[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 63 (Friday, April 2, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 16007-16013]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-8164]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Tennessee Valley Authority
[Docket No. 50-259]
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Issuance of Director's
Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision concerning a Petition
dated April 5, 1998, filed on behalf of the Union of Concerned
Scientists (Petitioner) by Mr. David A. Lochbaum, pursuant to Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.206 (10 CFR 2.206). The
Petition requests the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to (1)
revoke the operating license for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1;
(2) require the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to submit either a
decommissioning plan or a lay-up plan for Unit 1; (3) conduct NRC
inspections at Browns Ferry Unit 1 against the decommissioning plan or
the lay-up plan; and (4) hold a hearing in the Washington, DC, area.
The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined
to deny in part and grant in part the Petition, for the reasons stated
in the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-99-06). The
complete text that follows this notice is available for public
inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2210 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local
public document room for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant at the Athens
Public Library, 405 E. South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.
A copy of this decision has been filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission's review. As provided for by 10 CFR
2.206(c), the decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes a review of the decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 9
Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (DD-99-06)
I. Introduction
On April 5, 1998, Mr. David A. Lochbaum filed a petition
1, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR 2.206), on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists
(Petitioner).
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\1\ The petition can be viewed and downloaded from the NRC World
Wide Web page (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/2206/petitions/g980199/
g980199.html). Copies of the petition also are available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555-0001, and at the
local public document room located at the Athens Public Library,
South Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.
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Petitioner requested the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to (1)
revoke the operating license for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1;
(2) require the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to submit either a
decommissioning plan or a lay-up plan for Unit 1; (3) conduct NRC
inspections at Browns Ferry Unit 1 against the decommissioning plan or
the lay-up plan; and (4) hold a hearing in the Washington, DC, area.
As the basis for the request, Petitioner asserts that because Unit
1 has been on ``administrative hold'' since June 1, 1985, and has not
operated since then, revoking the operating license and requiring
relicensing if TVA later decides to restart Unit 1 is a better and
safer process than is the current restart process of Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0350. Further, a decommissioning plan would provide
assurance that the irradiated fuel is stored safely and that Units 2
and 3 are sufficiently independent of Unit 1 for safe operation.
Petitioner notes that while Unit 1 has been in administrative hold
status, the NRC has issued numerous bulletins, generic letters, and
information notices. TVA's typical action in response to these NRC
communications is to delay addressing the issues until prior to
returning the unit to service. Petitioner notes a similar response was
provided by TVA to the NRC's letter of October 9, 1996, which requested
information pertaining to the adequacy, availability, and control of
design-basis information 2, 3. Petitioner
speculates that the configuration management problems and plant
material condition that led to the shutdown in 1985 only could have
worsened since then. Thus, Petitioner believes that requiring
relicensing for Unit 1 if the decision is made to restart would ``wipe
the licensing slate clean and allow TVA, the NRC, and the public to
examine restarting the plant without the burden of unraveling the mess
caused by more than a decade of licensing limbo.'' Petitioner further
asserts that the NRC cannot meaningfully inspect a facility in a
degraded condition and in an uncertain licensing status.
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\2\ NRC letter from James M. Taylor, Executive Director for
Operations, to Craven Crowell, Chairman, TVA Board of Directors,
dated October 9, 1996.
\3\ This letter was sent to TVA on Browns Ferry Units 2 and 3,
Sequyoah Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Units 1 and 2 dockets. It was
not sent on the Browns Ferry Unit 1 docket because that facility was
not operating, and it was known to the NRC that extensive design-
basis reconstitution will be required before the facility may be
restarted.
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On April 29, 1998, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the petition and
informed Petitioner that the petition had been assigned to the Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for response. Petitioner was
informed that the request for a hearing was denied because the petition
did not provide new information that raised the potential for a
significant safety issue and did not allege any violations of NRC
requirements. Petitioner was advised that any new information that
should be considered by the NRC in evaluating the issues raised in the
petition should be provided promptly to the NRC in writing.
