[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 94 (Friday, May 15, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 26955-26963]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-12978]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each
week.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15, 1998 / Rules and
Regulations
[[Page 26955]]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 60, 72, 73, 74, and 75
RIN 3150-AF32
Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level
Radioactive Waste
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations
to clarify physical protection requirements for spent nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage
installations (ISFSIs), monitored-retrievable storage (MRS)
installations, and geologic repository operations areas (GROAs). These
amendments codify standards for protecting spent fuel at the various
storage sites licensed under the Commission's regulations.
EFFECTIVE DATE: November 12, 1998.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8110, e-mail
[email protected]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On August 15, 1995 (60 FR 42079), the Commission published for
public comment a proposed rule that would clarify its regulations on
the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. The proposed regulation would have applied to spent
fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at ISFSIs, power reactors
that have permanently ceased reactor operations, MRS installations, and
the GROA. The proposed rule stated that the requirements for physically
protecting this type of material lacked clarity in defining which
regulations were to be applied at these sites. This resulted in a non-
cohesive regulatory base. The proposed rule would provide a set of
performance-based requirements, consistent with current programs that
are currently licensed and implemented at sites under a unified policy
for physical protection.
The proposed rule also indicated that the Commission was studying
the need for specific protection against the malevolent use of a
vehicle at sites affected by the rule (this is discussed further under
the ``Protection Goal'' heading). The rule also proposed a conforming
amendment to 10 CFR Part 60--to require material control and accounting
(MC&A) measures at the GROA that would be identical to that required of
ISFSIs under Part 72 . The proposed rule added a provision under 10 CFR
Part 75 to clarify that if GROAs are subject to International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, then NRC's nuclear material accounting
and control regulations for implementing the ``Agreement between the
United States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the
United States'' apply. Finally, the Commission requested specific
comment on five questions regarding impacts of the proposed regulation
on licensees.
II. Summary and Analysis of Public Comments
The proposed rule was subject to a 90-day public comment period
which ended on November 13, 1995. Twenty letters of comment were
received. Sources for these comments included a nuclear industry group
[the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)]; one national laboratory; fifteen
utilities involved in nuclear activities; two Federal agencies [the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy
(DOE)]; and one citizen's group. Twelve letters of comment explicitly
endorsed, either in total or in part, the views expressed by the NEI.
Four letters of comment, in part, supported the general objectives of
the proposed rulemaking. Correspondence received from EPA indicated no
comment. The comments have been grouped under the following general
topics:
1. Protection Goal.
2. Basis for Requirements.
3. Required Level of Physical Protection.
4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.
5. Rule Language Specifics.
6. GROAs.
7. Staff-Generated Amendments.
8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.
1. Protection Goal
Comment. Commenters noted that, although it was appropriate that a
protection goal for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste be
defined, the protection goal needed to be less stringent than the
codified design basis threat for radiological sabotage. It was further
stated that a 10 CFR Part 100 release, the unofficial criterion for
determining radiological sabotage of power reactors, would be extremely
difficult to realize with respect to spent fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. The citizen's group commented that any protection
goal developed for spent fuel should also counter the malevolent use of
an airborne vehicle.
Response. The NRC agrees that the establishment of a protection
goal should be the first step in the development of any physical
protection standards. One issue that may have caused confusion in the
proposed rule is that the assumptions for determining ``radiological
sabotage'' differ between Part 72, ``Licensing Requirements for the
Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,''
and Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Material.'' The
differing assumptions are appropriate because ``radiological
sabotage,'' as used under Part 73, applies to a power reactor and
implies the unofficial criterion of a Part 100 release for power
reactors. ``Radiological sabotage'' as used under Part 72 applies to
the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and is based
on the consequences of a design basis accident as defined under Part
72. Although the same term is used under both 10 CFR Parts; it is based
on different assumptions and results in different levels of required
protection. The Commission agrees that this is confusing and that
``radiological sabotage,'' as used for operating reactors, is not an
appropriate protection level for spent fuel and high-level radioactive
waste. The Commission concludes that the protection goal is best
characterized by the phrase: ``protection against the loss of control
of the facility that could be sufficient to cause radiation exposure
exceeding the dose as described in 10
[[Page 26956]]
CFR 72.106.'' The final rule has been modified accordingly.
With regard to protection against the malevolent use of a land-
based vehicle, NRC has determined, based on the opinions of expert
study and a peer review of findings, that there is no compelling
justification for requiring a vehicle barrier as perimeter protection
for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a Part 60
or Part 72 license. Inclusion of an airborne vehicle was assessed for
possible inclusion into the protection goal for this rule. However,
protection against this type of threat has not yet been determined
appropriate at sites with greater potential consequences than spent
fuel storage installations. Therefore, this type of requirement is not
included within the protection goal for this final rule.
