[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 84 (Friday, May 1, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24130-24135]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-11408]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Part 232
[FRA Docket No. PB-9, Notice No. 11]
RIN 2130-AB22
Two-Way End-of-Train Telemetry Devices and Certain Passenger
Train Operations
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is revising the regulations regarding the use and design
of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices (two-way EOTs) to
specifically address certain passenger train operations where multiple
units of freight-type equipment, material handling cars, or express
cars are part of a passenger train's consist. Trains of this nature are
currently being operated by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak), and these revisions are intended to clarify and address the
applicability of the two-way EOT requirements to these types of
operations.
EFFECTIVE DATE: This rule is effective May 1, 1998.
ADDRESSES: Any petition for reconsideration should identify the docket
number and the notice number and must be submitted in triplicate to the
Docket Clerk, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Wilson, Motive Power and
Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3367), or
Thomas Herrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel, RCC-12,
FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590
(telephone 202-632-3178).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On January 2, 1997, FRA published a final rule amending the
regulations governing train and locomotive power braking systems at 49
CFR part 232 to add provisions pertaining to the use and design of two-
way end-of-train telemetry devices (two-way EOTs). See 62 FR 278. The
purpose of the revisions was to improve the safety of railroad
operations by requiring the use of two-way EOTs on a variety of trains
pursuant to 1992 legislation, and by establishing minimum performance
and operational standards related to the use and design of the devices.
See Pub. L. No. 102-365 (September 3, 1992); 49 U.S.C. 20141.
The regulations published on January 2, 1997, regarding two-way
EOTs, provided an exception from the requirements for ``passenger
trains with emergency brakes.'' See 49 CFR 232.23(e)(9). The language
used in this exception was extracted in total from the statutory
exception contained in the statutory provisions mandating that FRA
develop regulations addressing the use and operation of two-way EOTs or
similar technology. See 49 U.S.C. 20141(c)(2). A review of the
legislative history reveals that there was no discussion by Congress as
to the precise meaning of the phrase ``passenger trains with emergency
brakes.'' Consequently, FRA is required to effectuate Congress' intent
based on the precise language used in that and the other express
exceptions and based on the overall intent of the statutory mandate.
See 49 U.S.C. 20141(c)(1)-(c)(5). Furthermore, any exception contained
in a specific statutory mandate should be narrowly construed. See
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. United States, 248 F. 85 (6th Cir. 1918) cert.
den., 248 U.S. 580; DRG R.R. v. United States, 249 F. 822 (8th Cir.
1918); United States v. ATSF Ry., 156 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1946).
The intent of the statutory provisions related to two-way EOTs was
to ensure that trains operating at a speed over 30 mph or in heavy
grade territory were equipped with the technology to effectuate an
emergency application of the train's brakes starting from both the
front and rear of the train. The specific exceptions contained in the
statute were aimed at trains (i) that do not operate within the express
parameters or (ii) that are equipped or operated in a fashion that
provides the ability to effectuate an emergency brake application that
commences at the rear of the train without the use of a two-way EOT.
See 49 U.S.C. 20141(c)(1)-(c)(5). Based on the intent of the statute
and based upon a consistent and narrow construction of the specific
language used by Congress in the express exceptions, FRA believes it is
clear that Congress did not intend the phrase ``passenger trains with
emergency brakes'' to constitute a blanket exception for all passenger
trains. If that was Congress' intent, it would not have added the
qualifying phrase ``with emergency brakes.''
In FRA's view, this language limits the specific statutory
exception to passenger trains equipped with a separate emergency brake
valve in each car throughout the train and, thus, to passenger trains
possessing the ability to effectuate an emergency application of the
train's brakes from the rear of the train. Therefore, passenger trains
that include RoadRailers, auto racks, express cars, or
other similar vehicles designed to carry freight that are placed at the
rear of the train, that are not equipped with emergency brake valves,
would not fall within the specific statutory or regulatory exception as
they are incapable of effectuating an emergency brake application that
commences at the rear of the train. Further, FRA does not believe that
Congress envisioned a significant number of express or intermodal cars
being hauled at the rear of passenger trains when the specific
exception was included in the statute.
