[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 81 (Thursday, April 27, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20654-20657]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-10323]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 213
[Docket No. RST-94-3, Notice No. 1]
Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.
ACTION: Interim statement of policy.
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SUMMARY: FRA issues an interim statement of policy for the safety of
railroad bridges. FRA establishes suggested criteria for railroads to
use to ensure the structural integrity of bridges that carry railroad
tracks. FRA will subsequently make the interim statement of policy part
of the final rule amending 49 CFR part 213 (See 57 FR 54038, November
16, 1992). This final rule will reflect any changes that appear
necessary following public comment on the interim statement of policy.
DATES: Effective Date: The interim statement of policy is effective May
30, 1995. Written comments must be received no later than June 26,
1995. Comments received after that date will be considered to the
extent possible without incurring additional delay or expense.
ADDRESSES: Written comments on this policy should be submitted to the
Docket Clerk (RCC-30), Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Persons desiring to be notified that
their written comments have been received by FRA should submit a
stamped, self-addressed postcard with their comments. The Docket Clerk
will indicate on the postcard the date the comments were received and
return the postcard to the addressee. Written comments will be
available for examination, both before and after the closing date for
comments, during regular business hours in Room 8201 of the Nassif
Building at the above address.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge
Engineer, Office of Safety Enforcement, Federal Railroad
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590,
(Telephone: 202-366-0507), or Nancy Lummen Lewis, Trial Attorney,
Office of Chief Counsel, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, (Telephone 202-366-0635).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Beginning in 1991, FRA conducted a review of
the safety of railroad bridges. The review was prompted by the agency's
perception that the bridge population was aging, traffic density and
loads were increasing on many routes, and the consequences of a bridge
failure could be catastrophic.
I. Bridge Safety Survey
FRA counted the approximate number of bridges that carry railroad
track in the United States, and then surveyed the safety of those
bridges. The count revealed that
a. Approximately 100,700 bridges carried railroad tracks in 1991,
b. Approximately 10 bridges exist for every 14 miles of railroad,
and
c. Approximately 120 feet of track per mile is located on a bridge.
The safety survey accomplished several objectives. It determined
whether the condition of railroad bridges posed a significant hazard to
the safety of the public. It documented the methods used by the
railroad industry for the inspection, management and assurance of
safety of those bridges. It provided information with which FRA could
evaluate the need for federal action to improve the safety of railroad
bridges.
The survey assessed the policies and practices used by 80 railroads
to ensure the integrity of their bridges. The railroads surveyed
included 21 major railroads (including 14 class I railroads and seven
major passenger or commuter railroads), 20 class II regional railroads,
and 39 class III shortline railroads. The 21 class I and passenger
railroads are termed ``major railroads'' because they own most of the
railroad bridges and handle the majority of freight and passenger
traffic. In the course of the survey, FRA inspectors observed railroad
inspections of more than 8,000 bridges.
The survey showed that all of the 21 major railroads have conducted
comprehensive, effective bridge inspection programs for several
decades. The survey demonstrated that these railroads are acting to
safeguard the integrity of their bridges. The railroad managers know
the condition of their bridges, and they are taking appropriate action
to prevent structural failure. The findings for the 20 regional
railroads were similar to those of the major railroads.
The survey showed the major and regional railroads use a variety of
methods to inspect and manage their bridges. The degree to which
inspectors are supervised, the levels at which certain decisions are
made, and the methods used to record and report inspections vary
considerably among railroads. Nevertheless, these programs share
certain basic principles that characterize effective bridge management
practices.
The consistency of findings among the Class I and II railroads,
passenger operators, and many smaller railroads indicates that
railroads are following a course of action that corresponds with the
public interest in prevention of bridge failures. The railroads'
actions are driven by a need to prevent the significant economic harm
that result from the loss of a valuable bridge and the cost of
associated casualties.
On shortline railroads, however, FRA found considerable variation
in the quality of bridge management programs and bridge conditions.
Many shortlines have exemplary programs, well-suited to their size and
the nature of their structures and traffic. A few, however, did not
address all of their responsibilities for the safety of their bridges.
These smaller railroads with minimal bridge management programs
typically move low levels of traffic over a small number of bridges.