2. Basis for Requirements
Comment. Commenters frequently questioned the need for tying Part
72 requirements to Part 73. The commenters assumed that by involving
Part 73 in the rulemaking, it was implied that the level of physical
protection normally attributed to power reactors was being required.
Phraseology used in the proposed requirements, such as using the term
``protected area,'' (PA) tended to further foster this impression.
Response. The Commission disagrees that placing requirements under
Part 73 implies any association with the physical protection
requirements for power reactors. It is noted that Part 73 provides, in
one consolidated Part, all of the requirements for those facilities
needing physical protection. This is one reason why an explicit
requirement for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive
waste is being added to Part 73. Part 73 includes more stringent
requirements for power reactor and Category I fuel cycle facilities and
much less stringent requirements for the protection of Category III
facilities. With regard to use of the term ``protected area,'' the
Commission has determined that the term is correctly used in review of
its definition under 10 CFR 73.2. Nonetheless, the Commission has
reviewed the physical protection terminology found in the final rule to
ensure that it does not imply a different level of physical protection
than intended.
3. Level of Physical Protection Needed
Comment. Some commenters expressed the opinion that the level of
physical protection described by the proposed amendments was
unnecessary and overly burdensome. The industry group noted that what
was truly needed was a level of physical protection comparable to
``enhanced industrial security.'' Cited examples of this type of
protection were: use of suitable fencing, locked access points,
sufficient illumination, and periodic security patrols. Other
commenters questioned the need for some of the redundancy that was
included in the proposed rule. One citizen's group believed that
physical protection measures should be more stringent than those
described in the proposed rule.
Response. The Commission believes that the appropriate level of
physical protection for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste
lies somewhere between industrial-grade security and the level that is
required at operating power reactors. The Commission also notes that
the nature of spent fuel and of its storage mechanisms offers unique
advantages in protecting the material. This factor, along with revised
consequence considerations, leads the Commission to conclude that
physical protection at sites where spent fuel and high-level
radioactive waste are stored under a 10 CFR Part 60 or 72 license can
be more flexibly applied than previously proposed. Accordingly, the
final rule has been revised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility.
Specific changes are outlined in Section III, ``Summary of Specific
Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public Comment.''
4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis
Comment. NEI and a few licensees commented that the proposed
regulation imposes a generic backfit as defined under 10 CFR 50.109 and
72.62. The NRC asserted in the proposed rule that the amendments merely
codified and standardized physical protection measures that, through
license amendment, were already in place at existing sites. Hence, it
was concluded that no backfit was involved. Commenters further stated
that, in terms of backfit requirements, the cost to implement the
proposed rule was not justified based on the potential increase in
protection that the rule would afford public health and safety.
Other commenters specifically responded to the Regulatory Analysis
that accompanied the rule. These commenters expressed concern that
certain provisions of the regulatory analysis could turn into de facto
requirements.
Additionally, it was recommended that affected sites should be
``grandfathered'' under any final rulemaking. Accordingly, these sites
would not be required to meet the provisions of the new physical
protection rule because an adequate level of physical protection was
already in place at the site, based on an NRC-approved physical
protection plan.
Response. Under the proposed rule, the Commission stated that the
backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 did not apply because the amendments did
not impose any additional requirements on Part 50 licensees.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that all references to Part 50
licensees are deleted in the final rule.
The Commission further stated that the backfitting requirements in
10 CFR 72.62 did not apply because the proposed amendments neither
imposed nor modified procedures or organizations of ISFSIs licensed
under Part 72. The Commission considers these statements true based on
their assessment of the proposed regulation and its intended
implementation. However, on further review, the backfit rule in 10 CFR
72.62 may be applicable to one facility which has only one isolation
zone exterior to the perimeter barrier. The NRC staff has identified
alternative measures currently in place that provide an equivalent
level of physical protection. The staff does not intend to require this
facility to establish an interior isolation zone. Thus, no backfit
occurs due to the new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does not cover
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, the inclusion of 10 CFR 73.51
in 73.71 event reporting is not a backfit.
With respect to grandfathering existing sites, the Commission
believes that implementation of this final rule at these sites presents
no undue burden to affected licensees and provides a minimum level of
physical protection to adequately protect the public health and safety.
Accordingly, there is no need for a grandfathering provision and no
change has been made in the final rule in response to this comment. The
Commission notes that the Regulatory Analysis for the final rule has
been revised to reflect changes made in response to public comment and
to eliminate ambiguities.
5. Rule Language Specifics
Comment. A variety of comments were received regarding specific
rule terminology. The suggestion was made that the term ``protected
area'' be revised to ``ISFSI controlled access area.''
Response. As indicated previously in this notice, the use of the
term ``protected area,'' is consistent with its definition in 10 CFR
73.2. Furthermore, because it is the Commission's position
[[Page 26957]]
that a site where spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste is stored
be surrounded by a fence, it is not considered adequate to call the
enclosure a controlled access area (CAA). Under 10 CFR 73.2, the
definition of a CAA requires only a demarcation of the area, not a
fence.
