[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 70 (Wednesday, April 12, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18589-18594]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-9004]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision; Defense Waste Processing Facility at the
Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC
AGENCY: Department of Energy, DOE.
ACTION: Record of Decision, Defense Waste Processing Facility at the
Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is publishing a Record of
Decision for the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). DOE has
prepared and issued a Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) (DOE/EIS-0082-S, November 25, 1994) to assess the potential
environmental impacts of completing construction and operating the
DWPF, a group of associated facilities and structures, to pretreat,
immobilize, and store high-level radioactive waste at the Savannah
River Site (SRS). On the basis of the analysis of impacts in the
Supplemental EIS, monetary costs, and regulatory commitments, DOE has
decided to complete construction and startup testing, and begin
operation of DWPF. The facility will be completed and operated as
designed, which includes modifications to the conceptual design
originally proposed and evaluated in the EIS prepared for the DWPF in
1982 (DOE/EIS-0082). DOE also will implement additional safety
modifications to DWPF that will substantially reduce or eliminate
potential accidental releases of radioactive material and chemicals in
the unlikely event of a severe earthquake. Independent readiness
reviews of DWPF facilities will be conducted, and any potential
concerns raised in these reviews will be resolved before DOE proceeds
with radioactive operations.
High-level radioactive waste at SRS, the result of nuclear
materials production, has been stored in large underground tanks at SRS
since 1954. This waste now amounts to approximately 129 million liters
(34 million gallons) and exists as sludge, soluble salts dissolved in
water (supernatant), and crystallized saltcake formed from evaporation
of the supernatant. DWPF includes facilities to pre-treat the salt
(supernatant and saltcake) and sludge components using existing high-
level waste tanks. Pre-treatment of the salt component will involve
chemical precipitation in a high-level waste tank followed by
filtration for separation of highly radioactive constituents (cesium,
strontium, and plutonium) from the salt solution, yielding two output
streams: a highly radioactive precipitate slurry and a low
radioactivity salt solution. Pre-treatment of the highly radioactive
sludge will involve washing it with a sodium hydroxide solution in
selected high-level waste tanks to remove aluminum hydroxide and other
soluble salts. The highly radioactive constituents in the precipitate
slurry and the pre-treated sludge will be immobilized at DWPF by
incorporating them in borosilicate glass in a process called
vitrification. The highly radioactive vitrified waste will be sealed in
stainless steel canisters and stored in vaults at DWPF until a
permanent geologic repository becomes available. The low radioactivity
salt solution resulting from salt and sludge pre-treatment will be
immobilized in the Saltstone Manufacturing Plant (one of the DWPF
facilities) by being blended with cement, slag, and flyash, which will
harden into a concrete-like material called saltstone. Saltstone will
be permanently disposed of in large vaults located near DWPF.
Storage of high-level radioactive waste in tanks presents continued
long-term risk from releases to the environment, both from normal
operations and potential accidents. Completion and operation of DWPF
will provide DOE with facilities to immobilize high-level waste at SRS
in a form that will significantly reduce potential long-term hazards to
human health and the environment.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on DWPF or to
receive a copy of the Final Supplemental EIS contact: SR NEPA
Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River
Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031,
(800) 242-8269. For further information on the DOE National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom,
Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department
of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, D.C. 20585, (202)
586- [[Page 18590]] 4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the regulations of
the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). This Record of Decision is
based on DOE's Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
for the Defense Waste Processing Facility, SRS, Aiken, South Carolina
(DOE/EIS-0082-S).
DOE's SRS occupies approximately 800 square kilometers (300 square
miles) adjacent to the Savannah River, principally in Aiken and
Barnwell counties of South Carolina, about 40 kilometers (25 miles)
southeast of Augusta, Georgia, and about 32 kilometers (20 miles) south
of Aiken, South Carolina. When established in the early 1950s, SRS's
primary mission was to produce nuclear materials to support the
defense, research, and medical programs of the United States. SRS's
present mission emphasizes waste management, environmental restoration,
and decontamination and decommissioning of facilities that are no
longer needed.
