[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 82 (Thursday, April 29, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23133-23136]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-10685]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Florida Power & Light Company, Inc.
[Docket No. 50-389]
St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2 Environmental Assessment and Finding of
No Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-16, issued to Florida Power & Light Company, Inc., (the licensee),
for operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, located in St. Lucie
County, Florida.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed amendment would modify the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2,
Technical Specifications by changing the criticality requirements for
the design of the spent fuel storage racks, referencing new tables that
specify the reactivity effects of fuel assembly burnup and decay time,
and increasing the listed capacity of the spent fuel pool. These
changes would allow the use of credit for soluble boron in the spent
fuel criticality analyses. This would allow Florida Power & Light to
increase the capacity of the spent fuel storage pool. The proposed
action is in accordance with the licensee's application for amendment
dated December 31, 1997, as supplemented May 15, September 15, November
25, 1998, and January 28, 1999.
The Need for the Proposed Action
The proposed action would increase the allowed storage capacity of
the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, spent fuel pool (SFP) to 1360 fuel
assemblies, allowing the licensee to continue to operate beyond 2001.
The Unit 2 SFP at St. Lucie Plant contains 1584 spent fuel storage
cells, of which 1076 are currently allowed for storage by the technical
specifications. The licensee estimates that, by the year 2001, St.
Lucie Plant, Unit 2, will have filled all SFP storage locations not
reserved for a full-core off-load of fuel. The projected loss of
capability to store spent fuel from future operation of St. Lucie
Plant, Unit 2, would affect the licensee's ability to operate St. Lucie
Plant, Unit 2. The proposed amendment is needed in order to ensure the
capability to perform a full-core off-load to the SFP until
approximately 2007.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Thermal Impact
The licensee's thermal analysis on the effects of the proposed
change revealed that the proposed increase in storage capacity will
change the maximum decay heat load for a partial core offload from
16.9E6 Btu/hr to 19.76E6 Btu/hr and for full core offload conditions
from 31.7E6 Btu/hr to 35.22E6 Btu/hr. This increased heat load results
in an increase of approximately 3 deg.F in the maximum fuel pool water
temperature for the partial core offload case, and an increase of
approximately 5 deg.F in water temperature for storage of the limiting
full core offload (note: maximum fuel pool temperature will be
maintained less than or equal to 150 deg.F). The total heat load
rejected to the environment by St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, is about 6.2E9
Btu/hr. The percentage increase in the heat rejected to the environment
due to the increase in spent fuel storage capacity is on the order of
0.05% for partial core discharges and 0.06% for fuel storage following
a full core offload. This heat rejection to the environment is not
considered a significant increase from current heat rejection levels.
Radiological Evaluation
Solid Radioactive Waste. The net effect of increasing the St.
Lucie, Unit 2, spent fuel pool storage capacity is that
[[Page 23134]]
older fuel elements will be retained in wet storage beyond the time
when they would have otherwise been loaded into casks for dry storage
on-site. Retaining already-aged fuel in wet storage for an additional
period of time will not appreciably increase the activity in the fuel
pool water or the amount of solid radioactive waste which must be
disposed of because the short-lived isotopes associated with these fuel
bundles will have had an opportunity to decay. Therefore, increasing
the fuel pool storage capacity as proposed for St. Lucie, Unit 2, will
have no significant effect on the quantity of radioactive waste
collected.
Gaseous Radioactive Waste. Storage of additional quantities of
spent fuel in the SFP will not significantly increase the release of
gaseous fission products such as Krypton-85 and Iodine-131. Experience
has demonstrated that during the period between refueling outages,
there is no longer a significant release of fission products, including
Krypton-85, from stored spent fuel containing cladding defects. Iodine-
131 released from spent fuel assemblies to the SFP water will not be
significantly increased as a result of the expansion of the fuel
storage capacity since the Iodine-131 inventory in the fuel will decay
to negligible levels in the period between refueling outages. The
licensee has stated that fuel rod integrity at St. Lucie, Unit 2, has
been very good, with most fuel cycles evidencing no leaking fuel rods.
