[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 12, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18613-18617]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-8966]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Office of the Attorney General
[AG Order No. 1962-95]
RIN 1105-AA36
Proposed Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registratioan Act
AGENCY: Department of Justice.
ACTION: Proposed guidelines.
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SUMMARY: The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) is publishing
Proposed Guidelines to implement the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act.
DATES: Comments must be received by July 11, 1995.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to Bonnie J. Campbell, Director,
Violence Against Women Office, U.S. Department of Justice, Tenth and
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530, 202-616-8894.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 170101 of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038
(codified at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 14071), contains the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act
(hereafter referred to as the ``Jacob Wetterling Act'' or ``the Act'').
The Act provides a financial incentive for states to establish 10-year
registration requirements for persons convicted of certain crimes
against minors and sexually violent offenses, and to establish a more
stringent set of registration requirements for a sub-class of highly
dangerous sex offenders, characterized as ``sexually violent
predators.'' States that fail to establish such systems within three
years (subject to a possible two year extension) face a 10% reduction
in their Byrne Formula Grant funding (under 42 U.S.C. 3756), and
resulting surplus funds will be reallocated to states that are in
compliance with the Act.
Proposed Guidelines
These guidelines carry out a statutory directive to the Attorney
General, in Sec. 170101(a)(1), to establish guidelines for registration
systems under the Act. Before turning to the specific provisions of the
Act, four general points should be noted concerning its interpretation
and application.
First, states that wish to achieve compliance with the Jacob
Wetterling Act should understand that its requirements constitute a
floor for state registration systems, not a ceiling, and that they do
not risk the loss of part of their Byrne Formula Grant funding by going
beyond its standards. For example, a state may have a registration
system that covers a broader class of sex offenders than those
identified in the Jacob Wetterling Act, or requires address
verification for such offenders at more frequent intervals than the Act
prescribes, or requires offenders to register for a longer period of
time than the period specified in the Act.
Exercising these options creates no problem of compliance, since
the provisions in the Jacob Wetterling Act concerning duration of
registration, covered offenders, and other matters, do not preclude
states from imposing additional or more stringent requirements that
encompass the Act's baseline requirements. The general objective of the
Act is to protect people from child molesters and violent sex offenders
through registration requirements. It is not intended, and does not
have the effect, of making states less free than they were under prior
law to impose registration requiremnts for this purpose.
Second, states that wish to achieve compliance with the Jacob
Wetterling Act also should understand that they may, within certain
constraints, use their own criminal law definitions in defining
registration requirements, and will not necessarily have to revise
their registration systems to use technical definitions of covered sex
offenses based on federal law. This point will be explained more fully
below.
Third, the Jacob Wetterling Act contemplates the establishment of
programs that will impose registration requirements on offenders who
are subsequently convicted of offenses in the pertinent categories. The
Act does not require states to attempt to identify and impose
registration requirements on offenders who were convicted of offenses
in these categories prior to the establishment of a conforming
registration system. Nevertheless, the Act does not preclude states
from imposing any new registration requirements on offenders convicted
prior to the establishment of the registration system.
Fourth, the Act gives states wide latitude in designing
registration programs that best meet their public safety needs. For
instance, the Act allows states to release relevant information
necessary to protect the public, including information released through
community notification programs. Some state registration and
notification systems have been challenged on constitutional grounds. A
few courts have struck down registration requirements in certain cases.
See Rowe v. Burton, No. A94-206 (D. Alaska July 27, 1994) (on motion
for preliminary relief); State v. Babin, 637 So.2d 814 (La. App. 1994),
writ denied, 644 So.2d 649 (La. 1994); State v. Payne, 633 So. 2d 701
(La. App. 1993), writ denied, 637 So.2d 497 (La. 1994); In re Reed, 663
P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). However, a majority of courts that have
dealt with the issue have held that registration systems like those
contemplated by the Jacob Wetterling Act do not violate released
offenders' constitutional rights.
A few recent decisions, currently on appeal, have held that aspects
of New Jersey's community notification program violate due process
guarantees, or violate ex post facto guarantees as applied to persons
who committed the covered offense prior to enactment of the
notification statute. See Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, No.