On June 5, 1998, Petitioner reiterated the request for a hearing
and cited NRC Bulletin 94-01, ``Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by
Inadequate Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit
[[Page 16008]]
1,'' as an example of what could involve one or more significant safety
issues. Bulletin 94-01 was sent to (1) all holders of operating
licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors (for
information) and (2) all holders (except Shoreham) of licenses for
nuclear power reactors that are permanently shutdown with spent fuel in
the spent fuel pool (for action). Petitioner argued that Bulletin 94-01
should have been sent to the Unit 1 licensee for action instead of
merely for information because Unit 1 is more nearly like a permanently
shutdown facility than an operating facility and the conditions
described in the bulletin could have existed at Unit 1.
By letter dated August 7, 1998, Petitioner was informed that the
NRC had reconsidered its earlier denial of the request for a hearing
and had decided that holding an informal public hearing would be
appropriate 4, even though such a hearing was not required
under the criteria for such hearings as provided in NRC Management
Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions.'' The
August 7 letter also addressed the issues surrounding Bulletin 94-01
and its applicability to Browns Ferry Unit 1. The hearing was held on
October 26, 1998, in the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Training
Center.5
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\4\ The NRC concluded that the petition raised novel issues with
respect to maintaining an operating license for a facility for which
there are no plans for future operation and that the information
that might be presented during an informal public hearing could
constitute a valuable resource for the NRC in reaching a decision
with regard to the petition.
\5\ The hearing transcript can be obtained from the NRC World
Wide Web page (http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/PUBLIC/2206trans.html). Copies
of the transcript are available for public inspection at the
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555-0001, and at the local public
document room located at the Athens Public Library, 504 E. South
Street, Athens, Alabama 35611.
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II. Background
TVA is the holder of operating licenses for three nuclear power
units at the Browns Ferry site. In March 1985, TVA voluntarily shut
down Units 1 and 3 because of questions relating to primary containment
isolation testing at Unit 1 and reactor water level instrumentation at
Unit 3. Unit 2 was in a refueling outage, but TVA voluntarily decided
not to restart the unit as scheduled because other questions and
concerns arose about the adequacy of TVA's nuclear program. In
September 1985,6 the NRC requested TVA to submit its plans
for correcting problems and improving performance in its overall
nuclear program and at Browns Ferry. The Commission did not order TVA
to obtain its approval before restarting the plants because of prior
verbal agreement between TVA and NRC to that effect; however, TVA was
required, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), to inform the NRC if TVA
intended to change this commitment. In late 1985, TVA submitted its
corporate nuclear performance plan (CNPP) to address weaknesses in the
TVA corporate nuclear program. The CNPP was followed by the Browns
Ferry Nuclear Performance Plan to address site-specific weaknesses and
to resolve additional concerns raised by the NRC. These plans formed
the regulatory framework for the restart of Unit 2.
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\6\ NRC letter from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for
Operations, to Charles Dean, Chairman,TVA Board of Directors, dated
September 17, 1985.
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In July 1987, the NRC concluded 7 that organizational,
staffing, and programmatic improvements already in place or under way
would resolve the problems at the corporate level. In January 1991, the
NRC concluded 8 that TVA's commitments and corrective action
programs for Unit 2 were acceptable, and in April 1991, the Commission
approved Unit 2 restart. Unit 2 restarted May 24, 1991. TVA submitted
its corrective action plan for returning Units 1 and 3 to service in
1991,9 and generally used the same methods, criteria, and
technical positions for Unit 3 that were approved for the restart of
Unit 2. In February 1992, an NRC Restart Panel was formed in accordance
with NRC IMC 0350. TVA completed the recovery of Browns Ferry Unit 3 in
1995, and the Commission authorized the Regional Administrator to
approve restart of Unit 3 upon completion of certain open issues. The
NRC Administrator for Region II issued restart approval on November 19,
1995. Units 2 and 3 have operated well since their respective restarts,
and this performance is reflected in the NRC systematic assessment of
licensee performance reports issued since the restart of Unit 2.
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\7\ NUREG-1232, Volume 1, ``Safety Evaluation Report on
Tennessee Valley Authority Revised Corporate Nuclear Performance
Plan,`` July 1987.
\8\ NUREG-1232, Volume 3, Supplement 2, ``Safety Evaluation
Report on Tennessee Valley Authority: Browns Ferry Nuclear
Performance Plan. Browns Ferry Unit 2 Restart,'' January 1991.
