[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 76 (Tuesday, April 20, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21110-21114]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-9019]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[Report No. AUC-04-57-A (Auction No. 57); DA 04-954]
Automated Maritime Telecommunications System Spectrum Auction
Scheduled for September 15, 2004; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or
Minimum Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: This document announces the auction of twenty Automated
Maritime Telecommunications System licenses in Auction No. 57,
scheduled to begin on September 15, 2004. This document also seeks
comment on reserve prices or minimum opening bids and other auction
procedures.
DATES: Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply comments
are due on or before April 30, 2004.
ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail
to the following address: [email protected]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For legal questions: Christopher
Shields, (202) 418-0660. For general auction questions: Lyle Ishida
(202) 418-0660, Lisa Stover (717) 338-2888. For service rule questions:
Roberto Mussenden or Ghassan Khalek, (202) 418-0680.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auction No. 57
Comment Public Notice released on April 5, 2004. The complete text of
the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, including the attachments, is
available for public inspection and copying during regular business
hours at the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th
Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554. The Auction No. 57
Comment Public Notice may also be purchased from the Commission's
duplicating contractor, Qualex International, Portals II, 445 12th
Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (202) 863-
2893, facsimile (202) 863-2898, or via e-mail [email protected]
1. By the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau (``Bureau'') announces the auction of 20
Automated Maritime Telecommunications System (AMTS) licenses. This
auction is scheduled to commence on September 15, 2004 (Auction No.
57). AMTS is a specialized system of coast stations which provide
integrated and interconnected marine voice and data communications,
somewhat like a cellular phone system, for tugs, barges, and other
vessels on waterways. Service to units on land is permitted, so long as
marine-originating communications receive priority. In Auction No. 57,
two 500-kilohertz blocks of paired spectrum in the 217/219 MHz band
will be offered in each of 10 AMTS Areas (AMTSAs).
2. A complete list of licenses available for Auction No. 57 is
included as Attachment A of the Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice.
The following table describes the licenses that will be auctioned
in each of the AMTSAs:
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Geographic area No. of
Block Frequency bands (MHz) Total bandwidth Pairing type licenses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.......... 217.5-218.0/219.5-220.0. 1 MHz.............. 2 x 500 kHz........ AMTSA............. 10
B.......... 217.0-217.7/219.0-219.5. 1 MHz.............. 2 x 500 kHz........ AMTSA............. 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The table displays the band edges of spectrum blocks A and
B using the twenty 25 kHz channels that comprise each block as
listed in 47 CFR 80.385(a)(2). It should be noted that pursuant to
47 CFR 80.481, licensees are not required to use 25 kHz
channelization and may choose any channelization scheme; however,
regardless of the channelization scheme used, emissions at these
band edges must be attenuated within the limitation that would be
required under 47 CFR 80.211 if the licensee were using 25 kHz
channels.
3. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to
``ensure that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this
subsection, an adequate period is allowed * * * before issuance of
bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction
procedures. * * *'' Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced
Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to
familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the
day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau,
under its existing delegated authority, to seek comment on a variety of
auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction. The
Bureau therefore seeks comment on the following issues relating to
Auction No. 57.
I. Auction Structure
A. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design
4. The Bureau proposes to award all licenses included in Auction
No. 57 in a simultaneous multiple-round auction. This methodology
offers every license for bid at the same time with successive bidding
rounds in which bidders may place bids. The Bureau seeks comment on
this proposal.
B. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility
5. The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine
an appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license
area and the value of similar spectrum. The upfront payment is a
refundable deposit made by each bidder to establish eligibility to bid
on licenses. Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum subject
to auction protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide
the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments
owed at the close of the auction. With these guidelines in mind for
Auction No. 57, The Bureau proposes to calculate upfront payments on a
license-by-license basis using the following formula:
$0.0075 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000
per license. Accordingly, in Attachment A of the Auction No. 57 Comment
Public Notice the Bureau lists all licenses included in Auction No. 57
and the proposed upfront payment for each license. The Bureau seeks
comment on this proposal.
6. The Bureau further proposes that the amount of the upfront
payment submitted by a bidder will determine the maximum number of
bidding units on which a bidder may place bids. This limit is a
bidder's initial eligibility. Each license is assigned a specific
number of bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in
Attachment A of the
[[Page 21111]]
Auction No. 57 Comment Public Notice, on a bidding unit per dollar
basis. This number does not change as prices rise during the auction. A
bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses.