FRA believes that Congress intended to except only those trains
traditionally considered to be passenger trains, which would include
passenger trains containing baggage and mail cars as these have
consistently been considered passenger equipment with emergency brakes.
However, passenger trains which operate with numerous inaccessible
baggage or mail cars attached to the rear of the train that lack any
ability to effectuate an emergency brake application from the rear of
the
[[Page 24131]]
train would, in FRA's view, fall outside the specific statutory and
regulatory exception for ``passenger trains with emergency brakes.''
Subsequent to the issuance of the final rule on two-way EOTs
published on January 2, 1997 and the period permitted for the
submission of petitions for reconsideration of that rule, Amtrak raised
concerns regarding the applicability of the final rule to some of its
passenger train operations, particularly those which recently began to
operate with numerous express, material handling cars, or
RoadRailers entrained in the consist. These concerns
focused on FRA's enforcement guidance provided to its field inspectors,
which stated that the exception for ``passenger trains with emergency
brakes'' was intended to apply only to trains traditionally considered
to be passenger trains, a category that would include passenger trains
containing a limited number of baggage and mail cars at the rear of the
train. This guidance was based on the reasoning provided in the
preceding discussion. Amtrak contended that FRA's interpretive guidance
was an improper reading of the statutory and regulatory exception and
did not adequately consider the superior braking capabilities of
passenger equipment. Although FRA disagrees that its guidance was
improper, FRA did agree that a closer examination of the applicability
of the two-way EOT requirements to passenger trains needed to be
performed in light of the superior braking ratios of passenger cars and
the presence of emergency brake valves on the passenger cars in mixed
train consists, which provide certain safety assurances that are not
present in traditional freight operations. Consequently, FRA agreed
that the mixed passenger and ``express'' service currently being
operated by Amtrak is unique and needed to be handled separately from
traditional freight operations.
Amtrak currently operates a number of trains that include numerous
material handling cars, express cars, auto racks, mail cars, and/or
RoadRailer equipment. These types of rolling equipment are
either not equipped with emergency brake valves or, if equipped with
such valves, they are not accessible to any member of the train crew.
Amtrak expects that the operation of this type of rolling equipment
will continue to grow and that many of its trains will eventually have
a number of these vehicles in their consists. As noted above, FRA
believes that a passenger train operated with this rolling equipment
falls outside the statutory and regulatory exception to the two-way EOT
requirement for ``passenger trains with emergency brakes,'' and thus,
would be required under the existing rules to be equipped with an
operative two-way EOT or alternative technology. However, FRA also
recognizes the unique nature of these types of mixed operations and
realizes that the safety assurances provided by the braking ratios and
the presence of emergency brake valves at various locations through
much of the consist on certain mixed passenger trains make requiring
the use of a two-way EOT unnecessary.
To gain a perspective on the stopping characteristics and safety
implications of the mixed passenger train operations, FRA requested the
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) to review the
information and procedures used by Amtrak in developing various
stopping distance calculations submitted to FRA. In addition, FRA
requested that Volpe develop and analyze its own data regarding these
types of mixed passenger trains. In making their calculations, both
Volpe and Amtrak used variables of grade; train configuration; and the
number, weight, and types of cars and locomotives expected to be used
in these types of operations. Although all of the calculations were
based on worse-case scenarios (e.g., the angle cock was assumed to be
closed just behind the last car with an accessible emergency brake
valve, and only friction braking--tread or disc brakes of locomotives
and cars--was considered available to stop the train), all stops were
achieved on the specified grade used in the calculation.
In making its calculations Volpe used a MathCad program to compute
stopping distances. Volpe used the results of its calculations as a
check against the results Amtrak had produced and submitted to FRA.
Volpe concluded that Amtrak's procedures predicted longer (more
conservative) stopping distances than the approach taken by Volpe.