\9\ Letter from Mark O. Medford, Vice President, Nuclear
Assurance, Licensing, and Fuels, TVA, dated January 9, 1991.
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In April 1996, TVA requested removal 10 of Browns Ferry
Unit 1 as a Category 3 plant from the NRC's list of problem plants. TVA
stated that no decision had been reached on the long-term operational
status of Unit 1, and the unit is defueled and maintained in lay-up
status. Those shared systems that support operation of Units 2 and 3,
however, will continue to be kept in service. TVA noted that there are
no plans for equipment refurbishing or recovery activities at Unit 1.
TVA committed to inform the NRC immediately of a decision to return
Unit 1 to service, to implement the same programs used for the Unit 3
recovery, and to not restart Unit 1 without prior Commission approval.
Unit 1 was removed from the list of problem plants 11 on
June 21, 1996.
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\10\ Letter from Oliver D. Kingsley, President and Chief Nuclear
Officer, TVA, dated April 16, 1996, to James M. Taylor, NRC
Executive Director for Operations.
\11\ NRC letter from James A. Taylor, Executive Director for
Operations, to Oliver D. Kingsley, President and Chief Nuclear
Officer, TVA, dated June 21, 1996.
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III. Discussion
The hearing provided Petitioner the opportunity to present
information related to issues that have a bearing upon the actions
requested in the petition. Petitioner, represented by Mr. David
Lochbaum, was joined in presenting information to support the petition
by Ms. Ann Harris, a representative of We the People of Tennessee and
spokesperson for the National Nuclear Safety Network. The NRC staff has
reviewed the transcript of the hearing to identify the relevant issues
to be considered in addition to the filing of April 5, 1998. The
following paragraphs discuss the issues raised in the petition and in
the hearing. Related issues have been grouped together and are
addressed in the following paragraphs.
Petitioner Issues
The NRC does not inspect Browns Ferry Unit 1.
The NRC cannot meaningfully inspect Browns Ferry Unit 1
because the NRC does not have an ``Administrative Hold'' category.
The NRC cannot meaningfully inspect Browns Ferry Unit 1
because it is not in compliance with NRC regulations, including the
``Maintenance Rule.''
Petitioner asserts that, contrary to a statement made in a letter
12 to him by
[[Page 16009]]
the NRC Project Manager for Browns Ferry, he has information that shows
that NRC inspectors do not look at Browns Ferry Unit 1 at all.
Petitioner asserted further, that NRC inspectors could not meaningfully
inspect Unit 1 because NRC regulations recognize only two categories of
power plants: operating plants and permanently closed plants.
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\12\ NRC letter from Albert W. De Agazio, Browns Ferry Project
Manager, to David A. Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists, dated
January 23, 1998. This letter also was an attachment to the April 5,
1998, submitted by Mr. Lochbaum.
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Browns Ferry Unit 1 is sometimes referred to as being in an
``Administrative Hold'' 13 status, but this is a TVA
designation and it is irrelevant for regulatory purposes. Browns Ferry
Unit 1 is an operating reactor subject to all the terms and conditions
that are specified in Operating License DPR-3314, the
uncertainty of its return to service notwithstanding. The Unit 1
Technical Specifications (TSs) are maintained, are in force, and must
be complied with. The operating license and associated TSs are amended
periodically, usually in concert with similar changes for Units 2 and
3.
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\13\ ``Administrative Hold'' is a TVA designation that denotes
that while no decision has been made regarding future operation of
the facility, the option for restart at an unspecified future date
is being retained.
\14\ Operating License No. DPR-33 was issued to TVA for the
operation of Browns Ferry Unit 1 on December 20, 1973. The license
expires on midnight October 20, 2013.
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Some Unit 1 systems or components 15 are required to
support the unit in its current defueled condition, or they directly
support the safe operation of Units 2 or 3. These systems and
components are maintained and operated as required under applicable
plant programs or TSs. The remaining systems and components
16 have been placed in lay-up status to protect their
economic value and to preserve the equipment in the event a decision is
made to restart the unit.
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\15\ This includes such systems (or portions thereof) as spent
fuel pool cooling and cleanup, raw water, fire protection, reactor /
refuel zone ventilation, radiation monitoring, residual heat
removal, reactor building closed cooling water, certain electrical
systems, and emergency diesel generators.
