[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 78 (Thursday, April 23, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20219-20221]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-10843]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-423]
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-49 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the licensee) for
operation of Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, located in New
London County, Connecticut.
The proposed change to Technical Specification 3/4.4.3,
Pressurizer, would replace the pressurizer maximum water inventory
requirement with a pressurizer maximum indicated level requirement. The
proposed amendment would also make editorial changes and modify the
associated Bases section.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) has reviewed the
proposed revision in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded
that the revision does not involve a significant hazards
consideration (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three
criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are not satisfied. The proposed revision
does not involve [an] SHC because the revision would not:
1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequence of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed Technical Specification provides added restrictions
on pressurizer level to ensure that the pressurizer will not
overfill or empty in a transient and that RCS [reactor coolant
system] pressure control will
[[Page 20220]]
be maintained. The proposed Technical Specification requires
pressurizer level to be maintained at the programmed level. The
programmed level is a curve that varies linearly from 28% at no load
Tave to 61.5% at full power Tave. This is more
restrictive than the current upper limit of 92% of volume and
provides added assurance that pressurizer overfill will not occur
for those events where prevention of overfill is a criterion and
that the pressurizer would not empty due to a transient. In
addition, it assures that there is enough steam space available to
prevent RCS overpressurization in a transient. This requirement also
applies to manual operation to ensure that pressurizer level is
maintained in a band around the programmed level of +/-6% of full
scale. A two hour restriction on operation with pressurizer level
not within programmed level +/-6% of full scale has been added. This
will provide added assurance that operator error in pressurizer
level control will not result in a transient. Based on the above,
the changes do not negatively impact the probability of occurrence
of the previously evaluated accidents.
For Modes 1 and 2, the Chapter 15 FSAR [Final Safety Analysis
Report] accident analysis assumes that pressurizer level is being
maintained by the automatic control system at the programmed level.
For most of the accident analysis, pressurizer level is assumed to
be at 61.5% for power conditions and 28% for hot zero power. For
events where pressurizer level overfill is a concern, initial
pressurizer level is assumed to be 6% over the nominal value of
61.5% at full power. This bounds the automatic control system
uncertainty as documented in WCAP 14353. Thus, the proposed
Technical Specification LCO [Limiting Condition for Operation] for
Modes 1 and 2 is consistent with the Chapter 15 FSAR accident
analysis. When pressurizer level is being maintained by manual
operator action, a 6% operating band is specified. This band is
consistent with the 6% error assumed for the pressurizer overfill
events, but it does not take into account instrument uncertainty.
Because of the infrequent use of manual operation combined with the
multiple main board indications and the randomness associated with
instrumentation uncertainty, it is unnecessary to apply instrument
uncertainty effects on top of the operating band. As such, the 6%
band is bounded by the current Chapter 15 FSAR analysis. Thus, it is
concluded that the proposed Technical Specification is consistent
with analysis assumptions.
With regard to Mode 3 operation, an evaluation has been
performed for those events analyzed in Chapter 15 for Mode 3. The
only accident analysis provided in Chapter 15 of the FSAR for Mode 3
is the boron dilution event. Pressurizer level has no impact on the
results. As stated in the evaluation, the other events either would
not occur, or the plant response would be extremely slow or not
meaningful without power generation.
For Inadvertent Operation of ECCS [emergency core cooling
system] that Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory, the MP3 [Millstone
Unit 3] FSAR Section 15.5.1 clearly identifies this transient as an
event evaluated at Power Operation. This is consistent with SRP
[Standard Review Plan] Section 15.5.1-15.5.2 where the initial power
condition is specified as the licensed core thermal power with
allowance for measurement uncertainty. Thus, the current licensing
basis does not require analysis of this event for the shutdown
modes, including Modes 3 and 4.
Thus, the current specification which assures that a steam
bubble exists in Mode 3 is sufficient [ ] to ensure consistency with
the accident analysis assumptions.
Therefore, the proposed revision does not involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
The Technical Specification changes provide tighter restrictions
on pressurizer level to ensure that pressurizer level will be
controlled as intended. The Bases change better reflects what
assures the validity of the accident analyses assumptions and the
bases for the maximum level. A two hour restriction on operation
with pressurizer level not within +/-6% (full scale) has been added.
This provides added assurance that pressurizer level will be
maintained consistent with the accident analysis initial condition
assumption. The changes provide added assurance that RCS pressure
control will be maintained and reduces the likelihood of pressurizer
emptying or overfill. These changes modify neither accident
mitigation nor system response post-accident.
Therefore, the proposed revision does not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The Technical Specification changes provided are consistent with
the initial condition assumed in the Chapter 15 accident analysis by
placing tighter restrictions on pressurizer level. The Chapter 15
FSAR accident analysis assumes that pressurizer level is being
maintained by the automatic control system at the programmed level.
For most of the accident analysis, pressurizer level is assumed to
be at 61.5% for power conditions and 28% for hot zero power. For
events where pressurizer overfill is a concern, initial pressurizer
level is assumed to be 6% above the nominal value of 61.5% at full
power. This bounds the automatic control system uncertainty as
documented in WCAP 14353. Thus, the proposed Technical Specification
LCO for Modes 1 and 2 is consistent with the Chapter 15 FSAR
accident analysis. When pressurizer level is being maintained by
manual operator action, a 6% operating band is specified. This band
is consistent with the 6% error assumed for the pressurizer overfill
events, but it does not take into account instrument uncertainty.
Because of the infrequent use of manual operation combined with the
multiple main board indications and the randomness associated with
instrumentation uncertainty, it is unnecessary to apply instrument
uncertainty effects on top of the operating band. As such, the 6%
band is bounded by the current Chapter 15 FSAR analysis. For Mode 3,
the current specification which assures that a steam bubble exists
in Mode 3 is sufficient to assure consistency with the accident
analysis assumptions. The Bases are modified to reflect the proposed
changes and define the consistency with the Chapter 15 accident
analysis. Therefore, the change does not reduce the margin of
safety.
Therefore, the proposed revision does not involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
In conclusion, based on the information provided, it is
determined that the proposed revision does not involve an SHC.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received
[[Page 20221]]
may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building,
2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By May 26, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and at the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut. If a request for a hearing or
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of
hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior
Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270,
Hartford, Connecticut, 06141-0270, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(I)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated April 7, 1998, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and at the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope
Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of April 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Daniel G. McDonald Jr.,
Senior Project Manager, Special Projects Office--Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-10843 Filed 4-22-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
