[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 80 (Tuesday, April 26, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-10008]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: April 26, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-458]
Entergy Operations, Inc.; Consideration of Issuance of Amendment
to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards
Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-47 issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) for operation
of the River Bend Station, Unit 1, located in West Feliciana Parish,
Louisiana.
The proposed amendment would revise various instrumentation
technical specifications by extending the allowable outage times (AOTs)
of the instruments, and by increasing their channel functional
surveillance test intervals (STIs) to quarterly. The amendment also
revises certain technical specification actions to address loss-of-
function concerns associated with the AOT and STI changes.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
Reactor Protection System (RPS)
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
These proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant
design or operation, they simply involve the frequency at which
testing of the RPS instrumentation is performed and the allowable
outage time (AOT) for instruments. Failure of the RPS
instrumentation itself cannot create an accident. As a result, these
proposed changes cannot increase the probability of occurrence of
any design basis accident previously evaluated.
As identified in NEDC-30851P, these proposed changes increase
the average RPS failure frequency from 4.6 x 10-6/year to
5.4 x 10-6/year. This increase (8 x 10-7/year) is
considered to be insignificant. As identified in the NRC Staff's
Safety Evaluation Report of NEDC-30851P, this increase in average
RPS failure frequency would contribute to a very small increase in
core-melt frequency. The small increase in average RPS failure
frequency is offset by safety benefits such as a reduction in the
number of inadvertent test-induced scrams, a reduction in wear due
to excessive equipment test cycling, and better optimization of
plant personnel resources. Hence, the net change in risk resulting
from these proposed changes would be insignificant. Therefore, these
proposed changes do not result in a significant increase in either
the probability or the consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in any change to the plant
design or operation, only to the AOT and frequency at which testing
of the RPS instrumentation is performed. Since failure of the RPS
instrumentation itself cannot create an accident, these proposed
changes can at most affect only accidents which have been previously
evaluated. Therefore, these proposed changes cannot create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
As identified above, these proposed changes increase the average
RPS failure frequency from 4.6x10-6/year to 5.4x10-6/year.
The NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report of NEDC-30851P concluded
that this small average RPS failure frequency increase would
contribute to a very small increase in core-melt frequency. This
small increase in average RPS failure frequency would be offset by
safety benefits such as a reduction in the number of inadvertent
test-induced scrams, a reduction on wear due to excessive equipment
test cycling, and better optimization of plant personnel resources.
Hence, the net change in risk resulting from these proposed changes
would be insignificant. In addition, RBS has confirmed that the
proposed changes to the functional test intervals will not result in
excessive instrument drift relative to the current established
setpoints. Therefore, these proposed changes do not result in a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
These proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant
design or operation, they simply involve the frequency at which
testing of the ECCS actuation Instrumentation is performed and the
allowable outage time (AOT) for instruments. Failure of the ECCS
actuation instrumentation itself cannot create an accident. As a
result, these proposed changes cannot increase the probability of
occurrence of any design basis accident previously evaluated.
As identified in NEDC-30936P (Part 2), these proposed changes
increase the calculated average water injection failure frequency
from 1.952x10-5 to 1.992x10-5 per year for Case 5B and
from 1.386x10-4 to 1.401x10-4 per year for Case 5C. This
represents an increase of 4x10-7 for Case 5B (2.0%) and
1.5x10-6 for Case 5C (1.1%), which are well within the
acceptance criteria (4%) provided in NEDC-30936P (Part 2). The small
increase in average water injection failure frequency is offset by
safety benefits such as a reduction in the number of inadvertent
test-induced scrams, a reduction in wear due to excessive equipment
test cycling, and better optimization of plant personnel resources.
Hence, the net change in risk resulting from these proposed changes
would be insignificant. Therefore, these proposed changes do not
result in a significant increase in either the probability or the
consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in any change to the plant
design or operation, only to the AOT and frequency at which testing
of the ECCS actuation instrumentation is performed. Since failure of
the ECCS actuation instrumentation itself cannot create an accident,
these proposed changes can at most affect only accidents which have
been previously evaluated. Therefore, these proposed changes cannot
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
As identified above, these proposed changes increase the
calculated average water injection failure frequency from
1.952x10-5 to 1.992x10-5 per year for Case 5B and from
1.386x10-4 to 1.401x10-4 per year for Case 5C. This
increase is well within the acceptance criteria found acceptable in
the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report for NEDC-30936P (Part 2).
