94-8024. Cold-Rolled Stainless Steel Sheet From Germany; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 5, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-8024]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: April 5, 1994]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
    [A-428-013]
    
     
    
    Cold-Rolled Stainless Steel Sheet From Germany; Final Results of 
    Antidumping Duty Administrative Review
    
    agency: International Trade Administration/Import Administration, 
    Department of Commerce.
    
    action: Final results of antidumping duty administrative review.
    
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    summary: On May 21, 1992, the Department of Commerce issued the final 
    results of its administrative review of the antidumping duty order on 
    cold-rolled stainless steel sheet from the Federal Republic of Germany. 
    We conducted this antidumping duty administrative review pursuant to a 
    remand order from the U.S. Court of International Trade in Krupp Stahl, 
    A.G., et al. v. United States (Slip Op. 91-31, April 19, 1991).
        In that decision, the court ruled that the Department had illegally 
    applied its automatic assessment regulation to Krupp's December 1982 
    through June 1983 entries because the original less-than-fair-value-
    investigation was initiated prior to the October 30, 1984, amendment to 
    the Tariff Act of 1930 and prior to the October 22, 1986, amendment to 
    the effective date provision of the 1984 Act. Because the 1984 and 1986 
    amendments are not retroactive, the court held that Krupp was entitled 
    to an automatic review of its entries.
        The review covers one manufacturer/exporter of subject merchandise, 
    Krupp Stahl, A.G., and the period December 17, 1982 through June 23, 
    1983. The final margin is 27 percent. The final results of this review 
    were affirmed by the Court on May 26, 1993, in Krupp Stahl, A.G., et 
    al. v. United States, 822 F. Supp. 789 (CIT 1993). The Court's opinion 
    was not appealed; therefore, we are publishing the final results of the 
    administrative review. Attached is the notice of Final Results of 
    Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Cold-Rolled Stainless Steel 
    Sheet from Germany, as issued on May 21, 1992.
    
    EFFECTIVE DATE: April 5, 1994.
    
    for further information contact: Wendy J. Frankel, Office of 
    Antidumping Compliance, International Trade Administration, U.S. 
    Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
    0367.
        This notice is in accordance with section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff 
    Act of 1930, as amended.
    
        Dated: March 22, 1994.
    Joseph A. Spetrini,
    Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
    
    Cold-Rolled Stainless Steel Sheet From Germany; Final Results of 
    Antidumping Duty Administrative Review
    
    AGENCY: International Trade Administration/Import Administration, 
    Department of Commerce.
    
    ACTION: Final results of antidumping duty administrative review.
    
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    SUMMARY: On November 7, 1991, the Department of Commerce published the 
    preliminary results of its administrative review of the antidumping 
    duty order on cold-rolled stainless steel sheet from the Federal 
    Republic of Germany (56 FR 56976). We have conducted this antidumping 
    duty administrative review pursuant to a remand order from the U.S. 
    Court of International Trade in Krupp Stahl, A.G., et al. v. United 
    States (Slip Op. 91-31, April 19, 1991). The review covers one 
    manufacturer/exporter of subject merchandise, Krupp Stahl, A.G., and 
    the period December 17, 1982 through June 23, 1983. Based on our 
    analysis of the comments received, we have not changed the preliminary 
    results. The final margin is listed below in the section ``Final 
    Results of Review.''
    
    EFFECTIVE DATE: April 5, 1994.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jackie Johnson or Wendy Frankel, 
    Office of Agreements Compliance, International Trade Administration, 
    U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-
    3793 or -0367.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    
    Background
    
