[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 97 (Friday, May 17, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25092-25103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12420]
[[Page 25091]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part IV
Department of Energy
_______________________________________________________________________
Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a
Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices
[[Page 25092]]
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement
on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided
to implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance
policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-218F of February 1996), subject to
additional stipulations specified in Section VII of this Record of
Decision. The new policy applies only to aluminum-based and TRIGA
(Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics) foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel and target material containing uranium enriched in
the United States. The purpose of the acceptance policy is to support
the broad United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy
calling for the reduction and eventual elimination of the use of highly
enriched (weapons-grade) uranium in civil commerce worldwide.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The new policy set forth in this Record of Decision is
effective upon being made public May 13, 1996, in accordance with DOE's
NEPA implementation regulations (10 CFR Sec. 1021.315).
ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a
Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-0218F, the Final EIS) and
this Record of Decision are available in the public reading rooms and
libraries identified in the Federal Register Notice that announced the
availability of the Final EIS (61 FR 6983, February 23, 1996), or by
calling 1-800-736-3282 (toll free).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the management of
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel or this Record of Decision
contact: Mr. Charles Head, Program Manager, Office of Spent Fuel
Management (EM-67), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, Telephone (202) 586-9441.
For information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
process, contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, Telephone (202) 586-4600, or leave
message at 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Synopsis of the Decision
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State
jointly issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-218F) on February
16, 1996. In this Final EIS, DOE and the Department of State considered
the potential environmental impacts of a proposed policy to manage
spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. After consideration
of the Final EIS, public comments submitted on the Draft EIS and
concerns expressed following issuance of the Final EIS, DOE, in
consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement the
proposed policy as identified in the Preferred Alternative contained in
the Final EIS, subject to additional stipulations specified in Section
VII of this Record of Decision. This implementation will involve
acceptance of approximately 19.2 MTHM (metric tonnes of heavy metal) of
foreign research reactor spent fuel and approximately 0.6 MTHM of
target material into the United States over a 13 year period, beginning
on the effective date of the policy. The spent fuel will be received
from abroad through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South
Carolina (about 80%) and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in
California (about 5%). Most of the target material and some of the
spent fuel (about 15%) will be received overland from Canada. Shipment
through Charleston is expected to begin in the summer of 1996 and
through Concord in mid-1997. Shipments from Canada have not been
scheduled at this time. The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel
and target material could be safely transported overland within the
United States by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either
transportation mode may be used. Nevertheless, based on initial input
from the public near the ports of entry indicating a preference for
shipment by rail, DOE will generally seek to use rail for shipments
from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the Savannah River Site in
South Carolina and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho.
The particular mode of transportation to be used will be determined
after further discussions between DOE and State, Tribal and local
officials. After a limited period of interim storage, the spent fuel
will be treated and packaged, or chemically separated, at the Savannah
River Site and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory as necessary to
prepare it for transport to a final disposal repository.
II. Background
Beginning in the 1950's, as part of the ``Atoms for Peace''
program, the United States provided nuclear technology to foreign
nations for peaceful applications in exchange for their promise to
forego development of nuclear weapons. A major element of this program
was the provision of research reactor technology and the highly
enriched uranium (HEU) needed in the early years to fuel the research
reactors. Research reactors play a vital role in important medical,
agricultural, and industrial applications. Nevertheless, the highly
enriched uranium initially used in the fuel elements for these reactors
can also be used in nuclear weapons. In the past, after irradiation in
the research reactor, the used fuel elements (often referred to as
``spent nuclear fuel'' or ``spent fuel'') were transported to the
United States, where they were chemically separated to extract the
uranium still remaining in the spent nuclear fuel. In this way, the
United States maintained control over disposition of the HEU that it
provided to other nations.
Before 1964, bilateral agreements with the countries operating
research reactors provided for the lease of the enriched uranium, with
explicit provision for the return of the spent nuclear fuel to the
United States. After 1964, most agreements provided for the sale of
this material to the foreign nation, and the United States began to
operate under a policy known as the ``Off-Site Fuels Policy'', under
which the United States continued to accept, temporarily store, and
chemically separate the spent nuclear fuel.
Research reactors have become the major civilian users of HEU. To
further reduce the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation, the United
States in 1978 initiated the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactors (RERTR) program, which was aimed at reducing the use of HEU in
civilian programs by promoting the conversion of foreign and domestic
research reactors from HEU fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel (LEU
cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons). As part of the RERTR
program, DOE developed LEU fuel and
[[Page 25093]]
worked with foreign research reactor operators to convert their
reactors to run on such fuel.
The foreign research reactor operators who converted to LEU fuel
did so in support of nuclear weapons nonproliferation objectives, even
though such conversions were expensive and generally resulted in
reduced reactor capabilities and increased operating costs. From the
beginning of the RERTR program, foreign research reactor operators made
it clear that their willingness to convert their research reactors to
LEU fuel was contingent upon the continued acceptance by DOE of their
spent nuclear fuel for disposition in the United States.
The United States accepted foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel until the ``Off-Site Fuels Policy'' expired (in 1988 for HEU fuels
and 1992 for LEU fuels). At that time, DOE committed to conduct an
environmental review of the impacts of extending the program for
accepting foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. In 1991, DOE
issued an environmental assessment of the potential environmental
impacts of the proposed extension. DOE received numerous comments from
the public stating that a new, long-term policy should not be
implemented until an EIS had been prepared. DOE decided in mid-1993 to
prepare an EIS to evaluate the impacts of implementing a new foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel acceptance policy.
On October 21, 1993, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) (58 FR
54336) to prepare an environmental impact statement on a proposed
policy for the acceptance of foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. The NOI
announced public scoping meetings and requested public comments and
suggestions for DOE to consider in its determination of the scope of
the EIS. Nine public scoping meetings were held in November and
December 1993. DOE received a total of 2,215 scoping comments from 493
commentors.
On April 21, 1995, DOE published a Notice of Availability (60 FR
19899) of the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS analyzed three Management
Alternatives for implementing the proposed action:
Management Alternative 1--Accept and manage foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel in the United States;
Management Alternative 2--Facilitate the management of foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel overseas; and
Management Alternative 3--A hybrid, or combination, of elements from
the first two Management Alternatives.