94-6287 (NHP) (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1995); Diaz v. Whitman, No. 94-6376
(JWB) (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 1994); John Doe v. Deborah Poritz, No. BUR-1-5-95
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 22, 1995). However, the Department of
Justice takes the position in briefs filed that the New Jersey
community notification statute at issue in those cases does not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause of its own force does not require recognition of such a
liberty interest on the part of offenders affected by that statute.
The remainder of these guidelines address the provisions of the
Jacob Wetterling Act in the order in which they appear in Sec. 170101
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
General Provisions--Subsection (a)(1)-(2)
Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Sec. 170101 directs the Attorney
General to [[Page 18614]] establish guidelines for state programs that
require:;
(A) Current address registration for persons convicted of ``a
criminal offense against a victim who is a minor'' or `'a sexually
violent offense,'' and
(B) Current address registration under a different set of
requirements for persons who are determined to be ``sexually violent
predators.''
Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) states that the determination
whether a person is a ``sexually violent predator'' (which brings the
more stringent registration standards into play), and the determination
that a person is no longer a ``sexually violent predator'' (which
terminates the registration requirement under those standards), shall
be made by the sentencing court after receiving a report by a state
board composed of experts in the field of the behavior and treatment of
sexual offenders.
``State board'' in paragraph (2) should be understood to mean a
body or group containing twos or more experts that is authorized by
state law or designated under the authority of state law. Beyond the
requirement that a board must be composed of experts in the field of
the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders, the Act affords states
discretion concerning the selection and composition of such boards. For
example, a state could establish a single permanent board for this
purpose, could establish a system of state-designated boards, or could
authorize the designation of different boards for different courts,
time periods, geographic areas or cases.
Definition of ``Criminal Offense Against a Victim Who is a Minor''--
Subsection (a)(3)(A)
The Act prescribes a 10-year registration requirement for persons
convicted of a ``criminal offense against a victim who is a minor''.
Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a) defines the term
``criminal offense against a victim who is a minor.'' ``Minor'' should
be understood to mean a person below the age of 18, consistent with the
normal understanding.
The specific clauses in the definition of ``criminal offense
against a victim who is a minor'' are as follows:
(1) Clauses (i) and (ii) cover kidnapping of a minor (except by a
parent) and false imprisonment of a minor (except by a parent). All
states have statutes that define offenses--going by such names as
``kidnapping,'' criminal restraint,'' or ``false imprisonment''--whose
gravamen is abduction or unlawful restraint of a person. States can
comply with these clauses by requiring registration for persons
convicted of these statutory offenses whose victims were below the age
of 18. The Act does not require inclusion of these offenses in the
registration requirement when the offender is a parent, but states may
choose to require registration for parents who commit these offenses.
(2) Clause (iii) covers offenses consisting of ``criminal sexual
conduct toward a minor.'' Such offenses include convictions under
general provisions defining sexually assaultive crimes--such as
provisions defining crimes of ``rape,'' sexual assault,'' or ``sexual
abuse''--in cases where the victim is in fact a minor. Coverage is not
limited to cases where the victim's age is an element of the offense
(such as prosecutions for specially defined child molestation
offenses).
States can comply with clause (iii) by requiring registration for
persons convicted of all statutory sex offenses under state law whose
elements involve physical contact with a victim, where the victim was
below the age of 18 at the time of the offense. Offenses that do not
involve physical contact, such as exhibitionism, are not subject to the
Act's mandatory registration requirements pursuant to clause (iii), but
states are free to require registration for persons convicted of such
offenses as well if they so choose.
(3) Clause (iv) covers offenses consisting of solicition of a minor
to engage in sexual conduct. This covers any conviction for an offense
involving the solicitation of conduct that would be covered by clause
(iii) if carried out.
(4) Clause (v) covers offenses consisting of using a minor in a
sexual performance. This includes both live performances and using
minors in the production of pornography.
(5) Clause (vi) covers offenses consisting of solicition of a minor
to practice prostitution.
(6) Clause (vii) covers offenses consisting of any conduct that by
its nature is a sexual offense against a minor. This clause is intended
to insure uniform coverage of convictions under statutes defining sex
offenses in which the status of the victim as a minor is an element of
an offense, such as specially defined child molestation offenses, and
other offenses prohibiting sexual activity with underage persons.
