[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 70 (Monday, April 13, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18104-18108]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-9642]
[[Page 18103]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part IX
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Aviation Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
Explosives Detection Systems; Notices
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 70 / Monday, April 13, 1998 /
Notices
[[Page 18104]]
Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. 28671]
RIN 2120-AF95
Explosives Detection Systems
agency: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
action: Final criteria for certification of explosives detection
systems.
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summary: The FAA is issuing the final Criteria for Certification of
Explosives Detection Systems (EDS's) (hereafter referred to as
``Criteria''). The Criteria introduces minimum performance standards
for EDS equipment designed to identify detonators. The prior EDS
Criteria issued September 10, 1993, established minimum performance
standards only for EDS equipment designed to identify main/bulk
explosive charges. The current Criteria allows the FAA to certify EDS
equipment that meets or exceeds either the minimum performance
standards for explosive material categorized as main/bulk explosive
charges, or the minimum performance standards for explosive material
categorized as detonators. This action is responsive to 49 U.S.C. 44913
(formerly section 108 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,
Public Law 101-604), which requires the Administrator to certify, prior
to mandating its deployment, that EDS equipment ``can detect under
realistic air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations,
and types of explosive material which would be likely to be used to
cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft.''
effective date: May 13, 1998.
for further information contact: Mr. Armen A. Sahagian, Senior Engineer
(ACP-400), Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, D.C., 20591, telephone (202) 267-7076.
supplementary information:
Availability of Document
Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by
calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the docket number
of this notice.
Release of National Security and Sensitive Information
The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security has
determined that certain portions of the Criteria are of national
security concern and require safeguarding from unauthorized disclosure
pursuant to Executive Order 12356 (National Security Information).
Further, pursuant to 14 CFR part 191 (Protection of Sensitive Security
Information), certain unclassified information has been determined to
be sensitive security information. Upon request, the complete Criteria
will be provided to prospective manufacturers of explosives detection
equipment, and other interested parties with a bona fide need to have
the complete Criteria, provided such persons have appropriate
authorization for access to U.S. Government national security
information and/or sensitive security information.
Availability of Criteria
Persons requesting access to, or a copy of, the complete text
(including all classified and sensitive security information) of the
Criteria may write to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of
Civil Aviation Security Operations, Attention: FAA Security Control
Point (ACO-400), Docket No. 28671, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, D.C. 20591.
Individuals requesting the classified portion of the Criteria must
include information regarding authorizations and security clearances
for access to U.S. Government national security information, and
sufficient explanatory information supporting the request to
demonstrate a bona fide need to know the information contained in the
Criteria.
Background
The Criteria are responsive to the statutory mandate for testing
and certifying EDS. The FAA has had a long-standing research and
development (R&D) effort to counter the threat of explosive materials
to civil aviation. Along with other technologies, the FAA invested in
detonator detection R&D beginning in 1985. However, based upon early
research, the FAA focused its R&D resources primarily on the detection
of main/bulk explosive charges, because it appeared to be the most
technologically feasible approach. The effort resulted in the September
10, 1993, Criteria (58 FR 47804), which established minimum performance
standards for main/bulk explosive charges detection equipment; however,
recent technological advances suggest that equipment capable of
detecting the different types of detonators used to initiate or
detonate an explosive may also be effective means of screening checked
baggage. On August 30, 1996, the FAA published a Proposed Amendment to
Criteria for Certification of Explosive Detection Systems (61 FR 46011)
with a request for public comments by October 29, 1996, which was later
extended to January 6, 1997 (61 FR 57511; Nov. 6, 1996). After
considering the comments received, the FAA now considers it appropriate
to adopt amendments to the minimum performance standards for the
detection of detonators.
