[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 90 (Wednesday, May 11, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-11359]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: May 11, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATON
Pipeline Safety Advisory Bulletin ADB-94-04 Offshore Operators,
Emergency Planning Coordination
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Advisory to offshore pipeline operators on coordinating
emergency planning with offshore producers.
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SUMMARY: This advisory calls the attention of offshore pipeline
facility operators to a safety recommendation by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the need for emergency
planning and coordination between themselves and offshore producers.
Advisory
As a result of NTSB accident report NTSB/PAR-90/02 and NTSB Safety
Recommendation P-90-31, on an incident on October 3, 1989, involving a
Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America (NGPL) underwater transmission
line in the Gulf of Mexico, this advisory bulletin informs offshore
pipeline operators of the following report findings:
(a) The accident report records the following shortcomings in the
transmission line operator's emergency plan for offshore emergencies
(NTSB's rationale is in parenthesis):
(1) Inadequate guidance for Gas Control personnel on notification
procedures (when NGPL Gas Control personnel were first notified of the
accident, they failed to contact the district superintendent directly).
(2) Inadequate guidance on the duties and responsibilities of the
emergency coordinator (the district superintendent failed to properly
fulfill his duties as emergency coordinator because of a lack of
guidance in the NGPL emergency plan).
(3) Inadequate guidance for liaison and coordination with public
officials (although the NGPL emergency plan listed a telephone number
for the Coast Guard, NGPL took no action to establish liaison with
local Coast Guard officials).
(4) Inadequate guidance for liaison and coordination with offshore
producers (neither the NGPL emergency plan nor the district
superintendent had an emergency telephone number with which to contact
personnel responsible for the unmanned offshore production platform
where automatic shutdown equipment was located and which failed to shut
off gas flow into the failed pipeline).
(b) With respect to item (a)(3) above, the requirements for
emergency plans in 49 CFR 192.615 for gas pipelines, and similar
requirements in 49 CFR 195.402(e) for hazardous liquids pipelines,
require operators to establish and maintain adequate communication and
liaison with appropriate fire, police and other public officials. As
noted in (a)(3) above, the operator failed to establish adequate means
of communication and liaison with the local Coast Guard (public
officials) as required by 49 CFR 192.615.
Background
This advisory bulletin is based on two offshore pipeline failures
and an NTSB safety recommendation.
In March 1989, an ARCO production platform in the Gulf of Mexico
was engulfed in flames and destroyed when a sudden release of gas
ignited during repairs to a Southern Natural Gas Company (SONAT) 18''
offshore pipeline. There were seven fatalities. In preparing for the
repair work, SONAT began venting the pipeline to atmosphere through
piping at the ARCO platform. Unfortunately, and unbeknown to SONAT,
venting came to a halt when ARCO personnel isolated the platform by
closing valves on all pipelines entering the platform, including
SONAT's 18'' pipeline (ARCO did this in preparation for some platform
maintenance work). As a result, the 18'' pipeline which the SONAT crew
began to repair, and which they thought had been safely vented free of
flammables, still contained some gas and liquids. A cutting machine was
being used on the pipeline's 18'' riser at the platform, and as cutting
neared completion, the pipe separated unexpectedly, releasing gas and
liquids which ignited. In the judgment of Federal accident
investigators, a lack of adequate coordination between both the
producer's (ARCO) and the pipeline operator's (SONAT) field personnel
was a significant contributing factor.
In October 1989, another pipeline failure involving fatalities
occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. A fishing vessel, the Northumberland
(crew of 14), punctured an NGPL 16'' underwater transmission line
carrying natural gas at 835 psig pressure. The escaping gas ignited
almost immediately, creating a fireball which completely destroyed the
vessel. Eleven (11) crew members perished. The incident happened at
approximately 6:00 PM. However, gas flow feeding the fire was not fully
shut off for over three hours, until shortly after 9:15 PM.
According to the NTSB report, a major contributing factor in this
long delay was the lack of a telephone number for contacting the
operators of an unmanned production platform [refer to (a)(4) above].
As a result, NTSB Safety Recommendation P-90-31 was issued to RSPA, as
follows:
Evaluate, with the assistance of the Minerals Management
Service, the need for emergency planning and coordination between
offshore pipeline operators and producers, and then implement, if
necessary, appropriate safety regulations.
The NTSB report also noted an inadequacy involving communications
with local Coast Guard officials [refer to (b) above] and shortcomings
[refer to (a)(1) through (a)(5) above].
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 5, 1994.
George W. Tenley, Jr.
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 94-11359 Filed 5-10-94; 8:45 am]
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