Additionally, the rod pressure, which tends to act as driving force for
fission product release, is substantially decreased after long periods
of fuel cooling.
The increased heat load on the SFP from the storage of additional
spent fuel assemblies could potentially result in an increase in the
SFP evaporation rate, which may result in a slight increase in the
amount of gaseous tritium released from the pool. However, the overall
release of radioactive gases from St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, will remain
a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, and is therefore
considered insignificant.
Radioactive Releases Due to Accidents. The existing analyses of
record pertaining to the radiological consequences of a fuel handling
accident within the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Fuel Handling Building
(FHB) and the postulated drop of a spent fuel cask just outside the FHB
have been examined to assess the impact of the proposed license
amendment. The assumptions and parameters previously employed in
evaluating the fuel mishandling accident were consistent with NRC
Regulatory Guides 1.13 and 1.25. The previously analyzed consequences
of dropping a spent fuel cask were based on the guidelines provided in
Section 15.7.5 of the Standard Review Plan. The licensee's review of
the existing analysis of the fuel handling accident has concluded that
the gap activities provided in the analysis of record for the fuel
handling accident conservatively bound those values expected to occur
at assembly discharge burnups of up to 60,000 MWD/MTU. As defined by
Section 15.7.4 of the Standard Review Plan, calculated dose values are
well within the guidelines if the calculated whole body dose is less
than or equal to 6 rem and the calculated thyroid dose is less than or
equal to 75 rem.
The proposed license amendment does not involve any changes to the
method of operating or range of motion of the spent fuel cask handling
crane. No movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel
assembly, control element assembly, and associated handling tool is
permitted over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool. Protection
against dropping the spent fuel cask into the spent fuel storage pool
is provided by the basic layout of the FHB. As noted in updated final
safety analysis report, Section 9.1.4.3.2, additional protection is
afforded by the trolley bumpers and a set of limit switches that work
together with bridge and trolley brakes to prevent movement of the
crane hook into the restricted area.
The proposed amendment will not involve any changes in the
operation or range of motion of the spent fuel handling machine. During
movement of a fuel assembly, the load on the hoist cable is monitored
to ensure that movement is not restricted. Installed interlocks will
continue to restrict movement of the handling machine when the hoist is
withdrawing or inserting an assembly.
The licensee has also examined the existing analysis of an accident
involving the drop of a spent fuel cask containing ten irradiated fuel
assemblies. This review has determined that conservative input
assumptions were used and that the results of the existing analysis are
well within the acceptance criteria for a Limiting Fault-2 event.
Increasing the storage capacity of the St. Lucie, Unit 2, SFP as
described in this proposed license amendment will have no effect on the
radiological consequences of an assumed fuel mishandling event or on
the consequences of dropping a loaded spent fuel cask. For each of
these events, the calculated doses are small relative to the guideline
values.
The impact of the proposed increase in St. Lucie, Unit 2, spent
fuel storage capacity and the implications of the use of reactivity
credit for fuel pool soluble boron have been examined in the above
discussion. Each of the impacts of the proposed change has been
quantified and determined to be within acceptable limits by comparison
to established acceptance criteria.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Summary
The Commission has completed its evaluation of the proposed action.
The proposed action will not increase the probability or consequences
of accidents, no changes will be made in the types of any effluents
that may be released off-site, and there will be no significant
increase in occupational or public radiation exposure. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that there are no significant radiological
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, the proposed
action involves features located entirely within the restricted area as
defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It will not affect non-radiological plant
effluents and has no other environmental impact. The proposed action
does not involve any historic sites. Therefore, there are no
significant non-radiological environmental impacts associated with the
proposed action. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are
no significant environmental impacts associated with the proposed
action.