States can comply with this clause by including convictions under these
statutes uniformly in the registration requirement.
(7) Considered in isolation, clause (viii) gives states discretion
whether to require registration for attempts to commit offenses
described in clauses (i) through (vii). However, any verbal command or
attempted persuasion of the victim to engage in sexual conduct would
bring the offense within the scope of the solicitation clause (clause
(iv)), and make it subject to the Act's mandatory registration
requirements. Morever, this provision must be considered in conjunction
with the Act's requirement of registration for persons convicted of a
``sexually violent offense,'' which does not allow the exclusion of
attempts if they are otherwise encompassed within the definition of a
``sexually violent offense.''
Hence, state discretion to exclude attempted sexual offenses
against minors from registration requirements pursuant to clause (viii)
is limited by other provisions of the Act. The simplest approach for
states would be to include attempted sexual assaults on minors (as well
as completed offenses) uniformly as predicates for the registration
requirements.
At the conclusion of the definition of ``criminal offense against a
victim who is a minor,'' the Act states that (for purposes of the
definition) conduct which is criminal only because of the age of the
victim shall not be considered a criminal offense if the perpetrator is
18 years of age or younger. For example, suppose that state law
prohibits sexual relations with a person below the age of 16, where the
defendant is more than 4 years older than the victim. Suppose further
that an 18-year-old is convicted of violating this prohibition by
engaging in consensual sexual relations with a 13-year-old, where the
conduct would not violate state law but for the victim's age. Under the
provision, if a state did not require such an offender to register, the
state would still be in compliance with the Act. However, here again,
states are free to go beyond the Act's baseline requirements. The
exemption of certain offenders based on age from the Act's mandatory
registration requirements does not bar states from including such
offenders in their registration systems if they wish. Moreover, the
scope of subsection (a)(3)(A)'s exemption is also limited by other
provisions of the Act that require registration of persons convicted of
``sexually violent offenses'' (as defined in (a)(3)(B)), with no
provision excluding younger offenders where the criminality of the
conduct depends on the victim's age.
Since the Act's registration requirements depend in all
circumstances on conviction of certain types of offenses, states are
not required to mandate registration for juveniles who are adjudicated
delinquent--as opposed to adults convicted of crimes [[Page 18615]] and
juveniles convicted as adults--even if the conduct on which the
juvenile delinquency adjudication is based would constitute an offense
giving rise to a registration requirement if engaged in by an adult.
However, states remain free to require registration for juvenile
delinquents, and the conviction of a juvenile who is prosecuted as an
adult does count as a conviction for purposes of the Act's registration
requirements.
Definition of ``Sexually Violent Offense''--Subsection (a)(3)(B)
The Act prescribes a ten-year registration requirement for
offenders convicted of a ``sexually violent offense,'' as well as for
those convicted of a ``criminal offense against a victim who is a
minor.''
Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) defines the term ``sexually
violent offense'' to mean any criminal offense that consists of
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as described in sections 2241
and 2242 of title 18, United States Code, or as described in the State
criminal code), or an offense that has as its elements engaging in
physical contact with another person with intent to commit such an
offense. In light of this definition, there are two ways in which a
state could satisfy the requirement of registration for persons
convicted of ``sexually violent offenses'':
First, suppose that a state has offenses in its criminal code that
are designated ``aggravated sexual abuse'' and ``sexual abuse,'' or has
a definitional provision in its criminal code that characterizes
certain offenses (however denominated) as constituting ``aggravated
sexual abuse'' and ``sexual abuse'' for registration purposes or other
purposes. Such a state could comply simply by requiring registration
for all offenders who are convicted of these state offenses, and all
offenders convicted of any state crime that has as its elements
engaging in physical contact with another person with intent to commit
such an offense.
Second, a state could comply by requiring registration for
offenders convicted for criminal conduct that would violate 18 U.S.C.
2241 or 2242--the federal ``aggravated sexual abuse'' and ``sexual
abuse'' offenses--if subject to federal prosecution. (The second part
of the definition in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3), relating to
physical contact with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or
sexual abuse, does not enlarge the class of covered offenses under the
federal law definitions, since sections 2241 and 2242 explicitly
encompass attempts as well as completed offenses.)
