04-9019. Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction Scheduled for September 15, 2004; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures  

  • [Federal Register Volume 69, Number 76 (Tuesday, April 20, 2004)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 21110-21114]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 04-9019]
    
    
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    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
    
    [Report No. AUC-04-57-A (Auction No. 57); DA 04-954]
    
    
    Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction 
    Scheduled for September 15, 2004; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or 
    Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures
    
    AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
    
    ACTION: Notice.
    
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    SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of twenty Automated 
    Maritime Telecommunications System licenses in Auction No. 57, 
    scheduled to begin on September 15, 2004. This document also seeks 
    comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other auction 
    procedures.
    
    DATES: Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply comments 
    are due on or before April 30, 2004.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail 
    to the following address: [email protected]
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Christopher 
    Shields, (202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Lyle Ishida 
    (202) 418-0660, Lisa Stover (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions: 
    Roberto Mussenden or Ghassan Khalek, (202) 418-0680.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 57 
    Comment Public Notice released on April 5, 2004. The complete text of 
    the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, including the attachments, is 
    available for public inspection and copying during regular business 
    hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th 
    Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 57 
    Comment Public Notice may also be purchased from the Commission's 
    duplicating contractor, Qualex International, Portals II, 445 12th 
    Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (202) 863-
    2893, facsimile (202) 863-2898, or via e-mail [email protected]
        1. By the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, the Wireless 
    Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces the auction of 20 
    Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) licenses. This 
    auction is scheduled to commence on September 15, 2004 (Auction No. 
    57). AMTS is a specialized system of coast stations which provide 
    integrated and interconnected marine voice and data communications, 
    somewhat like a cellular phone system, for tugs, barges, and other 
    vessels on waterways. Service to units on land is permitted, so long as 
    marine-originating communications receive priority. In Auction No. 57, 
    two 500-kilohertz blocks of paired spectrum in the 217/219 MHz band 
    will be offered in each of 10 AMTS Areas (AMTSAs).
        2. A complete list of licenses available for Auction No. 57 is 
    included as Attachment A of the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice.
        The following table describes the licenses that will be auctioned 
    in each of the AMTSAs:
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Geographic area      No. of
       Block       Frequency bands (MHz)     Total bandwidth          Pairing               type           licenses
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A..........  217.5-218.0/219.5-220.0.  1 MHz..............  2 x 500 kHz........  AMTSA.............           10
    B..........  217.0-217.7/219.0-219.5.  1 MHz..............  2 x 500 kHz........  AMTSA.............           10
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
        Note: The table displays the band edges of spectrum blocks A and 
    B using the twenty 25 kHz channels that comprise each block as 
    listed in 47 CFR 80.385(a)(2). It should be noted that pursuant to 
    47 CFR 80.481, licensees are not required to use 25 kHz 
    channelization and may choose any channelization scheme; however, 
    regardless of the channelization scheme used, emissions at these 
    band edges must be attenuated within the limitation that would be 
    required under 47 CFR 80.211 if the licensee were using 25 kHz 
    channels.
    
        3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to 
    ``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this 
    subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of 
    bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction 
    procedures. * * *'' Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced 
    Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to 
    familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the 
    day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, 
    under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of 
    auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. The 
    Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues relating to 
    Auction No. 57.
    
    I. Auction Structure
    
    A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design
    
        4. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction 
    No. 57 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. This methodology 
    offers every license for bid at the same time with successive bidding 
    rounds in which bidders may place bids. The Bureau seeks comment on 
    this proposal.
    