Amtrak's results were also compared to the requirements of the Amtrak
Communication and Signal Department, Specification S-603, Curve 8,
which is used to determine stopping distances for passenger equipment
for signal block spacing. Curve 8 values for stopping distances are
augmented by a factor of 25 percent to account for conditions which may
impair brake performance. The absolute (actual) signal block spacing on
the Northeast Corridor is actually greater than any of the stopping
distances produced by either Volpe or Amtrak in their calculations.
Therefore, stopping distances within established signal blocks should
not be a problem. The process Amtrak used was sufficiently conservative
so that predicted stopping distances were greater than would be
experienced in reality. Nevertheless, FRA worked with Amtrak to define
further limitations adequate to ensure safety under identified worst-
case conditions, and these limitations were set forth in this proposal.
Based on the information provided by Amtrak and the independent
calculations conducted by Volpe, FRA published an NPRM on January 16,
1998, proposing to revise the regulations on two-way EOTs to
specifically address certain passenger train operations where numerous
freight-type cars, material handling cars, or express cars are part of
a train's consist. See 63 FR 2647 (January 16, 1998). In the NPRM, FRA
stated that swift action was necessary with regard to the provisions
proposed and that a lengthy comment period would be impracticable,
unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest. It was noted that a
number of freight railroads were expressing concern and apprehension
over permitting these mixed passenger trains to operate over their
rails in light of FRA's above-mentioned interpretive guidance. In fact,
at least one instance was found in which a mixed Amtrak train was
detained for six hours by a freight railroad until a two-way EOT was
applied because the freight railroad refused to permit the train to
operate without the device. FRA also believed that requiring Amtrak to
acquire a number of two-way EOTs and operate under the provisions of
the current regulatory scheme during a lengthy comment period would
impose a substantial and unwarranted financial and operational burden
without improving the safety of Amtrak operations. Furthermore, the
proposals contained in the NPRM included certain restrictions on the
operation and make-up of certain passenger trains that were proposed
for exception from the two-way EOT requirements, restrictions that FRA
believe will enhance the safety of those operations and that are not
currently mandated.
In addition to the concerns discussed above, FRA also believed that
swift action was necessary because Amtrak is continuing to take
delivery of express and other equipment and to build this line of
business in order to close its operating deficit and to support
continued intercity rail passenger service in a time of declining
support from the public treasury. The public's interest in continued
rail passenger service warrants reasonable flexibility to achieve this
business objective. This
[[Page 24132]]
development corresponded with the implementation of two-way EOT
requirements, rapidly complicating what appeared at the outset to be a
relatively straightforward issue. Prior to the effective date of the
two-way EOT rule, Amtrak implemented a two-way EOT system on its
AutoTrain, previously the only Amtrak train operated with any
significant number of unoccupied cars at the rear of the train.
Anticipating the need to equip other trains as the express business
grows, Amtrak is in the process equipping over 100 locomotives and
deploying rear-end units at appropriate points along its lines where
trains are built. Amtrak also committed to FRA to operate cars with
cables for head-end power transmission (such as mail and baggage cars)
at the front of trains where practicable given constraints on loading
and unloading, in order limit the number of cars to the rear of the
train that are beyond the last car with an accessible emergency valve.
However, as Amtrak's express service grows and Amtrak builds trains
responsive to that growth (a phenomenon that is well underway), there
is an increased danger that Amtrak's own internal policies for use of
available two-way EOT systems would not be honored in the field through
oversight. Thus, FRA believed that having clear and certain Federal
requirements regarding the use of two-way EOTs were essential to public
safety.
Based on the concerns noted above, FRA issued the NPRM with a
comment period of only 15 days in order to quickly address the
applicability of the two-way EOT requirements to mixed passenger train
operations. FRA made clear that if no substantive adverse comments were
received on the NPRM within the 15-day comment period, it would
immediately issue a final rule containing the provisions of the
proposal. FRA also made clear in the NPRM that it intended for any
final rule issued to take effect immediately upon publication.