During the 90-day public comment period (April 21, 1995 to July 20,
1995), about 900 individuals attended 17 public hearings held in or
near candidate ports, management sites, and in Washington, DC. In
addition to oral comments, DOE received approximately 5,040 written
comments contained within approximately 1,250 comment documents on a
wide range of policy, economic, and technical issues. Many commentors
supported the United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy
objective of seeking to reduce the use of HEU (i.e., nuclear weapons-
grade uranium) in civil commerce. However, the comments also reflected
a wide range of views as to which Management Alternative should be
adopted. Some commentors supported management of the spent nuclear fuel
in the United States. Other commentors questioned the need to accept
spent nuclear fuel from allies of the United States and those countries
that appear to have the capability to manage their own spent nuclear
fuel abroad. These commentors generally believed that such spent
nuclear fuel should be managed overseas. With regard to implementation
of the policy in the United States, some commentors preferred the use
of military ports, a practice DOE has followed in the recent past based
on strong public preference. Risks during transport, including those
from terrorism, a sunken cask, severe shipboard fires, and the level of
emergency preparedness at ports were frequently raised as matters of
concern.
In consideration of public comments, DOE added information to the
Final EIS, including: clarification of the proposed United States
policy on accepting spent nuclear fuel from allies; examination of the
consequences of sabotage or terrorist attack; safety of transportation
casks; re-examination of the shipboard fire analysis; and general
descriptions of transportation and emergency response regulations and
management activities related to safe transport of the spent fuel and
target material. In addition, the Naval Weapons Station at Charleston,
South Carolina was analyzed along with the other terminals of the port
of Charleston that had been included in the Draft EIS.
On February 23, 1996, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
published a Notice of Availability (61 FR 6983) of the Final
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-0218F of February 1996), after DOE had
distributed approximately 3,000 copies of the EIS and/or the EIS
Summary to government officials and interested groups and individuals.
DOE has prepared this Record of Decision in accordance with the
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for Implementing
NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures
(10 CFR Part 1021). This Record of Decision is based on DOE's Final
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS). In making the decisions announced in this
Record of Decision, DOE, in consultation with the Department of State,
considered environmental impacts and other factors, such as nuclear
weapons nonproliferation policies; public comments received on the
Draft EIS and concerns expressed following issuance of the Final EIS;
analysis of impacts and alternatives in the DOE Programmatic Spent
Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final
Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0203-F of April 1995, the
``Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS'') and the Records of Decision for that EIS
(60 FR 28680, June 1, 1995 and 61 FR 9441, March 8, 1996).
III. Policy Considerations
A key goal of United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation
policy is to reduce international civil commerce in HEU, since HEU can
be used directly in the production of nuclear weapons. The proposal by
DOE and the Department of State to adopt a policy to manage foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the
United States is intended to support efforts by the United States to
convert foreign research reactors from HEU to LEU fuels (the latter
cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons) and to gain worldwide
acceptance of the use of LEU fuels in new research reactors.
Failure of the United States to manage foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel could have a number of adverse consequences. Foreign
governments and research reactor operators have participated in the
RERTR program in large part because the United States previously
accepted the spent nuclear fuel from their research reactors. The
United States has not accepted HEU spent nuclear fuel for more than
seven years, with the exception of recent limited shipments made after
completion of the Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance
[[Page 25094]]
of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EA-0912, April
1994). As a result, several foreign research reactor operators are
running out of space to store their spent nuclear fuel, and others will
run out soon. Under such conditions, the foreign research reactor
operators must either shut down their reactors, construct new storage
facilities, or ship the spent nuclear fuel offsite for storage or
reprocessing. Many of the reactor operators do not have the option of
increasing their storage capacities due to local regulatory
restrictions. Moreover, construction and licensing of new storage
facilities cannot be accomplished in time to support continued
operations. The most realistic near-term option for a limited number of
the reactor operators (particularly those in countries with power
reactor programs that have an infrastructure to accept the return of
the radioactive waste generated during reprocessing) is to ship their
spent nuclear fuel offsite for reprocessing.
The current practice followed in overseas reprocessing of research
reactor spent fuel results in separated HEU that is placed back into
commerce (some or all of it may be refabricated into new HEU research
reactor fuel), a result that undermines United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation goals. Furthermore, none of the foreign reprocessing
facilities have the capability to reprocess the new, high density LEU
fuel developed under the RERTR program. Thus, in the absence of action
to resolve the question of the disposition of spent nuclear fuel, many
foreign research reactor operators who could reprocess to control their
spent fuel inventory would likely continue to use, or convert back to,
fuel containing HEU. In such a case, the foreign research reactor
operator community as a whole would have little incentive to convert
their reactors to LEU fuels. This would have the effect of encouraging
the foreign research reactor operators to use HEU (weapons-grade
uranium) as fuel for their reactors, would increase the amount of HEU
in international commerce, and would inevitably increase the
opportunity for diversion of HEU into a nuclear weapons program.
DOE and the Department of State do not seek to indefinitely accept
or otherwise manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.
Rather, the purpose of the new policy is to recover as much HEU that
originated in the United States as possible from international
commerce, while providing the foreign research reactor operators and
their host countries time to convert the reactors to LEU fuel and to
make their own arrangements for disposition of subsequently generated
LEU spent nuclear fuel. The foreign research reactor operators and host
countries must be prepared to implement their own arrangements for
disposition of their spent nuclear fuel after the policy expires (i.e.,
after 10 years of spent fuel generation following the effective date of
the policy).
IV. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS
DOE evaluated the following alternatives for management of the
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel:
A. Management Alternative 1: Accept and Manage Foreign Research Reactor
Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States
Under Management Alternative 1, foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be
transported to the United States in casks designed to comply with
international regulations that are essentially identical to those
promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
certified by the U.S. Department of Transportation. In accordance with
the Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS, all of
the aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel accepted
by DOE (about 18.2 MTHM) would be managed at the Savannah River Site in
South Carolina, and the TRIGA elements (about 1 MTHM) would be managed
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, pending ultimate
disposition.
The basic implementation elements of Management Alternative 1
provide the foundation for the analyses of impacts presented in the
EIS. They are:
Policy Duration. The policy duration would be 10 years. Spent
nuclear fuel that is currently being stored or that is generated during
a 10 year policy period would be accepted. Actual shipments of spent
nuclear fuel to the United States could be made for a period of 13
years, starting from the effective date of policy implementation. A
five year policy duration and an indefinite duration for acceptance of
HEU (with a ten year duration for LEU) were also analyzed as
alternatives in the EIS.
Amount of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. The amount
of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel that would be accepted
under the basic implementation of Management Alternative 1 is up to
about 19.2 MTHM in up to approximately 22,700 individual spent nuclear
fuel elements. These spent nuclear fuel elements would be received from
41 countries. Alternative amounts of spent nuclear fuel considered as
implementation alternatives were: receipt of spent fuel only from
countries that do not have high-income economies, acceptance of HEU
spent fuel only, and acceptance of target material in addition to spent
fuel.
Marine Transport. Under the basic implementation alternative, the
spent fuel and target materials would be transported by sea in either
chartered or regularly scheduled commercial ships. DOE estimates that
721 cask loads of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (a cask
load is one spent fuel shipping cask loaded with spent fuel) would be
sent to the United States by ship over a 13-year acceptance period
under Management Alternative 1. Acceptance of an additional 15 cask
loads of target material by sea is also analyzed.