\16\ Many of these systems and components have been drained,
deenergized, and disassembled, as appropriate.
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Unit 1 is subject to both routine and reactive NRC inspection, and
the unit is inspected by NRC inspectors. However, the operational
status of the facility is considered when determining the frequency,
type, and scope of inspections, and the amount of inspection effort is
substantially less than for a comparable facility in active service
because much of the equipment and systems serve no safety function
while the unit is shutdown and defueled. Thus, the NRC inspection
effort for Unit 1 is focused mostly upon those areas that have a direct
bearing upon safety. Generally, this includes those structures,
systems, and components (SSCs) that are necessary to ensure the safe
storage of Unit 1 irradiated fuel and to support the safe operation of
Units 2 and 3. The inspection effort includes no or little effort for
SSCs that are not needed to provide a safety function for the current
plant operating status.
Petitioner, in the original petition and during the hearing, relied
upon information compiled by the NRC that led him to conclude that Unit
1 is not inspected at all. The sources of the tables used by
Petitioner, though not fully identified, appear to be taken from
certain NRC documents that were intended primarily for internal
management use, but the information has been released through at least
one Freedom of Information Act request, and similar information has
been presented at several of the annual Regulatory Information
Conferences sponsored by NRR. We acknowledge that the NRC documents are
misleading and could lead a person to that conclusion regarding Unit 1
inspection. Until 1997, NRR compiled quarterly various program and
management information in a ``White Book,'' intended for internal
purposes. The documents included data on inspection efforts expended at
single-, dual-, and triple-unit sites. In those documents, Browns Ferry
was shown as a dual unit site, though it is actually a triple unit
site. Unit 1 was not included because it was not in operational
service. This was done so that the data could be used for comparison
purposes to other dual-unit sites. Although these documents
17 have described incorrectly the Browns Ferry site as a
dual-unit site, the fact remains that Unit 1 is inspected by NRC
inspectors. This inspection activity is adequately demonstrated by the
results of a review of NRC inspection reports for Browns Ferry issued
for the 3-year period 1996 through 1998. Of 32 inspection reports
issued for that period, 10 refer to NRC inspection of Unit 1 issues
(Table I). Table I does not include inspection activities associated
with the systems ``shared'' between the units or inspection of common
buildings; those items are routinely inspected as support for Units 2
and/or 3.
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\17\ Publication of these documents was discontinued at the end
of 1996.
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NRC IMC 0030, ``Policy and Guidance for Development of NRC
Inspection Manual Programs,'' provides guidance for the development of
the NRC inspection program, and the inspection program at Browns Ferry
has been developed in accordance with this guidance. For the 12 month
period from October 1, 1997, through September 30, 1998, the actual NRC
inspection effort expended at Unit 1 was approximately 12 percent of
the effort expended at either of the other units. On a site basis, Unit
1 received approximately 6 percent of the total inspection hours for
the site. Thus, the greater inspection effort at the operating units
allows the NRC to adequately assess the licensee's performance and to
focus its efforts into areas that have the greater safety significance
as opposed to inspecting in areas of Unit 1 that have little on no
safety significance.
Petitioner asserts that Browns Ferry Unit 1 is not in compliance
with NRC regulations. To support this contention, Petitioner states
that usually TVA has deferred taking actions with respect to Browns
Ferry Unit 1 requested by numerous generic communications issued since
1985. TVA typically has committed to completing the actions before
returning the unit to service, if such a decision is made. As
additional support for this contention, Petitioner notes that there is
an outstanding issue regarding Unit 1 compliance with 10 CFR 50.65,
commonly referred to as the maintenance rule.
IMC 0720 provides guidance with regard to NRC generic
communications on nuclear reactor issues. Generic communications
consist of bulletins, generic letters, and information notices.
Bulletins may transmit information to the addressees, request specified
actions, and require a written response. Generic letters request that
analyses be performed or descriptions of proposed corrective actions be
submitted regarding matters of safety, safeguards, or environmental
significance. The addressees may be asked to accomplish the actions and
report their completion by letter. Information relating to these
actions may be requested on a voluntary basis or in accordance with
Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR
50.54(f). Usually, this type of generic letter requests new or revised
licensee commitments or other continuing actions but may not explicitly
or coercively solicit licensee commitments. Information notices provide
information regarding safety, safeguards, or environmental issues.