    B. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
    
        5. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine 
    an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking 
    into account such factors as the population in each geographic license 
    area and the value of similar spectrum. The upfront payment is a 
    refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid 
    on licenses. Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum subject 
    to auction protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide 
    the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments 
    owed at the close of the auction. With these guidelines in mind for 
    Auction No. 57, The Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a 
    license-by-license basis using the following formula:
        $0.0075 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 
    per license. Accordingly, in Attachment A of the Auction No. 57 Comment 
    Public Notice the Bureau lists all licenses included in Auction No. 57 
    and the proposed upfront payment for each license. The Bureau seeks 
    comment on this proposal.
        6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront 
    payment submitted by a bidder will determine the maximum number of 
    bidding units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a 
    bidder's initial eligibility. Each license is assigned a specific 
    number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in 
    Attachment A of the
    
    [[Page 21111]]
    
    Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding unit per dollar 
    basis. This number does not change as prices rise during the auction. A 
    bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses. 
    Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination of licenses as long 
    as the total number of bidding units associated with those licenses 
    does not exceed its current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be 
    increased during the auction. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment 
    amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units 
    it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single round, and 
    submit an upfront payment covering that number of bidding units. The 
    Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    
    C. Activity Rules
    
        7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable 
    period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively 
    throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction 
    before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific 
    percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of 
    the auction. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule will 
    either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or must use an 
    activity rule waiver (if any remain).
        8. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into two stages, each 
    characterized by an increased activity requirement. The auction will 
    start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will 
    advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when the 
    auction activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units 
    receiving new high bids, is approximately twenty percent or below for 
    three consecutive rounds of bidding. However, the Bureau further 
    proposes that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages 
    unilaterally by announcement during the auction. In exercising this 
    discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder 
    activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, 
    the percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which 
    there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase 
    in revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
        9. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes the following activity 
    requirements: Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the 
    auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is 
    required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of 
    its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite 
    activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility 
    in the next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). 
    During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be 
    calculated by multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths 
    (5/4).
        Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to 
    maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent 
    of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced 
    eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the 
    current round activity by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).
        10. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that 
    believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their 
    reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. 
    Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and 
    suggested alternative activity rules.
    
    D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
    
        11. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current 
    bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round 
    being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies 
    to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity 
    waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a 
    mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction 
    eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from 
    placing a bid in a particular round.
        12. The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with 
    insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if 
    available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system 
    will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at 
    the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below 
    the minimum required unless: (i) the bidder has no activity rule 
    waivers available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic 
    application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the 
    minimum requirement. Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and 
    does not satisfy the required activity level, its current eligibility 
    will be permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the 
    auction.
        13. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its 
    bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the 
    bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism 
    during the bidding period by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function 
    in the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is 
    permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the 
    activity rules. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be 
    permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
        14. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means 
    to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a 
    proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding 
    system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are 
    submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility 
    will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which 
    there are no new bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open. 
    Note: Once a proactive waiver is submitted during a round, that waiver 
    cannot be unsubmitted.
        15. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 57 be 
    provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the 
    bidder's discretion during the course of the auction. The Bureau seeks 
    comment on this proposal.
    
    E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
    
        16. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice 
    or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, 
    or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical 
    obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding 
    activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason 
    that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In 
    such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the 
    auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the 
    auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its 
    entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend 
    the auction. Exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion 
    of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for 
    situations in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule 
    waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    
    II. Bidding Procedures
    
    A. Round Structure
    
        17. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 57 over the Internet. 
    Telephonic bidding will also be available. As a contingency plan, the 
    FCC Wide Area Network will be available as well. The telephone number 
    through which the backup FCC Wide Area Network may be accessed will be
    
    [[Page 21112]]
    
    announced in a later public notice. Full information regarding how to 
    establish such a connection will be provided in the public notice 
    announcing details of auction procedures.
        18. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public 
    notice to be released at least one week before the start of the 
    auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The 
    simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of sequential bidding 
    rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details 
    regarding the location and format of round results will be included in 
    the same public notice.
        19. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in 
    order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the 
    bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding 
    strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for 
    the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, 
    depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau 
    seeks comment on this proposal.
    