Comment. Another commenter supported the Commission position that
operating power reactor licensees that store spent fuel under a general
license should have the option of using the physical protection
measures of either 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) or the proposed 10 CFR 73.51.
The commenter also questioned whether the requirements of 10 CFR
72.182, 72.184, and 72.186 apply to a general license, in addition to
Subpart K. A related question requested clarification on how general
license holders were to notify NRC regarding which option they would
exercise.
Response. The Commission notes that a licensee having a Part 50
license does not fall within the scope of the final rule. The
Commission believes it is premature to bring these licensees under the
provisions of the final rule because continued protection for spent
fuel in storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently under study by the
NRC.
Comment. One commenter requested clarification on the specific
exclusion of an exemption for ISFSIs from the malevolent use of a
vehicle threat within the design basis threat. The commenter indicated
that it was not readily apparent and also a cumbersome process to
determine the current exempt status of an ISFSI under present
regulations.
Response. The Commission agrees and has revised the text of the
rule to exclude reference to the design basis threat described under 10
CFR 73.1.
Comment. One commenter questioned whether the proposed rule would
apply to a permanently shutdown power plant where spent fuel is stored
and the plant is operating with a Part 50 possession-only license.
Response. A facility with a Part 50 license is not subject to the
provisions of the final rule. This revision to the final rule has been
made because the Commission believes it is premature to include these
licensees within the scope of the rule because continued protection for
spent fuel in storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently under study
by the NRC.
Comment. A commenter requested clarification on the need for back-
up power for physical protection-related equipment.
Response. The Commission believes that affected licensees should
not be vulnerable to loss of offsite power. Thus, it is necessary for
licensees to assure either continuous operation of required physical
protection equipment during power failure or to demonstrate the ability
to provide immediate compensation for such failures.
Comment. Required illumination levels, assessment techniques,
required frequency of physical protection patrols, and searches before
entry to the PA were all subjects of comment. A commenter suggested
that illumination be provided only during periods of assessment and
that the entire PA need not be illuminated to a level of 0.2
footcandle.
Response. The Commission agrees that illumination to a 0.2
footcandle level represents a large operating cost and may be difficult
to achieve, given cask structure. This provision has been amended to
more clearly indicate that, while illumination should be maintained
during all periods of darkness, only an adequate level of illumination
is required within the PA for the detection assessment means used. In
addition, required performance capabilities regarding detection are
clarified in the final rule by specifying the use of active intrusion
detection equipment, as opposed to passive systems.
Comment. Some commenters noted that the frequency of patrols should
coincide with watchmens' duty shift lengths, as opposed to once every
eight hours as recommended in the proposed rule.
Response. The Commission does not agree that the frequency of
patrols should coincide with duty shift lengths. However, the
Commission agrees that some flexibility can be provided. Accordingly,
this provision of the final rule is revised to require daily random
patrols, only.
Comment. Licensees cited the burden of maintaining expensive and
delicate explosives detection equipment to meet the proposed
requirement for explosives searches conducted before entry to the PA.
Response. The Commission agrees. To clarify this issue, the
Commission has revised the proposed rule to require only a visual
search for explosives. Because pedestrian and vehicular traffic is not
expected to be high volume at facilities affected by the rule, this
type of search is not considered an undue burden to affected licensees.
Furthermore, the amount of explosives that may cause a radiological
release is not easily concealed.
Comment. Other commenters noted redundant records retention
requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 10 CFR 73.51(c).
Response. This concern has been corrected in the final rule.
Comment. One commenter noted an apparent contradiction in the
proposed regulation regarding use of deadly force in the protection of
an ISFSI. The commenter had been advised by NRC staff that use of
deadly force was not expected of members of the security organization
at ISFSIs. The commenter reasoned that this was not consistent with the
requirement to protect against radiological sabotage under the proposed
rule.
Response. The issue involving the use of the term radiological
sabotage has been resolved as discussed previously. Further, the
Commission never intended that onsite physical protection personnel at
an ISFSI would provide a response to a safeguards event other than
calling for assistance from local law enforcement or other designated
response force unless their timely response could not be ensured. The
Commission also notes that 10 CFR 73.51 only calls for unarmed
watchmen, not armed guards.
Comment. Commenters believe that the requirements for redundant
alarm monitoring stations and specified staffing levels for the primary
alarm station are overly burdensome and unnecessary.
