[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 92 (Friday, May 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21522-21526]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-11725]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
[Docket No. 28567]
A Call for the Development of Prototype(s) for a Global Analysis
and Information Network (GAIN)
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: David Hinson, Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), stresses that Zero Accidents is the only
acceptable safety goal for the aviation industry and the FAA. This
notice offers some ideas for the elements needed to establish an early
warning capability for existing and emerging safety concerns that would
move the aviation industry towards Zero Accidents, and challenges the
aviation industry to participate in developing that capability. Because
of an emerging combination of improved cooperation between airline
management, labor, and various governments, advancements in information
technologies, and the political environment in several countries, the
international aviation industry has an unprecedented opportunity, by
sharing and analyzing aviation safety information, to reach Zero
Accidents.
This notice (a) solicits comments on the Global Analysis and
Information Network (GAIN) concept and implementation strategy for
collecting and analyzing aviation safety data, and (b) invites
participation in the development of proof-of-concept prototypes. All
interested parties, whether or not in the aviation community, are
invited to comment on the ideas presented, offer alternative solutions,
indicate interest in helping to develop a GAIN prototype or the overall
system itself, and comment about how government aviation safety
agencies can best help the industry reach Zero Accidents.
DATES: Comments in response to this call for action must be received by
June 14, 1996.
ADDRESSES: It is requested that all comments be submitted via the
Internet by sending an e-mail message with your comments (plain text
preferred, no graphics please) to: concept __paper@.
Please include your name and organization. Comments must also be
mailed in hard-copy (two copies) via regular mail to: Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Ave., SW., Office of Chief Counsel,
Attention: Rules Docket (AGC-200), Docket No. 28567, Washington, DC
20591.
All comments must be marked: ``Docket No. 28567.'' Commenters
wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments must include a
pre-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is
made: ``Comments to Docket No. 28567.'' The postcard will be date
stamped and mailed to the commenter.
Comments submitted about this Notice may be examined at the FAA at
the above address in room 915G on weekdays, except on Federal holidays,
between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. In addition, commenters will be able to
review all other comments by Internet. Your submission should not
contain any proprietary or other information that you do not want to be
made available to the public.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Chuck Fluet, Manager, Safety
Analysis Division, Office of Aviation Safety, ASY-200, Federal Aviation
Administration, 400 7th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone
202-267-GAIN (202-267-4246).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The aviation industry has made remarkable
progress in reducing aviation accident rates. With today's volume of
flights, the industry would have suffered more than 10,000 fatalities
last year worldwide if the accident rate had not improved so
dramatically since 1960. Because of this major decline in the accident
rate, the industry now suffers an average of less than 800 fatalities
worldwide per year. However, the rate has remained stubbornly
consistent for about the last 10 years; and at today's accident rate,
forecast growth in air transportation demand will lead to more than
4,500 fatalities worldwide per year by 2025--clearly an unacceptable
result.
Sound methods for certifying the safety of new aviation products
and procedures, as well as surveillance activities that help to ensure
safe operation and maintenance of these products and procedures, have
contributed significantly to the current safety levels of the aviation
industry. Within the framework of these regulatory methods,
technological advances in engine performance and reliability, airframes
and materials, air traffic control, cockpit automation, and simulator
training have contributed to the safety of the aviation system.
Compliance inspections, accident and incident investigations, special
studies, and program evaluations are the fundamental methods of
continuing surveillance in the operating environment, and safety has
improved significantly over the years in part because of the lessons
learned by using these methods to understand the mistakes and
oversights of the past.
Yet all too often, the industry has not been able to use data about
accidents, incidents and other system anomalies to become aware of
existing or emerging safety problems in time to take preventive
measures. Just as traditional product design and manufacturing methods
eventually gave way to new, improved principles and methods, a new
safety information paradigm, with much greater sensitivity to anomalies
in daily aviation system operations, could help the industry reach Zero
Accidents. Just as aviation product improvements
[[Page 21523]]
of the past have been fostered by technological advances, improvements
in aviation safety monitoring and alerting will become possible as a
result of major advances in information management technology.