The process used in the past to recover uranium and plutonium from
production reactor fuel and target assemblies in SRS's two chemical
separations areas resulted in high-level radioactive waste. This waste,
which now amounts to approximately 129 million liters (34 million
gallons), is stored in underground tanks at the F- and H-Area Tank
Farms. After introduction into the tanks as a liquid, the high-level
waste separates into a sludge layer at the bottom of the tanks and an
upper layer of salts dissolved in water (supernatant). Evaporation of
the supernatant in the tank farms using evaporators has produced a
third waste form in the tanks, crystallized saltcake.
In 1979 and 1980, DOE prepared an EIS (DOE/EIS-0023; 44 FR 88320,
December 3, 1979) and issued a Record of Decision (45 FR 9763, February
13, 1980) to continue a research and development program to develop
technology for removing these wastes from the tanks and immobilizing
the highly radioactive constituents in a form suitable for disposal. In
its Record of Decision, DOE indicated that immobilization was the
process most likely to ensure that the waste would remain contained in
a form that would pose the least threat to human health or the
environment.
In 1982, DOE published an EIS (DOE/EIS-0082; 47 FR 10901, March 12,
1982) evaluating a proposal to design, construct, and operate the DWPF
to immobilize SRS high-level waste in a form suitable for safe storage,
transport, and ultimate disposal at a permanent geologic repository. A
Record of Decision to construct and operate DWPF was issued on June 1,
1982 (47 FR 23801). Subsequently, after completing an Environmental
Assessment (DOE/EA-0179; 47 FR 32778, July 29, 1982), DOE selected
borosilicate glass as the medium of choice for stabilization of high-
level waste at DWPF.
The DWPF is now mostly constructed, and the major high-level waste
pre-treatment processes and the vitrification process are nearly ready
to operate. However, DOE has made design changes to the DWPF process
since the 1982 EIS to improve efficiency and safety of the facility.
Among these changes are modifications to processes for pre-treatment of
the salt (i.e., supernatant and saltcake) and sludge components of the
high-level waste before vitrification, and modifications in methods
used for onsite disposal of the immobilized low radioactivity waste
fraction (saltstone) resulting from salt pre-treatment. The potential
environmental impacts of these modifications had been considered
individually, but not cumulatively, in prior NEPA documentation.
In view of these considerations, DOE determined that a focused EIS-
level review of the environmental impacts of the DWPF as now envisioned
was timely and appropriate. Thus, on April 6, 1994, DOE published in
the Federal Register a Notice of Intent (59 FR 16499) to prepare a
Supplemental EIS for the operation of the DWPF. This notice initiated a
formal scoping period that extended through May 31, 1994.
DOE held three informal public workshops early in the scoping
period in North Augusta, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and
Columbia, South Carolina on April 12, 19, and 21, 1994, respectively,
to provide the public with information on the DWPF. Interested parties
were invited to submit comments for consideration in the preparation of
the Supplemental EIS. DOE also established a toll-free telephone line
allowing interested parties to submit comments by voice or facsimile.
Comments were also submitted by mail and at formal public scoping
meetings held in Savannah, Georgia, and North Augusta and Columbia,
South Carolina, on May 12, 17, and 19, 1994, respectively.
On August 26, 1994, DOE and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) published Notices of Availability of DOE's Draft
Supplemental EIS in the Federal Register (59 FR 44137 and 59 FR 44143,
respectively). EPA's notice officially started the public comment
period on the Draft Supplemental EIS, which extended through October
11, 1994. Comments were received by letter, telephone (voice mail), and
formal statements made at 10 public hearing sessions. The hearings,
which included the opportunity for informal discussions with DOE
personnel involved with DWPF, were held in Aiken, South Carolina on
September 13, 1994 (2 sessions); Hilton Head, South Carolina on
September 14, 1994; Beaufort and Hardeeville, South Carolina, and
Savannah, Georgia (first session) on September 15; Savannah, Georgia
(second session) on September 16; and Allendale, Barnwell, and
Columbia, South Carolina on September 20, 1994.
DOE considered the comments it received from agencies,
organizations, and individuals on the Draft Supplemental EIS in
preparing the Final Supplemental EIS. On November 18, 1994, DOE
announced its completion of the Final Supplemental EIS, and EPA
published a Notice of Availability of the document in the Federal
Register on November 25, 1994 (59 FR 60630), following distribution of
approximately 300 copies to government officials and interested groups
and individuals.
