[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 83 (Thursday, April 30, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 23813-23814]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-11506]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 70-7001 Certificate No. GDP-1 EA 98-156]
In the Matter of United States Enrichment Corporation Bethesda,
MD; Confirmatory Order Modifying Certificate (Effective Immediately)
I
United States Enrichment Corporation (Corporation) is the holder of
Certificate No. GDP-1 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC
or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 76. The certificate authorizes
the Corporation to operate the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
(Paducah) for the purpose of enriching uranium up to 2.75 percent
\235\U by weight. The certificate, originally issued on November 26,
1996, is due to expire on December 31, 1998.
II
Since transition to NRC regulatory oversight on March 3, 1997, the
Corporation has been operating its withdrawal facilities (Buildings C-
310/310A and C-315) with liquid uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
inventories in process piping, condensers, and accumulators. The
certificate conditions placed no restrictions on those inventories,
thereby allowing the accumulators to contain any amount up to their
full capacity. A certificate amendment request dated October 31, 1997,
submitted by the Corporation, requested an update to the Safety
Analysis Report (SAR) to include a new Chapter 4, ``Accident
Analysis.'' An NRC request for additional information (RAI) dated
February 5, 1998, identified questions about the conservative nature of
assumptions for the seismic accident scenario in Chapter 4. In response
to the RAI, the Corporation reviewed Paducah's liquid UF6
withdrawal facilities' records and determined that the seismic accident
analysis assumption of no liquid UF6 in both facilities'
accumulators underestimated the potential source term from the
withdrawal facilities for the seismic accident scenario. In telephone
discussions with the NRC on February 18, 1998, the NRC made it clear to
the Corporation that a notification pursuant to 10 CFR 76.9(b) was
warranted. Thereafter, the Corporation provided verbal notification to
NRC Region III on February 19, 1998, and a follow-up written report on
February 20, 1998, identifying the potential nonconservative assumption
in the SAR updated accident analysis. Then, on February 24, 1998, in
telephone discussions with NRC, the Corporation also provided
information that the withdrawal facilities' current operations were
outside the Certification SAR because the Chapter 4 seismic accident
analysis assumed no liquid UF6 in Building C-315 withdrawal
facility's process piping, condensers, and accumulators. In addition,
the source term from Building C-310/310A was probably too low.
Based on the NRC's review of the certificate amendment request
dated October 31, 1997, submitted by the Corporation and the current
Certification SAR, the NRC has concluded that violations of NRC
requirements occurred. The violations involve an inadequate accident
analysis and a failure to comply with the conditions of certification.
The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 76.85 require the Corporation,
as the certificate holder, to perform an analysis of potential
accidents and consequences to establish the basis for limiting
conditions for operations and to provide assurance that plant operation
will be conducted in a manner to prevent or to mitigate the
consequences from a reasonable spectrum of postulated accidents,
including natural phenomena. Further, 10 CFR 76.85 requires that the
assessment consider the full range of operations, including operations
at the maximum capacity contemplated. The Commission's regulations in
10 CFR 76.51 require the Corporation, as the certificate holder, to
comply with the conditions set forth in the Certificate of Compliance.
Condition 8 of the Certificate of Compliance (GDP-1) for the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant requires the Corporation to conduct its
operations in accordance with the statements and representations
contained in the certification application and subsequent amendments.
The certification application includes Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
Chapter 4, ``Accident Analysis,'' Section 4.6, ``Natural Phenomena,''
describing assumptions made on facility operations to determine the
consequences of postulated seismically-induced failures. The Chapter 4
seismic accident analysis is based on an inappropriately low assumption
of the amount of liquid UF6 in Buildings C-310/310A and C-
315 withdrawal facilities' process piping, condensers, and accumulators
in calculating the possible releases. Current facility configuration
and operations are such that significantly higher volumes (on the order
of several thousand pounds (lbs)) of liquid UF6 may be
present. Therefore the accident analysis in the Certification SAR is
not in compliance with 10 CFR 76.85 and operation of that facility is
not in compliance with Condition 8. Furthermore, operation with the
larger amount of liquid UF6 in the withdrawal facilities is
safety significant because failure could result in potential on-site
fatalities/injuries and off-site injuries. During a seismic event of
0.05 g peak ground acceleration, failure of equipment in both
withdrawal facilities would likely occur with releases of liquid
UF6. If the 0.05 g seismic event occurred with substantial
amounts of liquid UF6 in those facilities, the on-site and
off-site consequences would exceed any analyzed accident and be
unacceptable.