An Outline of a New Safety Monitoring Paradigm
The industry must develop a significantly improved operational
early warning capability that is sensitive enough to detect and alert
the aviation community to existing and emerging problems. A major
aspect of this capability is the sharing of safety information, both
within categories in the industry, e.g., carriers must share with other
carriers and manufacturers with other manufacturers; and across
categories, e.g., labor, management, carriers, manufacturers, air
traffic controllers, airport operators, and others must share with each
other. Creating useful information, however, generally requires the
collection of large amounts of data, and it also involves the careful
analysis of that data. Rarely would there be any need or desire to
share any raw data, but the sharing of the analysis of the data--the
information--could be mutually beneficial. Gathering and analyzing
large amounts of qualitative and quantitative aviation safety data to
better understand routine system operations is the foundation of the
Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN) concept.
The GAIN system would be more sensitive to conditions that signal
increased safety risks because it would contain information about
normal aviation system operations. The statistical baseline for normal
aviation operations, constructed with digital flight and ATC radar
data, among other major and currently untapped sources, would be the
plumb line from which deviations are measured. The importance of
obtaining information about a far greater percentage of aircraft
operations has been illustrated repeatedly by all-too-typical accident
investigation findings of earlier flights that experienced problems
similar to the accident aircraft. A truly effective early warning
capability would involve significant improvements in information
feedback and analysis for aviation operations. At a minimum, the GAIN
concept would add the following new elements to the existing monitoring
systems to improve sensitivity:
--New data sources that would improve risk assessment and provide a
baseline for normal flight operations, thus improving the chances of
early anomaly detection.
--New and innovative data management and analytical techniques and
methodologies that quickly reveal obscure and/or infrequent data
patterns and associations.
--New methods to disseminate the findings quickly and globally to all
who could use them to improve aviation safety.
Analytical Strategies and Automated Tools
The proposed analysis process would be based upon new sources of
information and new information technology capabilities. First,
information from voluntary reporting programs (such as the confidential
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), or the Air Safety Reports
(ASR) used by certain airlines) and mandatory incident reporting
systems (such as the Pilot Deviation or Runway Incursion data bases)
would be subjected to a range of analysis tools. These include advanced
data pattern searches--which can be performed autonomously on the data
by ``intelligent agent'' automation tools to discover patterns or
associations, finding the ``needle in the haystack.'' ``Intelligent
agent'' software would aid analysts in discovering thematic
associations in text data bases, and data visualization tools would
show the analyst associations in data base elements. Application of
such data mining analysis tools would provide a more focused
understanding of operational safety concerns much sooner than current
analysis techniques. The data management and analysis take place in a
``data warehouse'' where operational data are extracted from existing
systems and, through a series of steps that standardize and improve the
quality of the data, the data are transformed into a data base designed
for targeted analysis. Within a ``data warehouse'' environment, safety
analysts can employ various data mining strategies.
Once existing or emerging safety concerns are identified,
hypotheses that are developed to explain them can be tested using
empirical digital flight data, ATC radar data, or other appropriate
data sources. A focus on remedial measures would at times result from
an analysis of digital flight data or ATC automated data, both vast
sources of empirical data.
As a result of new information technologies, we have the
capability, for the first time, to monitor and analyze the parameters
of safe and normal flight. Until very recently, it has been very
difficult to obtain accurate and reliable information on normal flight
operations. Now, thanks to new computer technologies, we can use flight
data recorder and radar information to generate large amounts of very
accurate and detailed information about flight performance. For
example, the Boeing 777 records information on 700 flight parameters 8
times a second. Several countries, mostly in Europe, have programs in
which a carrier or civil aviation agency routinely monitors and
analyzes operational data captured on flight data recorders.