Information notices normally are used to bring significant, recently
identified safety, security, or environmental information to the
attention of licensees. Addressees are expected to review the
[[Page 16010]]
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions,
as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
IMC 0720 states that the various types of generic communications
are not used to impose regulatory requirements, and they are not to be
used as a substitute for the rule-making process. Thus, the fact that a
licensee merely provides the written response required by the Atomic
Energy Act and/or NRC rules and regulations but does not, or will not,
implement other requested action(s) does not, by itself, constitute
being in non-compliance with a regulatory requirement and does not
constitute a basis for suspension or revocation of the operating
license. In such circumstances, the NRC, may take other action
commensurate with the safety significance of the issues. Such actions
could vary in severity from acceptance by the NRC that the licensee has
a valid basis for not taking the requested actions up to the NRC's
issuing an Order to shut down (or to remain shutdown) until the
particular safety issue is resolved in an acceptable manner. With
regard to Browns Ferry Unit 1, the licensee has either taken the
requested actions in the generic communications when necessary or has
committed to address the issues raised before the unit can be
restarted. Furthermore, although TVA has no announced plans for
restarting the facility, TVA has agreed not to restart it without
specific approval from the Commission. Thus, any Commission action
taken with regard to revoking the Unit 1 operating license merely
because of TVA's deferral of actions requested in generic
communications pending a decision to restart Unit 1 would serve no
useful purpose.
With the possible exception of 10 CFR 50.65, the Commission is not
aware of any non-compliance issues with applicable NRC rules and
regulations at Browns Ferry Unit 1. Furthermore, Petitioner has not
offered any contradictory credible information, either in the original
petition or during the hearing. However, the issue of Unit 1 compliance
with 10 CFR 50.65 is still undergoing review by the NRC staff, and no
final decision has been made.
The issue regarding 10 CFR 50.65 arose from an inspection of the
implementation of 10 CFR 50.65 at the Browns Ferry plant from April 4
through April 8, 1997.18 The inspection team found that the
licensee considered Unit 1 status (shutdown and defueled) for
implementing 10 CFR 50.65. Thus, a number of Unit 1 systems, such as
high pressure coolant injection, which normally would be included
within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 for an operating plant, were not
included, and performance monitoring, data collection, and trending
were not being performed on these systems. However, those Unit 1
systems that support Unit 2 and/or Unit 3 operation, systems that are
common to Unit 2 or Unit 3, or systems required to maintain safe
shutdown of Unit 1, such as spent fuel pool cooling, were properly
scoped under 10 CFR 50.65, and performance monitoring, data collection,
and trending were being performed on these systems.
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\18\ NRC Inspection Report 50-259/97-04, 50-260/97-04, and 50-
296/97-04, issued May 21, 1997.
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At issue is whether scoping Unit 1 SSCs by considering the defueled
and indefinite shutdown condition of Unit 1 satisfies 10 CFR 50.65. The
staff has informed the licensee that the issue can be resolved by one
of three approaches, namely, certify per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) that Unit 1
operations have ceased permanently, submit a request for exemption from
those aspects of 10 CFR 50.65 that currently are not being met, or
revise the scope of the Unit 1 maintenance program to meet the
requirements of the rule. On February 4, 1999, TVA submitted a request
for a temporary partial exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
50.65. The staff currently is reviewing the proposed exemption request.
Petitioner Issues
TVA would exceed its statutory debt limit if Browns Ferry
Unit 1 is closed prematurely.
TVA may lack the money needed to put Browns Ferry Unit 1
into the operating category, or the permanently closed category.
TVA does not have the necessary funds for decommissioning
funding assurance.
Petitioner has made a number of assertions regarding the ability of
TVA to fund operations and/or decommissioning of Unit 1 but has not
provided any facts in support thereof. The NRC, however, has no
regulatory authority with regard to issues related to TVA's statutory
debt limit or other financial matters and decisions other than
decommissioning funding assurance.
