arrested major Peruvian trafficker Demetrio
Limonier Chavez-Penaherrera (``Vaticano''). He was
tried in Peru and is serving a 30-year sentence. There
were similar successes against other major Peruvian
trafficking organizations. The Peruvian Air Force (FAP)
continued to implement an air intercept program with A-
37s and Tucano aircraft, despite the USG shutdown of
intelligence sharing in May (which has now resumed
pursuant to a U.S. Presidential Determination).
The GOP has cooperated with UN Drug Control Program
alternative development projects in parts of the
Huallaga, Aguaytia, Pachitea and Urubamba valleys.
Resumption of international financial institution
lending was followed by World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank projects to rehabilitate over 1500
kilometers of roads, and improved electrical power
facilities in areas affected by the coca economy. Such
improvements in infrastructure facilitate the
production and transport of alternative licit crops.
Coca seedbed eradication was resumed in July, and has
had a measurable impact on efforts to reduce the
cultivation of coca in specific areas.
Alternative development programs in or near coca-
producing regions will set the stage for future coca
crop reduction. The GOP must integrate alternative
development efforts with actual net reduction of coca
cultivation and prevent the expansion of new coca
cultivation areas in order to comply with 1988 UN
Convention goals and U.S. and Peruvian drug plans.
A decrease in narcotics cooperation with the GOP
would result in more cocaine entering the United
States. The risks associated with denying certification
to Peru are greater than the risks associated with
Peru's failure in the past year to cooperate fully with
the United States, or take adequate steps on its own to
reduce coca cultivations.
STATEMENT OF EXPLANATION
Afghanistan
In 1994, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
increased dramatically amid ongoing civil war,
widespread lawlessness, and poor economic
opportunities. According to USG estimates, opium
production in Afghanistan rose 38 percent to
approximately 950 metric tons of opium in 1994.
Cultivated hectarage rose 39 percent to 29,180
hectares. USG analysis indicates Afghanistan remains
the second largest opium producer in the world.
The nominal Government of Afghanistan was unable to
eradicate systematically poppy plants, investigate or
prosecute traffickers, or impede the transportation of
opium, morphine base, or other narcotics. Few
provincial leaders apart from Haji Qadir, Governor of
poppy-rich Nangarhar, attempted to disrupt the
cultivation or trafficking through the areas under
their control. Haji Qadir in late 1994 began a campaign
of plowing under Nangarhar's newly-planted poppy
fields. Despite a demonstration of poppy-plowing for
the benefit of U.S. and other international officials,
we are unable to judge the extent or efficacy of
Qadir's campaign. [[Page 12879]]
Afghan traffickers continued development of new
trafficking routes through the Newly Independent
States, supplementing existing routes through Pakistan
and Iran.
Reports continue to allege the direct involvement
of some factional leaders, particularly small-scale
independent ``commanders,'' in narcotics production and
trafficking and the indirect involvement of others who
provide security to the narcotics trade in return for
payment.
There is no functioning bilateral agreement between
Afghanistan and the United States. While Afghanistan
ratified the 1988 UN Convention in 1992, it has made
virtually no progress in achieving its goals.
The tremendous increase in poppy cultivation during
1994, combined with the inadequate efforts to eliminate
cultivation and trafficking, precludes a determination
that Afghanistan has cooperated fully with the United
States or taken adequate steps on its own to meet the
goals and objectives established by the 1988
Convention. The core problem in Afghanistan is the
absence of a functional central government. Although
the USG has vital national interests in fostering the
re-establishment of a functioning central government
that could cooperate with us on regional security
issues and drug eradication, USG assistance for such
purposes falls largely outside the definition of U.S.
assistance that would be cut off by denial of
certification, at least this fiscal year. Accordingly,
denial of certification is appropriate.
Burma
Burma remains the world's largest producer of
illicit opium and heroin and the Government of Burma
(GOB) continues to treat counternarcotics efforts as a
matter of secondary importance. Estimated opium
production in 1993/94 was 2,030 metric tons and illicit
poppy cultivation covered 146,600 hectares. Opium
production fell by 21 percent, due principally to poor
weather. There were some modest signs of greater
government efforts in counternarcotics. One of the
results of a Burmese Army campaign against the Shan
United Army (SUA) of Khun Sa was to restrict the opium
supply and drug trafficking routes of the SUA. The GOB
has also begun to show signs of willingness to
cooperate in counternarcotics efforts and has agreed to
facilitate an opium yield survey in 1995 and to allow
the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP) to perform an
aerial survey of project areas. Domestic enforcement
efforts have also shown some marginal improvement with
regional task forces under the Burmese police becoming
more active in drug enforcement. These efforts,
however, fall short of what is required to address
seriously the drug problem in Burma.
The government's ability to suppress Burma's opium
and heroin trade is severely limited by lack of access
to and control over the areas in which most opium is
grown and heroin processed. Well-equipped ethnic armies
sheltered in these remote mountainous regions have been
permitted wide-ranging, local autonomy in exchange for
halting their active insurgencies against Rangoon. At
the same time, opium poppy cultivation has soared in
the base areas of the insurgent groups, especially in
the Wa hills, despite nominal commitments by insurgents
and the government alike that efforts would be made to
reduce opium growing. Direct government complicity in
the drug trade does not appear to be a problem among
senior officials, but narcotics corruption is a problem
among lower level officials.
Multilateral drug control projects in enforcement
and alternative development under the UNDCP involving
cooperative efforts between Burma, China and Thailand
are underway. These projects continue to receive
support from the international community. Project scale
is small, however, and the overall impact of these
efforts on the huge opium cultivation problem in Burma
has been extremely limited so far.
Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has
enacted some legislation in conformity with the
Convention, but has not made a strong effort to enforce
these laws. There has been no bilateral
counternarcotics [[Page 12880]] agreement with the USG
since the State Law and Order Restoration Council
assumed power in 1988.
Iran
Iran is a major drug transit country. Reportedly,
almost half the morphine base that arrives in Turkey
monthly for processing as heroin passes through Iran.
It also continues to grow opium poppy in remote
provinces. Although the USG did not estimate production
in 1994, the USG does not believe cultivation
diminished significantly as we know of no eradication
campaigns. The 1993 estimate was about 3,500 hectares
of cultivation with a yield of between 35 and 70 metric
tons of opium.
Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has
undertaken at least some activities to fulfill the
goals and objectives the Convention established. Since
Iran and the United States do not have diplomatic
relations and have not cooperated in counternarcotic
efforts, the U.S. has been unable to ascertain the
extent or adequacy of Iran's undertakings. There is no
bilateral counternarcotics agreement in place between
Iran's government and the USG.
According to both Iranian radio reports and Iranian
government reports to the UN Drug Control Program
(UNDCP), the Government of Iran (GOI) is waging a
vigorous campaign to eradicate trafficking through
Iran. Almost daily radio reports announce substantial
morphine base and heroin seizures. Reportedly many
individuals are arrested and later executed for drug
trafficking. The USG cannot verify many of these
reports as it has no representatives in Iran. UNDCP
observers have viewed some seizures, including 30 tons
of opium in one exhibit bond room. Interpol statistics
for 1994, probably based on Iranian government reports,
state Iran seized 112 tons of opium, 800 kilograms of
heroin and 15 tons of morphine base. However, despite
claims about the high level of Iran's counternarcotics
effort, the level of drugs arriving in Syria and Turkey
has not noticeably decreased.
UNDCP representatives have verified that Iran has
fortified frontier guard posts with Pakistan and dug a
trench to prevent crossing between posts in an effort
to decrease trafficking. Intelligence reports suggest
that border guards continue to be bribed to permit drug
caravans through, however. The USG believes drug-
related corruption continues to be a serious problem
among Iran's law enforcement and security services. The
USG does not know the extent to which Iran enforces its
prominently advertised campaign to prevent and punish
public corruption.
Human rights organizations and some Iranian exiles
accuse Iran of executing dissidents on false charges of
drug trafficking.
Nigeria
A major transit country for Asian heroin and Latin
American cocaine destined for the United States and
numerous other points around the world, Nigeria remains
the focal point for most West African trafficking
organizations. Corruption in the Nigerian Drug Law
Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and other law enforcement
agencies has not been addressed adequately, thereby
hindering counternarcotics efforts. The export of
Nigerian drug trafficking to Liberia and other West
African counties is of particular concern. The NDLEA's
focus in 1994 remained almost exclusively on drug
couriers rather than on leaders of drug trafficking
groups.
The Government of Nigeria (GON) did begin to show
concern about international and domestic drug abuse
during 1994. The GON prepared a draft national drug
policy plan aimed at rooting out trafficking and
substance abuse. The GON formed a ministerial level
task force on drug abuse which will develop a drug
control strategy by mid-1995. In late December, the GON
appointed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering,
and advance fee fraud whose task is to coordinate the
anti-drug efforts of the NDLEA, the police, and the
customs agency. In 1994, the GON returned to the United
States three drug barons responsible for heroin
rings. [[Page 12881]]
These steps may have potential for significant
improvement in Nigeria's anti-drug efforts. We will
evaluate at an early stage if they and other steps are
being implemented effectively and if these steps are
followed by additional anti-drug measures.
While the United States welcomes the positive steps
taken during the past year, Nigeria did not meet the
goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention. Nigeria
did not effectively implement its bilateral agreement
with the United States.
Based on a complete and thorough review of the
GON's counternarcotics actions throughout 1994,
Nigeria's prominent role in international narcotics
trafficking, and its failure in 1994 to make
significant progress in meeting the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Convention, the threat posed
to the United States by drug trafficking by Nigerians
through Nigeria and elsewhere justifies continued
denial of certification.
Syria
Syria is a transit point for narcotics flowing
through the Middle East to Europe and, to a lesser
extent, the United States. In addition, Syria continues
to have a responsibility for assisting Lebanese
authorities in ending drug production and trafficking
through Lebanon because of the presence of some 30,000
Syrian troops in the Bekaa Valley. In 1994, Syria
continued and expanded its cooperation with Lebanese
authorities to eradicate opium poppy and cannabis
cultivation in the Bekaa Valley, significantly reducing
opium and cannabis cultivation. Syrian forces increased
seizures of cocaine, heroin, and hashish and raised the
number of arrests of drug traffickers in Syria and
Lebanon. Syrian military authorities in Lebanon
assisted in a significant seizure of cocaine base
delivered to Beirut's port during 1994. Despite these
efforts, however, the flow of narcotics did not
diminish in 1994.
The Syrian government has reiterated its
willingness to pursue all information regarding the
possible production of narcotics in Lebanon and Syria.
However, neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese
authorities moved successfully against cocaine or
heroin laboratories operating in either country. There
were a significant number of arrests in Syria for drug-
related offenses, but despite reports of individual
Syrian military officials profiting from the drug trade
in Lebanon, no corruption investigations or charges
were brought against any Syrian government or military
officials in 1994.
The USG does not provide Syria with bilateral
assistance and does not support loans for Syria in
multilateral institutions.
Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. While
Syria greatly improved its performance in reducing
illicit cultivation and increased seizures in Lebanon,
it did not meet some of the other goals and objectives
of the 1988 UN Convention. Syria does not have a
bilateral narcotics agreement with the United States.
[FR Doc. 95-5850
Filed 3-6-95; 4:03 pm]
Billing code 4710-10-M