Response. The Commission agrees that the requirement for redundant
alarm stations is excessive. Regarding alarm monitoring, this provision
is revised in the final rule to require, in the redundant location,
only a summary indication that an alarm has been generated. This
location need not necessarily be located onsite and could, for example,
be a simple readout in a continually-staffed local law enforcement
agency office. This is contingent on the assurance that communications
with the local law enforcement agency or the designated response force
can be maintained. Regarding required staffing levels of the primary
alarm station, the Commission has deleted the specific requirement that
the physical protection organization be comprised of at least two
watchmen from the final rule. This deletion is contingent on the
Commission's expectation that a human presence be maintained in the
primary alarm station at all times. To achieve this, the Commission
clarifies its position that the primary alarm station must be located
within the PA, be bullet-resisting, and be configured such that
activities within the station are not visible from outside the PA. The
intent of these measures is to ensure that a single act cannot destroy
the capability of an onsite watchman to call for
[[Page 26958]]
assistance. The final rule has been modified accordingly.
Comment. Finally, concerning the actual terminology and format of
the proposed rule, commenters expressed support for its performance-
based nature but rejected the set of provisions under 10 CFR 73.51(d)
as being overly prescriptive.
Response. The Commission responds that the proposed regulation
found in 10 CFR 73.51(d) is needed to provide additional clarity in
meeting the performance capabilities in 10 CFR 73.51(b) and notes that
many of the physical protection measures described under 10 CFR
73.51(d) are relaxed in the final rule and are less prescriptive in a
number of cases.
6. GROA
Comment. Two comments were received from DOE on the amendments to
Part 60 dealing with the geologic repository. The first commenter
requested that it be emphasized in the ``Statement of Considerations''
for the final rule that the requirement for physical protection of
GROAs be applicable only during their operational phases and not after
closure.
Response. The Commission agrees with this observation and has
clarified the exemption in the final rule to specifically exempt GROAs
from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 after permanent closures.
Comment. The second commenter requested clarification on apparent
conflicts in Part 60, ``Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste in
Geologic Repositories,'' regarding the level of detail required of
physical protection plans during the different phases of the
certification process.
Response. The Commission notes that NUREG 1619, ``Standard Review
Plan for Physical Protection Plans for the Independent Storage of Spent
Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,'' to be issued concurrently with
the effective date of the final rule, will contain guidance in this
area.
7. NRC Staff-Generated Amendments
Subsequent to publication of the proposed rule, a technical issue
arose involving the cooling time of spent fuel as it relates to the
degree of physical protection needed. Because a response to this issue
continues to evolve within the NRC, the Commission believes it would be
inappropriate to apply the provisions of the final rule at this time to
a licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license. Hence, licensees holding a
10 CFR Part 50 license are not within the scope of the final rule.
Further, review indicated that there was some confusion pertaining to
MC&A requirements for ISFSIs. Specifically, the NRC staff asked if
ISFSIs were exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51 and, if not,
why not. Specific MC&A requirements for ISFSIs are found under Part 72.
After consideration of the issue, for clarification, the NRC staff has
included an amendment to 10 CFR Part 74 that specifically exempts
ISFSIs from 10 CFR 74.51 in the final rule.
8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions
Question 1. Would the proposed amendments impose any significant
additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel
beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?
Summary of Responses. Five responses from nuclear utilities
specifically addressed this issue. All indicated that the amendments,
as proposed, would significantly increase costs. Manpower-intensive
measures, such as the requirement to maintain a minimum of two watchmen
per shift, were most often cited as creating an undue burden. One
licensee estimated costs of $1 to $2 million to implement, and a
continuing cost increase of 30-50 percent, annually, to physical
protection operations.
NRC Response. Licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are no
longer within the scope of this rule. The final rule has been revised
to minimize redundancy and add flexibility to its implementation. There
should be no significant increase in cost to current licensees.
Question 2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees
to differ substantially from those of current licensees?
Summary of Responses. Four responses from nuclear utilities
specifically addressed this issue. Three utilities cited both higher
current and annual operating costs. One utility noted that, to the
extent that current licensees have been required to commit to the
practices recommended in the proposed rule in initial licensing, there
is no anticipated difference in cost.
NRC Response. Licensees holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license are no
longer within the scope of this rule. The final rule has been amended
to be more consistent with physical protection implemented at sites
with currently approved physical protection plans. Hence, there should
be no significant increase in costs to future licensees.
Question 3. Are the cost estimates in Table III of the Draft
Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are
there significant costs that have not been included in the table?
Summary of Responses. Three responses from nuclear utilities
specifically addressed this issue. One respondent indicated that the
cost estimates in Table III of the ``Draft Regulatory Analysis'' are
sufficiently broad to address industry experience. However, the
inclusion of a continual surveillance system is not covered and the
respondent suggested that it should be a separate line item. Another
respondent indicated that the cost estimates appear to be comprehensive
except they do not include construction and maintenance of physical
protection office space, a records retention area, and alarm
station(s).
NRC Response. The ``Regulatory Analysis'' has been revised to
reflect public comment to include any omissions or changes made to the
final rule.
Question 4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be
afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would
afford essentially the same benefits but be more cost effective?