II. Alternatives
In the Final Supplemental EIS, DOE examined two major alternatives
for treating waste at DWPF, and a no-action alternative. These
alternatives are described below.
A. Proposed Action
Under this alternative, DOE would complete construction and begin
operation of the DWPF as currently designed to immobilize SRS high-
level radioactive waste. DOE would continue DWPF process and facility
modifications that are underway, complete startup testing activities,
and operate the facility upon completion of testing. DOE also would
implement safety modifications to substantially reduce or eliminate the
probability and consequences of accidental releases of radioactive
materials and chemicals in the unlikely event of a severe earthquake.
These modifications, which would be implemented before the facility is
operated with radioactive waste, address three types of systems:
process vessel ventilation systems, building ventilation systems, and
systems to prevent or reduce releases of [[Page 18591]] hazardous
chemicals. These upgrades could be achieved through additional barriers
and within the basic design of the existing facility. The upgrades
would ensure that radioactive and hazardous materials would be confined
during and following postulated accidents to provide a level of safety
to facility workers and the public that is within SRS standards.
Based on operating plans and projected funding used in the SEIS
analysis, high-level waste processing would be completed in about 24
years. As analyzed in the SEIS, DWPF includes pre-treatment processes,
the Vitrification Facility and associated support facilities and
structures, and Saltstone Manufacturing and Disposal, as described
below.
Pre-Treatment Processes and Facilities
Extended Sludge Processing--a washing process that would
be carried out in selected H-Area high-level radioactive waste tanks,
to remove aluminum hydroxide and soluble salts from the high-level
waste sludge. Sludge would be processed in the DWPF, and the wash water
would be directed to the Evaporator Feed Tanks. These facilities are
built and the sludge washing process is being tested.
In-Tank Precipitation (ITP)--a process that would be
carried out in selected H-Area high-level radioactive waste tanks and
associated new facilities to remove dissolved radioactive constituents
(strontium, cesium, and plutonium) from the highly radioactive salt
solution by chemical precipitation and filtration. The precipitate
would be sent to Late Wash, which is now under construction; the
remaining low radioactivity salt solution would be sent to Saltstone
Manufacturing and Disposal. These facilities are constructed, and
testing is nearly complete.
Late Wash--a process to concentrate residual radioactive
constituents and wash the highly radioactive precipitate resulting from
ITP to remove a chemical (sodium nitrite) that could potentially
interfere with operations in the Vitrification Facility. This facility
is being constructed.
Vitrification Facility and Associated Support Facilities and Structures
Vitrification Facility--a large building that contains
processing equipment to immobilize the highly radioactive sludge and
precipitate portions of the high-level waste in borosilicate glass. The
sludge and precipitate would be treated chemically, mixed with frit
(finely ground glass), melted, and poured into stainless steel
canisters that would then be welded shut. The facility is presently
constructed and undergoing startup testing.
Glass Waste Storage Buildings--buildings for storage of
the radioactive glass waste canisters in highly shielded and ventilated
vaults located below ground level. One building is completed; another
building is in the planning stage and would be built as part of the
proposed action.
Chemical Waste Treatment Facility--an industrial waste
treatment facility that neutralizes nonradioactive wastewater from bulk
chemical storage areas and nonradioactive process areas of the
Vitrification Facility. This facility is constructed and in operation.
Failed Equipment Storage Vaults--shielded concrete vaults
that would be used for storage of failed process equipment that is too
radioactive to allow onsite disposal. These vaults would be used until
permanent disposal facilities can be developed. Two vaults are nearly
constructed; four more vaults are planned for the near future. DOE
estimates that a total of approximately 14 vaults would be needed to
accommodate waste generated during the 24-year Vitrification Facility
operating period as analyzed in the SEIS.
Organic Waste Storage Tank--A 568,000-liter (150,000-
gallon) capacity aboveground tank that stores a flammable liquid
organic waste consisting primarily of benzene, a byproduct of
processing precipitate prior to vitrification. During radioactive
operations, this waste would contain small amounts of radioactivity,
primarily cesium. The tank is constructed and currently stores
nonradioactive liquid organic waste generated during nonradioactive
chemical testing of the Vitrification Facility.