Statistical analysis of digital data or ATC automated data from
normal flights would yield a baseline of routine operations that can be
used to detect variations from norms. In addition, baseline statistics
would help safety analysts quantify operating risks within, as well as
beyond, the envelope of normal operations. By collecting and analyzing
information primarily about what went wrong, we are missing the
opportunity to learn what was done right to avoid an accident or
incident in earlier situations. The likelihood of detecting problems
and developing remedies is significantly greater from studying large
numbers of normal daily operations than from relying primarily upon a
far smaller number of periodic inspections or accident and incident
investigations.
Analysis of digital flight data can provide several types of
information, including aircraft path analysis, derivation of
environmental conditions, aircraft configuration time histories,
aerodynamic coefficients (analysis of coefficients can reveal
degradation in aerodynamic performance), engine performance, aircraft
attitude, automated flight control modes and status, warning
parameters, takeoff and landing distances, and flight loads. Digital
flight data can be used to detect single anomalies--alerting operators
when criteria values for selected parameters have been exceeded or when
particular events occur. Such data also can be used to develop
descriptive statistics across fleets, to detect deviations from
statistical norms in the aviation system, or to measure the effects of
design, procedure, or equipment changes.
ATC automated data could be used to analyze airplane motion and
relative position, important factors in analyzing issues such as wake
vortex and environmental effects. An analysis of air traffic control
automated data for normal operations could provide insight into methods
for improving ATC system operations or potential problem areas. Flight
data anomalies from accidents could be compared to similar anomalies of
flights that did not crash to learn what was done differently to avoid
an
[[Page 21524]]
accident. These findings might suggest guidelines on pilot training or
aircraft design. The same autonomous ``intelligent agent'' analysis
techniques used to find patterns in data from incident reporting also
can be applied to digital flight data and ATC radar data--or
information derived from this data such as paths, flight loads, or
aerodynamic coefficients--to determine if any otherwise unobserved
associations exist within the data.
Human Factors Analysis
This analytical process and the new sources of data under
consideration could significantly improve our ability to describe what
is happening in the aviation system, and a comparable human factors
analysis capability must also be developed. Without a reliable human
factors analysis tool that addresses the underlying causes or factors
associated with emerging safety concerns, remedial measures may only be
temporary ``band aids.'' An effective human performance analysis
capability developed for use on digital flight data or ATC automated
data--augmented by feedback from voluntary disclosure systems--is an
essential part of an early warning system.
A Proposed Architecture for Sharing
As noted above, for a number of reasons, not the least of which is
the very large quantity of data, there will probably be little or no
sharing of raw data, but only of information from the analysis of data.
Moreover, because of improved networking technologies and capabilities,
information would not necessarily all be sent to a massive computer at
one location, but would probably be available to different users to
different extents by networking--sometimes known as a ``virtual
database.'' For example, this networking capability makes it possible
for each carrier, manufacturer, or union to have separate GAIN-type
systems, or they could do it collectively with one or more others or
through trade associations, or any combination of them, and the
information sharing could occur over the network to the extent desired
or permitted by the owner of each system.
The information that results from GAIN analyses would ideally be
available immediately to all recipients who could use it to improve
aviation safety. The dissemination of vital information can be
accomplished with existing infrastructure--using the Internet, for
example, if adequate safeguards can be provided to protect the security
and confidentiality concerns of the information providers regarding
identified or identifiable data. The GAIN network would have to
accommodate different requirements in a user-friendly way, and be able
to notify automatically all appropriate recipients about potential
problems without requiring them to know to query the system.
Examples of Proactive Use of Aviation Safety Data
There are several examples in various countries that demonstrate
how effectively proactive safety measures can be implemented as a
result of industry/labor/government partnership sharing of such
information. When one air carrier's data indicated that pilots were
frequently disregarding their Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS),
the carrier discovered that the frequent disregard was due to a high
false alarm rate, and further analysis of the data provided the basis
for developing a software remedy. As a result, that GPWS system was
improved (to the benefit of all carriers that used it), the false alarm
rate dropped, and pilots ignored the warning much less.