Detection of Main/Bulk Explosive Charges
During the past two decades, the FAA has been working on the
development of explosive detection equipment, with the initial
explosive detection research and development (R&D) efforts beginning in
1977. As part of these R&D efforts, in 1983 the FAA established a
formal, internal statement of detection and false alarm performance
goals for explosive detection equipment designed to identify main/bulk
explosive charges in checked baggage, air cargo, carry-on baggage and
on passengers. Based upon additional information and further
evaluation, these FAA explosives detection goals were revised and
upgraded in 1986 to reflect the changing terrorist threat to civil
aviation. Portions of these performance requirements were further
revised in August 1989 in anticipation of using explosives detection
equipment for screening international checked baggage. In October 1991,
the FAA completed an internal review of all previous studies, reviews,
analyses and other materials associated with explosive detection. The
review was the most extensive examination yet conducted of previous
classified and unclassified technical reviews and available information
on the amounts, types, and configurations of explosives used in
attempted or successful acts of sabotage against civil aviation. This
review culminated with the issuance of the Criteria (58 FR 47804; Sept.
10, 1993) which established minimum performance standards only for
main/bulk explosive charges detection equipment.
Detection of Detonators
In October 1995, the FAA completed its compilation and analyses of
detonator technical designs obtained during visits to 38 detonator
manufacturers located in the United States and 20 other countries.
These analyses were the most extensive
[[Page 18105]]
examinations on the types, materials, and configurations of detonators.
As a result, the FAA developed a comprehensive database on detonators
manufactured worldwide, as well as global detonator production and
consumption profiles. The types of detonators specified in the Criteria
were based, in part, upon reports which identified the types of
detonators used in terrorists acts, as well as those likely to be used
in future attempts to destroy or sabotage civil aviation, other modes
of transportation, and physical structures. This analysis was conducted
by the FAA with advice and consultation from U.S. and international
explosive materials experts, and agencies of the United States and
other governments.
Development of the Amended Criteria
The primary change to the September 10, 1993, EDS Criteria is the
introduction of minimum performance standards for the detection of
detonators. These standards are included in the portion of the document
not published in the Federal Register because they involve national
security and sensitive information. The principal purpose of the
Criteria is to state that it is possible to obtain certification of an
EDS to automatically detect explosive materials in two distinct ways,
either by identifying bulk/main explosive charges, or by identifying
detonators.
The changes to the September 10, 1993, EDS Criteria, which are
published here, include a definition for the term ``explosive
material.'' The definition distinguishes between two principal
components of explosive material: bulk/main explosive charges and
detonators.
Management Plan for Certification Testing
To facilitate testing of EDS candidate equipment under either of
the two methods of explosives material detection, the Criteria
references separate management test plans. The FAA previously developed
a management test plan for EDS certification of bulk/main explosive
charges detection equipment. A notice of availability of the draft
management test plan was published in the Federal Register on June 22,
1993, for public comment (58 FR 33967). That management test plan,
entitled FAA Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing, was based
upon the National Academy of Science's General Testing Protocol for
Bulk Explosive Detection Systems. A separate management test plan for
EDS certification of detonator detection equipment is currently being
developed. The FAA expects to issue a notice of availability of a draft
management test plan for EDS certification of detonator detection
equipment in the near future.
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received only one comment, from the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA), to the unclassified sections of the Notice of
Proposed Amendment to Criteria for Certification of Explosives
Detection Systems, and five responses from commenters addressing
sections that contain national security and sensitive information.
The Air Line Pilots Association opposes formal certification of
detonator detection equipment as EDS on several grounds. First, ALPA
states that it will be too difficult to detect detonators in cluttered
bags, a problem ALPA believes will increase as terrorists become more
sophisticated. The FAA agrees that the development of equipment to
detect detonators in baggage, whether cluttered or not, is a difficult
task. However, the FAA, in concert with foreign governments, has
conducted extensive research that indicates detection of detonators is
possible in cluttered baggage. The Criteria are designed to assure that
only equipment that can reliably detect detonators, even in cluttered
baggage, will be certified.
Second, ALPA opposes certification of detonator detection equipment
because it would not detect bulk explosive material, even though that
undetected explosive material is not part of a device designed to
explode, i.e., there is no detonator present to initiate an explosion.