Potential Port(s) of Entry for Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel. The following potential ports of entry were selected for
analysis because they met basic criteria designed to identify the most
appropriate ports for use in accepting foreign research reactor spent
fuel:
Charleston, SC (includes Charleston Naval Weapons Station and Wando
Terminal, Mt. Pleasant)
Concord Naval Weapons Station, CA
Galveston, TX
Hampton Roads, VA (includes Terminals at Newport News, Norfolk, and
Portsmouth, VA)
Jacksonville, FL
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, NC
Portland, OR
Savannah, GA
Tacoma, WA
Wilmington, NC
Ground Transport. The basic implementation of Management
Alternative 1 would involve transporting casks containing foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel by truck, rail, or barge from the
ports of entry or Canadian border crossings to potential management
sites.
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Sites. The
analysis considered five potential management sites selected to be
consistent with the management sites evaluated in the Programmatic
SNF&INEL EIS (i.e., the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Oak Ridge Reservation in
Tennessee, the Hanford Site in Washington State, and the Nevada Test
Site). The Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS
subsequently eliminated
[[Page 25095]]
the last three sites from consideration as management sites for spent
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.
Storage Technologies. During the first few years, storage would
take place in existing storage facilities that use either wet or dry
storage technologies. Under the basic implementation of Management
Alternative 1, any new storage capacity that would be built would be
dry storage. Wet storage was also evaluated as an alternative to dry
storage.
Near-Term Conventional Chemical Separation in the United States. As
an alternative to storage of the spent fuel in the United States, the
Final EIS evaluated chemical separation of foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel and target material in existing facilities at the
Savannah River Site or the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The
HEU could be blended down to LEU to preclude its use in nuclear
weapons. The resulting high-level waste could be vitrified and managed
onsite until a geologic repository becomes available.
Developmental Treatment and/or Packaging Technologies. As another
alternative for management of the spent fuel, the Final EIS discussed a
potential development program that DOE could conduct leading to a
decision on whether to construct and operate a new treatment and/or
packaging facility. The objective of this technical strategy would be
to treat, package, and store spent nuclear fuel in a manner suitable
for direct placement into a geologic repository without necessarily
separating the fissile materials, while meeting or exceeding all
applicable safety and environmental requirements.
Financing Arrangements. Under the basic implementation of
Management Alternative 1, high-income-economy countries would be
charged a competitive fee. The United States would bear the full cost
of transporting and managing foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel received from other countries. The Final EIS also evaluated
alternatives in which:
1) All countries would be subsidized;
2) All countries would be charged a full-cost recovery fee; or
3) Countries with high income economies would be charged a full-
cost recovery fee, while other countries would be subsidized.
Location for Taking Title. Under the basic implementation of
Management Alternative 1, the United States would take title to spent
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors at the limit of United
States territorial waters or continental border (for shipments from
Canada). The Final EIS also evaluated alternatives in which the United
States would take title prior to shipment, at the ports of entry, or at
the DOE management sites.
Ultimate Disposition. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (as
amended) authorizes disposal of the foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel in a geologic repository. DOE is working with staff from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure that the spent fuel
management actions it is undertaking for all of its spent fuel, and
actions that would be undertaken for any additional foreign research
reactor spent fuel to be accepted, will allow either direct emplacement
of the spent fuel in a geologic repository or acceptance of the spent
fuel in a treated form at a geologic repository.
Decisions regarding the actual disposal of DOE's spent nuclear fuel
would follow appropriate environmental review under the National
Environmental Policy Act.
B. Management Alternative 2: Facilitate the Management of Foreign
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Overseas
Under this Management Alternative, two subalternatives were
analyzed. In the first subalternative, DOE and the Department of State
would provide assistance, incentives, and coordination for spent fuel
storage at one or more locations overseas, with appropriate storage
technologies, regulations, and safeguards. In the second
subalternative, DOE and the Department of State would provide
nontechnical assistance, incentives, and coordination to foreign
research reactor operators and reprocessors to facilitate reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel overseas in facilities operated under
international inspections and safeguards. Facilities operated by the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority at Dounreay, United Kingdom, and
by Cogema at Marcoule, France might be used for this purpose. After
reprocessing, the recovered HEU would be blended down to LEU at these
same facilities. The wastes resulting from this reprocessing would be
sent to the country in which the spent nuclear fuel was irradiated. If
the reprocessing wastes could not be sent to the country in which the
spent nuclear fuel was irradiated, such wastes would be accepted by the
United States for storage and ultimate geologic disposal. It is
important to note that the foreign reprocessing facilities do not have
the capability to reprocess the new, high density, LEU fuel developed
under the RERTR program.
C. Management Alternative 3: A Combination of Elements from Management
Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative)
Under Management Alternative 3, DOE and the Department of State
would combine elements from Management Alternatives 1 and 2 to develop
new alternatives for management of foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel in the United States or abroad. For example, DOE and the
Department of State could combine partial storage or reprocessing
overseas with partial storage or chemical separation in the United
States. Implementation alternatives for the portion of the spent
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors to be managed in the United
States would be the same as those for Management Alternative 1.
D. No Action Alternative
In the No Action Alternative, the United States would neither
manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium
enriched in the United States, nor provide technical assistance or
financial incentives for overseas storage or reprocessing. In this
case, there would be no foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel
shipments to the United States and no assistance to foreign countries
for managing foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel overseas.
E. Preferred Alternative
Under the Preferred Alternative (which is a combination of the
implementation elements of Management Alternative 1), DOE would accept
and manage in the United States up to 19.2 MTHM of foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel in up to approximately 22,700 individual
spent fuel elements and up to an additional 0.6 MTHM of target
material. This spent fuel and target material would come from the
following countries:
Table 1--High-income economy countries:
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
[[Page 25096]]
United Kingdom
Table 2--Other Countries:
Argentina
Bangladesh
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Greece
Indonesia
Iran
Jamaica
Malaysia
Mexico
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Thailand
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zaire
The types of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and Target
Material that would be accepted under the Preferred Alternative are as
follows:
Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors
operating on LEU fuel or in the process of converting to LEU fuel when
the policy becomes effective.
Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors
that operate on HEU fuel when the policy becomes effective but that
agree to convert to LEU fuel. (Spent nuclear fuel would not be accepted
from research reactors that could convert to LEU fuel but do not agree
to do so.)
Spent nuclear fuel (HEU) from research reactors having
lifetime cores, from research reactors planning to shut down by a
specific date while the policy is in effect, and from research reactors
for which a suitable LEU fuel is not available.
Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors
that are already shut down.
Unirradiated fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from eligible research
reactors would be accepted as spent nuclear fuel. (This material could
be a particular nuclear weapons proliferation concern because it is not
highly radioactive and thus can be handled manually. Thus could allow
it to be stolen more easily.)