Similarly, a carrier that was experiencing frequent altitude
capture excursions and deviations in one of its aircraft types found
from the data that the problem was a combination of inadequate pilot
training and poor altitude capture logic. Analysis of the data provided
the basis for improving both the training and the logic. Again, the
logic fix benefited all users of that autopilot around the world, not
just the carrier that discovered the problem.
Other examples include improvements to training programs and/or
operations manuals as a result of high pitch angle takeoffs, more rapid
that desirable takeoff rotation rates, inadvertent flap/slat retraction
out of the proper speed range, and unstabilized approaches; design
fixes for equipment that did not perform as designed or anticipated
(e.g., an aircraft that was developing cracks from hard landings at
less than the 2 g cutoff beyond which inspection was mandated); and
improvements in airport signs and markings to help pilots more
accurately follow their taxi clearances.
Also important, of course, is that without the data, it is very
difficult for carriers, manufacturers, or governments to evaluate
whether new programs and other fixes are having the desired result.
Concept Implementation Issues
Collection and Analysis of Aviation Safety Data
In developing an analytical process for an early warning capability
that would monitor the system and alert the aviation community to
existing and emerging safety concerns, please consider what data
requirements, analysis methods, and information dissemination methods
you would propose. In relation to the analytical process, please
consider and comment on issues such as the following:
-- What aviation safety data and information are needed to support your
analysis plan and what, of those needs, is not now being collected?
--Should large quantities of data be collected on a wide range of
safety issues, or less data on fewer targeted safety issues?
--To what extent is standardization of the data collection or of
analysis techniques necessary? How should the necessary standardization
be accomplished?
--How could existing data, such as information from voluntary reporting
and correction, ASRS, AQP, FOQA, and other such programs, be analyzed
better to provide meaningful and useful information?
--What could industry and government do to improve existing means for
data collection?
--Are incentives needed to stimulate the submission of information that
is not derived from accidents or incidents, as opposed to merely
removing the disincentives, in order to encourage reporting?
--To what extent can international information sharing occur with a
``virtual database'' instead of a physically centralized data base?
--What techniques and capabilities are you aware of in the aviation
industry or in other industries to analyze data effectively and
generate statistically significant results, with predictive value, from
large quantities of data describing normal operations?
--What analytical techniques and capabilities are you aware of in the
aviation industry or in other industries to respond effectively to the
myriad of human factors issues that arise in operational monitoring
analysis?
Dissemination of Aviation Safety Information
--To what extent are security measures needed, and what security
measures are available, to protect information confidentiality while
still assuring that it reaches all in the industry who could use it to
improve aviation safety?
--What alerting methods are available to ensure that information is
automatically distributed to all recipients who could use it to
[[Page 21525]]
improve aviation safety without their having to know to ask?
General
--Will an analysis and dissemination system such as GAIN help the
aviation industry reach Zero Accidents?
--Are there better ways to help the industry reach Zero Accidents?
--What concerns, if any, do you have about the existence of an analysis
and dissemination system such as GAIN?
--What should the relationship be between government regulators and
GAIN for it to be most effective ?
--Although commercial aviation is the initial target for this effort,
how can other sectors of the aviation industry, including the military,
help with this initial effort?
--How can the program be expanded to include input from, and the
development of remedies in relation to information provided by,
manufacturing personnel, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers,
ramp personnel, and other aviation industry professionals whose input
could help with the proactive effort?
Considerations for Developing Prototypes
General
Ultimately GAIN could develop into a comprehensive international
network of systems for analysis and sharing of aviation safety
information. However, that development would have to occur
incrementally, starting with one or more prototypes of various pieces
of the network. Among the areas that should be evaluated from prototype
development are: international data standardization, data collection
protocols, analytical methods, data sharing, alerting mechanisms, and
the potential value of emerging technologies. By prototyping key
elements of GAIN, it will be possible to obtain operational proof of
the most significant new capabilities being incorporated in this early
warning system. With a minimal initial commitment of resources, risks
and costs would be reduced, while allowing the overall operational
feasibility of the concept to be assessed. It would help define
obstacles and issues associated with the development of GAIN, and
provide valuable information for future implementation planning.
