[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 79 (Thursday, April 24, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 20001-20002]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-10611]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
A Study of the Nonproliferation Implications of Chemical
Separation of Aluminum-based Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Request for comments on nonproliferation study's scope and
proposed outline.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to prepare
a study on the nuclear nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and
scheduling) implications of chemically separating (i.e., reprocessing)
aluminum-based research reactor spent nuclear fuel at DOE's Savannah
River Site, and requests comments from the public on the scope and
proposed outline of the study. The objective of the study is to assess
the nonproliferation benefits and disadvantages, and cost and timing
issues involved with chemically separating aluminum-based research
reactor spent nuclear fuel. The study will also identify potential ways
to mitigate any disadvantages identified by the study. DOE announced
its intent to perform this study in the Record of Decision on a Nuclear
Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor
Spent Nuclear Fuel. Although the Record of Decision specified that the
study would only address foreign research reactor spent fuel, the
Department has subsequently decided also to cover domestic research
reactor spent fuel at the Savannah River Site in the study because
many, if not all, of the same considerations that apply to management
of the foreign spent fuel also apply to the domestic spent fuel. The
Department of Energy has already proposed to manage domestic spent
research reactor fuel in a manner consistent with foreign spent
research reactor fuel.
DATES: Comments on the scope and proposed outline for the study must be
postmarked or submitted by fax or electronic mail by May 27, 1997 to
ensure that they will be considered in the drafting of this study.
Comments received after the close of the comment period will be
considered to the extent practicable. DOE plans to hold at least two
public meetings (in Washington, D.C. and near the Savannah River Site)
to discuss the draft study. The locations, dates, and times for these
meetings will be announced later by appropriate means.
ADDRESSES: Questions and comments concerning the Study of the
Nonproliferation and Other Implications of Chemical Separation of
Aluminum-based Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, as well as comments
on the scope of the study, may be submitted by writing to: Spent Fuel
Nonproliferation Study, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation,
NN-42/JBW, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20585.
Questions and comments can also be submitted via electronic mail
at: Assessment@hq.doe.gov. Questions and comments may also be submitted
to the following toll-free telephone numbers: phone 800-930-2014 or fax
800-930-2019.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Record of Decision on a Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel, 61 FR 25091, May 17,1996, stated, in part, that:
In order to provide a sound policy basis for making a
determination on whether and how to utilize the F-Canyon for
chemical separation tasks that are not driven by health and safety
considerations, DOE will commission or conduct an independent study
of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing)
implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from
foreign research reactors. The study * * * will be completed in a
timely fashion to allow a subsequent decision about possible * * *
chemical separation of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel
to be fully considered by the public, the Congress and Executive
Branch agencies.
Background
Following completion of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on
a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-218F of
February 1996), DOE and the Department of State decided to implement a
new policy for accepting from foreign research reactors spent nuclear
fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States (Record of
Decision, 61 FR 25091). Implementation of this policy will result in
the acceptance by the United States of up to 22,700 individual spent
nuclear fuel elements [about 19.2 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM)].
Of the total, about 17,800 elements (about 18.2 MTHM) are aluminum-
based spent fuel elements which have been assigned to DOE's Savannah
River Site for management. The remaining foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel elements (about 1 MTHM) will be managed at the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory.
In the Record of Decision, DOE announced that it will implement the
new spent fuel acceptance policy through a three-point strategy. First,
DOE has initiated an accelerated program to identify, develop, and
demonstrate one or more non-reprocessing, cost-effective treatment and/
or packaging technologies to prepare the foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel for ultimate disposal. The purpose of these technologies
would be to put the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel into a
form or package that is suitable for geologic disposal and meets all
applicable safety and environmental requirements, without necessarily
separating the fissile materials. Examples of such treatment or
packaging technologies could include: (1) press and dilute or poison,
(2) melt and dilute or poison, (3) plasma arc treatment, (4)
electrometallurgical treatment, (5) glass materials oxidation and
dissolution, (6) dissolve and vitrify, (7) direct disposal in small
packages, and (8) direct co-disposal with high-level radioactive
waste.\1\
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\1\ These alternatives are discussed in ``Technical Strategy for
the Treatment, Packaging, and Disposal of Aluminum-Based Spent
Nuclear Fuel: A Report of the Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
Task Team,'' Volume I, June 1996, United States Department of
Energy.
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[[Page 20002]]
DOE would select, develop, and implement, if possible, one or more
of these treatment or packaging technologies by the year 2000. After
treatment and/or packaging, the foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel would be managed onsite in ``road ready'' dry storage until
transported offsite for continued storage elsewhere or for disposal.
DOE is committed to avoiding indefinite storage of this spent nuclear
fuel in a form that is unsuitable for disposal.