This small increase in average ECCS actuation failure frequency
would be offset by safety benefits such as a reduction in the number
of inadvertent test-induced scrams, a reduction on wear due to
excessive equipment test cycling, and better optimization of plant
personnel resources. Hence, the net change in risk resulting from
these proposed changes would be insignificant. In addition, RBS has
confirmed that the proposed changes to the functional test intervals
will not result in excessive instrument drift relative to the
current, established setpoints. Therefore, the proposed changes do
not result in a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Control Rod Block Instrumentation
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
These proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant
design or operation, only the Allowable Outage Time (AOT) and
frequency at which testing of the Control Rod Block Instrumentation
is performed. Failure of the Control Rod Block instrumentation
itself cannot create an accident. As a result, these proposed
changes cannot increase the probability of occurrence of any design
basis accident previously evaluated.
As identified in NEDC-30851P, Supplement 1, these proposed
changes increase the average Control Rod Block failure frequency
less than 0.06%. As provided in the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation
Report of NEDC-30851P, Supplement 1, this increase is very slight
and is offset by the safety benefits associated with the proposed
changes to the RPS and Control Rod Block Instrumentation. As a
result, the combined effect of the changes proposed for the RPS and
Control Rod Block Instrumentation requirements should result in an
overall improvement in plant safety. Therefore, these proposed
changes do not result in a significant increase in either the
probability or the consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in any change to the plant
design or operation, only to the AOT and frequency at which testing
of the Control Rod Block instrumentation is performed. Since failure
of the Control Rod Block instrumentation itself cannot create an
accident, these proposed changes can at most affect only accidents
which have been previously evaluated. Therefore, these proposed
changes cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
As identified above, these proposed changes increase the average
Control Rod Block failure frequency less than 0.06%. This increase
is very slight and is offset by the safety benefits associated with
the proposed changes to the RPS and Control Rod Block
Instrumentation. As a result, the combined effect of the changes
proposed for the RPS and Control Rod Block Instrumentation
requirements should result in an overall improvement in plant
safety. In addition, RBS has confirmed that the proposed changes to
the functional test intervals will not result in excessive
instrument drift relative to the current, established setpoints.
Therefore, the proposed changes do not result in a significant
reduction in a margin of safety.
Isolation Actuation Instrumentation
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
These proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant
design or operation, only the Allowable Outage Time (AOT) and
frequency at which testing of the Isolation Actuation
instrumentation is performed. Failure of the Isolation Actuation
instrumentation itself cannot create an accident. As a result, these
proposed changes cannot increase the probability of occurrence of
any design basis accident previously evaluated.
As identified in NEDC-30851P, Supplement 2, these proposed
changes to the surveillance test interval requirements for the
Isolation Actuation instruments which are common to RPS or ECCS have
a negligible (less than 1%) impact on the average isolation
unavailability when combined with the individual valve failure
probability, and that the changes to the AOTs has [have] less than a
2% impact. The analyses demonstrate that the individual valve
failure probabilities dominate the overall isolation failure
probability. As provided in the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report
of NEDC-30851P, Supplement 2, these proposed changes would have a
very small impact on plant risk. As a result, overall plant safety
is not reduced by these proposed changes.
As identified in NEDC-31677P, the proposed changes to the
requirements for Isolation Actuation instrumentation not common to
RPS or ECCS result in a small decrease of 1.97x10-8/year in the
average isolation failure frequency. As identified in the NRC
Staff's Safety Evaluation Report of NEDC-31677P, the NRC agreed that
these proposed changes are acceptable because the failure frequency
impact is minimal. As a result, overall plant safety is not reduced
by these proposed changes.
The small increase in the average failure frequency of the
instruments common to RPS or ECCS due to the proposed changes to the
Isolation Actuation instrumentation requirements is offset by safety
benefits such as a reduction on the number of inadvertent test-
induced scrams and engineered safety feature actuations, a reduction
in wear due to excessive test cycling, and better optimization of
plant personnel resources. Hence, the net change in risk resulting
from these proposed changes would be insignificant. Therefore, these
proposed changes do not result in a significant increase in either
the probability or the consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in any change to the plant
design or operation, only to the AOT and frequency at which testing
of the Isolation Actuation instrumentation is performed. Since
failure of the Isolation Actuation instrumentation itself cannot
create an accident, these proposed changes can at most affect only
accidents which have been previously evaluated.
Therefore, these proposed changes cannot create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
As identified above, the proposed changes to the requirements
for Isolation Actuation instruments common to RPS or ECCS have a
negligible impact on the average isolation unavailability when
combined with the individual valve failure probability. The analyses
demonstrate that the individual valve failure probabilities dominate
the overall isolation failure probability.
The proposed changes to the requirements for Isolation Actuation
instruments not common to RPS or ECCS decrease their average
isolation failure frequency approximately 1.97x10-8/year.