Nevertheless, the consequences of a bridge failure on one of these
railroads could be as severe as a failure occurring anywhere. The risk
of human casualty or environmental damage would be the same for each,
and the cost of the failure could be ruinous to a railroad with limited
resources. This finding indicates a situation that FRA must address.
[[Page 20655]]
II. The Safety Record of Railroad Bridges
During the past five decades, not one fatality has been caused by
the structural failure of a railroad bridge. Train accidents caused by
the structural failure of railroad bridges have been extremely rare.
Although the average construction date of railroad bridges predates
most highway bridges by several decades, the older railroad bridges
were designed to carry heavy steam locomotives. Design factors were
generally conservative, and the bridges' functional designs permit
repairs and reinforcements when necessary to maintain their viability.
Railroad bridges are most often privately, rather than publicly,
owned. Their owners seem to recognize the economic consequences of
neglecting important maintenance. Private ownership enables the
railroads to control the loads that operate over their bridges. Cars
and locomotives exceeding the nominal capacity of a bridge are not
operated without permission from the responsible bridge engineers, and
then only under restrictions and conditions that protect the integrity
of the bridge.
Many railroad bridges display superficial signs of deterioration
but still retain the capacity to safely carry their loads. Corrosion on
a bridge is not a safety issue unless a critical area sees significant
loss of material. Routine inspections are prescribed to detect this
condition, but determination of its effect requires a detailed
inspection and analysis of the bridge. In general, timber bridges
continue to function safely, and masonry structures built as early as
the 1830's remain functional and safe for their traffic.
Of the few train accidents that involved bridges, most have not
been caused by structural failure. FRA accident records for 1982
through 1993 show 15 train accidents that were caused by bridge
structural failures, including three that involved improper repair
procedures. These accidents caused no reportable injuries and a
reported $856,046 damage to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.
During the same period, 29 train accidents on or near bridges were
caused by track conditions on the bridge or its approaches. These
accidents caused no reportable injuries, and a reported $4,596,733
damage to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.
The same time period saw 19 train accidents on bridges caused by
external damage to the bridge, including three fires, 11 floods or
washouts, four bridges struck by motor vehicles, and one bridge struck
by a marine vessel. The accident at Mobile, Alabama on September 22,
1993 alone caused 47 fatalities, 102 non-fatal injuries, and over
$10,000,000 in property damage. The losses from these 19 accidents
totaled 47 fatalities, 124 non-fatal injuries, and $22,150,865 damage
to railroad facilities, cars and locomotives.
IV. Bridge Safety Policy
The severity of a train accident is usually compounded when a
bridge is involved, regardless of the cause of the accident. FRA must
retain its capability to deal effectively with any safety problems
involving the structural integrity of railroad bridges. At the same
time, FRA must assure that private and public resources are not
diverted unnecessarily from other programs that are also critical to
railroad safety.
At one extreme, FRA could respond to bridge issues only when
accidents occur or when someone contacts the agency about particular
concerns. However, such a reactive policy would inhibit FRA's ability
to detect impending problems with railroad bridges. At the other
extreme, FRA could regulate all aspects of railroad bridge management,
including inspection, rating, construction and maintenance. The expense
to the railroad industry of such a policy is not justified by the
findings of the safety survey.
Because the industry has no apparent systemic bridge safety
problem, FRA chooses to adopt a policy, rather than issue regulations,
to carry out its responsibility of protecting bridge safety. The policy
includes non-regulatory guidelines to inform railroad managers and all
concerned about current good practices related to bridge inspection and
management. The guidelines accommodate a wide variety of effective
bridge inspection and management methods.
Even without specific bridge safety regulations, FRA maintains
authority under 49 U.S.C. 20101 et seq. (formerly the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970) to inspect any railroad facility that affects
safety and, if necessary, to remove it from service. The guidelines
represent the general criteria against which FRA will evaluate each
railroad's bridge inspection and management program.
FRA does not expect that its policy will unnecessarily divert
resources away from the functional work of bridge management by forcing
railroads to change effective bridge management programs. Likewise, the
policy should not require FRA to divert public resources to employ a
large staff of bridge specialists.