The Air Line Pilots Association believes that the inability to detect
such bulk explosive material poses some risk of catastrophic damage
because of the instability of some explosive material. The FAA
acknowledges that detonator detection equipment is not designed to
detect bulk explosive material; however, EDS designed to detect bulk
explosive material will not identify detonators. Both detonators and
bulk explosive material could be transported aboard aircraft in
violation of the hazardous materials regulations, and both would pose
some risk. However, neither by itself is ``likely to be used to cause
catastrophic damage to an aircraft.'' The FAA vigorously enforces the
hazardous materials regulations and would take aggressive action in any
instance where either a detonator or bulk explosive material is
transported in violation of those regulations.
The Air Line Pilots Association also opposes certification of
detonator detection equipment because it does not believe that a
detonator is an ``explosive material'' as that term is used in the
statutory provision on certification of EDS. The Air Line Pilots
Association views certification of detonator detection equipment as
weakening the existing Criteria. The FAA shares ALPA's commitment to
ensuring that equipment is certified as an EDS only when it meets the
rigorous standard of the statute, but does not agree with ALPA's
analysis. A detonator is designed to explode, and contains explosives
to achieve that purpose. More important, a detonator is a critical part
of an explosive device. A narrow reading misses the real purpose of the
statutory provision, which is to foster the development and
certification of EDS equipment that reliably detect explosive devices
that can cause catastrophic damage to aircraft. The FAA is committed to
that goal, and will encourage all technologies that demonstrate the
potential to reliably detect such explosive devices. The standards for
certification of detonator detection equipment are very high and are
not weaker than the standards for certification of bulk explosive
detection equipment.
The FAA also fully considered the five comments to sections of the
Proposed Amendment to Criteria that contain national security and
sensitive information. The FAA's analysis and response to those
comments has been placed in the non-public docket. The comments
resulted in the addition of another detonator to the list of detonators
and in minor revisions to the language of both the unclassified and
confidential portions of the proposed amendment. The comments
determined to contain sensitive security information, and the FAA's
response to them, are available, upon written request to the FAA, to
prospective manufacturers of explosives detection equipment and other
interested parties with a bona fide need, provided such persons have
appropriate authorization for access to U.S. Government national
security information.
Revisions to the Proposed Amendment
Based upon comments it received, the FAA added one detonator to the
list prescribed in the sensitive portion of the original proposal.
Additionally, in the ``Component Testing'' section, FAA has deleted
reference to detonator detection equipment in the discussion of
explosives detection devices (EDS's).
Regulatory Evaluation
The FAA has considered the impact of the Criteria as required under
Executive Order 12866 and under the Department of Transportation's
[[Page 18106]]
regulatory policies and procedures. The FAA has determined that this
action is not significant under either of these directives. In
addition, the FAA has determined that no cost-benefit analysis is
needed for the Criteria and related matters such as the Management Test
Plans. Any final EDS deployment decision will be subject to further
review, according to the requirements of Executive Order 12866. In this
regard, the Department determined that the rule authorizing deployment
of an EDS for screening international flights was a major rule as
defined in the Executive Order. Based upon circumstances and
information available at the final rule stage in 1989, the FAA
determined that the EDS available at that time, the Thermal Neutron
Analysis (TNA) device, would be cost-beneficial. The FAA has not
required, nor will it require the deployment of TNA or any other EDS
until such equipment meets the prescribed requirements of 49 U.S.C.
44913. The FAA's deployment strategy requires deployment of effective
EDS equipment in a cost-effective manner.
Information relevant to deployment decisions was developed in the
1989 final rule (54 FR 36946) in terms of the development,
installation, and annual operating costs of a TNA device. However, as
the EDS certification process proceeds and policies affecting EDS
deployment are developed, all relevant issues influencing the ultimate
decision on the timing and scope of deployment will be reviewed. The
FAA will analyze the information submitted by manufacturers during the
certification testing process to determine its effect on the scope and
timing of deployment.
Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by
Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily burdened
by government regulations. The RFA requires agencies to consider the
impact of rules on small entities, that is, small businesses, non-
profit organizations, and local governments. If there is a significant
impact on a substantial number of small entities, the agency must
prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.