        On November 7, 1991, the Department of Commerce (the Department) 
    published in the Federal Register (56 FR 56976) the preliminary results 
    of its administrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain 
    cold-rolled stainless steel sheet from Germany (48 FR 28680, June 23, 
    1983). In the notice of preliminary results of review, we noted that 
    Krupp Stahl, A.G. (Krupp), failed to respond to our questionnaire 
    issued in July 1991. On September 12, 1991, Krupp advised us that in 
    1989 it had destroyed the records for the December 1982-June 1983 
    review period, because German law does not require that business 
    records be retained beyond a minimum period of time. In addition, we 
    noted that after searching our files we were only able to locate the 
    public version of the narrative portion of Krupp's responses to the 
    Department's original and supplemental questionnaires issued in 1983 
    and 1984. Because that information was insufficient for purposes of 
    conducting an administrative review and because Krupp did not respond 
    to our questionnaire because it had destroyed all supporting 
    documentation, we used the best information available (BIA) for the 
    preliminary results of review.
        Subsequent to publication of the notice of preliminary results, we 
    discovered a few boxes labeled with the administrative proceeding 
    number relevant to this case in an annex to the Department's Central 
    Records storeroom. We notified the parties to the proceeding of our 
    discovery and suspended the briefing and hearing schedule until the 
    Department could thoroughly review all the documents contained in those 
    boxes to determine which, if any, might be relevant to the instant 
    period of review.
        The documents represented submissions from the original less than 
    fair value (LTFV) investigation, and from the first and second 
    administrative reviews. They contained information from other German 
    producers as well as from Krupp. There were three computer tapes in the 
    boxes. We were able to read two of the tapes which contained data 
    relevant to the LTFV investigation. The third tape could not be 
    formatted based on any of the formatting instructions provided in 
    either the LTFV or first review questionnaire and supplemental 
    responses, indicating that the tape did not pertain to the information 
    contained in those responses.
        Based upon its review of all of the documents found in the Central 
    Records annex, the Department determined that the information either 
    pertained to a different company, covered an irrelevant time period, or 
    was not in a useable computer format for purposes of conducting a 
    dumping analysis. On March 2, 1991, the Department contacted counsel 
    for Krupp and counsel for the Petitioner to inform them of the results 
    of our examination of the information. At that time a revised schedule 
    was outlined to allow adequate time for comments and rebuttal comments. 
    At the request of the respondent, we held a public hearing on April 14, 
    1992. The Department has now completed this administrative review in 
    accordance with section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the 
    Tariff Act).
    
    Scope of the Review
    
        Imports covered by the review are shipments of cold-rolled 
    stainless steel sheet whether or not corrugated or crimped and whether 
    or not pickled; not cut, not pressed and not stamped to non-rectangular 
    shape; not coated or plated with metal, and under 0.1875 inch in 
    thickness and over 12 inch in width. Until January 1, 1989, this 
    merchandise was classifiable under item number 607.9020 of the Tariff 
    Schedules of the United States Annotated (TSUSA). Since that date, this 
    merchandise is classifiable under the Harmonized Tariff Schedules (HTS) 
    item numbers 7219.32.00, 7219.33.00, 7219.34.00, 7219.35.00, 
    7219.90.00, 7220.20.10, and 7220.90.00. Like the TSUSA numbers, the HTS 
    numbers are provided for convenience and Customs purposes only. The 
    written product description remains dispositive.
        This review covers the shipments of one manufacturer/exporter of 
    cold-rolled stainless steel sheet from the Federal Republic of Germany 
    to the United States, Krupp, and the period December 17, 1982 through 
    June 23, 1983.
    