For research reactors with both HEU and LEU spent nuclear fuel
available for shipment, LEU spent nuclear fuel would not be accepted
until all HEU spent nuclear fuel has been accepted, unless there are
extenuating circumstances (e.g., deterioration of one or more LEU
elements sufficient to cause a health or safety problem if acceptance
were delayed). Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) would not be
accepted from new research reactors starting operation after the date
of implementation of the policy.
The duration of the policy under the Preferred Alternative would be
10 years. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the United States could be
made for a period of up to 13 years, starting from the effective date
of policy implementation, as long as the spent nuclear fuel had already
been discharged prior to the beginning of the policy period or is
discharged during the policy period. The additional three years in the
shipping period were included to provide time for the radiation levels
of the last spent fuel discharged during the 10 year policy period to
decay enough to allow its transportation, to provide time for logistics
in arranging for shipment of the last spent fuel discharged, and to
allow for potential shipping delays.
The aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel
(about 18.2 MTHM) and target material (about 0.6 MTHM) would be
transported to and managed at the Savannah River Site and the TRIGA
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (about 1 MTHM) would be
transported to and managed at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, in accordance with the Records of Decision for the
Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS and the settlement agreement reached between
DOE and the State of Idaho [Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Batt, No.
CV 91-0035-S-EJL (D. Id.) and United States v. Batt, No. CV-91-0054-S-
EJL (D. Id.)]. According to this agreement, DOE could accept up to 61
TRIGA spent nuclear fuel shipments from foreign research reactors prior
to December 31, 2000 for management at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. Before DOE would accept any shipments, the Governor of
Idaho would be notified and the Secretary of Energy would certify that
the shipments are necessary to meet national security and
nonproliferation requirements.
The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material
would be shipped by either chartered or regularly scheduled commercial
ships from the foreign ports to the United States.
Although all of the candidate ports listed in Management
Alternative 1 above would be appropriate ports to use for receipt of
the spent fuel and target material shipments, DOE would prefer to use
the military ports in proximity to the spent nuclear fuel management
sites (i.e., Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the Concord Naval
Weapons Station) to take advantage of the characteristics of these
ports to increase the safety and security of the spent fuel
transportation process. (Note: Section VII of this notice designates
these two ports as the ports of entry.)
DOE would take title to the foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel and target material that is shipped by sea after it is unloaded
from the ship at the port of entry, and to the spent nuclear fuel and
target material shipped solely overland (i.e., from Canada) at the
border crossing between Canada and the United States.
The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material
would be transported from the United States ports to the management
sites by truck or rail.
The financing arrangement under the Preferred Alternative would be
to charge high-income-economy countries a competitive fee and for the
United States to bear the full cost associated with acceptance of spent
fuel and target material from other countries. The fee policy for
countries with high-income economies would be established in a Federal
Register notice to allow DOE flexibility to adjust the fee policy to
account for inflation, or further development of spent nuclear fuel
management practices in the United States.
For the aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel,
the following three-point management strategy would be implemented:
1. New Technology Development/ Dry Storage. DOE would embark
immediately on an accelerated program at the Savannah River Site to
identify, develop, and demonstrate one or more non-reprocessing, cost-
effective treatment and/or packaging technologies to prepare the
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel for ultimate disposal. The
purpose of any new facilities that might be constructed to implement
these technologies would be to change the foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel into a form that is suitable for geologic disposal,
without necessarily separating the fissile materials, while meeting or
exceeding all applicable safety and environmental requirements.
In conjunction with the examination of new technologies, variations
of conventional direct disposal methods would also be explored. After
treatment and/or packaging, the foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel would be managed on site in ``road ready'' dry storage until
transported off-site for continued storage or disposal. DOE
[[Page 25097]]
would select, develop, and implement, if possible, one or more of these
treatment and/or packaging technologies by the year 2000. DOE is
committed to avoiding indefinite storage of this spent nuclear fuel in
a form that is unsuitable for disposal.
2. Potential Chemical Separation/Wet Storage. Despite DOE's best
efforts, it is possible that a new treatment and/or packaging
technology may not be ready for implementation by the year 2000. It may
become necessary, therefore, for DOE to use the F-Canyon at the
Savannah River Site to chemically separate some foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel elements, while the F-Canyon is operating to
stabilize at-risk materials in accordance with the Records of Decision
(60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995 and 61 FR 6633, February 21, 1996)
issued after completion of the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials
Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0220 of October 1995).
Under current schedules, this chemical separation of foreign research
reactor spent fuel could take place between the years 2000 and 2002. In
that event, the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would be
converted into LEU and wastes. The high-level radioactive wastes would
be vitrified in the Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing
Facility, while other wastes (all low level) would be solidified in the
Savannah River Site Saltstone facility. In order to provide a sound
policy basis for making a determination on whether and how to utilize
the F-Canyon for chemical separation tasks that are not driven by
health and safety considerations, DOE will commission or conduct an
independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and
timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from
foreign research reactors. The study will be initiated in mid-1996 and
will be completed in a timely fashion to allow a subsequent decision
about possible use of the F-Canyon for chemical separation of foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel to be fully considered by the
public, the Congress and Executive Branch agencies. Pending disposition
of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel by either a new
treatment and/or packaging technology or chemical separation in the F-
Canyon, the spent nuclear fuel would be placed in existing wet storage
at the Savannah River Site.
3. Spent Nuclear Fuel Monitoring (Wet Storage). DOE would conduct a
program of close monitoring of any foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel and target material that would be accepted for storage in
existing wet storage facilities. DOE is presently unaware of any
technical basis for believing that this spent nuclear fuel cannot be
safely stored until one or more of the treatment and/or packaging
technologies becomes available. Nevertheless, if health and safety
concerns involving any of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel elements are identified prior to development of an appropriate
treatment and/or packaging technology, DOE would use the F-Canyon to
chemically separate the affected spent nuclear fuel elements, if it is
still operating to stabilize at-risk materials.
Because the F-Canyon is only configured to handle LEU, under no
circumstances would it be possible to produce separated HEU that is
suitable for a nuclear weapon. Instead, depleted uranium would be added
to the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel near the beginning
of the chemical separations process, so that only LEU would be produced
when the uranium is separated from the fission products. The trace
quantities of plutonium in the spent nuclear fuel would be left in and
solidified along with the high-level radioactive wastes. This would
further the President's policy to discourage the accumulation of excess
weapons-grade fissile materials, to strengthen controls and constraints
on these materials and, over time, to reduce worldwide stocks.
The TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would be
stored at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in the Fluorinel
Dissolution and Fuel Storage facility (wet storage) or preferably in
the dry storage Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility and the CPP-749 dry
storage area. After 2003, all foreign research reactor spent nuclear
fuel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be managed in
accordance with specific provisions of the settlement agreement between
DOE and the State of Idaho, until transported off-site for ultimate
disposition. Depending on the nature of any new treatment and/or
packaging technology that might be developed, the TRIGA spent nuclear
fuel would also be processed using such a new technology, if necessary
for disposal.
V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives
CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require identification of the
environmentally preferred alternative(s). The analysis of alternatives
presented in the EIS indicates that the three Management Alternatives
and the Preferred Alternative (a modification of subelements of
Management Alternative 1) would have only small impacts on the human
environment on or around the DOE management sites, the populations near
the cask transportation routes, or the affected ports of entry. Using
conservative assumptions (i.e., assumptions that tend to overestimate
risks), the only measurable potential impacts from incident-free
operations are associated with low radiation exposure to workers near
the loaded transportation casks, particularly during transportation
cask loading or unloading, or near the spent fuel during storage, and,
to a much lesser degree, to the general population in and around the
ports of entry and the transportation routes. These conservatively
calculated impacts are extremely small, and are well within regulatory
standards for health and safety.
Although the impacts would be small for each alternative
considered, there are differences among the estimated impacts for the
various alternatives. Besides the no-action alternative and overseas
storage subalternative of Management Alternative 2, which would
generate no direct environmental impact in the United States because
they would result in no activity in the United States, the lowest
impacts in the United States would be associated with implementing the
proposed policy overseas under the overseas reprocessing subalternative
of Management Alternative 2. In the overseas reprocessing
subalternative, the foreign research reactor spent fuel would be
reprocessed overseas and only the vitrified reprocessing wastes would
be accepted in the United States. This alternative would have a very
small environmental impact in the United States since only a small
volume of waste in an inert, vitrified form would enter the United
States. This would require only a small amount of transportation,
handling, and storage in the United States and therefore would result
in very little radiation exposure in the United States. Hence,
Management Alternative 2 is the environmentally preferred alternative,
next to the no action alternative. Both of the other alternatives, the
hybrid alternative and the basic implementation of Management
Alternative 1, would have relatively higher, but still extremely low,
radiation exposure impacts because of the acceptance of a greater
volume of material in the United States, resulting in more shipments
and increased handling and storage requirements.
Among the Implementation Alternatives to Management Alternative 1
discussed in the Final EIS, accepting foreign research reactor spent
fuel into the United States only from developing
[[Page 25098]]
nations (i.e., the ``Other Nations'' listed in Table 2 above) would
present the lowest radiological risk in the United States. This is
because this subalternative would deal with the least amount of spent
fuel. The remaining subalternatives and implementation alternatives
discussed in the EIS (including the acceptance of target material in
addition to spent fuel, a policy duration of five years instead of ten
years, use of wet storage, and chemical separation) do not measurably
change the overall potential radiation exposure impact. The chemical
separation subalternative would generate slightly higher accident and
incident-free radiological exposure risk to the general population, but
once again, this is a small variation within the overall small impacts
from each of the alternatives.
Implementation of the Preferred Alternative would result in
relatively higher, but still extremely low, environmental and health
impacts because of the acceptance of the target material (in addition
to the maximum amount of spent fuel), resulting in the maximum number
of shipments and increased handling and storage requirements, and
because of the potential chemical separation of a limited amount of
spent fuel.
VI. Comments on the Final EIS
After issuing the Final EIS, DOE and the Department of State
received approximately 35 letters commenting on the Preferred
Alternative. These included letters from Governor Beasley of South
Carolina, Senators Feinstein of California and Glenn of Ohio,
Congressmen Baker and Miller of California, and Clyburn of South
Carolina, California State officials, mayors and other local officials
from the areas around the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the
Concord Naval Weapons Station, and several members of the public. Many
of the comments covered issues previously addressed in the Final EIS,
such as the following:
Why is the new spent fuel and target material acceptance
policy required?
How were the preferred ports of entry chosen?
Why are military ports preferred?
Has DOE adequately considered the risks associated with
shipments through the Concord Naval Shipyard due to its proximity to
the highly populated San Francisco Bay area and the potential for
seismic activity?
What kinds of training and other assistance would be
provided by DOE to prepare local jurisdictions to deal with the spent
fuel shipments?
All of these issues are covered in the Final EIS, either in the
body of the EIS or in the responses to comments submitted on the Draft
EIS. In the interests of brevity, readers are requested to refer to the
Final EIS for information on these issues. In addition, individual
responses will be sent to each of the commentors.
The comments on the Final EIS also raised several new issues (i.e.,
issues not raised during public review of the Draft EIS), as follows:
A. Many commentors from the area around the Concord Naval Weapons
Station were concerned that the cost of services required from local
police or other city and county departments (e.g., services associated
with emergency response, crowd control, etc.) to prepare for or respond
to events associated with the spent fuel shipments would unfairly be
left to the local communities to fund. The comments stated that DOE
should provide funding to cover these additional expenses. To address
this concern, DOE has replied that it is willing to enter into an
appropriate agreement to reimburse local agencies or provide the
incremental resources, either in kind or financial, that would be
necessary to enable emergency response personnel to respond to an
incident involving the proposed shipments of spent fuel, to provide for
public safety in situations that are attributable to the shipment of
spent fuel from foreign research reactors, and to allow a greater level
of assurance of the protection of the health and safety of the public.
B. Several individuals commented that the Final EIS did not
identify the specific local streets and roads over which the spent fuel
shipments would travel and did not include site-specific analyses of
the risk of the shipments through the ports of entry. DOE replied that
the Final EIS does estimate the potential radiological and other
health-related impacts (e.g., traffic accidents) of transporting the
spent fuel through the ports of entry (see, for example, Volume 1,
Table 4-7 in Section 4.2.2.3 of the Final EIS). However, the Final EIS
did not address specific characteristics of local streets since local
street, or rail, conditions could well change between the time the
Final EIS was written and the time the shipments would be made. As a
result, the actual route that would be taken for the overland
transportation, whether by truck or rail, would be chosen closer to the
time the transportation takes place. Selection of the actual route
would be accomplished in consultation with the affected States, Tribes,
local officials, and the carrier, and considering the conditions of the
potential shipment routes at that time. Any route that is chosen would
have to meet specific requirements imposed by the Department of
Transportation, taking into account specific characteristics of local
streets. Thus, when potential impacts are estimated, certain
assumptions can be made about the transportation route, without knowing
the actual route. Indeed, because the Final EIS analyses are
conservative (i.e., they tend to overstate the transportation risks),
changes in local conditions would be unlikely to result in changes in
transportation risks that would exceed those analyzed in the Final EIS.
The Final EIS contains enough information to accurately assess the
foreseeable impacts so that the public and Government decision makers
are adequately informed of potential consequences.