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. 2241-42 generally proscribe non-consensual
``sexual acts'' with anyone, ``sexual acts'' with persons below the age
of 12, and attempts to engage in such conduct. ``Sexual act'' is
generally defined (in 18 U.S.C. 2245(2)) to mean an act involving any
degree of genital or anal penetration, oral-genital or oral-anal
contact, or direct genital touching of a victim below the age of 16 in
certain circumstances even without penetration.
States that elect this second option--requiring registration for
offenses that consist of aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse as
defined in federal law provisions (18 U.S.C. 2241-42)--do not
necessarily have to refer to these federal statutes in their
registration provisions, but could alternatively achieve compliance by
requiring registration for the state law offenses that encompass types
of conduct proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 2241-42. Moreover, a state does not
have to have sex offenses whose scope is congruent with 18 U.S.C. 2241-
42 to take the latter approach. If state law does not criminalize some
types of conduct that are covered by 18 U.S.C. 2241-42, then a person
who engages in the conduct will not be subject to prosecution and
conviction under state law, and there will be no basis for a
registration requirement. On the other hand, if state sex offenses are
defined more broadly than 18 U.S.C. 2241-42, then states are free to
require registration for all offenders convicted under these state
provisions (notwithstanding their greater breadth), and this would be
sufficient to ensure coverage of convictions for criminal conduct that
would violate 18 U.S.C. 2241-42 if subject to federal prosecution.
Definition of ``Sexually Violent Predator''--Subsection (a)(3)(C)-(E)
Offenders who meet the definition of ``sexually violent predator''
are subject to more stringent registration requirements than other sex
offenders.
(1) Subparagraph (C) defines ``sexually violent predator'' to mean
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who
suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.
(2) Subparagraph (D) essentially defines ``mental abnormality'' to
mean a disorder involving a disposition to commit criminal sexual acts
of such a degree that it makes the person a menace to others. There is
no definition of ``personality disorder'' in the Act; hence, the
definition of this term is a matter of state discretion. For example, a
state may choose to utilize the definition of ``personality disorder''
that appears in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders: DSM-IV. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994).
(3) Subparagraph (E) defines ``predatory'' to mean an act directed
at a stranger or at a person with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
As with other features of the Jacob Wetterling Act, the sexually
violent predator provisions only define baseline requirements for
states that wish to maintain eligibility for full Byrne Formula Grant
funding. States are free to impose these more stringent registration
requirements on a broader class of offenders, and may use state law
categories or definitions for that purpose, without contravening the
Jacob Wetterling Act.
As noted earlier, the Act provides that the determination whether
an offender is a ``sexually violent predator'' is to be made by the
sentencing court with the assistance of a board of experts. The Act
does not require, or preclude, that all persons convicted of a sexually
violent offense undergo a determination as to whether they satisfy the
definition of ``sexually violent predator.'' It also does not specify
under what conditions such an inquiry must be undertaken. A state that
wishes to comply with the Act must adopt some approach to this issue,
but the specifics are a matter of state discretion. For example, a
state might provide that the decision whether to seek classification of
an offender as a ``sexually violent predator'' is a matter of judgment
for prosecutors, or might provide that a determination of this question
should be undertaken routinely when a person is convicted of a sexually
violent offense and has a prior history of committing such crimes.
Specifications Concerning State Registration Systems Under the Act--
Subsection (b)
Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) sets out duties for prison
officials and courts in relation to offenders required to register who
are released from prison, or who are placed on any form of post-
conviction supervised release (``parole, supervised release, or
probation'').
The duties, set out in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), include:
(i) Informing the person of the duty to register and obtaining the
information required for registration (i.e., address information), (ii)
informing the person that he must give written notice of a new address
within 10 days to a designated state law enforcement
[[Page 18616]] agency if he changes residence, (iii) informing the
person that, if he changes residence to another state, he must inform
the registration agency in the state he is leaving, and must also
register the new address with a designated state law enforcement agency
in the new state within 10 days (if the new state has a registration
requirement), (iv) obtaining fingerprints and a photograph if they have
not already been obtained, and (v) requiring the person to read and
sign a form stating that these requirements have been explained.