The second part of this strategy addresses the possibility that,
despite DOE's best efforts, a new treatment and/or packaging technology
may not be ready for implementation by the year 2000. In this instance,
the Department has stated that it will consider chemically separating
some of the foreign research reactor spent fuel elements, if Savannah
River Site canyon operations are still being conducted to stabilize at-
risk materials in accordance with the Records of Decision (60 FR 65300
of December 19, 1995, 61 FR 6633 of February 21, 1996 and 61 FR 48474
of September 6, 1996) issued after completion of the Interim Management
of Nuclear Materials Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0220
of October 1995). In order to provide a sound policy basis for
determining whether and how to use chemical separation when health and
safety considerations are not implicated, DOE committed to commission
or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other
(e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemically separating spent
nuclear fuel \2\ from foreign research reactors (i.e., the study
discussed in this request for comments). Although the Record of
Decision specified that the study would only address foreign research
reactor spent fuel, the Department has subsequently decided also to
cover domestic research reactor spent fuel at the Savannah River Site
in the study since many, if not all, of the same considerations that
apply to management of the foreign spent fuel also apply to the
domestic spent fuel.
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\2\ The term ``spent nuclear fuel,'' in the context of the
planned study, includes domestic as well as foreign research reactor
fuel, and target material from research reactors.
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The third part of DOE's strategy for managing foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel involves closely monitoring the spent fuel
placed in wet storage at the Savannah River Site to allow prompt
detection of any health or safety problems that might arise. DOE
currently is unaware of any technical basis for believing that this
spent nuclear fuel cannot be safely stored until one or more of the new
packaging and/or treatment technologies becomes available.
Nevertheless, if health and safety concerns involving any of the
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel are identified prior to
development of an appropriate new treatment or packaging technology,
DOE would use either or both of the reprocessing facilities at the
Savannah River Site, if those facilities are operating, to process the
affected spent fuel elements.
Scope of the Study
This request for comments presents the scope of the study of the
nonproliferation implications, including cost and scheduling aspects,
of possible chemical separation of the foreign and domestic research
reactor spent nuclear fuel in DOE's inventory at the Savannah River
Site, for reasons other than health and safety. The study will examine
the following issues:
(1) nonproliferation impacts of chemical separation of the foreign
and domestic research reactor spent nuclear fuel in either or both of
the Savannah River Site reprocessing canyons;
(2) comparable nonproliferation impacts of other alternatives for
managing the spent nuclear fuel;
(3) potential ways to mitigate any nonproliferation disadvantages
associated with chemical separation of this spent fuel; and
(4) the impacts of cost and scheduling considerations on
nonproliferation implications.
In examining these issues, the following outline is proposed:
Study Outline 3
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\3\ This outline is included to indicate the types of
information that the Department plans to include in the study and
how it might be presented. The Department may revise the outline, as
the study progresses, as appropriate.
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I. Introduction
A review of the origins of the proposed study in the
Record of Decision on a Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (61 FR 25091).
Scope, factors for analysis, and plan of the study.
II. Background and Context
U.S. nonproliferation policy dealing with the
proliferation risks of fissile materials, including highly enriched
uranium (HEU).
The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
(RERTR) Program.
The use of weapons-usable fissile material in the civilian
nuclear fuel cycle.
Research reactor spent nuclear fuel--acceptance,
inventories, status and expectations.
Status and future of DOE reprocessing facilities.
New technologies and other alternatives for disposal of
spent nuclear fuel without chemical separation.4
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\4\ These alternatives may include, but are not necessarily
limited to, direct disposal, HEU dilution, and advanced treatment
technologies as discussed in the report cited in footnote 1.
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III. Technological Aspects of Chemical Separation Versus Alternative
Treatments
Description of treatment technology.
Quantities of foreign and domestic fuels under study.
Scheduling the input/output stream.
Relative cost.
Physical form of output products.
IV. Nonproliferation Impacts of Chemical Separation Versus Alternative
Treatments
Reducing access to weapons-usable materials.
Reducing inventories of weapons capable materials abroad.
U.S. nonproliferation and arms control policy and goals.
Foreign fuel cycle choices and policies.
Foreign cooperation with the United States on broader
nonproliferation issues.
IAEA safeguards and transparency.
Broader U.S. policies on storage and disposition of excess
weapons-usable fissile materials.
Cost and/or schedule implications for nonproliferation.
V. Implications for Other Fuels Under DOE Management
Domestic research reactor fuels.
Other materials.
VI. Possible Mitigation Steps for Nonproliferation Disadvantages
VII. Conclusions
Issued in Washington, D.C. on April 15, 1997.
Cherie P. Fitzgerald,
Acting Director, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation.
[FR Doc. 97-10611 Filed 4-23-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