The same can be said about emergency services, personnel, emergency
preparedness and facilities (i.e., specific circumstances may change
between issuance of the Final EIS and the time an actual shipment would
take place). For this reason, DOE is required to prepare a detailed
Transportation Plan in cooperation with State, Tribal and local
officials before a shipment is made. The Transportation Plan would
specify details concerning how the shipments will be carried out and
the routes to be used, planned shipment schedules, roles and
responsibilities of emergency response personnel for jurisdictions
along the transportation route, emergency plans and communications
strategies. The Transportation Plan would also discuss any training to
be carried out in preparation for the shipments, and would identify any
equipment or other resources required to allow local responders and law
enforcement personnel to be adequately prepared for the shipments. This
procedure ensures that local officials would be well informed and
prepared to handle any contingency before a shipment would be made.
C. One commentor questioned whether an alternate West Coast port
would be required if scheduling conflicts occurred at the Concord Naval
Weapons Station. DOE explained that this issue had been discussed with
the Commander of the Naval Weapons Station and that he had informed DOE
that they currently have about 20% slack time available, and that this
should be more than adequate to accommodate 5 shipments over 13 years.
D. Recently, new information has come to light regarding the
ability of the F and H Canyons (chemical separations
[[Page 25099]]
facilities used at the Savannah River Site) to withstand a severe
earthquake. One commentor requested that DOE delay issuance of the
Record of Decision on the proposed acceptance policy until completion
of an on-going detailed safety analysis of the facilities. The
commentor noted that the Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS would
allow chemical separation under certain circumstances, and that
chemical separation followed by vitrification of the high-level
radioactive wastes remains the one proven means of stabilizing spent
fuel and preparing it for ultimate disposition.
In response, DOE explained that, until the on-going analysis is
complete, it will not be known with certainty whether the new
information will result in a significant change in the range of
potential impacts of chemical separation described in the Final EIS.
Analysis to date, however, provides reasonable assurance that
completion of the seismic analysis will soon demonstrate that chemical
separation in the F and H Canyons remains a viable alternative for
management of spent fuel. DOE had not contemplated chemical separation
of foreign research reactor spent fuel, if at all, until approximately
the year 2000, and the Canyons will not be used if the seismic analysis
indicates that they pose an unacceptable risk. Chemical separation
however, may never need to be pursued because the Preferred Alternative
provides for an aggressive new program to develop and implement new
treatment and/or packaging technologies to prepare the spent fuel for
ultimate disposition without the use of the F and H Canyons. In light
of these factors, and in order to encourage the research reactor
operators not to withdraw from the Reduced Enrichment for Research and
Test Reactors program (and resume or continue using HEU fuels), DOE and
the Department of State believe it is necessary to issue the Record of
Decision now, rather than awaiting completion of the seismic analysis.
Because research reactors are the major users of HEU in civil programs,
it is essential that they support the Reduced Enrichment for Research
and Test Reactors program if the United States is to achieve the goal
of eventually eliminating the use of HEU in civil commerce, thereby
reducing the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide.
DOE further notes that the Final EIS discusses the potential
impacts of chemical separation as merely one means of managing the
foreign research reactor spent fuel. Under the Preferred Alternative,
chemical separation would be considered only after completion of a
study of the impacts of chemical separation on United States nuclear
weapons nonproliferation policy, and then only if DOE is not ready to
implement a new technology to prepare the spent fuel for ultimate
disposition in approximately the year 2000 (see Section IV.E.). Even if
both chemical separation and a new technology were not available in the
year 2000, the Final EIS fully analyzes the potential impacts of
storing the spent fuel in wet and dry storage facilities for up to 40
years, so that the full range of reasonable alternative management
options is covered in the Final EIS. Therefore, the decision of whether
to accept foreign research reactor spent fuel into the United States
does not depend on the availability of chemical separation as a
management option.
E. Several commentors objected to the fact that DOE spent
Government funds to print and mail the Final EIS (or its Summary) to
members of the public. DOE explained that the regulations implementing
the National Environmental Policy Act require agencies to provide a
copy of a Final EIS to any individual who submits ``substantive''
comment on the draft of that EIS. DOE limited the cost of printing and
mailing to the greatest extent possible by mailing only the Summary of
the Final EIS to commentors from locations other than Augusta, Georgia,
and the States of California, Idaho, and South Carolina who had not
specifically requested a copy of the full Final EIS (all individuals
and organizations who were sent only a Summary were offered an
opportunity to receive the entire Final EIS).
VII. Decision
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to
implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy,
as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS, subject to
the additional stipulations noted below. In summary, implementation of
the new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy will
involve acceptance of aluminum-based spent fuel, TRIGA spent fuel, and
target material containing uranium enriched in the United States, as
defined in the Final EIS. This material will be accepted from the 41
countries listed in Section III of this notice. The spent fuel
acceptance will involve approximately 19.2 MTHM (metric tonnes of heavy
metal) of foreign research reactor spent fuel in up to 22,700 separate
spent fuel elements and approximately 0.6 MTHM of target material. This
amount of material is the amount that is currently in storage at the
foreign research reactors, plus that which DOE estimates will be
discharged over the next ten years. Shipments of this spent fuel into
the United States will be accepted over a 13 year period, beginning on
the effective date of the policy. The foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel will be shipped by either chartered or regularly scheduled
commercial ships. The majority of the spent fuel will be received from
abroad through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina
(about 80%) and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in California (about
5%). Most of the target material and some of the spent fuel (about 15%)
will be received overland from Canada. Shipment through Charleston will
begin in the summer of 1996 and through Concord in mid-1997. Shipments
from Canada have not been scheduled at this time. After a limited
period of interim storage, the spent fuel will be treated and packaged
at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory as necessary to prepare it for transportation to a final
disposal repository.
DOE will apply the following additional stipulations to
implementation of the new spent fuel acceptance policy:
A. DOE will reduce the number of shipments necessary by
coordinating shipments from several reactors at a time (i.e., by
placing multiple casks [up to eight] on a ship). DOE currently
estimates that a maximum of approximately 150 to 300 shipments through
the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and five shipments through the
Concord Naval Weapons Station will be necessary during the 13 year
spent fuel acceptance period.
B. Target material containing uranium enriched in the United States
will be accepted only if a reactor operator wishing to ship target
material formally commits to convert to the use of LEU targets, when
such targets become available (a program to develop LEU targets is
underway as an adjunct to the RERTR program). To demonstrate this
commitment, DOE will require that the affected reactor operators enter
into an agreement with DOE that sets forth the milestones and schedule
for the conversion. Reactor operators currently operating on HEU fuel
will be required to enter into a similar agreement regarding conversion
of their reactors to operate on LEU fuel.