III
By letter dated February 25, 1998, the Corporation committed to
implement the administrative control as stated below:
1. Access to Buildings C-310/310A and C-315 will be limited to only
those individuals essential to operations, inspections, or those
personnel performing any modifications to fix the identified seismic
failures.
By letter dated March 5, 1998, the Corporation committed to
implement the following additional administrative controls in order to
mitigate the consequences of a seismic event:
2. When flow of liquid UF6 has been diverted to the on-
line accumulator in C-310A or C-315 for greater than one hour (nominal
2,000 and 5,000 lbs liquid UF6, respectively, at one hour),
[[Page 23814]]
the Corporation will take the following immediate actions:
a. Notify the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) of accumulator
usage.
b. Begin tracking of quantities by using calculated withdrawal
rates.
c. The PSS will initiate high priority actions for timely
resolution of unscheduled outages.
d. The Cascade Coordinator will take actions to reduce tails
downflow and/or product or tails withdrawal rates to minimize
accumulator use as appropriate.
e. Notify the NRC.
3. If the calculated accumulator inventory reaches 4,000 lbs liquid
UF6 in C-310A or 10,000 lbs liquid UF6 in C-315,
flow of liquid UF6 to the affected accumulator will be
stopped immediately.
By letter dated March 11, 1998, the Corporation proposed to install
seismic modifications to the equipment in Buildings C-310/310A and C-
315 by September 30, 1998. Those seismic modifications will increase
the seismic capacity of the equipment to withstand an earthquake
producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.165 g.
I find that the Corporation's commitments to install the seismic
modification within the proposed time frame and these administrative
controls acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these
commitments the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In
view of the foregoing, I have determined that the public health and
safety require that the Corporation's commitments be confirmed by this
Order. By letter dated, April 1, 1998, the Corporation consented to the
issuance of this Order confirming its commitments, as described in
Section IV below. The Corporation further agreed in that letter that
this Order is to be effective upon issuance. Implementation of these
commitments will minimize the available liquid UF6
inventories that could be released in a seismic event and reduce the
on-site and off-site consequences. Based upon the above and the
Corporation's consent, this Order is immediately effective upon
issuance.
IV
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 161b, 161i, 161o, and 1701 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations
in 10 CFR Part 76, including specifically 10 CFR 76.70, It is hereby
ordered, effective immediately, that certificate No. GDP-1 is modified
as follows:
Condition 13 is added to the Certificate of Compliance GDP-1 to
require that:
1. The Corporation will by no later than September 30, 1998,
complete seismic modifications to the equipment containing liquid
UF6 in Buildings C-310/310A and C-315. Those seismic
modifications will increase the seismic capacity of the equipment to
withstand an earthquake producing a peak ground acceleration of 0.165
g.
2. Until such time as the above seismic modifications are
completed, the following additional administrative controls shall be
followed:
a. When flow of liquid UF6 has been diverted to the on-
line accumulator in C-310A or C-315 for greater than one hour (nominal
2,000 and 5,000 pounds (lbs) liquid UF6 respectively at one
hour), the Corporation will immediately:
i. Notify the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) of accumulator
usage.
ii. Begin tracking of quantities by using calculated withdrawal
rates.
iii. Ensure that the PSS will initiate high priority actions for
timely resolution of unscheduled outages.
iv. Ensure that the Cascade Coordinator will take actions to reduce
tails downflow and/or product or tails withdrawal rates to minimize
accumulator use as appropriate.
v. Notify the NRC.
b. If the calculated accumulator inventory reaches 4,000 lbs liquid
UF6 in C-310A or 10,000 lbs liquid UF6 in C-315,
flow of liquid UF6 to the affected accumulator will be
stopped immediately.
c. Access to Buildings C-310/310A and C-315 will be limited to only
those individuals essential to operations, inspections, or those
personnel performing any modifications to fix the identified seismic
failures.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or
rescind this Order upon demonstration by the Corporation of good cause.
V
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than the Corporation, may submit a written response within 20 days of
its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to respond. A request for extension of time must be
made in writing to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555,
and include a statement of good cause for the extension. Any response
shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, D.C. 20555. Copies of the response shall also be sent to
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, to the Deputy Assistant General
Counsel for Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional
Administrator, NRC Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, Illinois
60532-4351, and to the Corporation.
In the absence of any response, or written approval of an extension
of time in which to respond, the provisions specified in Section IV
above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order without
further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for submitting a
response has been approved, the provisions specified in Section IV
shall be final when the extension expires if a response is not
received. If a written response is received, the Commission may make a
final decision or may adopt by order further procedures for
consideration of the issues before making a final enforcement decision.
Written responses shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of April 1998.
James Lieberman,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 98-11506 Filed 4-29-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