Rather, a bidder may place bids on any combination of licenses as long
as the total number of bidding units associated with those licenses
does not exceed its current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be
increased during the auction. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment
amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number of bidding units
it may wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single round, and
submit an upfront payment covering that number of bidding units. The
Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
C. Activity Rules
7. In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable
period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively
throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a specific
percentage of their current bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction. A bidder that does not satisfy the activity rule will
either lose bidding eligibility in the next round or must use an
activity rule waiver (if any remain).
8. The Bureau proposes to divide the auction into two stages, each
characterized by an increased activity requirement. The auction will
start in Stage One. The Bureau proposes that the auction generally will
advance to the next stage (i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when the
auction activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units
receiving new high bids, is approximately twenty percent or below for
three consecutive rounds of bidding. However, the Bureau further
proposes that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages
unilaterally by announcement during the auction. In exercising this
discretion, the Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder
activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity level,
the percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which
there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase
in revenue. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
9. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes the following activity
requirements: Stage One: In each round of the first stage of the
auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is
required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent of
its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite
activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility
in the next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used).
During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be
calculated by multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths
(5/4).
Stage Two: In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 95 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).
10. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals. Commenters that
believe these activity rules should be modified should explain their
reasoning and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with analyses and
suggested alternative activity rules.
D. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility
11. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current
bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round
being below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies
to an entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
waivers can be either proactive or automatic and are principally a
mechanism for auction participants to avoid the loss of auction
eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
12. The FCC Automated Auction System assumes that bidders with
insufficient activity would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if
available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system
will automatically apply a waiver (known as an ``automatic waiver'') at
the end of any bidding period where a bidder's activity level is below
the minimum required unless: (i) the bidder has no activity rule
waivers available; or (ii) the bidder overrides the automatic
application of a waiver by reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the
minimum requirement. Note: If a bidder has no waivers remaining and
does not satisfy the required activity level, its current eligibility
will be permanently reduced, possibly eliminating the bidder from the
auction.
13. A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its
bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the
bidder must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism
during the bidding period by using the ``reduce eligibility'' function
in the bidding system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is
permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the
activity rules. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be
permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.
14. A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding
system) during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are
submitted, the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility
will be preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which
there are no new bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open.
Note: Once a proactive waiver is submitted during a round, that waiver
cannot be unsubmitted.
15. The Bureau proposes that each bidder in Auction No. 57 be
provided with three activity rule waivers that may be used at the
bidder's discretion during the course of the auction. The Bureau seeks
comment on this proposal.
E. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation
16. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes that, by public notice
or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend,
or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding
activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason
that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In
such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of the current round, resume the
auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend
the auction. Exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion
of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for
situations in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule
waivers. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
II. Bidding Procedures
A. Round Structure
17. The Commission will conduct Auction No. 57 over the Internet.
Telephonic bidding will also be available. As a contingency plan, the
FCC Wide Area Network will be available as well. The telephone number
through which the backup FCC Wide Area Network may be accessed will be
[[Page 21112]]
announced in a later public notice. Full information regarding how to
establish such a connection will be provided in the public notice
announcing details of auction procedures.
18. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public
notice to be released at least one week before the start of the
auction, and will be included in the registration mailings. The
simultaneous multiple-round format will consist of sequential bidding
rounds, each followed by the release of round results. Details
regarding the location and format of round results will be included in
the same public notice.
19. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in
order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the
bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding
strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for
the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day,
depending upon the bidding activity level and other factors. The Bureau
seeks comment on this proposal.
B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid
20. The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe
methods for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum
opening bid when FCC licenses are subject to auction, unless the
Commission determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is
not in the public interest. Consistent with this mandate, the
Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a
minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each
auction.
21. Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below
which an item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can
be either published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other
hand, is the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction
below which no bids are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate
the competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the
auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the
reserve price to be the same amount.
22. In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau
proposes to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 57. The
Bureau believes a minimum opening bid, which has been used in other
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.