On November 23, 1998, the Commission's amended rules for
``Financial Assurance Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Reactors'' became effective.19 The amendments require power
reactor licensees to report periodically on the status of their
decommissioning funds, and on changes in their external trust
agreements and other financial assurance mechanisms, and also allow
licensees to take credit for certain earnings on decommissioning trust
funds. The amendments also added a definition of the term ``Federal
Licensee'' to address the issue of which licensees may use statements
of intent. As now defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a Federal Licensee means any
NRC licensee, the obligations of which are guaranteed by and supported
by the full faith and credit of the United States Government. In the
past, TVA has relied upon statements of intent to have decommissioning
funds available. The purpose of the statement of intent is to obtain a
commitment by another, and superior, governmental entity that the
obligations of the subordinate governmental entity will be paid by the
superior entity if the subordinate entity cannot pay them. Such a
commitment represents support for the obligations by the full faith and
credit of the United States. TVA agrees 20 that the revised
definition excludes TVA from relying upon this funding mechanism and
has informed the NRC that statements of intent will no longer be relied
upon for decommissioning funding assurance. TVA has provided
documentation for three external Master Decommissioning Trusts that
were established in 1996. TVA has stated that the external trusts
arrangements meet the requirements for an external sinking fund (10 CFR
50.75(e)(ii)). The trust arrangements meet the requirement that the
account be segregated from licensee assets and placed outside the
licensee's administrative control. During the hearing on October 26,
1998, a representative of the TVA's Office of the General Counsel
stated that the external trust fund arrangements exceeded several
hundreds of millions of dollars. As required by 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1), TVA
is to report to the NRC by March 31, 1999, and at least once every 2
years thereafter, the status of its decommissioning funding, including
the amount of decommissioning funds estimated to be required, the
amount accumulated to the end of the calendar year preceding the date
of the report, and a schedule of the annual amounts remaining to be
collected. The NRC will review the status of TVA's decommissioning
funding report, and if necessary, appropriate action will be
[[Page 16011]]
taken to ensure compliance with NRC regulations.
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\19\ Final rule changes to 10 CFR Parts 30 and 50 on financial
assurance requirements for the decommissioning of nuclear power
plants were published in the Federal Register on September 22, 1998
(63 FR 50465).
\20\ Letter from Mark J. Burzynski, Manager, Nuclear Licensing,
TVA, dated December 21, 1998, to NRC.
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Petitioner Issue
A decommissioning plan would ensure safe storage of Browns
Ferry Unit 1 irradiated fuel and would ensure sufficient independence
of Units 2 and 3 from Unit 1.
Petitioner contends that Unit 1 irradiated fuel stored in its spent
fuel pool will continue to represent a threat to public health for many
years. The probability of an accident involving stored fuel is
considered to be sufficiently small to make the overall risk to the
public from an accident acceptable; however, Petitioner contends that
the probability is small only because NRC regulations for design
features and administrative controls at both permanently closed plants
and operating plants minimize the chances of an accident. Petitioner
asserts that there are no regulations for plants in Administrative Hold
status, and, thus, there are no regulations that apply to Unit 1.
As previously stated, Administrative Hold is a TVA designation, not
an NRC designation, and, thus, for NRC regulatory purposes, Browns
Ferry Unit 1 is an operating reactor and is subject to all terms and
conditions of the Unit 1 operating license, TSs, and all applicable NRC
regulations, contrary to Petitioner's assertion that Unit 1 is
unregulated.
Each of the reactors at Browns Ferry has its own spent fuel storage
pool, but the pools of Units 1 and 2 are joined by a transfer canal
that allows fuel assemblies to be transferred between the Unit 1 and
Unit 2 fuel storage pools. The fuel storage facilities are shared only
for Units 1 and 2, and the transfer canal is the only shared feature.
The Unit 1 spent fuel storage pool is located on a common refueling
floor with and in the same structure that houses the Units 2 and 3
spent fuel storage pools.
Units 2 and 3 are in active operational status, thus, each unit is
refueled periodically, requiring discharge of recently irradiated fuel
into the storage pools. Compared to Unit 1 fuel that was last
discharged in 1985, recently discharged fuel from Unit 2 or Unit 3 is
substantially more radioactive and produces greater decay heat. Thus,
the consequences of an accident involving recently discharged
irradiated fuel would be more severe than the same accident involving
Unit 1 fuel. It follows that TSs, administrative controls, technical
requirements, and design features that are adequate to ensure the safe
storage of Unit 2 or Unit 3 spent fuel are also adequate to ensure safe
storage of Unit 1 irradiated fuel.