    Analysis of Comments Received
    
        We invited interested parties to comment on the preliminary 
    results. The Department received comments and rebuttal comments from 
    both parties.
        Comment 1: The petitioner notes that Krupp admitted that in 1989 it 
    destroyed all records relevant to the period of review and, therefore, 
    was unable to respond to the Department's questionnaire issued in July 
    1991. Because of Krupp's actions, the petitioner contends that Krupp 
    has significantly impeded the Department's conduct of this review in 
    that the Department now is unable to verify the accuracy and 
    completeness of the information submitted in Krupp's 1983 and 1984 
    responses to the Department's earlier questionnaires. Petitioner 
    asserts that destruction of relevant records during an ongoing judicial 
    proceeding where Krupp was aware that the Court might remand the case 
    to the Department for administrative review does not, contrary to 
    Krupp's claim, ``demonstrate [ ] a willingness'' to cooperate. Given 
    the circumstances, petitioner argues that the Department is obligated 
    to use BIA based on an adverse inference.
        Department's Response: On September 12, 1991, Krupp informed the 
    Department that in 1989 it destroyed all data relevant to the period 
    under review, because German law does not require that records be 
    maintained for more than five years. Because of its actions, Krupp 
    stated that it was unable to respond to our July 1991 questionnaire. In 
    addition, Krupp's destruction of its records prevented the Department 
    from conducting a verification of what few written submissions of 
    factual information remain in the Department's files from Krupp's 1983 
    and 1984 submissions. In reviews such as this one, involving old data, 
    the Department may conduct a verification. See Television Receivers, 
    Monochrome and Color from Japan; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
    Administrative Review, 54 FR 13917 (Apr. 6, 1989). In 1988 we verified 
    information covering the period April 1983 through August 1983 
    submitted by two companies subject to the Japanese television finding. 
    See, also, Memorandum For the File from Laurie Lucksinger and Jim 
    Arnold, dated May 28, 1987, regarding Large Power Transformers from 
    Italy--Analysis for Preliminary Results of Review for Ansaldo, where we 
    verified data in 1987 covering sales in 1982.
        While German law may prescribe a minimum required period for the 
    retention of business records, it is irrelevant to the current judicial 
    proceeding. Respondents have a responsibility to maintain documents 
    relevant to ongoing litigation. See Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United 
    States, Slip Op. 92-72 (CIT May 15, 1992) at 19. As a consequence of 
    its actions, Krupp explicitly acknowledges in its September 12, 1991 
    letter ``that the Department will be unable to complete the 
    administrative review in the manner contemplated by the Court of 
    International Trade'' in its remand opinion and recognizes that the 
    Department ``will thus be forced to use the best information 
    available'' (BIA) for this administrative review. Therefore, pursuant 
    to 776(c) of the Tariff Act we have continued to use BIA for these 
    final results.
        Comment 2: Krupp alleges that the Department suggested, and later 
    confirmed, through a memorandum to the file that the Department had 
    destroyed Krupp's proprietary questionnaire responses submitted in 1983 
    and 1984.
        Department's Position: The Department did not destroy documents 
    relevant to this period of review. Prior to publication of the 
    preliminary results of this administrative review, we were unable to 
    locate documents other than written public versions of Krupp's 1983 and 
    1984 responses to requests for information. Subsequent to publication 
    of the preliminary results of review, we discovered a few boxes of 
    documents bearing the administrative proceeding number relevant to this 
    case in an annex to the Central Records storeroom. A thorough review of 
    the information contained in those documents revealed that it 
    ``pertained either to a different company, an irrelevant period of 
    review, or was in an unusable computerized format for purposes of a 
    dumping analysis.'' See Memorandum to the File from Jackie Johnson, 
    Case Analyst, dated March 2, 1991. Other than indicating what the 
    Department was ultimately able to locate in its files, the memorandum 
    contains no statement that any of Krupp's files were destroyed, nor 
    does the memorandum contain any implication that this was done. 
    Accordingly, contrary to Krupp's allegations, the memorandum does not 
    support the contention that the Department destroyed any documents 
    whatsoever.
        Comment 3: Krupp argues that the statutory language and legislative 
    history of sections 776(b) and (c) of the Tariff Act explicitly 
    prohibit the Department from using information submitted in support of 
    a petition as BIA in an administrative review. Krupp contends that 
    petition information may only be used for purposes of a final BIA 
    determination in an investigation.
        The petitioner supports the Department's use of an adverse BIA rate 
    based on information from the petition arguing that the Department's 
    regulations not only allow the Department the discretion to determine, 
    on a case-by-case basis, what is the best information available, but 
    explicitly allow for the use of information submitted in support of a 
    petition as BIA. See 19 CFR 353.37.
        Department's Position: We do not agree with Krupp's interpretation 
    that either the statute or its legislative history prohibits the 
    Department from using the information submitted in support of a 
    petition as BIA for the margin in an administrative review. While 
    section 776(b) of the Tariff Act indicates that the Department ``may'' 
    use information from the petition as a basis for a final determination 
    in an investigation, this section contains no prohibition, explicit or 
    otherwise, against using such information as a basis for the final 
    results of an administrative review. Indeed, section 776(c) of the 
    Tariff Act explicitly states that, in making its ``determinations under 
    this [sub]title,'' the Department ``shall, whenever a party * * * 
    refuses or is unable to produce information requested in a timely 
    manner and in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an 
    investigation, use the best information otherwise available.''
        This section, which governs the use of BIA for all determinations 
    made under Subtitle IV of the Tariff Act, places no limitations on the 
    use of information from the petition for purposes of making a final BIA 
    determination in an administrative review.
        Moreover, the legislative history of the 1984 amendments to section 
    776 of the Tariff Act places no limitations on the Department's use of 
    petition information for the purposes of making BIA determinations. The 
    House Report confirms that ``[a]s under present law, the administering 
    authority will use the best information available to it for its action 
    if it is unable to verify the accuracy of the information submitted.'' 
    H.R. Rep. No. 98-725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1984). The Conference 
    Report is even more clear that the permissive nature of the statutory 
    language does not prohibit the use of petition information for BIA 
    purposes in administrative review:
    