Written comments on the NPRM have been received from Amtrak,
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), and the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers (BLE). The relatively brief comments received from
Amtrak and Conrail do not substantively affect the approach taken in
the NPRM and primarily relate to clarifying the language used in the
proposed provisions of the NPRM or the discussion contained in the
section-by-section analysis of the NPRM. Therefore, these specific
comments will be directly addressed in the section-by-section analysis
of this final rule. In Amtrak's written comments, Amtrak also requests
that trains consisting of six or fewer mail or express cars be
specifically excepted from the requirements for the use of a two-way
EOT. As the NPRM and this final rule are specifically and narrowly
focused on mixed passenger train operations, FRA believes that this
rulemaking is not the appropriate forum for addressing Amtrak's
request. Furthermore, such a request has much broader industry-wide
implications than the issues addressed in this rulemaking and would
involve consideration of additional safety concerns and the performance
of detailed research not focused on or contemplated in this proceeding.
In its written comments, Conrail raises a concern regarding the
responsibility and potential liability of a host railroad if a
passenger train operates on its line while not in compliance with the
requirements of this rule. The responsibilities of the host railroad
with regard to this rule are the same as they are for any of the
requirements contained in part 232. See 232.0(e). As a matter of
policy, enforcement actions for noncompliance with this rule will
generally be imposed on the railroad or individuals responsible for the
operation of the train (i.e., Amtrak in most cases), unless the host
railroad causes the violation of such requirements.
The BLE submitted brief written comments on the NPRM, generally
objecting to any amendments to the two-way EOT regulations. The BLE
agrees with FRA that Congress did not discuss the potential for mixed
passenger train operations and generally asserts that when passenger
equipment is used in conjunction with freight equipment it should be
equipped with a two-way EOT. The BLE does not provide any specific data
or cite to any potential safety or operational problems involved with
excepting certain mixed passenger trains from the requirements for use
of a two-way EOT. Furthermore, the BLE does not object either to the
data assembled and assessed by FRA regarding mixed passenger trains or
to the additional safety assurances that exist on these types of trains
that are not present in traditional freight operations. Consequently,
based on the discussion above and contrary to the broad assertions of
the BLE, FRA believes that it would be in the public interest and that
there is more than sufficient safety justification for excepting
certain mixed passenger trains from the requirements related to the use
of two-way EOTs.
After reviewing the above noted comments received on the NPRM, FRA
concludes that no substantive adverse comments have been provided that
cause FRA to further consider or delay the implementation of the
requirements proposed in the NPRM. Furthermore, FRA has received no
requests for a public hearing on the NPRM. Consequently, the final rule
that is being issued by FRA revising the regulations on two-way EOTs to
specifically address certain passenger train operations where numerous
freight-type cars, material handling cars, or express cars are part of
a train's consist is virtually identical to the proposal contained in
the NPRM published on January 16, 1998.
Section-by-Section Analysis
FRA is amending Sec. 232.23 by revising paragraphs (e) and (g) and
by adding a new paragraph (h) to specifically address passenger train
operations that include using cars that do not have readily accessible
emergency brake valves.
Paragraph (e) of Sec. 232.23 contains a listing of the trains that
are excepted from the two-way EOT requirements. Conforming changes have
been made to paragraphs (e)(8) and (e)(9). In paragraph (e)(9) FRA
retains the exception for passenger trains in which all of the cars in
the train are equipped with a readily accessible emergency brake valve,
as discussed in detail above.
In paragraph (e)(10) FRA adds an exception to the requirements
regarding two-way EOTs for passenger trains that operate with a car
placed at the rear of the train that is equipped with an emergency
brake valve readily accessible to a crew member in radio communication
with the locomotive engineer of the train. FRA intends for this
exception to be applicable to passenger trains containing cars that do
have a readily accessible emergency brake valve at the rear of the
train. FRA believes this exception is justified as it is virtually
identical to the exception granted to freight trains with an occupied
caboose (contained in paragraph (e)(3)) since it would permit an
emergency application of brakes to be initiated from the occupied car
at the rear of the passenger train.
