[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 72 (Tuesday, April 15, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18369-18371]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-9659]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 50-287, 50-413, 50-414, 50-369 and 50-370]
Duke Power Company, et al.; (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3), (Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2), and (McGuire Nuclear
Station Units 1 and 2)
Exemption
I
Duke Power Company, et al. (DPC or the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-
52 for the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; and License Nos.
NPF-9 and NPF-17 for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The
licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission in effect now and
hereafter.
[[Page 18370]]
The Oconee Nuclear Station consists of three pressurized water
reactors near Greenville in Oconee County, South Carolina. The Catawba
Nuclear Station consists of two pressurized reactors near Rock Hill in
York County, South Carolina. The McGuire Nuclear Station consists of
two pressurized reactors near Charlotte in Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina.
II
Section 73.55 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR 73.55), ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage,''
paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall establish and
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization
which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that
activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk
to the public health and safety.''
Section 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle
access into a protected area.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escort.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *.''
The licensee has proposed to implement an alternative unescorted
access control system that would eliminate the need to issue and
retrieve badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all
individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges when departing
the site.
An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow such
individuals who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated August
23, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.
III
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to
provide alternative measures for protection against radiological
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall
level of system performance provides protection against radiological
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the
regulation.
Currently, unescorted access into the protected areas at the
Oconee, Catawba, and McGuire units is controlled through the use of a
photograph on a badge/keycard (hereafter, referred to as ``badge'').
The security officers at each entrance station use the photograph on
the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The
licensee's employees and contractor personnel who have been granted
unescorted access are issued badges upon entrance at each entrance/exit
location and the badges are returned upon exit. The badges are stored
and are retrievable at each entrance/exit location. In accordance with
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractors are not allowed to take these badges
offsite.
Under the proposed biometric system, each individual who is
authorized unescorted entry into protected areas would have the
physical characteristics of his/her hand (i.e., hand geometry)
registered, along with his/her badge number, in the access control
system. When a registered user enters his/her badge into the card
reader and places his/her hand onto the measuring surface, the system
detects that the hand is properly positioned, and records the image.
The unique characteristics of the hand image are then compared with the
previously stored template in the access control computer system
corresponding to the badge to verify authorization for entry.
Individuals, including plant employees and contractors, would be
allowed to keep their badges when they depart the site and, thus,
eliminate the need to issue, retrieve, and store badges at the entrance
stations to the plant. Badges do not carry any information other than a
unique identification number. All other access processes, including
search function capability, would remain the same. This system would
not be used for persons requiring escorted access (i.e., visitors).
A Sandia report, ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometrics
Identification Devices,'' SAND91-0276UC-906, Unlimited Release,
June 1991, concluded that hand geometry equipment possesses strong
performance and high detection characteristics. Also, based on its own
experience with the current photo identification system, the licensee
determined that the proposed hand geometry system would provide the
same high level of assurance as the current system that access is only
granted to authorized individuals. The biometric system has been in use
for a number of years at several sensitive Department of Energy
facilities and, recently, at other nuclear power plants.
The licensee will implement a process for testing the proposed
system to ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to
that specified in the regulation. When the changes are implemented, the
respective Physical Security Plans will be revised to include
implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system
and to allow plant employees and contractors to take their badges
offsite.
When implemented, the licensee will control all points of personnel
access into a protected area under the observation of security
personnel through the use of both badge and a hand geometry
verification system. The numbered picture badge identification system
will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized
unescorted access to protected areas. Badges will continue to be
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected areas.
Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for
access into the protected areas, the proposed system would provide a
positive verification process. The potential loss of a badge by an
individual as a result of taking the badge offsite would not enable an
unauthorized entry into protected areas.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which
would be provided by the regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, this exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or
property or common defense and
[[Page 18371]]
security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants the requested exemption from the requirements
of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) to allow individuals not employed by the licensee
(e.g., contractors) to take their photo identification badges offsite,
provided that the proposed hand geometry biometrics system is in effect
to control access into protected areas at the Oconee, Catawba, and
McGuire nuclear stations.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse
environmental impact (62 FR 17221).
For further details with respect to this action, see the request
for exemption dated August 23, 1996, which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document rooms located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South
Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina, for the Oconee Nuclear Station;
the York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South
Carolina, for the Catawba Nuclear Station; and the J. Murrey Atkins
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University
City Boulevard, North Carolina, for the McGuire Nuclear Station.
This exemption is granted for the Oconee, Catawba, and McGuire
nuclear stations with the condition that the corresponding
modifications, procedures, training, and revisions to the Physical
Security Plans necessary for implementation of the hand geometry
biometrics system at the facilities will be submitted to the NRC staff
for review and approval.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of April 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-9659 Filed 4-14-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