FRA will revise the guidelines as necessary to accomplish the
objectives of the bridge safety program. To that end, FRA will continue
to monitor and evaluate the railroads' bridge inspection and management
programs to guarantee that those responsible for the safety of bridges
continue to meet their responsibilities. FRA will make its findings
available to the public upon request, excluding any proprietary
information received and identified as such. Should FRA find through
its monitoring that widespread bridge structural problems have
developed, it may use the information it has gathered to commence a
rulemaking proceeding.
Effect of This Interim Statement of Policy
The purpose of this notice is to issue an interim statement of
policy containing guidelines for the proper maintenance of bridge
structures. It is meant to be advisory in nature; it does not have the
force of regulations under which FRA ordinarily issues violations and
assesses civil penalties.
However, FRA maintains emergency authority to issue emergency,
compliance, and disqualification orders, as well as authority to seek
injunctive relief in federal district court, under 49 U.S.C. 20104
(formerly known as the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970) and 49 CFR part
209. FRA will exercise this authority when an unsafe condition or
improper maintenance of a railroad bridge creates an imminent hazard of
death or injury to persons. Furthermore, should FRA, in the future,
find the need to address bridge integrity in a regulatory proceeding,
it will do so.
Following the comment period, FRA will issue any necessary changes
to the interim statement of policy. The notice of changes will appear
simultaneously with the Notice of Final Rule for the proceeding
amending the track safety standards in 49 CFR part 213, begun in
November, 1992. (See 57 FR 54038, November 16, 1992.) Except as
modified in response to the comments, this interim statement of policy
will become a final statement of policy at that time.
Public Participation
Because the interim statement of policy is advisory in nature,
notice and public participation are not required. However, the public
is invited to submit comments within 30 days following its publication.
FRA would appreciate comments about its plan to issue a statement
of policy rather than regulations governing railroad bridge
maintenance. FRA would also welcome comments about the value of
permanently placing the [[Page 20656]] statement of policy in a new
appendix to 49 CFR part 213. Finally, FRA would like comments about the
guidelines themselves and their value as criteria in deciding whether
stronger enforcement action on particular railroad bridges is
warranted.
Comments received after the 30-day deadline will be considered if
it is possible to do so without incurring additional delay or expense.
Regulatory Impact
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies
This interim statement of policy has been evaluated in accordance
with existing regulatory policies. The regulatory document is
considered to be a nonsignificant regulatory action under E.O. 12866
and is a nonsignificant rule under section 5(a)(4) of DOT Regulatory
Policies and Procedures (44 FR. 11034, February 26, 1979) because it is
advisory only and does not carry with it the force of law or
regulation. For nonsignificant rules, the DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures ordinarily require an economic evaluation to be placed in
the public docket. This evaluation should include an analysis of the
economic consequences of the rule, including (if possible) an
estimation of the cost and benefits of the rule to the private sector,
consumers, and all levels of government. However, such an evaluation is
not required if the expected impact of a rule is deemed minimal.
Because this interim statement of policy offers only guidelines to be
followed and does not mandate any actions or establish any
recordkeeping requirements, the need for a regulatory evaluation is not
indicated.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires a review of rules to assess their impact on small entities. In
reviewing the economic impact of this interim statement of policy, FRA
concluded that it will not have any measurable impact on small
entities. There are no direct or indirect economic impacts for small
units of government, businesses, or other organizations. Therefore, it
is certified that this rule will not have a significant economic impact
on a very substantial number of small entities under the provisions of
the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Paperwork Reduction Act
There are no information collection requirements contained in this
interim statement of policy.
Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated this interim statement of policy in accordance
with its procedures for ensuring full consideration of the potential
environmental impacts of FRA actions, as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act and related directives. This notice meets the
criteria that establish this as a non-major action for environmental
purposes.
Federalism Implications
Implementation of this interim statement of policy could result in
a judicial determination that it constitutes FRA's occupation of the
field of railroad bridge safety regulation. Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, a
state may enforce its own statute or regulation related to railroad
safety until the Secretary of Transportation issues an order or
regulation ``covering the subject matter'' of the state's law. A state
may adopt or enforce a more stringent law relevant to the subject
matter as long as it ``(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce a local
safety hazard; (2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order
of the United States Government; and (3) does not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce.''