In paragraph (e)(11) FRA provides an exception for certain
passenger trains that have cars placed at the rear of the train that do
not have readily accessible emergency brake valves. This exception is
intended to recognize the safety of these types of trains if configured
and operated in accordance with the provisions of this exception. The
exception contained in this subparagraph applies only to trains of
twenty-four (24) cars or fewer. Therefore, passenger trains that have
[[Page 24133]]
more than 24 cars in the consist and that do not fall within the
exceptions contained in subparagraphs (e)(9) or (e)(10) would be
required to be equipped with an operative two-way EOT device or
alternative technology. It should be noted that a locomotive that is
used for power and/or controlling purposes and is not designed to carry
passengers will not be considered a car for purposes of these
calculations. Therefore, locomotives hauled dead in tow would be
required to be counted as a car for purposes of these calculations.
In the NPRM, FRA proposed that each bogie used in
RoadRailer operation be counted as a car for purposes of
calculating the number of cars in a passenger train consist. See 63 FR
2649. In its written comments, Amtrak objected to this method of
calculating the number of cars in a train as it would artificially
inflate the number of cars in a train. Amtrak stated that a string of
RoadRailer equipment will always have at least one more
bogie than the total number of RoadRailer vans since bogies
include at least one couplermate. It was not FRA's intention to
artificially inflate the number of cars in the train by proposing such
a method of calculation. FRA's use of the term ``bogie'' was intended
to refer to the intermediate bogies not the couplermates. However,
after consideration of Amtrak's comments, FRA believes it would be
confusing and possibly lead to incorrect calculation of the number of
cars in a train if bogies are used as the determining factor.
Consequently, in order to avoid confusion and clarify the intent of the
final rule, FRA will calculate the number of cars in a train containing
RoadRailer equipment by counting each
RoadRailer van as a car. It should be noted that this
method of calculation is solely for the purpose of applying the
exception contained in this paragraph. In order to accurately calculate
the percentage of operative brakes pursuant to Secs. 232.1 and 232.12,
it is necessary to consider the brakes on all the bogies in the train.
Based on data and information submitted by Amtrak and reviewed by
Volpe and based upon Volpe's independent analysis regarding passenger
train braking ratios and the response of passenger train brakes, FRA
believes that certain mixed passenger trains can be safely operated
without being required to be equipped with a two-way EOT or alternative
technology, provided certain operational and train configuration
restrictions are maintained. Paragraph (e)(11)(i) requires that if the
total number of cars in a passenger train consist is twelve (12) or
fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the consist (counting
from the first car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency
brake valve readily accessible to a crew member. For example, in a
consist containing twelve (12) cars, the sixth (6th) car (or a car
closer to the rear) in the consist must have a readily accessible
emergency brake valve; likewise, in an eleven (11) car consist, the
sixth (6th) car (or a car closer to the rear) must have a readily
accessible emergency brake valve, since all half numbers will be
rounded up. Paragraph (e)(11)(ii) requires that if the total number of
cars in a passenger train consist is from thirteen (13) to twenty-four
(24), a car located no less than two-thirds (\2/3\) of the way through
the consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped
with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member. For
example, in a twenty-one (21) car consist, the fourteenth (14th) car
(or a car closer to the rear) must have a readily accessible emergency
brake valve.
In addition to these train-configuration requirements, paragraphs
(e)(11)(iii) and (iv) contain certain operating requirements that must
be followed by any passenger train operating pursuant to this specific
exception. Such trains are required to have a train crew member occupy
the rearmost car equipped with a readily accessible emergency brake
valve and remain in constant radio communication with the locomotive
engineer whenever the train is operating over a section of track with
an average grade of two percent or higher over two continuous miles.
FRA recommends that the engineer alert the train crew member
approximately ten (10) minutes prior to descending the heavy grade, so
the crew member will be in place at the crest of the grade.
Furthermore, the final rule requires that the crew member not leave his
or her position until the locomotive engineer advises that the train
has traversed the grade. FRA believes that these operational
requirements will ensure that immediate action can be taken by a member
of the train crew to effectuate an emergency brake application whenever
the train is descending a heavy grade.
FRA is also amending paragraph (g) to indicate that the operating
limitations that will be imposed on a passenger train required to be
equipped with a two-way EOT that experiences an en route failure of the
device will be contained in paragraph (h). It should be noted that FRA
intends the criteria contained paragraph (g) for determining when a
loss of communication between the front and rear units will be
considered an en route failure to be applicable to passenger train
operations.