Saltstone Manufacturing and Disposal
Saltstone Manufacturing Plant--a processing plant that
would blend the low radioactivity salt solution with cement, slag, and
flyash to create a mixture that hardens into a concrete-like material
called saltstone. The plant is in operation to treat liquid waste
residuals from the F- and H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility, an
existing wastewater treatment facility that serves the F- and H-Area
Tank Farms. The plant is ready for treatment of low radioactivity salt
solution produced by ITP.
Saltstone Disposal Vaults--large concrete disposal vaults
into which the mixture of salt solution, flyash, slag, and cement that
is prepared at the Saltstone Manufacturing Plant is pumped. After cells
in the vault are filled, they are sealed with concrete. The vaults
would then be covered with soil, and an engineered cap constructed of
clay and other materials would be installed over the vaults to reduce
infiltration by rainwater and leaching of contaminants into the
groundwater. Two vaults have been constructed. About 13 more vaults
would be constructed over the life of the facility for the proposed
action.
B. Ion Exchange Alternative
This alternative is as described above for the proposed action,
except that DOE would replace the ITP process with an ion exchange
process for high-level waste pre-treatment. DOE examined two options
for implementing ion exchange for waste pre-treatment: (1) Phased
replacement and (2) immediate replacement. In phased replacement, ITP
would operate until the ion exchange facility had been designed,
constructed, tested, and was available for use, in approximately 14
years. In immediate replacement, ITP would not operate and waste
removal from tanks would not begin, meaning the waste would remain in a
more mobile state until the ion exchange facility was operational in
approximately 10 years. Under the immediate replacement option, the ion
exchange facility would be available four years earlier than it would
be under the phased replacement alternative. Because ITP would not be
operating to empty the high-level waste tanks, DOE would design,
construct, and test an ion exchange facility on an accelerated
schedule.
C. No Action
Under this alternative, DOE would continue to manage SRS high-level
waste in the F- and H-Area Tank Farms for an indefinite period until an
alternative to DWPF can be developed to effectively immobilize the
high-level waste. DOE would not operate the Vitrification Facility and
associated facilities and structures, ITP, or Extended Sludge
Processing. DOE would continue current Saltstone Manufacturing and
Disposal operations to treat waste residuals from the F- and H-Area
Effluent Treatment Facility. DOE would ``mothball'' the Vitrification
Facility for an indefinite period and reduce DWPF operations staff
accordingly. At least two additional Saltstone Disposal Vaults would be
constructed for disposal of F- and H-Area Effluent Treatment Facility
waste residuals. [[Page 18592]]
D. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives Documented in the Supplemental
EIS
The alternatives (except the no-action alternative) would result in
an overall reduction in risk to human health and the environment
associated with management of high-level radioactive waste currently
stored in the tank farms. As long as the waste remains in the tanks,
particularly in liquid form, releases to the environment could occur as
a result of leaks, spills, or tank system rupture. In the process of
reducing this overall risk, taking action would have environmental
impacts. Although the no-action alternative would not pose these
operational impacts, it also would not reduce the continuing risk posed
by tank storage of the high-level radioactive waste. Implied in the no-
action alternative is the operation at some future time of a
replacement immobilization facility (an alternative to DWPF) to treat
the high-level radioactive waste. However, the risks and impacts of
future alternative immobilization facilities are not known and were not
evaluated in the Final Supplemental EIS.
Under all the alternatives, minor impacts would be expected to
geologic resources (e.g., soils), surface water, socioeconomic
resources, traffic and transportation, and decontamination and
decommissioning. No impacts to cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic
resources, floodplains and wetlands, or threatened and endangered
species would be expected from implementing any of the alternatives.
Other impacts are discussed below.