        The express reference in the statute to the use of information 
    submitted in support of the petition as the best information 
    available for purposes of final determinations in investigations 
    should not be interpreted as precluding the administering authority 
    from using the best information available for purposes of 
    administrative reviews.
    
        Conf. Rep. No. 98-1156, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 177 (1984). As is 
    evident from the legislative history as well, in giving the Department 
    permissive use to employ petition information for BIA purposes in a 
    final determination in an investigation, Congress was careful not to 
    place any prohibitions on the use of BIA information for purposes of 
    administrative reviews, including the use of information submitted in 
    support of a petition.
        Under Krupp's forced interpretation of the statutory language, the 
    Department could not even use petition information as a basis for a 
    preliminary BIA determination in an investigation. Such interpretation 
    would render the Department powerless to secure the cooperation 
    required to conduct investigations and administrative reviews. However, 
    the Court, in Krupp Stahl A.G. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 394 (CIT 
    1982) (Krupp I), has already shown such an interpretation to be invalid 
    as it denied Krupp's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 
    Department from using petition information to make a preliminary BIA 
    determination in the underlying investigation of this case.
        In addition, the Court, in Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 
    899 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1990), stated that the Department's BIA 
    presumption ``implements the basic purpose of the statute'' and 
    ``effectively induces [respondents] to comply with agency 
    questionnaires; an important practical consideration since the ITA has 
    no subpoena power.'' Id. at 1191. As such, the BIA rule can be viewed 
    as ```an investigative tool, which [the] agency may weld as an informal 
    club over recalcitrant parties * * * whose failure to cooperate may 
    work against their best interest.''' Id., citing Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. 
    v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
        Accordingly, based on the plain language of the statute, a clear 
    reading of the legislative history, and mindful of relevant Court 
    opinions on the application of the BIA provision of the statute, the 
    Department must reject Krupp's interpretation as contrary to all three. 
    We conclude, therefore, that there is no legal basis which would 
    prevent the Department from using petition information for purposes of 
    the final results of the administrative review in question.
        Comment 4: Krupp also claims that the Department's use of 
    information submitted in support of the petition as BIA for this 
    administrative review is an unprecedented departure from Department 
    practice. Krupp contends that the Department has clearly and repeatedly 
    stated that its policy is to use as BIA the higher of the highest rate 
    for any firm: in the current review; a previous review; or the final 
    LTFV determination.
        Krupp notes that in Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous 
    Paving Equipment From Canada; Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
    Administrative Review, 56 FR 47451 (September 19, 1991) (Canadian 
    Paving Equipment), the Department discussed that in the preliminary 
    results of review that it had the authority to consider petition 
    information as BIA. However, the Department rejected the petition 
    information for purposes of BIA in the final results of review, despite 
    the respondent's repeated failure to respond to the Department's 
    requests for information. Citing industrial Belts and Components and 
    Parts Thereof, Whether Cured or Uncured, From the Federal Republic of 
    Germany; Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 
    56 FR 2500 (January 23, 1991) (German Belts), Krupp contends that the 
    Department's statement that it preliminarily used a rate from the 
    petition as BIA is misleading, because the rate used is actually the 
    margin from the final determination of the fair value investigation.
        Department's Position: As we stated in Canadian Paving Parts, 
    ``because each investigation and administrative review present the 
    Department with a unique set of facts and circumstances, the Department 
    often must select an appropriate unique BIA rate to achieve the 
    purpose'' of the statute. Id. at 47453. See also Final Results of 
    Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Steel Jacks from Canada, 52 FR 
    32957 (Sept. 1, 1987) (``Selection of the best information is made on a 
    case-by-case basis.'').
        In Canadian Paving Parts we selected a less adverse BIA for the 
    final results of review rather than a higher rate based on information 
    submitted in support of the petition because the respondent had made 
    several attempts to cooperate with our requests. However, the only 
    reason the Department decided not to use the petition-based rate for 
    the final results of the review was because the respondent made some 
    attempt to cooperate, not because the Department determined it was 
    legally precluded from doing so.
        Contrary to Krupp's assertions, the Department has used petition-
    based rates as BIA in numerous administrative reviews. For example, in 
    the administrative review of Antifriction Bearings (Other Than Tapered 
    Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from Germany, 56 FR 31692 (July 11, 
    1991) (AFBs), we applied the most adverse BIA to companies who refused 
    to respond to the Department's questionnaire or otherwise significantly 
    impeded the conduct of the administrative review. While the notice of 
    final results indicated that the rate used as BIA was the highest rate 
    from the final determination of sales at LTFV, the final LTFV 
    determination notice clearly stated that the information used as BIA 