The small entities that could be potentially affected by the
implementation of this action are small business enterprises that are
or might seek to become manufacturers of EDS equipment. The number of
small business enterprises that are in, or that might seek to enter,
this market cannot be determined.
The Criteria imposes minimal costs on those small business
enterprises. These costs are primarily for obtaining access to or
copies of the classified and sensitive security information portions of
the Criteria. Because the incremental cost imposed by this proposed
action is expected to be small, the FAA finds that this proposed action
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Joint Aviation
Regulations
In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA's policy to comply with ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices and the Joint Aviation Regulations
to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA is not aware of any
differences that the Criteria would present.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)), there are no requirements for information collection
associated with the Criteria.
The Amended Criteria (Excluding Sensitive Portions)
The following sets forth the entire text of the Criteria except
those portions of the document that contain either national security
information that requires safeguarding pursuant to Executive Order
12356, or sensitive security information that requires safeguarding
pursuant to 14 CFR part 191. (Note: Paragraph markings (U) indicate
that the content of the paragraph is unclassified consistent with
standard procedures for paragraph markings in the original classified
document.)
Criteria for Certification of Explosives Detection Systems
Introduction
(U) Prior to any requirement for the deployment or purchase of
explosives detection equipment under 14 CFR, 49 U.S.C. 44913 (formerly
section 108 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public
Law 101-604) requires the FAA to certify that, based upon the results
of tests conducted pursuant to protocols developed in consultation with
experts from outside the FAA, such equipment can detect under realistic
air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, and types
of explosive materials likely to be used in attacks against commercial
aircraft.
(U) The criteria establish the minimum acceptable performance
requirements for an Explosives Detection System (EDS) to meet the
mandate of 49 U.S.C. 44913 for certification by the FAA, and supersede
previous EDS performance requirements established by the FAA.
Explosive Materials Definition
(U) For purposes of these Criteria for Certification of Explosives
Detection Systems: ``Explosive materials'' consist of bulk/main
explosive charges and detonators; a ``bulk/main explosive charge'' is
an explosive which may be detonated or initiated by a detonator; and a
``detonator'' is a device, containing an initiating or primary
explosive, used for initiating detonation if the bulk/main explosive
charge.
Explosives Detection System (EDS) Definition
(U) An EDS is an automated device or combination of devices, which
has the ability to detect, in passenger checked baggage, the amounts,
types, and configurations of explosive materials as specified by the
FAA. The term ``automated'' means that the ability of the system to
detect explosive materials, prior to the initial automated system
alarm, does not depend on human skill, vigilance, or judgment.
(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted): In the full text of the
classified Criteria document, this portion addresses alarm resolution
requirements subsequent to the initial automated alarm.)
General Operational Requirements
(U) The EDS must detect and differentiate explosive materials from
among all other materials found in checked baggage.
(U) The detection must not be dependent on the shape, position,
orientation, or configuration of the explosive materials.
(U) The EDS must not pose a health hazard to system operators or
the public (as detailed in 10 CFR part 20--Standards for Protection
Against Radiation and 10 CFR part 51--Environmental Protection
Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions and
21 CFR part 1020--Performance Standards for Ionizing Radiation Emitting
Products).
(U) The EDS must not cause damage or significant residual
alteration of the luggage or its contents, other than highly sensitive
materials such as photographic film.
Detection Requirements
(U) The detection of explosive materials in checked baggage is
affected by the type, quantity, and configuration of the bulk/main
explosive charges or detonators, as well as the bag and its
[[Page 18107]]
contents. Depending on the type of detection equipment used, the EDS
must reliably detect a mix of types and quantities of explosive
materials selected by the FAA when any of these charges or detonators
are present in checked baggage.
(U) The term ``checked baggage'' applies to all passenger bags
destined for the cargo hold, including originating and transfer
baggage, regardless of whether or not the bags accompany a passenger on
a particular flight.