Each alternative considered in the Supplemental EIS, including no
action, would result in the unavoidable loss or alteration of land,
natural resources, and associated natural resource services (e.g.,
groundwater for drinking, natural habitats). Land used for the
Saltstone Disposal Vaults, approximately 22 hectares (55 acres) under
the no-action alternative, and approximately 73 hectares (180 acres)
under the proposed action, or under the ion exchange alternatives,
would be permanently committed to waste management and would not be
available for other purposes (e.g., forestry). Under the no action
alternative, two additional vaults would be constructed on land that
has already been cleared. Under the action alternatives, further land
use impacts would be spaced over time as an additional 13 new Saltstone
Disposal Vaults are constructed. Small mammals, reptiles, and birds
occupying this habitat would be displaced or disturbed by clearing and
construction activities, but local and regional populations of these
wildlife species would not be impacted.
Under all alternatives, use of this land for waste disposal would
also unavoidably impact groundwater. Some contamination of shallow
groundwater at and near the Saltstone Disposal Vaults is projected to
occur from leaching of radionuclides and other pollutants (e.g.,
nitrate). However, releases from the vaults are not expected to reach
the shallow groundwater for at least 100 years, and contamination is
projected to remain below drinking water standards beyond a distance of
100 meters (328 feet) from the vaults. Peak concentrations of
nonradioactive contaminants are expected to occur at least 1,000 years
after closure. The peak radiological dose from groundwater
contamination will occur 2,000 years after closure and is 100 times
less than current EPA dose limits for drinking water.
Under normal operations, radiation exposure to workers and members
of the public would be well within DOE and EPA limits for any of the
alternatives. DOE does not expect adverse health effects to members of
the public. Normal operations under either action alternative could
result in approximately one additional fatal cancer from exposure to
radiation among DWPF workers over the 24 years of DWPF processing as
analyzed in the SEIS.
Under any of the alternatives, wastes would be generated as a
result of operations. These wastes would include low-level, hazardous,
mixed (hazardous and radioactive), construction debris, and sanitary
wastes. In addition to these waste streams, highly radioactive failed
equipment such as failed melters, process vessels, and miscellaneous
small failed equipment would be generated under the action
alternatives. The wastes generated under any alternative would impact
the existing and planned SRS waste management infrastructure. The
treatment and disposal options for these waste streams, except for the
highly radioactive failed equipment (which is specifically designated
for storage in the Failed Equipment Storage Vaults) and sanitary waste,
are being evaluated in the SRS Waste Management EIS, currently being
prepared.
Major differences in potential impacts among the alternatives
include the following:
Although long-term risk to human health and the
environment would be reduced by immobilizing the waste, the proposed
action and either option under the ion exchange alternative would
initially pose an increased risk above that posed by continued storage
(no action). During the period of DWPF operation, the risk would
gradually decrease below that of continued tank storage to a smaller,
continuing risk from radioactive glass waste canisters stored
underground in the Glass Waste Storage Buildings and from residual
radioactivity in the high-level waste tanks and processing facilities.
Under the ion exchange immediate replacement option, current levels of
risk from tank farm operations would persist for an additional 10 years
because high-level waste removal and stabilization would be delayed 10
years. Under the no-action alternative, the risk from managing high-
level radioactive waste at the tank farms would continue indefinitely.
Under either action alternative, radiological releases,
resulting from failures of DWPF equipment and systems after a severe
earthquake (frequency of once every 5,000 years), could result in a
dose of approximately 4,000 rem to a worker located 100 meters (328
feet) from the Vitrification Facility and greater doses to workers
located closer to the facility. Such doses would result in death within
a few days. These equipment and system failures would also result in
doses to the public that exceed the DOE dose standard for normal
operations. The proposed action includes safety modifications, which
would be implemented before the facility is operated with radioactive
waste, to substantially reduce or eliminate the probability and
consequences of these failures resulting from a severe earthquake.
Potential, but unlikely, chemical accidents under each of
the action alternatives could result in nitric acid concentrations that
may cause nearby workers to experience or develop life-threatening
health effects or prevent them from taking protective actions. The
proposed safety modifications would be in place to minimize the
consequences of these potential accidents.
Potential, but unlikely, chemical accidents for the
proposed action and for the first 14 years of the phased replacement
option could result in formic acid and benzene concentrations that may
cause nearby workers to experience or develop life-threatening health
effects or prevent them from taking protective actions. This potential
impact would not exist for the no-action alternative, the immediate
replacement ion exchange option, or the last 10 years of the phased
replacement ion exchange option. The proposed safety modifications
would be in place to [[Page 18593]] minimize the consequences of these
potential accidents.