Summary of Responses. Three responses from nuclear utilities
specifically addressed this issue. All three indicated that the costs
were not justified by the benefits derived from the proposed rule. One
respondent stated that the individual measures of 10 CFR 73.51(d) have
merit, but, when taken in aggregate, they are not necessary to protect
public health and safety. This respondent further stated that
redundancy in the proposed rule was not needed and the rulemaking
should give affected licensees latitude in selecting and justifying the
means of physical protection. Alternatives that were suggested involved
the deletion of specific provisions of the proposed rule and also the
restructuring of the rule so as to not group all ISFSIs under one set
of physical protection criteria.
NRC Response. The Commission has revised the requirements of the
proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, add flexibility in
implementation, and reduce manpower-intensive measures while
maintaining an adequate level of physical protection.
Question 5. Are the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate
for an MRS or geologic repository operated by DOE?
Summary of Response. NEI was the only respondent to this issue. NEI
noted that NRC should be mindful of the evolving nature of MRS
installations and the geologic repository in the development of
physical protection regulations for these sites.
[[Page 26959]]
NRC Response. NRC staff continues to work closely with DOE staff in
the development of the certification process for MRS installations and
the GROA.
III. Summary of Specific Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result
of Public Comment
Major changes made to the proposed rule include:
(1) The incorporation of a protection goal, and
(2) Regarding required levels of physical protection, redundancies
have been reduced, flexibility added, and manpower-for example--
Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant alarm station
need only provide a summary indication at a continually staffed
location;
Redundant records retention has been eliminated;
The required staffing level for the security organization
has been eliminated and required siting and configuration of the
primary alarm station clarified;
Hand-held equipment searches for explosives are replaced
with visual searches; and
Illumination levels need only permit adequate assessment
of the PA according to the assessment means used. Detection equipment
must be active in nature.
As discussed previously, the final rule does not apply to a
licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50 license.
A section-by-section comparison of the proposed and final rules
follows.
Part 60--Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic
Repositories
1. Section 60.21, Content of application. This section is unchanged
from the proposed rule.
2. Section 60.31, Construction authorization. This section is
unchanged from the proposed rule.
3. Section 60.41, Standards for issuance of a license. This section
is unchanged from the proposed rule.
4. Section 60.78, Material control and accounting records and
reports. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.
Part 72--Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste
5. Section 72.24, Contents of application: Technical information.
This section is unchanged from the proposed rule. The term
``radiological sabotage'' is based on Part 72 assumptions and not a
Part 100 radiological release.
6. Section 72.180, Physical security plan. This section is
unchanged from the proposed rule except for changing the title to
Physical Protection Plan to be consistent with 10 CFR Part 73.
7. Section 72.212, Conditions of general license issued under
Sec. 72.210. Revisions to this section have been deleted in their
entirety.
Part 73--Physical Protection of Plants and Materials
8. Section 73.1, Purpose and Scope. Paragraph (b)(6) is unchanged
from the proposed rule.
9. Section 73.50, Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities. This section remains unchanged from the proposed rule.
10. Section 73.51, Requirements for the physical protection of
stored spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Paragraph
(a), Applicability, has been revised to more precisely define the type
of material affected by the rule and to eliminate 10 CFR Part 50
licensees from the provisions of the rule.
Paragraph (b)(3), General Performance Objectives, has been revised
to read: ``The physical protection system must be designed to protect
against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to
cause radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in 10 CFR
72.106.'' This revised statement describes a more appropriate
protection goal that is consistent with Part 72. It also allows for a
physical protection system less stringent than required to protect
against radiological sabotage at operating power reactors.
The introductory text of paragraph (d) has been revised to more
clearly indicate the Commission's intent that alternative measures may
also be available for meeting the provisions of (d). For example,
several questions arose during final rule development as to whether the
use of a hardened and protected alarm station sited at an adjacent
operating power reactor would meet the intent of paragraph (d)(3) to
have a hardened alarm station within the PA of the ISFSI. Staff
considers this to be an acceptable alternative measure for meeting this
provision of the final rule.
In paragraph (d)(1), the last sentence has been deleted because it
is no longer necessary due to the revision cited in the previous
paragraph above.
Paragraph (d)(2) has been revised to read: ``Illumination must be
sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetrations
of or activities within the protected area.'' This revision has been
made to permit flexibility in illumination levels.
Paragraph (d)(3) has been revised to read: ``The perimeter of the
protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be
protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is capable of
detecting penetration through the isolation zone and that is monitored
in a continually staffed primary alarm station located within the
protected area, and in one additional continually staffed location to
ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of the onsite
watchman to call for assistance. The primary alarm station must be
located within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors,
ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible
from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment must
also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant location
need only provide a summary indication that an alarm has been
generated.'' This clarifies the Commission's position that the
necessary level of protection should ensure that a single act cannot
destroy the capability of the onsite watchman to call for assistance.