(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the
classified Criteria, this portion contains two tables. The first table
identifies the types and quantities of explosive materials (bulk/main
explosive charges) that must be detected, the minimum detection rate
for each category of bulk/main explosive charges; and the overall
detection and maximum false alarm rates. The first table also specifies
the requirement to detect the minimum quantity and larger quantities of
each listed bulk/main explosive charge. The second table lists the
makes, models, and U.N. classification numbers of detonators that must
be detected, and the overall detection and maximum false alarm rates.
The throughput requirement that appears in both the main/bulk explosive
charges and detonator tables, is quoted under ``Overall Performance
Requirements'' below, because it is the only item that is not sensitive
security information.)
Overall Performance Requirements
(U) All the criteria pertaining to detection rate, false alarm
rate, and throughput are based exclusively on the fully automated
component(s) or element(s) of the system.
(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the
classified Criteria document, this portion includes information
regarding requirements for no human intervention, detection rate, and
false alarm rate.)
(U) The cumulative minimum automated system throughput processing
rate during the certification tests must be at least 450 bags/hour (not
including alarm resolution).
Other Operational Issues
(U) In addition to the mandatory criteria discussed above, there
are a number of other operational considerations that will influence
any future FAA decision to require the purchase, deployment, and use of
EDS for screening checked baggage. While these considerations are not
mandatory for certification of EDS equipment, they should be factored
into development and design decisions made by potential manufacturers
and vendors of EDS equipment.
(U) The FAA has not yet established precise EDS parameters which
would serve to define what is practical or cost-effective (e.g.,
precise physical characteristics such as unit weight and size, or
precise unit cost). Given the variety of airport and air carrier
operating environments, the FAA does not wish to foreclose the
development of technologies which may work under some, but not all,
operating conditions.
(U) The FAA can, however, provide potential manufacturers and
vendors, as well as air carriers and airports with the following
guidance. In general, EDS equipment that is less costly, smaller and
lighter is more practical for use in a variety of airports than a
system that is more expensive, larger, and heavier, especially if such
equipment would require separate structures or substantial
modifications of existing terminal structures for installation or
operation. Also, systems which are easily operated and maintained, and
are proven to be reliable, will be more acceptable than systems that
require extensive specialized training for operation, calibration, and
maintenance.
(U) In addition, systems with throughput rates that substantially
exceed the minimum rate established in the certification criteria are
operationally more efficient in many applications, and are less likely
to cause delays and congestion when large numbers of passenger bags
must be screened in short periods of time. Further, systems that can be
more easily integrated into existing passenger and baggage processing
systems would presumably be more acceptable to potential users.
(U) Trade-offs are often made among these and other operational
considerations during the course of system design. For example,
reliability, maintainability, and availability can usually be improved,
but often at the expense of an increase in purchase price. While such
trade-offs may not affect certification, they will be considered during
decision making to require deployment of certified EDS.
System Certification
(U) The FAA will certify EDS equipment based upon the mandatory
detection criteria and develop a list of certified equipment that would
be eligible for use by air carriers. Additional action must be taken by
the FAA to require the deployment of certified EDS to screen checked
baggage.
(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the
classified Criteria document, this portion contains information on the
Act's requirement to detect likely-to-be-used explosive materials.)
(U) The FAA will not require air carriers to use certified EDS
equipment until such time as the FAA determines that such equipment is
available in sufficient quantities to satisfy air carrier and airport
operational concerns, and is practical for use under realistic air
carrier operating conditions (e.g., cost, size, weight, reliability,
maintainability, and availability), and cost-effective.
(U) The FAA will only certify complete systems. It will not certify
or allow for use, individual component devices. Prior to final
certification, the FAA will require manufacturers and vendors to
provide full system documentation. This documentation will include, but
is not limited to: recommended system installation and calibration
procedures; minimum essential test equipment and devices; routine field
testing procedures and test objects to be used; routine and emergency
operation procedures; field preventative maintenance and repair
procedures; and training programs.
Certification Testing
(U) Testing of bulk/main explosive charges detection equipment
presented to the FAA for EDS certification, will be performed in
accordance with the FAA's Management Plan for EDS Certification
Testing, based upon A General Testing Protocol for Bulk Explosives
Detection Systems, (National Advisory Board, final report 1993).