    B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
    
        20. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe 
    methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum 
    opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the 
    Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is 
    not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the 
    Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a 
    minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each 
    auction.
        21. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below 
    which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can 
    be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other 
    hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction 
    below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate 
    the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the 
    discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the 
    auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the 
    reserve price to be the same amount.
        22. In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau 
    proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 57. The 
    Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been used in other 
    auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
        23. Specifically, for Auction No. 57, the Commission proposes the 
    following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening 
    bids:
        $0.0075 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000 
    per license. The specific minimum opening bid for each license 
    available in Auction No. 57 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction 
    No. 57 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this 
    proposal.
        24. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will 
    result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable 
    amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should 
    explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an 
    alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims 
    with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening 
    bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the 
    Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of 
    spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of 
    technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service 
    areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other 
    relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of 
    the AMTS spectrum. The Bureau also seeks comment on whether, consistent 
    with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by 
    having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.
    
    C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments
    
        25. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a 
    given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Automated 
    Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for 
    each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
    acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening 
    bid. In the rounds after a bid is placed on a license, the minimum 
    acceptable bid for that license will be equal to the standing high bid 
    plus the defined increment.
        26. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the FCC 
    Automated Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for 
    that license for the following round. The difference between the 
    minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license will 
    define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each 
    license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid 
    plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using 
    multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the 
    standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid 
    amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid increment, 
    etc.).
        27. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
    acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening 
    bid. The additional bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received 
    a bid will be calculated differently.
        28. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum 
    acceptable bids by using a smoothing methodology, as we have done in 
    several other auctions. The smoothing formula calculates minimum 
    acceptable bids by first calculating a percentage increment, not to be 
    confused with the bid increment. The percentage increment for each 
    license is based on bidding activity on that license in all prior 
    rounds; therefore, a license that has received many bids throughout the 
    auction will have a higher percentage increment than a license that has 
    received few bids.
        29. The calculation of the percentage increment used to determine 
    the minimum acceptable bids for each license for the next round is made 
    at the end of each round. The computation is based on an activity 
    index, which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round 
    and the activity index from the prior round. The current activity index 
    is equal to a weighting factor times the number of new bids received on 
    the license in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the 
    weighting factor times the activity index from the prior round. The 
    activity index is then used to calculate a percentage increment by 
    multiplying a minimum percentage increment by one plus the activity 
    index with that result being subject to a maximum percentage increment. 
    The Commission will initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the 
    minimum percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage 
    increment at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial settings, the 
    percentage increment will fluctuate between 10% and 20% depending upon 
    the number of bids for the license.
    
    Equations
    
    Ai = (C * Bi) + ((1-C) * Ai-1)
    Ii+1 = smaller of ((1 + Ai) * N) and M
    X i+1 = Ii+1 * Yi
    
    where,
    Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)
    C = activity weight factor
    Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)
    
    [[Page 21113]]
    
    Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1), 
    A0 is 0
    Ii+1 = percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)
    N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor
    M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling
    Xi+1 = dollar amount associated with the percentage 
    increment
    Yi = high bid from the current round
    
        30. Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received 
    on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the 
    following round will be the high bid from the current round plus the 
    dollar amount associated with the percentage increment, with the result 
    rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the 
    nearest hundred if it is under ten thousand.
    
    Examples
    
    License 1
    C = 0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2
    Round 1 (2 New Bids, High Bid = $1,000,000)
        i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the 
    smoothing formula:
    
    A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
    I2 = The smaller of ((1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the 
    maximum percentage increment)
        ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
    increment for round 2 (using I2):
    
    X2 = 0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000
    
        iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000
    Round 2 (3 New Bids, High Bid = $2,000,000)
        i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the 
    smoothing formula:
    
    A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
    I3 = The smaller of ((1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the 
    maximum percentage increment)
        ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
    increment for round 3 (using I3):
    
    X3 = 0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000
    
        iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000
    Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)
        i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the 
    smoothing formula:
    
    A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5
    I4 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the 
    maximum percentage increment)
    
        ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage 
    increment for round 4 (using I4):
    
    X4 = 0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000
    
        iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000
        31. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum 
    acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening 
    bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the difference 
    between the minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum percentage 
    increment, and the minimum opening bid. That is, I = (minimum opening 
    bid)(1 + N){rounded{time} -(minimum opening bid). Therefore, when N 
    equals 0.1, the first additional bid amount will be approximately ten 
    percent higher than the minimum opening bid; the second, twenty 
    percent; the third, thirty percent; etc.
        32. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has 
    been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second 
    highest bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are 
    calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times 
    one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second 
    highest bid.
        33. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum 
    acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances 
    so dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Automated 
    Auction System. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
    
