[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 64 (Thursday, April 3, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15942-15943]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-8545]
[[Page 15942]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-286]
Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit No. 3); Exemption
I
The Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) is the
holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64, which authorizes
operation of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). The
license provides that the licensee is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the
Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of a pressurized-water reactor at the
licensee's site located in Westchester County, New York.
II
The Code of Federal Regulations at subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24,
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee
authorized to possess special nuclear material shall maintain in each
area where such material is handled, used, or stored, a criticality
monitoring system ``using gamma- or neutron-sensitive radiation
detectors which will energize clearly audible alarm signals if
accidental criticality occurs.'' Subsection (a)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24
specifies the detection, sensitivity, and coverage capabilities of the
monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24(a). The specific requirements of
subsection (a)(1) are that ``the monitoring system shall be capable of
detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue
of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded
distance of 2 meters from the reacting material within one minute.''
Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires that the licensee shall
maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed
special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored and provides (1)
that the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of
safety upon the sounding of a criticality monitor alarm, (2) that the
procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the
evacuation plan, and (3) that the procedures designate responsible
individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of
radiation survey instruments in accessible locations for use in such an
emergency. Subsection (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who
believes that there is good cause why he should be granted an exemption
from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such
an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the relief requested.
The purpose of 10 CFR 70.24 (a), (a)(1), and (a)(3) is to ensure
that any inadvertent criticality is detected and that action is taken
to protect personnel and correct the problem. By letter dated December
20, 1996, as supplemented March 5, 1997, and March 19, 1997, the
licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
The licensee proposes to handle and store unirradiated fuel without
having the criticality monitoring system specified in 10 CFR 70.24. The
licensee also proposes to handle and store unirradiated fuel without
the speicfic emergency procedures detailed in 10 CFR 70.24. The
licensee believes that fuel handling procedures and design features
make an inadvertent criticality unlikely. The licensee believes that a
portable radiation monitoring system and existing plant procedures will
provide adequate protection in the unlikely event of an accidental
criticality. The licensee also believes that current emergency
procedures and training are adequate to meet the intent of 10 CFR
70.24(a)(3).
III
Special nuclear material, as nuclear fuel, is stored in the spent
fuel pool or the new (unirradiated) fuel storage racks. The spent fuel
pool is used to store irradiated fuel under water after its discharge
from the reactor, and new fuel prior to loading into the reactor. The
new fuel racks are used to store new fuel in a dry condition upon
arrival on site.
Special nuclear material is also present in the form of fissile
material incorporated into fission chambers for nuclear
instrumentation, primary source assemblies, and Health Physics
calibration sources. The small quantity of special nuclear material
present in these items precludes an inadvertent criticality.
Consistent with Technical Specification Section 5.4, the spent fuel
pool is designed to store the fuel in a geometric array using a solid
neutron absorber that precludes criticality. The spent fuel racks are
designed such that the effective neutron multiplication factor,
Keff, will remain less than or equal to 0.95 under normal and
accident conditions for fuel of maximum enrichment of 5.0 wt% U-235.
The staff has found this design adequate.
The new fuel storage racks may be used to receive and store new
fuel in a dry condition upon arrival on site and prior to loading in
the reactor or spent fuel pool. The spacing between new fuel assemblies
in the storage racks is sufficient to maintain the array in a
subcritical condition even under accident conditions assuming the
presence of moderator. The maximum enrichment of 5.0 wt% U-235 for the
new fuel assemblies results in a maximum Keff of less than 0.95
under conditions of accidental flooding. The staff has found the design
of the licensee's new fuel storage racks to be adequate to store fuel
enriched to no greater than 5.0 wt% U-235.
Nuclear fuel is moved between the new fuel storage racks, the
reactor vessel, and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling
operations. In addition, fuel is moved into the facility and within the
reactor vessel, or within the spent fuel pool. Fuel movements are
procedurally controlled and designed to preclude conditions involving
criticality concerns. Fuel handling procedures and the design features
of the fuel handling system are discussed in the licensee's Final
Safety Analysis Report.
Technical Specification Section 3.8 precludes certain movements of
heavy loads over the spent fuel pool to prevent a fuel handling
accident. Previous accident analyses have demonstrated that a fuel
handling accident (i.e., a dropped fuel assembly) will not create
conditions which could result in inadvertent criticality.
Procedures and controls prevent an inadvertent criticality during
fuel handling; nevertheless the licensee will provide monitoring in the
IP3 Fuel Storage Building during dry fuel handling operations. During
dry fuel handling operations, the licensee will have in operation at
least one portable detector that will meet the detection and
sensitivity criteria of Sections 5.6 and 5.7 of ANSI/ANS 8.3 (1986),
``American National Standard Criticality Accident Alarm System.'' Upon
detection, this instrument shall automatically cause an immediate alarm
audible in all areas from which evacuation is necessary to minimize
exposure. The staff has determined that the detection and sensitivity
criteria in the ANSI standard are as rigorous as those specified in 10
CFR 70.24(a)(1). The staff has also determined that, because fuel
handling equipment design and procedures make a criticality unlikely,
one detector will be adequate and that in the case of fuel handling at
IP3 two detectors as required by 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1) are not necessary.
The licensee has procedures and conducts training on dealing with
radiological emergencies consistent with 10 CFR 50.47 and Part 50,
Appendix E. In addition to this training, the licensee gives training
on responding to a criticality monitor alarm
[[Page 15943]]
to radiation workers accessing the fuel handling building. This
training will be provided as necessary until dry fuel handling in 1997
is complete and the subject material has been incorporated into general
employee training. The staff has determined that the licensee's
procedures and training meet the intent of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(3);
therefore, adherence to the specific requirements of this section is
not necessary to serve the underlying purpose of the rule.
Because inadvertent criticality is precluded by both design and
procedure, because adequate radiation monitoring is present, and
because the licensee maintains emergency procedures for the areas in
which fuel is handled, the staff has concluded that there is reasonable
assurance that irradiated and unirradiated fuel will remain
subcritical; furthermore, there is reasonable assurance that, should an
inadvertent criticality occur, the licensee will detect such a
criticality and workers will respond properly. The combination of plant
design features, fuel handling procedures, the use of a portable
criticality monitor, radiological emergency procedures and radiation
worker training constitute good cause for granting an exemption to the
requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
IV
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the following
exemption:
The Power Authority of the State of New York is exempt from the
requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a), 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1), and 10 CFR
70.24(a)(3) for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3. This
exemption is contingent on the facility's maintaining the hardware,
procedure, and training described in Section III above.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
quality of the human environment (62 FR 14705).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 27th day of March 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-8545 Filed 4-2-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