(U) Testing of detonator detection equipment presented to the FAA
for EDS certification, will be performed in accordance with the FAA's
Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing of Detonator Detection
Equipment, based upon FAA's General Testing Protocol for Detonator
Detection Systems.
(U) The FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey will
perform certification tests for producers of candidate explosives
detection systems. The EDS Certification Test Director in the Office of
Aviation Security Research and Development is the point of contact.
(U) As required by both the FAA Management Plan for EDS
Certification Testing, and the FAA Management Plan for EDS
Certification Testing of Detonator Detection Equipment, manufacturers
seeking FAA certification for their candidate EDS must submit complete
descriptive data and their test results to the FAA prior to receiving
permission to ship their equipment to the FAA Technical Center. The FAA
reserves the right to visit manufacturers' facilities for technical
quality assurance purposes, require and/or monitor in-
[[Page 18108]]
house tests, and review associated data prior to granting permission to
ship equipment for certification testing.
(U) There may be extenuating circumstances that make it impractical
for the equipment to be accommodated at the FAA Technical Center.
Therefore, the FAA will consider requests for an exception that would
permit equipment to be tested at a facility other than the FAA
Technical Center. The written request must explain in detail why an
exception is in the best interest of the U.S. Government and indicate
the methods and procedures that will be used to conduct equivalent
tests to those conducted at the FAA's facility.
(U) The FAA may recognize, on a reciprocal basis, EDS testing and
certification conducted by a foreign government's aviation security
organization. Such recognition by the FAA will be considered only if
certain conditions are met. These conditions include, but are not
limited to, the negotiation of an appropriate security technical
exchange agreement which assures compliance with the FAA Criteria for
Certification of Explosives Detection Systems using strict quality
control procedures that are consistent with FAA testing procedures. The
agreement must also provide for full reciprocity for certifications
issued by both the foreign government aviation security organization
and the FAA.
(U) All direct costs associated with testing and certification
(e.g., insurance, shipping, installation, set-up, technical operation,
maintenance, calibration, disassembly, and FAA laboratory testing
costs) must be borne by the manufacturers or vendors. Both the FAA
Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing, and the FAA Management
Plan for EDS Certification Testing of Detonator Detection Equipment
contain specific information on the incremental costs associated with
tests performed at the FAA Technical Center facilities, or other
locations.
(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the
classified Criteria, this portion contains information pertaining to
test objects used in EDS certification testing.)
Component Testing
(U) As part of the FAA Security R&D program, the FAA Technical
Center evaluates explosives detection devices (EDD's) that do not meet
all of the EDS performance standards. An EDD is an automated,
uncertified EDS that is capable of meeting the partial detection
requirements for bulk/main explosive charges, in the criteria. For
instance, some of the devices that the FAA has evaluated have
relatively low throughput rates and higher false alarm rates than the
maximum acceptable rate. It will be possible under certain
circumstances, for example, for a manufacturer of an automated EDD to
have the FAA test and evaluate the device, even though it is not
expected to fully meet the EDS certification criteria (e.g., false
alarm rate or throughput).
(U) Although only complete systems can be certified, the FAA may
attest to the performance of, but not certify or approve for use, EDD's
or individual components. Attesting to the performance of EDD's is
intended to assist manufacturers and vendors who are seeking partners
with whom they can create a functioning EDS composed of multiple
devices.
(U) Testing of EDD's will only be conducted: (1) on a first-come,
first-served basis; (2) if adequate resources and facilities are
available at the FAA Technical Center to permit such testing (The FAA
will also consider requests to test the equipment at a facility other
than the FAA Technical Center; these requests will be given the lowest
priority and the testing will be performed only if it does not delay
other testing being performed by the FAA Technical Center.); (3) at a
lower precedence than EDS certification testing; and (4) if the FAA
determines from the manufacturer's test data that there is a
substantial likelihood that the device will meet the partial detection
criteria.
(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702,
44705, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105)
Issued in Washington, DC, on April 7, 1998.
Jane F. Garvey,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-9642 Filed 4-10-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