    for that determination had been submitted in support of the petition. 
    Also, in Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies from Japan; Final 
    Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 54 FR 48011 (Nov. 
    20, 1989) (CMTs), and in Industrial Belts and Components and Parts 
    Thereof, Whether Cured or Uncured, From the Federal Republic of 
    Germany; Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 56 FR 
    9673 (Mar. 7, 1991) (German Belts), we used, as BIA, margins from the 
    final LTFV determinations, which were based on information submitted in 
    support of the original petitions. See CMTs final LTFV determination, 
    50 FR 45447 (Oct. 31, 1985), and German Belts final LTFV determination, 
    54 FR 15505 (Apr. 18, 1989), respectively.
        Comment 5: Citing Rhone Poulenc, where the Court found that it is 
    an acceptable interpretation of the best information statute that the 
    Department can presume that the highest prior margin is the most 
    probative of current margins in BIA situations, Krupp asserts that the 
    Department may only consider prior margins for purposes of BIA. Krupp 
    argues that, because the petition-based BIA preliminary determination 
    rate was superseded by a final calculated determination rate in the 
    LTVF investigation, the preliminary LTFV rate ``is not a prior margin'' 
    and thus may not be used as BIA for the final results of this 
    administrative review.
        In addition, Krupp argues that the Department itself declared the 
    rates established in this preliminary determination ``no longer in 
    effect,'' in the Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; 
    Certain Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip Products from the Federal 
    Republic of Germany, 48 FR 20459 (May 6, 1983). Krupp goes on to argue 
    that the Court in Krupp I would have found Krupp's challenge to the 
    Department's petition-based preliminary BIA margin to be ripe for 
    review if the Court thought that the preliminary determination ``could 
    determine the final liquidation rate for Krupp's entries, 
    notwithstanding a final determination.''
        The Petitioner states that application of the 27 percent rate in 
    this case represents a reasonable exercise of the Department's 
    discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, what is the best 
    information available. The Petitioner argues that 19 CFR 353.37(b) 
    provides for the use of petition information as BIA. The Petitioner 
    further contends that, as discussed in Rhone Poulenc, the statute 
    provides for the Department to presume that the highest prior margin is 
    the most probative when a company is non-responsive to the Department's 
    requests for information, otherwise, the respondent would have provided 
    current information demonstrating that the current margin is less. The 
    Petitioner argues that such a presumption must exist here since the 
    respondent failed to comply with the Department's request for 
    information and in fact destroyed all the records pertaining to the 
    instant period of review.
        Department's Position: We disagree with Krupp's contentions that, 
    in an LTFV investigation, a preliminary determination rate based upon 
    the best information available--in this instance from information 
    submitted in support of the petition--is not a legitimate margin and, 
    thus, cannot be a ``prior margin'' which may serve as the basis for a 
    final rate in an administrative review. To the contrary, an affirmative 
    preliminary BIA rate, even if based on information submitted in support 
    of the petition, results in the suspension of liquidation and the 
    collection of cash deposits or bond. See section 733(d)(2) of the 
    Tariff Act. In addition, in Daewoo Electronics Co., v. United States, 
    712 F. Supp. 931 (CIT 1989), the Court upheld the Department's 
    determination that an LTFV preliminary margin serves as a provisional 
    measures rate cap, with respect to merchandise entered between the 
    dates of the preliminary and final determinations. See section 737(a) 
    of the Tariff Act. In fact, because of the importance of the 
    preliminary margin, the Department has promulgated regulations 
    providing for the correction of clerical errors in preliminary 
    determinations of sales at LTFV. See 57 FR 1131 (Jan. 10, 1992).
        Thus, a preliminary margin, whether it is a calculated rate or is a 
    petition-based BIA rate, has legal force and effect. As such, it serves 
    as a ``prior margin'' to the same extent as a final margin. In this 
    respect, Krupp's reliance on Rhone Poulenc is misplaced. While the 
    Federal Circuit did state that ``it reflects a common sense inference 
    that the highest prior margin is the most probative evidence of the 
    current margins,'' 899 F.2. at 1190, it placed absolutely no 
    qualifications on what constituted the ``highest prior margin.'' The 
    Court went on the explain that if this common sense inference were not 
    so, ``the [respondent], knowing of the rule, would have produced 
    current information showing the margin to be less.'' Id (emphasis in 
    original).
        Notwithstanding its interpretation of the statutory language and 
    legislative history, even Krupp admits that information submitted in 
    support of the petition can be used as a BIA rate for an administrative 
    review. See Public Hearing Transcript (Apr. 14, 1992) (Transcript) at 
    42-43. Krupp, however, attempts to qualify the use of such information 
    by arguing that the petition-based BIA rate must also be the final 
    determination rate of the LTFV investigation. In other words, if the 
    preliminary determination is a BIA rate based on information from the 
    petition but is ``carried forward'' to the final determination, then it 
    becomes a ``prior margin.'' Transcript at 43. Once this has occurred, 
    then according to Krupp, the petition-based BIA rate may serve as the 
    basis for a BIA rate in an administrative review. Id. Such reasoning, 
    however, is based on the faulty premise that a preliminary margin is 
    not a ``real'' margin, and thus cannot be a ``prior margin.'' However, 
    as explained above, a preliminary margin is an actual margin to which 