Paragraph (d)(4) has been revised to reduce the frequency of patrol
from ``not less than once every 8 hours'' to ``daily random patrols''
with additional discussion provided in guidance issued to support the
rule.
Paragraph (d)(5) has been revised to read: ``A security
organization with written procedures must be established. The security
organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for
monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance,
assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate
response. Members of the security organization must be trained,
equipped, qualified and requalified to perform assigned job duties in
accordance with Appendix B to Part 73, I.A, (1) (a) and (b); B(1)(a);
and the applicable portions of II.'' This change eliminates a required
staffing level and describes qualification and training levels for
watchmen, only, as the primary members of the security organization.
Paragraph (d)(6) has been changed to require ``timely'' response
from the designated response forces. If timely response cannot be
provided, additional protective measures may be required, to include
use of armed guards.
Paragraph (d)(7) has been deleted.
Paragraph (d)(8) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(7) and
revised to read as follows: ``A personnel identification system and a
controlled lock system must be established and maintained to limit
access to authorized individuals.'' This eliminates the unnecessary
coupling of the identification system with the system
[[Page 26960]]
used for key and lock control as requested by commenters.
Paragraph (d)(9) has been deleted. If a person is authorized access
to the PA, properly identified, and subject to search, there is no need
for the individual to be escorted.
Paragraph (d)(10) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(8).
Regarding communications, the term ``security organization'' has been
revised to ``onsite security force members'' to more precisely define
communication channels.
Paragraph (d)(11) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(9) and
revised to read as follows: ``All individuals, vehicles and hand-
carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper
authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry.'' This
is permissible because the amount of explosives needed to cause a
radiological release is not easily concealable.
Paragraph (d)(12) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(10). The
text of this paragraph is unchanged from the proposed rule.
Paragraph (d)(13) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(11) and
revised to read as follows: ``All detection systems, surveillance/
assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination
systems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be
maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be
taken after discovery of inoperability to assure that the effectiveness
of the physical protection system is not reduced.''
Paragraph (d)(14) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(12) and
remains unchanged from the proposed rule.
Paragraph (d)(15) has been redesignated as paragraph (d)(13). This
provision has been added to assure that duplication of records under
Sec. 72.180 is not required. Paragraph (d)(13)(ii) has been revised to
read as follows: ``Screening records of members of the security
organization.'' Finally, the log of patrols must contain all patrols,
not just routine patrols.
Paragraph (e) has been revised for clarity.
11. Section 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events, remains
unchanged from the proposed rule.
Part 74--Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material
12. In Section 74.51, Nuclear material control and accounting for
special nuclear material, paragraph (a) has been revised to read as
follows: ``General performance objectives. Each licensee who is
authorized to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic
special nuclear material (SSNM) and to use such material at any site,
other than a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this
chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved
with waste disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility
licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter, shall establish,
implement, and maintain a Commission approved material control and
accounting (MC&A) system that will achieve the following objectives: *
* * '' This paragraph specifically exempts Part 72 ISFSIs from the
requirements of 10 CFR 74.51.
Part 75--Safeguards on Nuclear Material--Implementation of US/IAEA
Agreement
13. Section 75.4, Definitions, remains unchanged from the proposed
rule.
Criminal Penalties
NRC notes that these final amendments are issued under Sections
161b and i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Therefore,
violation of these regulations may subject a person to criminal
sanctions under section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Environmental Impact: Categorical Exclusion
The Commission has determined that this final rule is the type of
action described as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i)
and (iii). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an
environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule amends information collection requirements that are
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0002, 3150-0055, 3150-0123, and
3150-0132.
Public Protection Notification
If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB
control number, the NRC may not conduct and a person is not required to
respond to, the information collection.
Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a ``Final Regulatory Analysis'' for
this final rule. The final analysis examines the benefits and
alternatives considered by the Commission. The ``Final Regulatory
Analysis'' is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document room,
2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington DC. Single copies of the
analysis may be obtained from Priscilla A. Dwyer, Division of Fuel
Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001. The ``Final Regulatory Analysis'' is available for viewing and
downloading from the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the
Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final
rule affects operators of ISFSIs and DOE as the operator of the MRS and
GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of the
definition of ``small entities'' set forth in Section 601(3) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the NRC's size standards (10 CFR 2.810).
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement
Fairness Act of 1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a
``major rule'' and has verified this determination with the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB.
Backfit Analysis
The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR
50.109 does not apply because this final rule does not impose new
requirements on existing 10 CFR part 50 licensees. The backfit rule in
10 CFR 72.62 may be applicable to one facility which has only one
isolation zone exterior to the perimeter barrier. However, the NRC
staff has identified alternative measures currently in place that
provide an equivalent level of physical protection. The staff does not
intend to require this facility to establish an interior isolation
zone. Thus, no backfit occurs due to the new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62
does not cover reporting and recordkeeping requirements, the inclusion
of 10 CFR 73.51 in 10 CFR 73.71 event reporting is not a backfit.