Thus, whether or not Unit 1 was to be declared permanently shut
down, the fuel storage requirements would not be changed. Requiring the
licensee to declare the permanent shutdown of Unit 1 and to submit a
post-shutdown decommissioning activities report, as requested by
Petitioner, would have no effect upon the risk to the public from a
potential fuel-handling accident or from accidental draining of the
fuel storage pool because the existing technical specifications and
administrative controls would not be changed, and existing design
features to preclude draining of the storage pools would be maintained.
Additionally, the SSCs required to ensure safe storage of irradiated
fuel in the Unit 1 storage pool are operated, tested, and maintained to
ensure that they are capable of performing their function.
With regard to Petitioner's assertion that a decommissioning plan
would ensure sufficient independence of Units 2 and 3 from Unit 1, it
is not at all clear which safety issue would be addressed. As currently
licensed, the Browns Ferry units incorporate some sharing of certain
structures and systems to obtain redundancy and improve reliability,
but aside from the shared and common features, each unit is capable of
operating independently of the other units, and each unit's TSs and
technical requirements take into account the shared and common features
that must be operable to support safe operation of that unit. Requiring
the licensee to declare the permanent shutdown of Unit 1 and to submit
a post-shutdown decommissioning activities report would require
retaining those sections of the Unit 1 TSs that are necessary to
support the safe operation of Units 2 and 3.
Continuing Operational Safety of Browns Ferry Unit 1
The Browns Ferry Unit 1 TSs are maintained and amended periodically
as necessary, as is the case with Units 2 and 3, and TVA is required to
operate Unit 1 in conformance with the TSs and technical requirements.
Inasmuch as Unit 1 is shutdown and defueled, a number of safety and
non-safety systems and components are not required to be operational.
These systems and components have been drained, deenergized, and
disassembled, as appropriate, and have been placed in a lay-up
condition to protect and preserve the equipment pending a decision to
resume power operations. The lay-up program is described in plant
procedures and includes periodic monitoring of the condition of the
equipment and lay-up status.
Unit 1 systems and components required to perform a function while
the unit is in its current defueled status or that are required to
support Units 2 and 3 operations are operated, maintained, and
periodically tested in conformance with applicable TSs, and are
included within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65)
program. Design and configuration control is maintained for these
systems, and modifications or temporary alterations are performed under
the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Certain systems and components not required to perform a function
while Unit 1 is shutdown and defueled may not now conform to the design
basis or may not have been modified to meet the actions requested by
various NRC generic communications issued since the unit shut down.
This, by itself, does not constitute a basis for revoking the license
since the facility is in an operational mode in which the equipment is
not required to be operable. TVA has committed to implementing a Design
Baseline Verification Program for Unit 1 prior to returning Unit 1 to
service.
Units 1 and 2 share a common control room that is staffed
continually by licensed reactor operators, and the Unit 1 control
boards are given regular attention similar to the operating units.
Operators and engineers routinely tour areas of Unit 1 containing the
systems and equipment that the TSs require to be operable to ensure
safe storage of irradiated fuel and to support operation of the other
units.
Relicensing Versus Applying the IMC 0350 Process
Petitioner asserts that revoking the operating license and
requiring relicensing if TVA later decides to restart Unit 1 is a
better and safer process than is the current restart process in IMC
0350. Petitioner believes that this would ``wipe the licensing slate
clean and allow TVA, the NRC, and the public to examine restarting the
plant without the burden of unraveling the mess caused by more than a
decade of licensing limbo.''
NRC IMC 0350 provides staff guidelines for approving restart of
nuclear power plants that have been shut down either voluntarily or
involuntarily because of a significant operating event, complex
equipment problems, or serious licensee management deficiencies. The
guidelines have been used successfully for the restart of Browns Ferry
Unit 3, Crystal River Unit 3, and Millstone Unit 3 and are being used
for the D. C. Cook
[[Page 16012]]
reactors and Millstone Unit 2. In each case, a plant-specific restart
plan is developed using the IMC for guidance. The restart action plan
identifies expected NRC actions to be taken before approving restart
and includes an inspection plan to ensure that an adequate inspection
record is created to support the restart decision. IMC 0350 specifies
that the NRC Commissioners are to be adequately informed of staff
restart actions on a continuing basis through Commission papers or
through the Executive Director for Operations, and as necessary, the
staff will brief the Commissioners. IMC 0350 provides the opportunity
for public participation through public meetings. Through such
meetings, the public may hear and comment on the licensee's restart
plans and the results of NRC reviews of the restart activities. Public
comments and concerns are considered by the NRC and may be factored
into the restart review, as appropriate.