    D. High Bids
    
        34. At the end of a bidding round, a high bid for each license will 
    be determined based on the highest gross bid amount received for the 
    license. In the event of identical high bids on a license in a given 
    round (i.e., tied bids), we propose to use a random number generator to 
    select a single high bid from among the tied bids. If the auction were 
    to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, the winning 
    bidder would be the one that placed the selected high bid. However, the 
    remaining bidders, as well as the high bidder, can submit higher bids 
    in subsequent rounds. If any bids are received on the license in a 
    subsequent round, the high bid again will be determined by the highest 
    gross bid amount received for the license.
        35. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid 
    on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from 
    a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.'' 
    Bidders are reminded that standing high bids confer activity.
    
    E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal
    
        36. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes the following bid 
    removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding 
    period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that 
    round. By removing selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may 
    effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder 
    removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal 
    payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
        37. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous 
    rounds using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder 
    that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject 
    to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The 
    Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal 
    procedures.
        38. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 65 FR 52401, August 29, 
    2000, the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals 
    facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of 
    efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the 
    course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some 
    instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The 
    Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit 
    the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission 
    stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, 
    consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw 
    bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the 
    Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal 
    procedures.
        39. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each 
    bidder in Auction No. 57 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more 
    than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to 
    withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere 
    bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The 
    two rounds in which withdrawals may be utilized will be at the bidder's 
    discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the 
    Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high 
    bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals 
    are utilized. Withdrawals will remain
    
    [[Page 21114]]
    
    subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the 
    Commission's rules. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
    
    F. Stopping Rule
    
        40. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before 
    or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction 
    within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes to 
    employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping 
    rule means that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding 
    closes simultaneously on all licenses.
        41. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the 
    first round in which no new bids, proactive waivers, or withdrawals are 
    received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding will 
    remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
        42. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to 
    exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 57:
        i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. 
    The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses 
    after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver, 
    withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing 
    high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing 
    a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would 
    not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau 
    further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be 
    used at any time or only in stage two of the auction.
        ii. Keep the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers 
    are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, 
    the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive 
    waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder 
    with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use 
    a remaining activity rule waiver.
        iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of 
    additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes 
    this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final 
    round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least 
    one of a specified preceding number of rounds.
        43. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain 
    circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very 
    slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely 
    that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time. 
    Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to 
    increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number 
    of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum 
    bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still 
    a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.
    
    III. Conclusion
    
        44. Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply 
    comments are due on or before April 30, 2004. Because of the disruption 
    of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the Bureau 
    requires that all comments and reply comments be filed electronically. 
    Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail to the 
    following address: [email protected] The electronic mail containing 
    the comments or reply comments must include a subject or caption 
    referring to Auction No. 57 Comments and the name of the commenting 
    party. The Bureau requests that parties format any attachments to 
    electronic mail as Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word 
    documents. Copies of comments and reply comments will be available for 
    public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public 
    Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 
    20554. In addition, the Bureau requests that commenters fax a courtesy 
    copy of their comments and reply comments to the attention of Kathryn 
    Garland at (717) 338-2850.
        45. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
    disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte 
    rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that 
    memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the 
    substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects 
    discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and 
    arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to 
    oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose 
    proceedings are set forth in Sec.  1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.
    
    Federal Communications Commission.
    Gary Michaels,
    Deputy Chief, Auction and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
    [FR Doc. 04-9019 Filed 4-19-04; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
04/20/2004
Department:
Federal Communications Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Action:
Notice.
Document Number:
04-9019
Dates:
Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply comments are due on or before April 30, 2004.
Pages:
21110-21114 (5 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Report No. AUC-04-57-A (Auction No. 57), DA 04-954
PDF File:
04-9019.pdf