Alternatives to the Proposed action
Shipping Fuel to a Permanent Federal Fuel Storage/Disposal Facility
Shipment of spent fuel to a high-level radioactive storage facility
is an alternative to increasing the onsite spent fuel storage capacity.
However, the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) high-level radioactive
waste repository is not expected to begin receiving spent fuel until
approximately 2010 at the earliest. In October 1996, the Administration
did commit DOE to begin storing waste at a centralized location by
January 31, 1998. However, no location has been identified and an
interim federal storage facility has yet to be identified in advance of
a decision on a permanent repository. Therefore, shipping spent fuel to
the DOE repository is not considered an alternative to increased
[[Page 23135]]
onsite spent fuel storage capacity at this time.
Shipping Fuel to a Reprocessing Facility
Reprocessing of spent fuel from the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, is not
a viable alternative since there are no operating commercial
reprocessing facilities in the United States. Spent fuel would have to
be shipped to an overseas facility for reprocessing. This approach has
never been used and it would require approval by the U.S. Department of
State as well as other entities. Additionally, the cost of spent fuel
reprocessing is not offset by the salvage value of the residual uranium
and reprocessing represents an added cost. Therefore, this alternative
is considered unacceptable.
Shipping Fuel to Another Utility or Site or to St. Lucie, Unit 1, for
Storage
Shipment of irradiated fuel from St. Lucie, Unit 2, to Turkey Point
or to the St. Lucie, Unit 1, fuel pool would provide short-term relief
from the storage problem at St. Lucie, Unit 2, but this transfer of
fuel between units would create no additional storage locations for
irradiated fuel. As a result, any fuel transfer would accelerate the
loss of fuel pool storage at the receiving unit and give no benefit to
the facility. Currently, the Turkey Point site has installed fuel pool
storage capacity sufficient to handle site requirements for irradiated
fuel storage until approximately the end of licensed life in 2012 (for
Unit 3) and 2013 (for Unit 4). Further expansion of the storage
capacity of the Turkey Point spent fuel pools is not feasible. Unlike
the situation at Turkey Point, the St. Lucie site will require
development of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) to
permit operation to the end of licensed life. As a result, shipment of
irradiated fuel from St. Lucie to Turkey Point would require the early
development of an ISFSI at Turkey Point without eliminating the
requirement to subsequently develop an ISFSI at the St. Lucie site.
Additionally, the design of the Turkey Point fuel pool storage racks
has been optimized for storage of fuel with a different lattice and
different reactivity characteristics than that used at St. Lucie, Unit
2; thus, storage of Unit 2 fuel at Turkey Point would both limit
storage of future discharged Turkey Point fuel and represent a less
than optimal use of the existing Turkey Point storage capability.
Likewise, the shipment of irradiated fuel from St. Lucie, Unit 2,
to St. Lucie, Unit 1, for storage does not eliminate the need to
develop additional spent fuel storage capability at the St. Lucie site
in the future. FPL knows of no other utility that is prepared to accept
shipments of irradiated fuel from St. Lucie, Unit 2, for long-term
storage at its site.
For these reasons, and considering the increased fuel handling and
additional occupational radiation exposure incurred during the shipment
of irradiated fuel, the alternative of shipping St. Lucie, Unit 2, fuel
to Turkey Point or to St. Lucie, Unit 1, for storage is not an
acceptable alternative to the proposed action.
Alternatives Creating Additional Storage Capacity
A variety of alternatives to increase the storage capacity of the
St. Lucie, Unit 2, spent fuel pool were considered prior to developing
the proposed license amendment based on soluble boron credit. Fuel rod
consolidation was examined as a potential alternative and was
eliminated because of the limited industry experience in disassembling
irradiated fuel and because of the potential for fission product
release due to rod breakage during disassembly. Additionally, because
the Department of Energy (DOE) considers consolidated fuel to be a non-
standard waste form, FPL was concerned that the presence of fuel in
this form would cause the DOE to delay its acceptance of waste from St.