    legal consequences attach and, thus, is as much a ``prior margin'' as 
    the rate for the final determination. Thus, Krupp's ``carried forward'' 
    theory must be rejected as being without legal foundation.
        Further, contrary to Krupp's contentions, the final LTFV 
    determination margin is no more representative of the period under 
    review than is the preliminary margin. Both of these margins are based 
    upon information which relates to a period prior to the period of 
    review. Indeed, in this instance because Krupp failed to respond to the 
    Department's information request, it has not demonstrated that the 
    final determination rate is any more probative of the period under 
    review than the preliminary rate. See Rhone Poulenc, 899 F. Supp. at 
    1190. As such, there is no record evidence to show that one is more or 
    less probative than the other as to what the actual dumping margins 
    would be for the period of review. This then is the reason for 
    undertaking an administrative review, i.e., to analyze information 
    concerning the actual entries for the review period so that any duties 
    that might be assessed on those entries would have been based on the 
    actual data relating to those entries.
        However, when the administrative review process is thwarted, as it 
    has been in this case by Krupp's failure to provide information about 
    the entries subject to review, then the Department is forced to rely 
    upon the best information available. Under these circumstances the 
    court has clearly ruled that ``Commerce may exercise discretion in 
    determining what is the best information available when a [respondent] 
    has failed to supply requested information.'' Tai Yang Metal Industrial 
    Co., v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 973, 977 (CIT 1989), citing 
    Chemical Products Corp., v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 289, 295 (CIT 
    1986). Further, when the respondent fails to provide the requested 
    information, the use of BIA ``can be detrimental to [respondent's] 
    interests.'' Daewoo, 712, F. Supp. at 944. Thus, because of Krupp's 
    failure to comply with the Department's information request, it should 
    not find itself in a better position as a result of noncompliance than 
    it would had it provided the Department with complete, accurate, and 
    timely data. See Canadian Paving Parts, 56 FR at 47453. ``Otherwise, 
    alleged unfair traders would be able to control the amount of 
    antidumping duties by selectively providing the ITA with information.'' 
     Olympic Adhesives, Inc., v. United States, 899 F. 2d 1565, 1572 (CIT 
    1990). Accord, Pistachio Group of Ass'n of Food Industries v. United 
    States, 671 F. Supp. 31, 40 (CIT 1987).
        Krupp's speculations as to what the Court might have done in Krupp 
    I had it been able to divine the particular circumstance of this review 
    are also misplaced. In fact, there is nothing in the Court's opinion 
    even to suggest that it would have considered Krupp's challenge to the 
    preliminary determination ripe for review if it had known that margin 
    would be used as a BIA margin in the first administrative review 
    because of Krupp's failure to comply with the Department's information 
    request. To the contrary, after reviewing the facts surrounding the 
    preliminary determination, the Court found that ``the deposit of 
    estimated duties will not cause a hardship of the type which justifies 
    judicial intrusion into an ongoing administrative investigation.'' 
    Krupp I, 553 F. Supp. at 396. Indeed, the Court saw the deposit of 
    estimated duties as being ``the normal consequences of involvement in 
    these investigations.'' Id.
        The reason the Court found no hardship to Krupp is that the 
    preliminary margin is simply an estimate of the potential duties owed--
    it does not represent an assessment rate for purposes of liquidation. 
    Under the statutory scheme, all of Krupp's entries subsequent to the 
    date of the preliminary LTFV determination would only be liquidated at 
    a rate determined on the basis of an administrative review of those 
    entries. If that assessment rate were determined to be higher than the 
    preliminary LTFV rate, Krupp would not be required to pay the 
    difference. Id. Thus, any so-called ``hardship'' that purportedly has 
    befallen Krupp is of its own making by virtue of its failure to comply 
    with the Department's information request, thereby resulting in the 
    assigning of an adverse BIA rate for the entries subject to review.
        Comment 6: The Petitioner recites the history of this litigation 
    highlighting that, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, Krupp asked the 
    Court, among other alternative prayers for relief, to enjoin 
    liquidation of the December 1982 through May 1983 entries while 
    directing the Department to conduct an administrative review of those 
    entries.
        Because the Court did not grant Krupp's request for a 7.76 percent 
    liquidation rate, but rather instructed the Department to conduct an 
    administrative review, the Petitioner asserts that Krupp's actions have 
    simply been an attempt to manipulate the outcome of the administrative 
    review process. The Petitioner concludes that if the Department were to 
    apply the 7.76 percent rate as BIA in these final results, the 
    respondent would in effect be rewarded for its lack of cooperation.
        Department's Position: Because Krupp failed to respond to our most 
    recent questionnaire and destroyed its business documents, thus 
    precluding conduct of an administrative review and verification of the 
    written information already on the record, we agree with the Petitioner 
    that use of a less adverse rate as BIA in the instant review would be 
    inappropriate. In Anhydrous Sodium Metasilicate From France; Final 
    Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 53 FR 4195 (February 
    12, 1988), we stated that to use the information that the respondent 
    suggests as BIA ``would, in effect, reward the respondent for this 
    failure to provide an adequate response'' in the review.
    