During the hearing on October 26, 1998, Petitioner was questioned
by an NRC representative regarding why it is believed that the
processes used by TVA and NRC to recover Units 2 and 3 would not work
for recovery of Unit 1. Petitioner indicated that the process is ``not
very objective and it's basically up to the whims of the restart team
as to what is safe, where the lines are drawn.'' However, when asked if
there would be an issue if the process is applied correctly with
openness and public involvement, Petitioner responded by referencing
the use of the process at Millstone and indicating that it [IMC 0350]
is a good process, but that it wasn't followed [at Millstone]. Thus,
Petitioner's issue does not appear to be the process but its
implementation. Petitioner conceded that the IMC 0350 process is
working very well in the case of the D.C. Cook plant, and that if it
were used at Browns Ferry Unit 1 as it is being used at D. C. Cook,
there would be reasonable expectation that a good product would be
realized.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The NRC has determined that--
Petitioner has not identified any credible safety concern
that has been created by the current ``Administrative Hold'' status of
the unit that would not otherwise exist if the operating license were
to be revoked. Absent a credible safety concern, there is no regulatory
basis for suspending or revoking an operating license merely because
the licensee chooses not to operate the unit.
The licensee is required to comply with and is, with one
possible exception to the staff's knowledge, in compliance with all
current applicable regulations for operating reactors and is required
to comply with Unit 1 TSs and other technical requirements for the
current operational mode of the unit. The issue of compliance of Unit 1
with 10 CFR 50.65 is the subject of an ongoing review, and resolution
is expected soon.
Unit 1 is inspected by NRC inspectors, but at a reduced
scope that is appropriate for the status of the unit.
Decommissioning Unit 1 would not provide any greater
degree of safety for the Unit 1 irradiated fuel, for radiation control,
or for Units 2 and 3 than is currently provided by the requirements of
the operating license, TSs, and the Technical Requirements Manual.
There is no demonstrated credible basis for the assertion
that facility restart based upon IMC 0350 is a less reliable process
for resolving the safety concerns of a problem plant than the
relicensing process. The IMC 0350 process has been demonstrated by a
number of restart efforts, including those for Browns Ferry Unit 3.
For the reasons stated herein Petitioner's requests for the NRC to
revoke the Browns Ferry Unit 1 operating license and to require TVA to
submit a decommissioning plan or a lay-up plan for Unit 1, and for the
NRC to conduct inspections against the decommissioning plan are denied.
As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this decision will be
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review.
This decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25
days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion,
institutes review of the Decision at that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment to Director's Decision 99-06
Table 1.--Browns Ferry Unit 1 Inspection Activities
[1996 through 1998]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspection report Date Inspection activity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50-259/96-01............................................... 02/29/96 Radioactive material postings.
50-259/96-03............................................... 04/15/96 Connection of Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent
fuel pool volumes, spent fuel pool
design-basis and operating
information.
50-259/96-05............................................... 06/18/96 Udated final safety analysis report
description of spent fuel pool
systems.
50-259/96-06............................................... 08/15/96 Continuous air monitoring systems.
50-259/96-10............................................... 11/07/96 Housekeeping issues.
50-259/96-12............................................... 12/20/96 Lay-up and preventive maintenance
program implementation.
50-259/97-03............................................... 04/22/97 Spent fuel pool cooling system
walkdown, identification that Unit 1
pool makeup valve operator had been
removed.
50-259/97-04............................................... 05/21/97 Maintenance rule implementation.
50-259/97-08............................................... 08/29/97 Sampling of a raw cooling water
discharge.
50-259/97-12............................................... 02/12/98 Repairs to a radiation monitoring
system valve.
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[[Page 16013]]
[FR Doc. 99-8164 Filed 4-1-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