Beyond these basic requirements, which apply to all registrants,
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subsection (b) requires that
additional information be obtained in relation to a person who is
required to register as a ``sexually violent predator.'' The
information that is specifically required under subparagraph (B) is the
name of the person, identifying factors, anticipated future residence,
offense history, and documentation of any treatment received for the
mental abnormality or personality disorder of the person.
States that wish to comply with the Act will need to adopt statutes
or administrative provisions to establish these duties and ensure that
they are carried out. These informational requirements, like other
requirements in the Act, only define minimum standards, and states may
require more extensive information from offenders. For example, the Act
does not require that information be obtained relating to registering
offenders' employment, but states may legitimately wish to know if a
convicted child molester is seeking or has obtained employment that
involves responsibility for the care for children.
Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) states that the responsible officer
or court shall forward the registration information to a designated
state law enforcement agency. The state law enforcement agency must
immediately enter the information into the appropriate state law
enforcement record system and notify a law enforcement agency having
jurisdiction where the person expects to reside. States that wish to
achieve compliance with the Act may need to modify state record systems
if they are not currently set up to receive all the types of
information that the Act requires from registrants.
The state law enforcement agency is also required to immediately
transmit the conviction data and fingerprints to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. No changes will be required in the national records
system because the Act only requires transmission of conviction data
and fingerprints, which the FBI already receives. The Act should not be
understood as requiring duplicative transmission of conviction data and
fingerprints to the FBI at the time of initial registration if the
state already has sent this information to the FBI (e.g., at the time
of conviction).
Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) relates to verification of the
offender's address. In essence, annual verification of address with the
designated state law enforcement agency is required for offenders
generally, through the return within ten days of an address
verification form sent by the agency to the registrant. However, the
verification intervals are 90 days (rather than a year) for ``sexually
violent predators.'' As noted earlier, these are baseline requirements
which do not bar states from requiring verification of address at
shorter intervals than those specified in the Act.
Paragraph (4) requires the designated state law enforcement agency
to notify other interested law enforcement agencies of a change of
address by the registrant. Specifically, when a registrant changes
residence to a new address, the designated law enforcement agency must
(i) notify a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the
registrant will reside, and (ii) if the registrant moves to a new
state, notify the law enforcement agency with which the offender must
register in the new state (if the new state has a registration
requirement).
Paragraph (5) further requires an offender who moves out of state
to register within ten days with a designated state law enforcement
agency in his new state of residence (if the new state has a
registration requirement). This partially reiterates the requirements
concerning notice of changes of address by the offender that were
described above.
Subparagraph (A) of paragraph (6) states that the registration
requirement remains in effect for ten years. As noted earlier, states
may choose to establish longer registration periods.
Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (6) states that the registration
requirement for ``sexually violent predators'' under the Act terminates
upon a determination that the offender no longer suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that would make him likely to
engage in a predatory sexually violent offense. This provision does not
require review of the offender's status at any particular interval. For
example, a state could set a minimum period of 10 years before
entertaining a request to review the status of a ``sexually violent
predator,'' the same period as the general minimum registration period
for sex offenders under the Act.
Moreover, this termination provision only affects the requirement
that a person register as a ``sexually violent predator'' under
subparagraph (B) of subsection (a)(1) of the Jacob Wetterling Act. It
does not limit states in imposing more extensive registration
requirements under their own laws, and does not limit any registration
requirement that arises independently under other provisions of the
Jacob Wetterling Act from the person's conviction of a ``criminal
offense against a victim who is a minor'' or a ``sexually violent
offense.''
Criminal Penalties for Registration Violations--Subsection (c)
The Act provides that a person required to register under a state
program established pursuant to the Act who knowingly fails to register
and keep such registration current shall be subject to criminal
penalties. Accordingly, states that wish to comply with the Act will
need to enact criminal provisions covering this situation as part of,
or in conjunction with, the legislation defining their registration
systems, if they have not already done so. If the violation by a
registrant consists of failing to return an address verification form
within 10 days of receipt, the state may allow a defense if the
registrant can prove that he did not in fact change his residence
address, as provided in subsection (b)(3)(A)(iv).