Lucie, Unit 2.
The addition of poison inserts to the Unit 2 fuel pool was examined
and later rejected because the large quantity of inserts necessary to
adequately control the fuel pool reactivity had a significantly greater
initial cost that the alternative selected. Additionally, use of poison
inserts increases the volume of radioactive waste that must be disposed
of or decontaminated during decommissioning of the spent fuel pool,
making this alternative unacceptable.
The early implementation of dry cask storage for irradiated fuel at
the St. Lucie site was also considered. Dry cask storage involves
transferring irradiated fuel, after several years of storage in the
Unit 2 fuel pool, to high capacity casks with passive heat dissipation
features. After loading, these casks would be placed on a concrete pad
at an outdoor location on the St. Lucie site. This alternative was
rejected by FPL because each of the alternatives discussed above would
provide additional storage locations for irradiated fuel at lower cost
and with less environmental impact.
As a result, FPL concluded that none of the alternative
technologies that could create additional spent fuel storage capacity
at St. Lucie, Unit 2, could do so with an environmental impact less
than the impacts associated with the chosen option.
Reduction of Spent Fuel Generation
To minimize the quantities of irradiated fuel generated during full
power operation at St. Lucie, FPL has developed efficient fuel loading
patterns that maximize the utilization of fissile material within each
assembly consistent with license limits on the integrated fuel rod
exposure. Batch discharge burnups for St. Lucie, Unit 2, fuel regularly
approximate 45 GWD/MTU with peak assembly burnups reaching 50 GWD/MTU
by the time of discharge. St. Lucie, Unit 2, consistently depletes fuel
assemblies to these burnups without experiencing cladding perforations
so that the fission product inventory present in the spent fuel pool
water remains low. The high values of batch average and peak assembly
discharge burnup ensure that the electricity generated by St. Lucie,
Unit 2, yields the minimum possible amount of spent fuel.
The fuel assembly design used at St. Lucie, Unit 1, and at Turkey
Point is not compatible with the St. Lucie, Unit 2, core. As a result,
partially irradiated fuel from other FPL nuclear units can not be used
at Unit 2 (or vice versa) to reduce the rate of spent fuel discharge.
Operation of St. Lucie, Unit 2, at a reduced power level for long
periods of time would extend the existing spent fuel pool storage
capacity. However, to compensate for the reduced generation by St.
Lucie, Unit 2, another power generation facility would be required to
increase its power output, possibly resulting in an increase in
airborne pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. The adverse
environmental impact of increased airborne pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions resulting from a long-term derate of St. Lucie, Unit 2,
generating capacity is significantly greater than the environmental
impact associated with increasing the storage capacity of the existing
Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
The No-Action Alternative
As an alternative to the proposed action, the NRC staff considered
denial of the proposed action (i.e., the ``no-action'' alternative).
Denial of the application would result in no significant change in
current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the
proposed action and the alternative action are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statement for St.
Lucie, Unit 2.
[[Page 23136]]
Agencies and Persons Consulted
By Letter dated March 8, 1991, Mary E. Clark of the State of
Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, informed
Deborah A. Miller, Licensing Assistant, U.S. NRC, that the State of
Florida does not desire notification of issuance of license amendments.
Thus, the State official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
On the basis of the environmental assessment, the Commission
concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission
has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated December 31, 1997, as supplemented May 15,
1998, September 15, 1998, November 25, 1998, and January 28, 1999. The
May 15, 1998 supplement was a result of an U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission request for additional information dated April 8, 1998. All
of these documents are available for public inspection at the
Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,
NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at
the Indian River Community College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Fort
Pierce, Florida 34981-5596.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 23rd day of April 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William C. Gleaves,
Project Manager, Section 2, Project Directorate II, Division of
Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 99-10685 Filed 4-28-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