The ion exchange alternative poses a lower risk from
hazardous materials than does operation of ITP because fewer hazardous
byproducts, such as benzene, would be produced.
The ion exchange and no-action alternatives would
eliminate the generation of DWPF organic waste as compared to the
proposed action.
E. Environmentally Preferable Alternative
DOE considers the alternative that would use ion exchange as an ITP
pre-treatment replacement to be the environmentally preferable
alternative. However, DOE considers either of the action alternatives
(i.e., proposed action and ion exchange alternative) environmentally
preferable over the no-action alternative because the risk posed by
storing the high-level waste at the tank farms under the no-action
alternative would continue indefinitely, as long as the high-level
radioactive waste remained in the tanks (particularly in liquid form),
due to potential releases to the environment from leaks, spills, or
tank system rupture.
Although DOE considers the ion exchange alternative environmentally
preferable, implementation of ion exchange would result in certain
environmental impacts as discussed above. Under the phased replacement
option, the proposed action impacts are present during the first 14
years. Under the immediate replacement option, an additional 10 years
of risk would exist from tank storage of the high-level radioactive
waste. The total impacts of the ion exchange alternative (both phased
and immediate replacement options), including the impacts of existing
offsite facilities and reasonably foreseeable onsite facilities and
operations, would be equal to or less than those of the proposed
action.
The advantages of the ion exchange alternative result from the
elimination of benzene as a byproduct of ITP. In addition, either ion
exchange replacement option would result in a slight decrease in the
generation of mixed waste compared to the proposed action. However, the
ion exchange alternative would slightly increase the number of
radiologically contaminated facilities at SRS requiring eventual
decontamination and decommissioning.
The ion exchange alternative which would not produce benzene or use
formic acid in the vitrification process, would eliminate the risks
caused by these substances in an accident. This alternative would also
reduce the likelihood of radiological accidents at the Vitrification
Facility by eliminating benzene, which is flammable and could cause
explosions under certain accident scenarios. However, under the
proposed action, DOE would implement safety modifications, before
radioactive operations are initiated, to substantially reduce or
eliminate the probability and consequences of such events.
III. Decision
DOE has decided to implement the proposed action as described in
the Final Supplemental EIS. DOE will complete construction and begin
operation of the DWPF as currently designed to immobilize high-level
radioactive waste. DOE will also implement additional safety
modifications to DWPF that will substantially reduce or eliminate
potential accidental releases of radioactivity and chemicals in the
unlikely event of a severe earthquake. DOE will continue the DWPF
process and facility modifications that are underway, complete startup
testing activities, and meet requirements for independent reviews. Upon
completion of these activities, DOE will operate the facility. Based on
operating plans and projected funding used in the SEIS analysis, high-
level waste processing would be completed in about 24 years.
A. Discussion
On the basis of analyses presented in the Final Supplemental EIS,
DOE considers the no-action alternative to be the least favorable of
the alternatives considered. DOE considers tank storage of the high-
level radioactive waste (i.e., the no-action alternative) to be only a
temporary solution to managing this waste, while action alternatives
offer a long-term solution, providing for the immobilization of the
waste in a form suitable for safe storage and ultimate disposal at a
permanent geologic repository. As discussed above, the risk of
potential releases to the environment posed by storing the high-level
radioactive waste in tanks would continue as long as waste remained in
the tanks.
Selection of the no-action or the ion exchange immediate
replacement alternative would result in DOE being unable to achieve or
maintain timely compliance with environmental requirements and
commitments made to environmental regulatory agencies. Since 1982, DOE
has entered into two major compliance agreements with regulatory
agencies that affect DWPF. The first is the Federal Facility Agreement
with the Environmental Protection Agency and the South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), made effective
in August 1993. It was developed to ensure that environmental
restoration activities at SRS meet applicable requirements of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). DOE committed in
this agreement to remove the high-level waste from those high-level
waste tanks and tank system components that do not meet stringent
standards, including adequate secondary containment to minimize the
potential for releases to the environment. DOE also committed to
develop, and is in the process of negotiating, a waste removal plan and
schedule to be approved by EPA and SCDHEC. This plan and schedule is
based on operating DWPF, including ITP and Extended Sludge Processing,
which EPA and SCDHEC formally recognize in the agreement as appropriate
treatment for high-level radioactive waste at SRS.