At this time, FRA is aware of only one state that could be affected
by a court's determination that the Secretary of Transportation,
through FRA, has covered the subject matter of railroad bridge safety
by issuing this policy statement. FRA has prepared a Federalism
Assessment, pursuant to Executive Order 12612 and placed it in the
docket reserved for this proceeding, to address the federalism
implications this interim policy could have on that state or any other
state seeking to regulate railroad bridge safety.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 213
Penalties, Railroad safety, Railroads.
Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Railroad
Administration issues the following:
Interim Statement of Agency Policy on the Structural Integrity of
Railroad Bridges
The structural integrity of bridges that carry railroad tracks is
important to the safety of railroad employees and that the public. The
responsibility for the safety of railroad bridges rests with the owner
of the track carried by the bridge, together with any other party to
whom that responsibility has been assigned by the track owner.
The capacity of a bridge to safely support its traffic can only be
determined by intelligent application of engineering principles and the
laws of physics. Bridge owners should use, as FRA will, those
principles to assess the integrity of railroad bridges.
The long term ability of a structure to perform its function is an
economic issue beyond the intent of this policy. In assessing a
bridge's structural condition, FRA will focus on the present safety of
the structure, rather than its appearance or long term usefulness.
FRA inspectors will conduct regular evaluations of railroad bridge
inspection and management practices. The objective of these evaluations
will be to document the practices of the evaluated railroad and to
disclose any program weaknesses that could affect the safety of the
public. Should problems be disclosed, FRA will seek a cooperative
resolution. If public safety is jeopardized by failure to resolve a
problem, or by the incompetence or dishonorable intentions of any
bridge owner, FRA will use available legal means, including issuance of
emergency orders, to protect the safety of railroad employees and the
public.
This policy statement addresses the integrity of bridges that carry
railroad tracks. It does not address the integrity of other types of
structures on railroad property, i.e., tunnels, or bridges carrying
highways or other features over railroads, except to the extent that
position and condition of these structures affects the safe passage of
trains. Likewise, this policy statement extends its reach beyond the
narrow issue of bridges carrying railroad tracks only where it is
necessary to do so for the protection of highway users, pedestrians and
others lawfully occupying the space under a railroad bridge.
The guidelines published in this statement are advisory, rather
than regulatory, in nature. They indicate those elements FRA deems
essential to successful bridge management programs. FRA will use the
guidelines when evaluating bridge inspection and management practices.
Guidelines
1. Responsibility for safety of bridges.
(a) Track owner. The owner of the track carried by a bridge is
responsible for ensuring that the bridge will safely support the trains
which operate over it and the loads imposed upon it.
(b) Operating railroad. The operating railroad that authorizes
train movements over a bridge should take whatever steps are necessary
to verify that the maintenance responsibility for the bridge is being
fulfilled so as to safeguard trains operated under its authority.
[[Page 20657]]
(c) Assignment of responsibility. The owner of the track carried by
a bridge may assign responsibility for maintenance of the bridge to
another party as long as the assignment ensures that responsibility for
the safety of the bridge is not diminished.
2. Capacity of bridges.
(a) Determination. The safe capacity of bridges should be
determined by competent engineers using accepted principles of
structural design and analysis.
(b) Analysis. Proper analysis of a bridge requires knowledge of the
actual dimensions, materials and properties of the structural members
of the bridge, their condition, and the stresses imposed in those
members by the service loads.
(c) Rating. The factors which were used for the design of a bridge
can generally be used to determine and rate the load capacity of a
bridge provided:
(i) The condition of the bridge has not changed significantly, and
(ii) The stresses resulting from the service loads can be
correlated to the stresses for which the bridge was designed or rated.
3. Bridge loads.
(a) Control of loads. The operating instructions for each railroad
operating over bridges should include provisions to restrict the
movement of cars and locomotives whose weight or configuration exceed
the nominal capacity of the bridges.
(b) Authority for exceptions. Equipment exceeding the nominal
weight restriction on a bridge should be operated only under conditions
determined by a competent engineer who has properly analyzed the
stresses resulting from the proposed loads.