    Final Results of Review
    
        Based on the Department's analysis of the comments received, the 
    final results of our review are unchanged from the preliminary results. 
    We determined that a 27 percent margin exists for Krupp.
        The Department will instruct the U.S. Customs Service to assess 
    antidumping duties on all entries of this merchandise made by Krupp 
    during the period December 17, 1982 through June 23, 1983. The 
    Department will issue appraisement instructions directly to the Customs 
    Service.
        On August 11, 1986, the Department published in the Federal 
    Register (51 FR 28739) a notice of revocation of the antidumping duty 
    order, effective March 1, 1986. This administrative review covering the 
    period December 17, 1982 through June 23, 1983, does not affect the 
    revocation of the antidumping duty order. Therefore, we will instruct 
    the Customs Service to continue to liquidate all entries of this 
    merchandise exported on or after March 1, 1986, without regard to 
    antidumping duties.
        This administrative review and notice are in accordance with 
    section 751(a)(1) of the Tariff Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and 19 CFR 
    353.22.
    
        Dated: May 21, 1992.
    Francis J. Sailer,
    Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
    [FR Doc. 94-8024 Filed 4-4-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 3510-DS-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
04/05/1994
Department:
Commerce Department
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Action:
Final results of antidumping duty administrative review.
Document Number:
94-8024
Dates:
April 5, 1994.
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: April 5, 1994, A-428-013