23. Specifically, for Auction No. 57, the Commission proposes the
following license-by-license formula for calculating minimum opening
bids:
$0.0075 * MHz * License Area Population with a minimum of $1,000
per license. The specific minimum opening bid for each license
available in Auction No. 57 is set forth in Attachment A of the Auction
No. 57 Comment Public Notice. The Bureau seeks comment on this
proposal.
24. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will
result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable
amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should
explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, the
Bureau particularly seeks comment on such factors as the amount of
spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of
technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service
areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands and any other
relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of
the AMTS spectrum. The Bureau also seeks comment on whether, consistent
with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by
having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.
C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments
25. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a
given license in any of nine different amounts. The FCC Automated
Auction System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for
each license. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. In the rounds after a bid is placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to the standing high bid
plus the defined increment.
26. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the FCC
Automated Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for
that license for the following round. The difference between the
minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license will
define the bid increment. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each
license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid
plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using
multiple bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the
standing high bid plus two times the bid increment, the third bid
amount equals the standing high bid plus three times the bid increment,
etc.).
27. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. The additional bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received
a bid will be calculated differently.
28. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes to calculate minimum
acceptable bids by using a smoothing methodology, as we have done in
several other auctions. The smoothing formula calculates minimum
acceptable bids by first calculating a percentage increment, not to be
confused with the bid increment. The percentage increment for each
license is based on bidding activity on that license in all prior
rounds; therefore, a license that has received many bids throughout the
auction will have a higher percentage increment than a license that has
received few bids.
29. The calculation of the percentage increment used to determine
the minimum acceptable bids for each license for the next round is made
at the end of each round. The computation is based on an activity
index, which is a weighted average of the number of bids in that round
and the activity index from the prior round. The current activity index
is equal to a weighting factor times the number of new bids received on
the license in the most recent bidding round plus one minus the
weighting factor times the activity index from the prior round. The
activity index is then used to calculate a percentage increment by
multiplying a minimum percentage increment by one plus the activity
index with that result being subject to a maximum percentage increment.
The Commission will initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the
minimum percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage
increment at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial settings, the
percentage increment will fluctuate between 10% and 20% depending upon
the number of bids for the license.
Equations
Ai = (C * Bi) + ((1-C) * Ai-1)
Ii+1 = smaller of ((1 + Ai) * N) and M
X i+1 = Ii+1 * Yi
where,
Ai = activity index for the current round (round i)
C = activity weight factor
Bi = number of bids in the current round (round i)
[[Page 21113]]
Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1),
A0 is 0
Ii+1 = percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)
N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor
M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling
Xi+1 = dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment
Yi = high bid from the current round
30. Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received
on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the
following round will be the high bid from the current round plus the
dollar amount associated with the percentage increment, with the result
rounded to the nearest thousand if it is over ten thousand or to the
nearest hundred if it is under ten thousand.
Examples
License 1
C = 0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2
Round 1 (2 New Bids, High Bid = $1,000,000)
i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the
smoothing formula:
A1 = (0.5 * 2) + (0.5 * 0) = 1
I2 = The smaller of ((1 + 1) * 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the
maximum percentage increment)
ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 2 (using I2):
X2 = 0.2 * $1,000,000 = $200,000
iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = $1,200,000
Round 2 (3 New Bids, High Bid = $2,000,000)
i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the
smoothing formula:
A2 = (0.5 * 3) + (0.5 * 1) = 2
I3 = The smaller of ((1 + 2) * 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the
maximum percentage increment)
ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 3 (using I3):
X3 = 0.2 * $2,000,000 = $400,000
iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = $2,400,000
Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = $2,400,000)
i. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the
smoothing formula:
A3 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 2) = 1.5
I4 = The smaller of ( (1 + 1.5) * 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the
maximum percentage increment)
ii. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 4 (using I4):
X4 = 0.2 * $2,400,000 = $480,000
iii. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = $2,880,000
31. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the difference
between the minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum percentage
increment, and the minimum opening bid. That is, I = (minimum opening
bid)(1 + N){rounded{time} -(minimum opening bid). Therefore, when N
equals 0.1, the first additional bid amount will be approximately ten
percent higher than the minimum opening bid; the second, twenty
percent; the third, thirty percent; etc.
32. In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has
been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second
highest bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are
calculated using the difference between the second highest bid times
one plus the minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second
highest bid.
33. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
acceptable bids and bid increments if it determines that circumstances
so dictate. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the FCC Automated
Auction System. The Bureau seeks comment on these proposals.
D. High Bids
34. At the end of a bidding round, a high bid for each license will
be determined based on the highest gross bid amount received for the
license. In the event of identical high bids on a license in a given
round (i.e., tied bids), we propose to use a random number generator to
select a single high bid from among the tied bids. If the auction were
to end with no higher bids being placed for that license, the winning
bidder would be the one that placed the selected high bid. However, the
remaining bidders, as well as the high bidder, can submit higher bids
in subsequent rounds. If any bids are received on the license in a
subsequent round, the high bid again will be determined by the highest
gross bid amount received for the license.
35. A high bid will remain the high bid until there is a higher bid
on the same license at the close of a subsequent round. A high bid from
a previous round is sometimes referred to as a ``standing high bid.''
Bidders are reminded that standing high bids confer activity.
E. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal
36. For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes the following bid
removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding
period, a bidder has the option of removing any bid placed in that
round. By removing selected bids in the bidding system, a bidder may
effectively ``unsubmit'' any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal
payment. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid.
37. A high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids from previous
rounds using the withdraw function in the bidding system. A high bidder
that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject
to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission rules. The
Bureau seeks comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal
procedures.
38. In the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 65 FR 52401, August 29,
2000, the Commission explained that allowing bid withdrawals
facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses and the pursuit of
efficient backup strategies as information becomes available during the
course of an auction. The Commission noted, however, that, in some
instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for improper reasons. The
Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the auction, to limit
the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding abuses. The Commission
stated that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion,
consider limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw
bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the
Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the Commission's bid withdrawal
procedures.
39. Applying this reasoning, the Bureau proposes to limit each
bidder in Auction No. 57 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more
than two rounds during the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to
withdraw bids in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere
bidding or the use of withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The
two rounds in which withdrawals may be utilized will be at the bidder's
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the
Commission's rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high
bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals
are utilized. Withdrawals will remain
[[Page 21114]]
subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the
Commission's rules. The Bureau seeks comment on this proposal.
F. Stopping Rule
40. The Bureau has discretion ``to establish stopping rules before
or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the auction
within a reasonable time.'' For Auction No. 57, the Bureau proposes to
employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous stopping
rule means that all licenses remain available for bidding until bidding
closes simultaneously on all licenses.
41. Bidding will close simultaneously on all licenses after the
first round in which no new bids, proactive waivers, or withdrawals are
received. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding will
remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.
42. However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to
exercise any of the following options during Auction No. 57:
i. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule.
The modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses
after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver,
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing
a new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would
not keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau
further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
used at any time or only in stage two of the auction.
ii. Keep the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers
are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event,
the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive
waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual and a bidder
with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use
a remaining activity rule waiver.
iii. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds (``special stopping rule''). If the Bureau invokes
this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least
one of a specified preceding number of rounds.
43. The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, for example, where the auction is proceeding very
slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely
that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of time.
Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt to
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the number
of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum
bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still
a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.
III. Conclusion
44. Comments are due on or before April 23, 2004, and reply
comments are due on or before April 30, 2004. Because of the disruption
of regular mail and other deliveries in Washington, DC, the Bureau
requires that all comments and reply comments be filed electronically.
Comments and reply comments must be sent by electronic mail to the
following address: [email protected] The electronic mail containing
the comments or reply comments must include a subject or caption
referring to Auction No. 57 Comments and the name of the commenting
party. The Bureau requests that parties format any attachments to
electronic mail as Adobe[reg] Acrobat[reg] (pdf) or Microsoft[reg] Word
documents. Copies of comments and reply comments will be available for
public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public
Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC
20554. In addition, the Bureau requests that commenters fax a courtesy
copy of their comments and reply comments to the attention of Kathryn
Garland at (717) 338-2850.
45. This proceeding has been designated as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the
substance of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally required. Other rules pertaining to
oral and written ex parte presentations in permit-but-disclose
proceedings are set forth in Sec. 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.
Federal Communications Commission.
Gary Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auction and Spectrum Access Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. 04-9019 Filed 4-19-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