Because more types of data, more types of analyses, and more users
should not generally be added unless experience demonstrates that such
additions would be useful, prototypes would help to provide the
experience to determine the desirability of such additions.
Ownership
For several reasons, the elements of the GAIN network should
probably not be owned or operated by the FAA or the aviation regulatory
agency of any other country. Instead, they should probably be owned by
those members of the international aviation industry that benefit
economically from its successful performance, analogous to existing
collectively-owned, non-profit joint ventures in the aviation industry
that provide services for the owners' mutual benefit. There are several
reasons for pursuing this type of ownership. First, GAIN would probably
enjoy better acceptance by the industry if it is not viewed as a
government effort to gather information for enforcement purposes or to
protect its own manufacturers and carriers in an international
marketplace. Second, private ownership, as compared with governmental
ownership, would facilitate protecting sensitive information from
public disclosure. Third, the funding of GAIN should not depend upon
the fiscal situation in any one country.
Last, but not least, GAIN's existence would be most assured, and it
would perform most effectively and efficiently, if it were owned
jointly by those who have a direct economic interest in its success--
namely, the insurers, manufacturers, carriers, pilots, mechanics,
controllers, and airport operators that make up the industry. Either
GAIN will improve aviation safety and substantially reduce costs for
the entire industry--because prevention costs less than accidents--in
which event industry will want to own and operate it; or it will not
accomplish these goals, in which event a better way must be developed
to reach Zero Accidents.
In determining how GAIN might be owned and structured, we invite
your comment about:
--What types of prototypes could best demonstrate the concept at the
lowest cost, given existing data collection and analysis techniques and
capabilities?
--What entities could help develop prototype projects, how much would
they cost, and what sources of funding are available?
--What role can you play in the prototyping effort and subsequent
efforts to develop an operational GAIN?
The Role of the FAA
The FAA is already engaged in several activities to demonstrate, in
relatively small scale, the utility of safety data collection and
analysis, but the GAIN network and its prototypes would probably not be
FAA systems. The FAA's Office of System Safety could help facilitate
the creation of GAIN by informing potential participants about the
concept, and by bringing potential participants together, but the FAA
will not own or operate GAIN, and will probably not fund its
development. Instead, the FAA would be one of many users of the
analytical results and supporting data from GAIN.
Given the numerous proactive accident prevention activities that
are already underway in various countries, it is likely that the
aviation industry would eventually develop an international cooperative
data sharing system, such as the GAIN network, on its own. The problem
has been that it is difficult for any one profession, manufacturer, or
airline to develop a program that systematically facilitates
international sharing of information to the benefit of the entire
international aviation community. Thus, in addition to facilitating
this development by demonstrating its intent to cooperate more with
industry to reach Zero Accidents, the FAA can play a major role in
accelerating the progress of private industry by bringing together the
entities that can help to develop GAIN prototypes--preferably by
building as much as possible upon the systems that are already in place
rather than starting anew--and by helping to assure that the prototypes
are sufficiently standardized and consistent to work together in the
more comprehensive GAIN network as it ultimately develops.
Conclusion: A Call To Action
Please let us know of your ideas regarding the development of a
GAIN network, particularly regarding how you can become involved,
either in a GAIN prototype or in the more comprehensive permanent
effort. This is not an invitation for bids or a request for proposals,
but we are soliciting indications of interest, as well as input
regarding the viability of this or any other concept to help the
industry reach Zero Accidents.
You are encouraged to review the comments (Commenters will be able
to review all other comments by Internet) and be creative about how
you, individually or together with other commenters, can begin the
development of GAIN prototypes. If warranted by the nature and extent
of the comments, the FAA will host a conference to bring interested
parties together to discuss refinements of the GAIN concept and the
development of prototypes.
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Issued in Washington, D.C., on May 7, 1996.
Christopher A. Hart,
Assistant Administrator for System Safety, Federal Aviation
Administration.
[FR Doc. 96-11725 Filed 5-9-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