C. The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target
material could be safely transported overland within the United States
by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either
[[Page 25100]]
transportation mode may be used. However, based on input from the
public in the vicinity of the ports of entry, there appears to be a
strong preference for the use of rail. Therefore, DOE will seek to use
rail for shipments from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory in Idaho, pending further discussions with the
States, Tribes and local jurisdictions along the proposed
transportation routes.
D. During the period starting with initial implementation of the
new spent fuel acceptance policy through approximately the end of 1999,
the Department will aggressively pursue one or more new technologies
that would put the foreign research reactor spent fuel in a form or
container that is eligible for direct disposal in a geologic
repository.
Should a new treatment or packaging technology not be ready for
implementation by the year 2000, DOE has under active consideration
chemical separation of some of the foreign research reactor spent fuel
in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site, where it would be blended
down to LEU and potentially placed under International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards. The Department intends to conduct a study that will
look in more depth at the issues associated with a decision to
chemically separate this spent fuel. Issues to be considered include
minimizing any potential proliferation risks, cost and timing. The
State of South Carolina will be invited to participate in the study.
A subsequent Record of Decision will be issued at approximately the
end of 1999 (or sooner if possible) to announce DOE's future management
plans for the foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material
based on the results of the Department's program to develop the new
treatment and/or packaging technologies by that time (including any
necessary environmental reviews), and the study discussed above.
Staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have agreed to
undertake an independent review of any new technology, or application
of existing technologies, that DOE proposes to develop, to provide a
high degree of confidence that implementation of such a technology
would produce a product that will be acceptable for disposal in a
geologic repository.
VIII. Use of All Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm
Implementation of this decision will result in low environmental
and health impacts. However, DOE will take the following steps to avoid
or minimize harm wherever possible:
A. DOE will use current safety and health programs and practices to
reduce impacts by maintaining worker radiation exposure as low as
reasonably achievable and by meeting appropriate waste minimization and
pollution prevention objectives.
B. DOE will require that the shipping contractors implement a
system to keep records of which ships are used to transport foreign
research reactor spent fuel and target materials and which ship crew
members, port workers and land transportation workers are involved in
the shipments. DOE will include a clause in the contract for shipment
of the spent fuel and target material requiring that other ship crew
members, port workers and land transportation workers be used if any
worker in these categories could approach a 100 mrem dose in any year
(the regulatory limit set in 10 CFR Part 20 for radiation exposure to a
member of the general public).
C. DOE will reduce the risk associated with shipment of the spent
fuel by shipping multiple casks per shipment, up to a maximum of eight,
whenever possible, thus reducing the total number of shipments.
D. DOE will implement a process of detailed transportation
planning, involving States, Tribes and local jurisdictions through
which the shipments will pass, to ensure that all organizations that
would respond to an accident involving a foreign research reactor spent
fuel shipment will be fully prepared and informed prior to any shipment
taking place.
E. DOE will conduct the program to identify and develop an improved
means of treating and/or packaging the foreign research reactor spent
fuel with the intent of providing a technology to be used to prepare
the spent fuel for geologic disposal that has less environmental
impacts than the technologies that are currently available.
Items A, C, D, and E above will be accomplished under existing
business practices in the normal course of implementing the new spent
fuel acceptance policy. For item B, DOE will prepare a Mitigation
Action Plan under the provisions of DOE's NEPA implementation
procedures (10 CFR 1021.331).
IX. Basis for the Decision
The elements of the decision discussed in Section VI above (i.e.,
the Preferred Alternative with additional stipulations) have been
selected based on the following considerations:
A. Management Alternative.
The various management alternatives considered are discussed in
Section 2 of the Final EIS. The analyses in Section 4 of the Final EIS
demonstrate that the impacts on the environment, involved workers, and
the citizens of the United States from implementation of any of the
management alternatives or implementation alternatives analyzed (other
than beneficial impacts associated with support for United States
nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy) would be small and within
applicable regulatory limits, and would not provide a basis for
discrimination among the alternatives. As a result, the process for
selection of the elements of the action to be taken focused on
programmatic considerations:
1. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded
that the No Action Alternative and Management Alternative 2,
Implementation Alternative 1a (Overseas Storage) would be unacceptable
since these alternatives are not consistent with United States nuclear
weapons nonproliferation policy objectives.
2. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, also believes
that Management Alternative 2, Implementation Alternative 1b (Overseas
Reprocessing) would not provide an incentive for reactor operators to
switch to LEU fuel or continue using LEU fuel. Since there is no
overseas reprocessing capability for the new, high density LEU fuel
developed by the RERTR program, foreign research reactor operators
would have to continue using HEU fuel in order to be able to rely on
reprocessing as a spent fuel management approach. In addition,
reprocessing could result in the continued production of HEU, which
could then be made available in civil commerce. Furthermore, the two
countries that provide reprocessing require that the resulting wastes
be returned to the countries of origin. Many of the countries in which
the foreign research reactors are located do not have the technical or
regulatory infrastructure to manage these wastes. Finally, the United
States would not be able to impose conditions on the reactor operators
or reprocessing firms to assure that its nuclear weapons
nonproliferation objectives would be met.
3. The sample hybrid alternative (Management Alternative 3)
analyzed in the Draft EIS involved partial reprocessing overseas
coupled with partial management in the United States. Even though the
use of overseas reprocessing would be more limited in
[[Page 25101]]
this alternative, many of the concerns raised above with regard to
reprocessing would apply. Because of these concerns and uncertainties,
DOE and the Department of State do not believe it would be prudent to
rely on the use of overseas reprocessing to meet United States' nuclear
weapons nonproliferation objectives.
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has concluded
that a modification of the basic implementation of Management
Alternative 1 as specified in the Preferred Alternative balances
policy, technical, cost and schedule requirements, and provides the
strongest support for United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation
policy objectives because all aspects of the alternative will be under
the control of DOE, either directly or through the spent nuclear fuel
acceptance contracts with the reactor operators.
B. Management Technology
The alternative spent nuclear fuel management technologies
considered are discussed in Sections 2.2.2.7 and 2.6.5 of the Final
EIS. The approaches fall into four broad categories, as follows:
Wet Storage. Wet storage is a proven technology, that has been used
for decades to safely store research reactor spent fuel from both
domestic and foreign reactors. The impacts of continued use of wet
storage would be small, and completely within applicable regulatory
limits. Furthermore, DOE currently has wet storage facilities in
operation at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory that can be used for storage of foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel. The water chemistry of the wet storage pools is
carefully controlled to minimize the possibility of degradation and
allow continued safe operation of the pools.
Dry Storage. Dry storage is also a proven technology that would
also have no more than small impacts, completely within applicable
regulatory limits. It is the storage medium that is being selected at
all commercial power reactor sites where additional storage capacity is
being built. Dry storage capacity could be provided at the management
sites in time to meet the program's projected needs, if initial spent
nuclear fuel receipts were placed into the available wet storage.