(c) Operating conditions. Operating conditions for exceptional
loads may include speed restrictions, restriction of traffic from
adjacent multiple tracks, and weight limitations on adjacent cars in
the same train.
4. Bridge records.
(a) The organization responsible for the safety of a bridge should
keep design, construction, maintenance and repair records readily
accessible to permit the determination of safe loads. Having design or
rating drawings and calculations that conform to the actual structure
greatly simplifies the process of making accurate determinations of
safe bridge loads.
(b) Organizations acquiring railroad property should obtain
original or usable copies of all bridge records and drawings, and
protect or maintain knowledge of the location of the original records.
5. Specifications for design and rating.
(a) The recommended specifications for the design and rating of
bridges are those found in the ``Manual for Railway Engineering''
published by the American Railway Engineering Association (AREA). These
specifications incorporate recognized principles of structural design
and analysis. They are continually reviewed and revised by committees
of competent engineers. Other specifications for design and rating,
however, have been successfully used by some railroads and may also be
suitable now.
(b) A bridge can be rated for capacity according to current
specifications regardless of the specification to which it was
originally designed.
6. Periodic inspections.
(a) Periodic bridge inspections by competent inspectors are
necessary to determine whether a structure conforms to its design or
rating condition and, if not, or the degree of nonconformity.
(b) The prevailing practice throughout the railroad industry is to
inspect railroad bridges at least annually. Inspections at more
frequent intervals may be indicated by the nature or condition of a
structure or intensive traffic levels.
7. Underwater inspections.
(a) Inspections of bridges should include measuring and recording
the condition of substructure support at locations subject to erosion
from moving water.
(b) Stream beds are often not visible to the inspector. Indirect
measurements by sounding, probing, or any other appropriate means are
necessary in those cases. A series of records of those readings will
provide the best information should unexpected changes suddenly occur.
Where such indirect measurements do not provide the necessary assurance
of foundation integrity, diving inspections should be performed as
prescribed by a competent engineer.
8. Special inspections.
(a) A special bridge inspection should be performed after an
occurrence that might have reduced the capacity of the bridge, such as
a flood, a derailment, or an unusual impact.
(b) When a railroad learns that a bridge might have suffered damage
through an unusual occurrence, it should restrict train operation over
the bridge until the bridge can be inspected and evaluated.
9. Inspection records.
(a) Bridge inspections should be recorded. Records should identify
the structure inspected, the date of the inspection, the name of the
inspector, the components inspected, and their condition.
(b) Information from bridge inspection reports should be
incorporated into a bridge management program to ensure that exceptions
on the reports are corrected or accounted for. A series of inspection
reports over time should be maintained so as to provide a valuable
record of trends and rates of degradation of bridge components. The
reports should be structured to promote comprehensive inspections and
effective communication between an inspector and an engineer who
performs an analysis of a bridge.
(c) An inspection report should be comprehensible to a competent
person without interpretation by the reporting inspector.
10. Bridge inspectors and engineers.
(a) Bridge inspections should be performed by technicians whose
training and experience enable them to detect and record indications of
distress on a bridge. Inspectors must provide accurate measurements and
other information about the condition of the bridge in enough detail
for an engineer to make a proper evaluation of the safety of the
bridge.
(b) Accurate information about the condition of a bridge should be
evaluated by an engineer who is competent to determine the capacity of
the bridge. The inspector and the evaluator are often not the same
individual. The quality of the bridge evaluation depends on the quality
of the communication between them.
11. Scheduling inspections.
(a) A bridge management program should include a means to ensure
that each bridge under the program is inspected at the frequency
prescribed for that bridge by a competent engineer.
(b) Bridge inspections should be scheduled from an accurate bridge
inventory list that includes the due date of the next inspection.
12. Special considerations for railroad bridges.
Railroad bridges differ from other types of bridges in the types of
loads they carry, in their modes of failure and indications of
distress, and in their construction details and components. Proper
inspection and analysis of railroad bridges requires familiarity with
the loads, details and indications of distress that are unique to this
class of structure.
Issued at Washington, DC., on April 21, 1995.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 95-10323 Filed 4-26-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