The small increase in average Isolation Actuation
instrumentation failure frequency of the instruments common to RPS
or ECCS are offset by the safety benefits such as a reduction on the
number of inadvertent test-induced scrams and engineered safety
feature actuations, a reduction in wear due to excessive test
cycling, and better optimization of plant personnel resources. As a
result, the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Reports for these BWROG
report concluded that these proposed changes would have a very small
impact on plant risk. In addition, RBS has confirmed that the
proposed changes to the functional test intervals will not result in
excessive instrument drift relative to the current, established
setpoints. Therefore, the proposed changes do not result in a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Other Technical Specification Instrumentation
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
These proposed changes do not involve a change to the plant
design or operation, only the Allowable Outage Time (AOT) and
frequency at which testing of the associated instrumentation is
performed. These instruments are designed to mitigate the
consequences of previously analyzed accidents. Failure of these
instruments cannot increase, and is independent of, the probability
of occurrence of such accidents. As a result, these proposed changes
cannot increase the probability of any accident previously
evaluated. As identified in GENE-770-06-01, although not
specifically analyzed, these proposed changes are bounded by the
results of the analyses discussed in Parts I through IV of this
request. Such analyses have shown that the safety function failure
frequency is not significantly impacted by similar proposed changes.
In addition, any increase in the probability of failure of these
instruments to perform their required functions would be offset by
safety benefits such as a reduction in the number of inadvertent
test-induced scrams and engineered safety features actuations, a
reduction in wear due to excessive equipment test cycling, and
better optimization of plant personnel resources. Therefore, these
proposed changes do not result in a significant increase in the
probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in any change to the plant
design or operation, only to the AOT and frequency at which testing
of the associated instrumentation is performed. As a result, these
proposed changes can at most affect only accidents which have been
previously evaluated. Therefore, these proposed changes cannot
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
As identified in GENE-770-06-01, although not specifically
analyzed, these proposed changes are bounded by the results of the
analyses discussed in Parts I through IV of this request. Such
analyses have shown that the safety function failure frequency is
not significantly impacted by similar proposed changes. In addition,
any increase in the probability of failure of these instruments to
perform their required functions would be offset by safety benefits
such as a reduction in the number of inadvertent test-induced scrams
and engineered safety features actuations, a reduction in wear due
to excessive equipment test cycling, and better optimization of
plant personnel resources. As a result, these proposed changes will
reduce overall plant risk. In addition, RBS has confirmed that the
proposed changes to the functional test intervals will not result in
excessive instrument drift relative to the current, established
setpoints. Therefore, these proposed changes do not involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Technical Specification Changes Relating to Loss-of-Function Issues
1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase
in the probability or consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
The proposed changes associated with the ``loss-of-function''
checks ensure a plant configuration which would have the capability
to automatically actuate the respective system/valve(s). These
instruments are designated to mitigate the consequences of
previously analyzed accidents. Failure of these instruments cannot
increase, and is independent of, the probability of occurrence of
such accidents. As a result, the proposed changes cannot increase
the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed
changes do not involve a change to the plant design or operation and
do not degrade the capability of the system(s) to perform its
required function. Further, these functions or tripped channel(s) in
an isolation logic are not considered as initiators for any
accidents previously analyzed. Therefore, these changes do not
significantly increase the consequences of any accident previously
evaluated.
2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not result in any change to the plant
design and no new mode of plant operation is introduced. As a
result, the proposed changes can at most affect only accidents which
have been previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes do
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident
from any accident previously evaluated.
3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction
in the margin of safety.
The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety since the required safety function of the
inoperable channel(s) will be fulfilled. The allowable Outage Time
(AOT) for several trip functions have been increased but only in
conjunction with the incorporation of the loss-of-function check
which ensures a plant configuration which would have the capability
to automatically actuate the respective system/valve(s). Therefore,
the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this
action will occur very infrequently.
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be
delivered to room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC
20555.
The filing requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By May 26, 1994, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the local
public document room located at the Government Documents Department,
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803. If a request
for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above
date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
designated by the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition;
and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment requests involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services
Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room,
the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, by the
above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the
notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform
the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-
(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the
following message addressed to William D. Beckner, Director, Project
Directorate IV-1: petitioner's name and telephone number, date petition
was mailed, plant name, and publication date and page number of the
Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to
the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and to Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston &
Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005, attorney for the
licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitioners for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(l)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated January 14, 1994, which is available
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the
local public document room located at the Government Documents
Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of April, 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert G. Schaaf,
Acting Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-1, Division of Reactor
Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-10008 Filed 4-25-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
