[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 77 (Tuesday, April 22, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19628-19631]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-10332]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-313]
Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-51, issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), for
operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, located in Pope County,
Arkansas.
The proposed amendment would permit steam generator tubes with
intergranular corrosion indications that may exceed through-wall limits
to remain in service until the next refueling outage.
The proposed amendment is being processed under exigent
circumstances for the following reason. During the 1R13 refueling
outage, an eddy current technique was used for the satisfactory
completion of the ANO-1 steam generator inspection surveillance. The
technique used had been qualified per Appendix H of the EPRI ``PWR
Steam Generator Tube Examination Guidelines.'' This technique was used
to depth size all intergranular attack flaws within the upper
tubesheet. As required by the technical specifications, all upper tube
sheet IGA indications with a depth size of greater than the plugging
limit as determined by the qualified sizing technique, were also
removed from service by plugging.
During the steam generator inspections, three tube samples
containing upper tubesheet IGA flaws were removed from the ``B'' OTSG
and sent offsite to be analyzed for future development of an alternate
repair criteria and to further support the qualified eddy current
sizing technique employed during refueling outages. The preliminary
destructive examination results were recently received by the ANO
staff. This data arrived approximately 5 months after the resumption of
operation following the steam generator inspections that occurred
during 1R13. These results indicate that the flaw depths do not
correlate well with the depths sized using the qualified eddy current
technique. Upon further review, ANO has determined that the application
of the sizing criterion is no longer valid. With the qualified sizing
technique invalidated, there is a potential that tubes could have been
left in service with indications that have through-wall depths greater
than the plugging limit specified in the technical specifications. This
would be considered a condition that is not allowed by the technical
specifications. Prior to the receipt of the preliminary destructive
examination results, ANO had no reason to question the adequacy of the
steam generator inspections that occurred during 1R13.
Based on the developments described above, on April 9, 1997, the
NRC verbally issued a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED). The NOED
was documented by letter dated April 11, 1997. The NOED expressed NRC's
intention to exercise discretion in enforcing compliance with portions
of the technical specifications related to steam generator tubes. The
NOED will remain in effect until an exigent technical specification
amendment is processed but in no case later than May 7, 1997.
[[Page 19629]]
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
An evaluation of the proposed change has been performed in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(1) regarding no significant hazards
considerations using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A discussion
of these standards as they relate to this amendment request follows:
Criterion 1--Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the
Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.
The steam generators are used to remove heat from the reactor
coolant system during normal operation and during accident
conditions. The steam generator tubing forms a substantial portion
of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. A steam generator tube
failure is a violation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and
is a specific accident analyzed in the ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report.
The purpose of the periodic surveillance performed on the steam
generator in accordance with ANO-1 Technical Specification 4.18, is
to ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the
reactor coolant system (RCS) will be maintained. The technical
specification (TS) plugging limit of 40% of the nominal tube wall
thickness requires tubes to be repaired or removed from service
because the tube may become unserviceable prior to the next
inspection. Unserviceable is defined in the TS as the condition of a
tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its
structural integrity in the event of an operating basis earthquake,
a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line break.[sic] Of these
accidents, the most severe condition with respect to patch
intergranular attack (IGA) degradation within the upper tube sheet
is the main steam line break (MSLB). During this event the
differential pressure across the tube could be as high as 2500 psid.
The rupture of a tube during this event could permit the flow of
reactor coolant into the secondary coolant system thus bypassing the
containment.
From testing performed on simulated flaws within the tubesheet
it has been shown that the patch IGA indications within the upper
tubesheet left in service during 1R13 with potential depths greater
than the plugging limit, do not represent structurally significant
flaws which would increase the probability of a tube failure beyond
that currently assumed in the ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report.
Burst tests were conducted on tubing with simulated flaws within
the tubesheet. In these tests, through-wall holes of varying sizes
up to 0.5 inch in diameter were drilled in test specimens. The
flawed specimen tubes were then inserted into a simulated tubesheet
and pressurized. In all cases the tube burst away from the flaw in
that portion of tube that was outside the tubesheet. The size of
these simulated flaws bound the indications left in service within
the upper tubesheet during 1R13. These tests demonstrate for flaws
similar to the patch IGA found in the ANO-1 upper tubesheet that the
tubes will not fail at this location under accident conditions.
The dose consequences of a MSLB accident are analyzed in the
ANO-1 accident analysis. This analysis assumes the unit is operating
with a 1 gpm steam generator tube leak and that the unit has been
operating with 1% defective fuel.
Increased leakage during a postulated MSLB accident resulting
from the patch IGA left in service in the upper tube sheet is not
expected. IGA has been present in the ANO-1 steam generators for
many years with no known leakage attributed to this damage
mechanism. Because of its localized nature and morphology, the flaw
does not open under accident pressure conditions.
This change allows continued operation with IGA indications
within the upper tube sheet with the potential of through-wall
depths greater than the technical specification plugging limit.
Continued operation with these flaws present does not result in a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated for ANO-1.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
Criterion 2--Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or
Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.
The steam generators are passive components. The intent of the
technical specification surveillance requirements are being met by
this change in that adequate structural and leakage integrity will
be maintained. Additionally, the proposed change does not introduce
any new modes of plant operation.
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
Criterion 3--Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the
Margin of Safety.
The ANO-1 Technical Specification Bases specify that the
surveillance requirements (which includes the plugging limits) are
to ensure the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS
pressure boundary. The technical specification plugging limit of 40%
of the nominal tube wall thickness requires tubes to be repaired or
removed from service because the tube may become unserviceable prior
to the next inspection. Unserviceable is defined in the technical
specification as the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a
defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event
of an operating basis earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a
MSLB.[sic] Of these accidents the most severe condition with respect
to IGA within the upper tubesheet is the MSLB.
Testing of tubes with representative IGA flaws removed from ANO-
1 OTSGs during 1R13, showed the flawed tubes to be capable of
withstanding differential pressures in excess of 10,000 psid without
the presence of the tubesheet. Testing of simulated through-wall
flaws of up to 0.5 inch in diameter within a tubesheet showed that
the tubes always failed outside of the tubesheet. Thus the
structural requirements listed in the bases of the technical
specification is satisfied considering this change.
Leakage under accident conditions would be limited due to the
small size and morphology of the flaws and would be low enough to
ensure offsite dose limits are not exceeded.
Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
In conclusion, based upon the reasoning presented above and the
previous discussion of the amendment request, Entergy Operations has
determined that the requested change does not involve a significant
hazards consideration.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice
[[Page 19630]]
of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action
will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules
Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and
Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice.
Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint
North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to
4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be
examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L
Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By May 22, 1997, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech
University, Russellville, AR 72801. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 14 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 14 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing.
The petitioner must also provide references to those specific
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the
petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion.
Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine
dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the
amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if
proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails
to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with
respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate
as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the
hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and
Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of
the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so
inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at
1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the
following message addressed to Dr. William Beckner: petitioner's name
and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A
copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
and to Winston & Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, 20005-3502,
attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated April 11, 1997, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room, located at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech
University, Russellville, AR 72801.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of April, 1997.
[[Page 19631]]
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
George Kalman,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-1, Division of Reactor
Projects--III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-10332 Filed 4-21-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