Finally, the transfer of spent fuel from a reactor, licensed under 10
CFR part 50 and subject to 10 CFR 73.55 physical protection
requirements, to an ISFSI licensed under 10 CFR part 72, and its
associated physical protection provisions (e.g., 10 CFR 73.51) is not a
backfit. A new license under 10 CFR art 72 is a matter of compliance
with regulations. In all
[[Page 26961]]
cases, transition from 10 CFR 73.55 to 73.51 is a relaxation of
requirements and not a backfit.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 60
Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Waste treatment and disposal.
10 CFR Part 72
Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety
and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures, Spent fuel.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
10 CFR Part 74
Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation,
Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and
containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material.
10 CFR Part 75
Criminal penalties, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear materials,
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Security measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553 the NRC is adopting
the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 60, 72, 73, 74, and 75.
PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORIES
1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141) and
Pub. L. 102-486, sec 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).
2. In Sec. 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(10) are
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.21 Content of application.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high-level
radioactive waste in accordance with Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. This
plan must include the design for physical protection, the licensee's
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections,
audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such
requirements.
(4) A description of the program to meet the requirements of
Sec. 60.78.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the
records described in Secs. 60.71 and 60.72.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 60.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.31 Construction authorization.
* * * * *
(b) Common defense and security. That there is reasonable assurance
that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to
the common defense and security.
* * * * *
4. In Sec. 60.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.41 Standards for issuance of license.
* * * * *
(c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common
defense and security and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to
the health and safety of the public.
* * * * *
5. A new Sec. 60.78 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 60.78 Material control and accounting records and reports.
DOE shall implement a program of material control and accounting
(and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that
specified in Secs. 72.72, 72.74, 72.76, and 72.78 of this chapter.
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
6. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183,
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953,
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat.
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L. 102-
486, sec. 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135,
137, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148,
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153,
10155, 10157, 10161, 10168).
Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d),
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b),
10168 (c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 955
(42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C.
10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub. L. 100-
203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)). Subpart J also issued
under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-425, 96
Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2224 (42 U.S.C. 10101, 10137(a),
10161(h)). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 133, 98 Stat.
2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and sec. 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C.
10198).
7. In Sec. 72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.24 Contents of application; Technical information.
* * * * *
(o) A description of the detailed security measures for physical
protection, including design features and the plans required by subpart
H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI or MRS, DOE will provide a
description of the physical protection plan for protection against
radiological sabotage as required by subpart H.
* * * * *
8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.180 Physical protection plan.
The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan
for physical protection as described in Sec. 73.51 of this chapter. The
licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the
Commission terminates the license for which the procedures were
developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the
superseded material for 3 years after each change or until termination
of the license. The plan must describe how the applicant will meet the
requirements of Sec. 73.51 of this chapter and provide physical
protection during on-site transportation
[[Page 26962]]
to and from the proposed ISFSI or MRS and include within the plan the
design for physical protection, the licensee's safeguards contingency
plan, and the security organization personnel training and
qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and
other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such
requirements.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
9. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96
Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued
under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100 Stat. 876
(42 U.S.C. 2169).
10. In Sec. 73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.1 Purpose and scope.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored in either
an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or a monitored
retrievable storage (MRS) installation licensed under part 72 of this
chapter, or stored at the geologic repository operations area licensed
under part 60 of this chapter.
* * * * *
11. The introductory text of Sec. 73.50 is revised to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.50 Requirements for physical protection for licensed
activities.
Each licensee who is not subject to Sec. 73.51, but who possesses,
uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear
material that are not readily separable from other radioactive material
and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess of 100
rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surfaces
without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility
licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall comply with the
following:
* * * * *
12. A new Sec. 73.51 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Secs. 73.20,
73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section
apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), and (2) of
this section. This includes--
(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored
under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of this chapter:
(i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or
(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or
(2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at a
geologic repository operations area (GROA) licensed pursuant to part 60
of this chapter;
(b) General performance objectives. (1) Each licensee subject to
this section shall establish and maintain a physical protection system
with the objective of providing high assurance that activities
involving spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.
(2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1) of this
section, each licensee subject to this section shall meet the following
performance capabilities.
(i) Store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste only
within a protected area;
(ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are
authorized to enter the protected area;
(iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of, or activities
within, the protected area;
(iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force
whenever necessary; and
(v) Manage the physical protection organization in a manner that
maintains its effectiveness.
(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect
against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to
cause a radiation exposure exceeding the dose as described in
Sec. 72.106 of this chapter.
(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall
retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for
3 years or until termination of the license for which procedures were
developed.