Paragraph (h) contains the operational limitations and restrictions
that are being placed on passenger trains that experience en route
failures of two-way EOTs. Conrail, in its written comments, voiced
concern that the language contained in the proposed rule text did not
accurately reflect the operating restrictions discussed in the
preamble. Consequently, in this final rule FRA has rewritten and
reorganized paragraph (h) to make it more understandable and to clarify
FRA's intent.
Due to the time-sensitive nature of passenger operations, FRA
believes that placing a speed restriction on passenger trains is not
the most effective method of handling en route failures of a two-way
EOT. Rather than delaying the movement of a passenger train that
experiences an en route failure of a device, FRA believes that certain
operating restrictions can be imposed on the train and its crew to
ensure the safety of these trains, particularly in non-heavy-grade
territory. However, FRA believes that in order to realize the benefits
of a two-way EOT as contemplated by Congress, the device must be
operative when the train descends a heavy grade. Thus, FRA will only
permit a passenger train to continue to operate under the operating
restrictions contained in this paragraph in other than heavy grade
territory. Consequently, paragraph (h)(1) has been slightly modified
from the NPRM and is intended to strictly prohibit a passenger train
that is required to be equipped with an operable device, from
descending an average grade of two percent or more for two continuous
miles until an operable device is installed or an alternative method of
initiating an emergency brake application from the rear of the train is
achieved.
Paragraph (h) has been further modified to make clear that the
operating restrictions contained in paragraph (h)(2) are applicable to
all passenger trains that experience en route failures of the two-way
EOT and that are operating on other than heavy grade territory (i.e.,
two percent for two continuous miles). Paragraph (h)(2) is intended to
permit passenger trains that develop an en route failure of the two-way
EOT to continue to operate over track that is not in heavy grade
territory as long as a crew member occupies the rearmost car with a
readily accessible emergency brake valve and remains in constant radio
communication with the locomotive engineer. In addition, FRA believes
that since the train no longer
[[Page 24134]]
has the safety assurances provided by a two-way EOT, the engineer must
periodically test the braking characteristics of the train by making
running brake tests. If the engineer suspects the brakes are not
functioning properly, immediate action shall be taken to bring the
train to a stop until corrections can be made. Paragraph (h)(3)
requires that all en route failures of the devices must be corrected
either at the next location where the necessary repairs can be made or
at the next location where a required brake test of the train is to be
conducted, whichever point the train arrives at first.
Regulatory Impact
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This final rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing
policies and procedures. Because the requirements contained in this
final rule clarify the applicability of the two-way EOT regulations to
a specific segment of the industry and generally reduce the regulatory
burden on these operators, FRA has concluded that this final rule does
not constitute a significant rule under either Executive Order 12866 or
DOT's policies and procedures.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
requires a review of rules to assess their impact on small entities.
FRA certifies that this final rule does not have a significant impact
on a substantial number of small entities. Because the requirements
contained in this final rule clarify the applicability of the two-way
EOT regulations to a specific segment of the industry and generally
reduce the regulatory burden on these operators, FRA has concluded that
there are no substantial economic impacts for small units of
government, businesses, or other organizations.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This final rule does not change any information collection
requirements.
Environmental Impact
FRA has evaluated this final rule in accordance with its procedures
for ensuring full consideration of the potential environmental impacts
of FRA actions, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other environmental statutes, Executive
Orders, and DOT Order 5610.1c. It has been determined that this final
rule does not have any effect on the quality of the environment.
Federalism Implications
This final rule does not have a substantial effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government. Thus, in accordance with Executive Order 12612,
preparation of a Federalism Assessment is not warranted.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 232
Penalties, Railroad power brakes, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Two-way end-of-train devices.