Release of Registration Information--Subsection (d)
Subsection (d) governs the disclosure of ``information collected
under a State registration program.'' Restrictions on the release of
information under this subsection do not constrain the release of
information that a state would have independently of the operation of
the registration system. For example, a state will normally have
criminal history information about an offender, and will often have
current address information as part of general probation or parole
supervision requirements, independently of any special requirements
imposed as part of the sex offender registration system. The Act does
not limit the release of such information.
Subsection (d) states specifically that the information collected
under a state registration program shall be treated as private data,
except under specified conditions.
The first condition under which disclosure is authorized--paragraph
(1)--is that ``such information may be disclosed to law enforcement
agencies [[Page 18617]] for law enforcement purposes.'' This exemption
permits use of the information for all law enforcement purposes,
including all police, prosecutorial, release supervision, correctional,
and judicial uses.
Paragraph (2) in subsection (d) says that registration information
may be disclosed to government agencies conducting confidential
background checks. ``Confidential'' should be understood to mean a
background check where information is disclosed to an interested party
or parties--such as a background check conducted by a government agency
that provides information concerning prospective employees to public or
private employers--as opposed to release of the information to the
general public. Release to the public, and other non-law enforcement,
non-background check uses, are governed by paragraph (3).
Paragraph (3) in subsection (d) says that the designated state law
enforcement agency, and any local law enforcement agency authorized by
the state agency, may release relevant information that is necessary to
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register
under this section. The Act does not impose any limitations on the
standards and procedures that states may adopt for determining when
public safety necessitates community notification. For example, states
could implement this authority by engaging in particularized
determinations that individual offenders are sufficiently dangerous to
require community notification concerning the offender's presence.
Alternatively, states could make categorical judgments that protection
of the public necessitates community notification with respect to all
offenders with certain characteristics or in certain offense
categories.
Releases of information for public-protection purposes short of
general community notification--such as giving notice about an
offender's location to the victims of his offenses, or to agencies or
organizations in specified categories--are also permitted under
paragraph (3).
The language in paragraph (3), like that in paragraphs (1) and (2),
is permissive, and does not require states to release information.
Paragraph (3) also does not deprive states of the authority to exercise
centralized control over the release of information, or if the state
prefers, to generally authorize local agencies to release information
as necessary. In addition to permitting proactive community
notification and other notification, as discussed above, paragraph (3)
and other provisions of the Act do not bar states from making
registration information available upon request, if it is determined
that such access is necessary for the protection of the public
concerning persons who are required to register.
A proviso at the end of paragraph (3) in subsection (d) states that
the identity of the victim of an offense that requires registration
under the Act shall not be released.
The purpose of this proviso is to protect the privacy of victims,
and its restrictions may accordingly be waived at the victim's options.
The proviso only applies to paragraph (3), and does not limit the
disclosure of victim identity pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2),
relating to law enforcement uses and confidential background checks.
Immunity for Good Faith Conduct--Subsection (e)
Subsection (e) states that law enforcement agencies, employees of
law enforcement agencies, and state officials shall be immune from
liability for good faith conduct under the Act.
Compliance--Subsection (f)
States have three years from the date of enactment to come into
compliance with the Act unless the Attorney General grants an
additional two years where a state is making good faith efforts at
implementation. States that fail to come into compliance within the
specified time period will be subject to a mandatory 10% reduction of
Byrne Formula Grant funding, and any funds that are not allocated to
noncomplying states will be reallocated to states that are in
compliance. The reallocated funds will be distributed among complying
states in proportion to their populations.
States are encouraged to submit descriptions of their existing or
proposed registration systems for sex offenders in conjunction with
their applications for Byrne Formula Grant funding, even prior to the
expiration of the ``grace period'' provided by the Act for achieving
compliance. Those submissions will enable the Department of Justice to
review the status of state compliance with the Act, and to suggest any
necessary changes to achieve compliance before the funding reduction
goes into effect.
To maintain eligibility for full Byrne Formula Grant funding
following the three-year grace period, states will be required to
submit information that shows compliance with the Act in at least one
program year, or an explanation of why compliance cannot be achieved
within that period and a description of good faith efforts that justify
an extension of time (but not more than two years) for achieving
compliance. States will also be required to submit information in
subsequent program years concerning any changes in sex offender
registration systems that may affect compliance with the Act.
Dated: April 7, 1995.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 95-8966 Filed 4-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