The second of these agreements is the Land Disposal Restrictions
Federal Facility Compliance Agreement between DOE and EPA, first made
effective in March 1991 and last amended in June 1994. This agreement
specifies actions DOE must take to ensure compliance with the land
disposal restriction requirements of RCRA. It applies to certain SRS
hazardous wastes that are also radioactive (i.e., mixed wastes),
including high-level waste at SRS. The land disposal restrictions
require that hazardous and mixed waste be treated to meet specific
treatment standards to reduce potential hazards and limit the amount of
waste that can be stored in an untreated condition. EPA has specified
vitrification as the treatment to be used for high-level waste, and the
Land Disposal Restrictions Federal Facility Compliance Agreement
requires DOE to vitrify this waste in the DWPF system as necessary to
support the waste removal plan and schedule developed in accordance
with the Federal Facility Agreement.
Several other factors contributed to DOE's decision to implement
the proposed action rather than the ion exchange alternative. First,
the difference in impacts between these two alternatives would be
small. Although the impacts of the ion exchange alternative would be
less than the proposed action, primarily due to the shorter period of
benzene production (phased replacement) or the elimination of benzene
production (immediate replacement), the benzene emissions would be
within regulatory standards. Also, safety modifications will be made
[[Page 18594]] to reduce the likelihood and consequences of accidents
that could occur from the presence of benzene. Secondly, construction
and implementation of an ion exchange system would be expensive. The
total cost of designing and constructing the ion exchange facility is
projected to be $500 million. The approximate cost of the immediate
replacement option would be $1.1 billion, in addition to the $500
million for designing and constructing the ion exchange facility.
Finally, although an ion exchange system is technically feasible,
uncertainty exists in designing and implementing this system for DWPF.
Large-scale demonstrations would be required to validate the safety
basis and the efficiency of the process to remove cesium, strontium,
and plutonium, and to demonstrate the impacts on radioactive glass
quality.
IV. Mitigation Action Plan
A Mitigation Action Plan is not required (10 CFR 1021.33) because
safety improvements have been incorporated into the proposed action to
reduce the consequences from potential accidents.
V. Final SEIS Comments
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region IV expressed
concern about projected high level waste throughput from storage of
foreign research reactor fuel or from acceptance onsite of commercial
wastes. The vitrification of waste other than liquid high level waste
now in tanks (and small increments produced as a result of site
activities) is not proposed at this time. If a proposal is made at a
later time, appropriate NEPA review will be undertaken. The final SEIS,
taking account of preliminary estimates of reasonably foreseeable
actions, including the acceptance of foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel, containing enriched uranium of United States origin,
stated that the incremental volume of high-level radioactive waste than
could result from these activities and that might be processed in DWPF
is small compared to the volume of high-level waste currently stored in
the tank farms (Section 2.2.1) and presented estimates of cumulative
impacts (Section 4.1.17). The acceptance of commercial wastes at the
Savannah River Site has not been proposed and is therefore outside the
scope of the DWPF SEIS.
VI. Conclusion
DOE has determined that the best course of action for immobilizing
SRS radioactive high-level waste is to complete construction and
startup testing and operate DWPF as currently designed, but include
additional safety modifications to reduce or eliminate potential
accidental releases of radioactive materials and benzene in the event
of a severe earthquake. This conclusion is based on careful
consideration of environmental impacts, monetary costs, and regulatory
commitments. Storage of high-level radioactive waste in tanks,
particularly in liquid form, presents continued risk of releases to the
environment, both from normal operation and accidents. Completion and
operation of DWPF will effectively reduce potential hazards to human
health and the environment posed by this high-level radioactive waste.
Issued in Washington, D.C. on March 28, 1995.
Thomas P. Grumbly,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 95-9004 Filed 4-11-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