The Rule
In consideration of the foregoing, FRA amends part 232, title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 232--RAILROAD POWER BRAKES AND DRAWBARS
1. The authority citation for part 232 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102, 20103, 20107, 20108, 20110-20112,
20114, 20133, 20141, 20301-20304, 20701-20703, 21301, 21302, 21304,
and 21311; and 49 CFR 1.49(c), (g), and (m).
2. Section 232.23 is amended by revising paragraphs (e)
introductory text, (e)(8), and (e)(9) and adding a new sentence to the
beginning of the introductory text of paragraph (g), and adding new
paragraphs (e)(10), (e)(11), (g)(2) and (h) to read as follows:
Sec. 232.23 Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices;
prohibition on purchase of nonconforming devices.
* * * * *
(e) Exceptions. The following types of trains are excepted from the
requirement for the use of a two-way end-of-train device:
* * * * *
(8) Trains that operate exclusively on track that is not part of
the general railroad system;
(9) Passenger trains in which all of the cars in the train are
equipped with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew
member;
(10) Passenger trains that have a car at the rear of the train,
readily accessible to one or more crew members in radio contact with
the engineer, that is equipped with an emergency brake valve readily
accessible to such a crew member; and
(11) Passenger trains that have twenty-four (24) or fewer cars (not
including locomotives) in the consist and that are equipped and
operated in accordance with the following train-configuration and
operating requirements:
(i) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is
twelve (12) or fewer, a car located no less than halfway through the
consist (counting from the first car in the train) must be equipped
with an emergency brake valve readily accessible to a crew member;
(ii) If the total number of cars in a passenger train consist is
thirteen (13) to twenty-four (24), a car located no less than two-
thirds (\2/3\) of the way through the consist (counting from the first
car in the train) must be equipped with an emergency brake valve
readily accessible to a crew member;
(iii) Prior to descending a section of track with an average grade
of two percent or greater over a distance of two continuous miles, the
engineer of the train shall communicate with the conductor, to ensure
that a member of the crew with a working two-way radio is stationed in
the car with the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on
the train when the train begins its descent; and
(iv) While the train is descending a section of track with an
average grade of two percent or greater over a distance of two
continuous miles, a member of the train crew shall occupy the car that
contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake valve on the
train and be in constant radio communication with the locomotive
engineer. The crew member shall remain in this car until the train has
completely traversed the heavy grade.
* * * * *
(g) En route failure of device on a freight or other non-passenger
train. Except on passenger trains required to be equipped with a two-
way end-of-train device (which are provided for in paragraph (h) of
this section), en route failures of a two-way end-of-train device shall
be handled in accordance with this paragraph. * * *
* * * * *
(2) [Reserved]
(h) En route failure of device on a passenger train. (1) A
passenger train required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train
device that develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in
paragraph (g) of this section) shall not operate over a section of
track with an average grade of two percent or greater over a distance
of two continuous miles until an operable two-way end-of-train device
is installed on the train or an alternative method of initiating an
emergency brake application from the rear of the train is achieved.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (h)(1) of this section, a
passenger train
[[Page 24135]]
required to be equipped with a two-way end-of-train device that
develops an en route failure of the device (as explained in paragraph
(g) of this section) shall be operated in accordance with the
following:
(i) A member of the train crew shall be immediately positioned in
the car which contains the rearmost readily accessible emergency brake
valve on the train and shall be equipped with an operable two-way radio
that communicates with the locomotive engineer; and
(ii) The locomotive engineer shall periodically make running tests
of the train's air brakes until the failure is corrected; and
(3) Each en route failure shall be corrected at the next location
where the necessary repairs can be conducted or at the next location
where a required brake test is to be performed, whichever is reached
first.
3. Appendix A to Part 232, ``Schedule of Civil Penalties,'' is
amended by revising the heading of the entry for Sec. 232.23 and
revising the entry for Sec. 232.23(g) and adding an entry for
Sec. 232.23(h), to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 232--Schedule of Civil Penalties
* * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Willful
Section Violation violation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
232.23 Operating standards:
* * * * *
(g) En route failure, freight or other non-
passenger 5,000 7,500
(h) En route failure, passenger 5,000 7,500
* * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 24, 1998.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-11408 Filed 4-30-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