(d) Physical protection systems, components, and procedures. A
licensee shall comply with the following provisions as methods
acceptable to NRC for meeting the performance capabilities of
Sec. 73.51(b)(2). The Commission may, on a specific basis and upon
request or on its own initiative, authorize other alternative measures
for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste
subject to the requirements of this section, if after evaluation of the
specific alternative measures, it finds reasonable assurance of
compliance with the performance capabilities of paragraph (b)(2) of
this section.
(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste must be
stored only within a protected area so that access to this material
requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one
barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering
substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the
perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in Sec. 73.2.
Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this
barrier, must be provided to facilitate assessment. The barrier
offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an
approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or
fuel storage building.
(2) Illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment
of unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected
area.
(3) The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to
continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm
system which is capable of detecting penetrations through the isolation
zone and that is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm
station and in one additional continually staffed location. The primary
alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-
resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the
station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely
means for assessment of alarms must also be provided. Regarding alarm
monitoring, the redundant location need only provide a summary
indication that an alarm has been generated.
(4) The protected area must be monitored by daily random patrols.
(5) A security organization with written procedures must be
established. The security organization must include sufficient
personnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and
the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and
communications to assure adequate response. Members of the security
organization must be trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to
perform assigned job duties in accordance with appendix B to
[[Page 26963]]
part 73, sections I.A, (1) (a) and (b), B(1)(a), and the applicable
portions of II.
(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or local
law enforcement agency (LLEA) must be established to permit timely
response to unauthorized penetration or activities.
(7) A personnel identification system and a controlled lock system
must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized
individuals.
(8) Redundant communications capability must be provided between
onsite security force members and designated response force or LLEA.
(9) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering
the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and
visually searched for explosives before entry.
(10) Written response procedures must be established and maintained
for addressing unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the
protected area including Category 5, ``Procedures,'' of appendix C to
part 73. The licensee shall retain a copy of response procedures as a
record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the
procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be
retained for 3 years after each change or until termination of the
license.
(11) All detection systems, surveillance/assessment systems, and
supporting subsystems, including illumination systems, must be tamper-
indicating with line supervision and be maintained in operable
condition. Timely compensatory measures must be taken after discovery
of inoperability, to assure that the effectiveness of the security
system is not reduced.
(12) The physical protection program must be reviewed once every 24
months by individuals independent of both physical protection program
management and personnel who have direct responsibility for
implementation of the physical protection program. The physical
protection program review must include an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the physical protection system and a verification of
the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.
(13) The following documentation must be retained as a record for 3
years after the record is made or until termination of the license.
Duplicate records to those required under Sec. 72.180 of part 72 and
Sec. 73.71 of this part need not be retained under the requirements of
this section:
(i) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area;
(ii) Screening records of members of the security organization;
(iii) A log of all patrols;
(iv) A record of each alarm received, identifying the type of
alarm, location, date and time when received, and disposition of the
alarm; and
(v) The physical protection program review reports.
(e) A licensee that operates a GROA is exempt from the requirements
of this section for that GROA after permanent closure of the GROA.
13. In Sec. 73.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and (c) are revised to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events.
* * * * *
(b)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20,
73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC
Operations Center within 1 hour of discovery of the safeguards events
described in paragraph I(a)(1) of appendix G to this part. Licensees
subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50, 73.51, 73.55,
73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material
and subject to Sec. 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations Center
within 1 hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in
paragraphs I(a)(2), (a)(3), (b), and (c) of appendix G to this part.
Licensees subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37, 73.50,
73.51, 73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1
hour after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph
I(d) of appendix G to this part.
* * * * *
(c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of Secs. 73.20, 73.37,
73.50, 73.51, 73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and
subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67(d) shall maintain a current log
and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs II (a) and (b)
of appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery by a licensee
employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization.
The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section
as a record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or
until termination of the license.
* * * * *
PART 74--MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
14. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 948,
953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended
202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841,
5842, 5846).
15. In Sec. 74.51, the introductory text of paragraph (a) is
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 74.51 Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear
material.
(a) General performance objectives. Each licensee who is authorized
to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic special nuclear
material (SSNM) and to use such material at any site, other than a
nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, an
irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved with waste
disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility licensed
pursuant to part 72 of this chapter shall establish, implement, and
maintain a Commission-approved material control and accounting (MC&A)
system that will achieve the following objectives:
* * * * *
PART 75--SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL--IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA
AGREEMENT
16. The authority citation for part 75 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 63, 103, 104, 122, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 932,
936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134,
2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).
Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425, 96
Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161).
17. In Sec. 75.4, paragraph (k)(5) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 75.4 Definitions.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(5) Any location where the possession of more than 1 effective
kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to parts 40, 60, or
70 of this chapter, or pursuant to an agreement state license.
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of May, 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 98-12978 Filed 5-14-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