Chemical Separation. Chemical separation is also a proven
technology, the impacts of which would be small, and completely within
applicable regulatory limits. However, DOE is phasing out its chemical
separation activities and is currently conducting chemical separations
only at the Savannah River Site to stabilize materials for health and
safety reasons. Because these chemical separations facilities could be
used to treat the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel, they
provide a contingency to be considered pending availability of an
alternate means of treating and/or packaging the spent nuclear fuel
prior to ultimate disposition.
New Technologies. In order to prepare the spent fuel for ultimate
disposition, some form of treatment and/or packaging may be required.
Several promising new technologies, as well as variations of existing
technologies, have been proposed and are under evaluation. Relatively
simple technologies appear to be feasible, although they require more
development work to confirm their viability and the cost of their
implementation. This development will take place before DOE makes a
decision on implementation of any of the new technologies.
In order to effectively accept and manage the foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel in the United States, DOE, in consultation
with the Department of State, developed the three point strategy for
management of aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel discussed in the
description of the Preferred Alternative (see Section IV.E.). This
strategy draws on the strengths of each of the spent nuclear fuel
management technologies discussed above, while avoiding sole reliance
on any of them. Due to the relatively more robust nature of the TRIGA
spent nuclear fuel, DOE believes that minimal additional development
may be needed to prepare it for storage and final disposition.
Accordingly, the decision specified in this Record of Decision is to
place the TRIGA spent nuclear fuel in existing dry storage facilities
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. However, the analysis to
determine what treatment, if any, will be necessary to qualify the
TRIGA spent fuel for geologic disposal will continue and the
appropriate treatment, if any, will be identified and implemented.
DOE will issue a second, separate Record of Decision at
approximately the end of 1999 (or sooner if possible) to provide
assurance to the States hosting the DOE spent fuel management sites
that DOE will place sufficient priority on the new technology
development effort, and to ensure that the decision on which spent fuel
management approach to adopt for use past the year 2000 receives
appropriate scrutiny by Executive Branch agencies, Congress and the
public.
C. Duration of the Policy
The alternatives for the duration of the policy that were
considered are discussed in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 of the Final
EIS. In analyzing these alternatives, DOE concluded that the 5-year
option is unlikely to provide sufficient time for the reactor operators
to arrange for alternative spent nuclear fuel disposal mechanisms, and
thus might result in some reactor operators refusing to participate in
the program to convert or continue to use LEU fuel. That would
substantially undermine the goal of eliminating civil commerce in HEU.
On the other hand, the analysis determined that there was
insufficient benefit to be gained from extending acceptance of all
foreign research reactor spent fuel containing HEU into the indefinite
future because such an approach would be unlikely to provide sufficient
incentive for other countries to proceed expeditiously with development
of alternative arrangements for disposal not involving the United
States.
The approach selected provides the incentive needed to gain the
reactor operators' cooperation, while specifying a definite cut-off
point. This alternative provides sufficient lead time to allow the
reactor operators to make other arrangements for disposition of their
spent nuclear fuel, and provides sufficient time to accept all spent
nuclear fuel containing HEU enriched in the United States.
D. Amount of Material to Manage
The alternative amounts of material that might be covered by the
proposed policy are described in Sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.2.1 of the
Final EIS. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded
that management of spent nuclear fuel only from countries that do not
have high income economies would strongly encourage the resurgence of
the use of HEU in the high-income economy countries, as well as opening
the United States, fairly or unfairly, to charges that it was not
living up to commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons. Management of only spent nuclear fuel containing HEU
would penalize those reactors that have already converted to the use of
LEU fuel, and would provide an incentive for reactors to continue to
use HEU fuel, or switch back to its use.
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that
management of all of the aluminum-
[[Page 25102]]
based and TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel currently
in storage or projected to be discharged during the policy period, and
target material containing uranium enriched in the United States, will
provide the best support for United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy. Implementation of this approach will provide
an opportunity for removal of all United States origin HEU from civil
commerce and will provide an incentive for the continued conversion to
and use of LEU as fuel for foreign research reactors, in place of HEU.
DOE added the stipulation specifying that target material will be
accepted only from foreign research reactors whose operators who
formally agree to switch to use of LEU targets, when such targets
become available, to provide an additional incentive for the reactor
operators to make the switch to LEU targets.
E. Marine Transport
The alternative approaches to marine transport of foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel are discussed in Section 2.2.1.5 of the
Final EIS. The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts
to the environment, workers, or the public from transport of the spent
nuclear fuel using any of these types of ships would be small, and
within applicable regulatory limits. The analyses do not identify any
difference in the small impacts that would result from the use of
purpose-built vs. general purpose ships. In addition, ``military
transports'' are in fact the same type of ship as chartered commercial
cargo ships and are crewed by civilians, use of ``military transports''
would not actually result in any difference in impacts. DOE, after
consultation with the Department of State, believes that use of actual
warships would be unnecessary from a security standpoint.
The approach selected by DOE, after consultation with the
Department of State, (use of chartered or commercial ships) provides
maximum flexibility for marine transport.
DOE has decided to specify the additional stipulation on reduction
of the number of shipments as a means of responding to public concerns
regarding the risk of the shipments and to reduce shipping costs.
F. Ground Transport
The ground transportation alternatives (i.e., truck, rail and
barge) are discussed in Section 2.2.1.7 of the Final EIS. The analyses
in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts to the environment,
workers, or the public, from any of these modes of ground transport
(counting barge as a mode of ``ground transport'') would be small and
within the applicable regulatory limits. Furthermore, the differences
in potential impacts between the truck, rail and barge alternatives
were not significant.
Both the truck and rail transportation options have been used
successfully to transport foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel
in the past. Truck transport was the predominant mode used for over
twenty years, until the old ``Off-Site Fuels Policy'' lapsed in 1988.
Rail was the mode used for both shipments under the Environmental
Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor
Spent Nuclear Fuel. Since neither of the ports of entry (see item H
below) can reasonably provide barge transport to either of the
management sites, barge transport was not included in the preferred
alternative.
The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target material
could be safely transported overland within the United States by either
truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either transportation mode may
be used. However, there appears to be a strong preference by some
members of the public in the port areas for the use of rail. Therefore,
in response to this preference, DOE has decided that it will seek to
use rail for shipments from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the
Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory in Idaho as a general matter, subject to further
discussions with the States, Tribes and local jurisdictions along the
proposed transportation routes.
G. Title Transfer Location
The alternative points at which DOE might take title to the spent
nuclear fuel and target material are discussed in Sections 2.2.1.4 and
2.2.2.4 of the Final EIS.
The point at which title will be transferred has no effect on the
physical processes that would take place, and thus will not have any
effect on the impacts on the environment, workers, or the public. The
Price-Anderson Act would provide liability protection in the unlikely
event of a nuclear accident in the United States, whether or not DOE
has taken title to the spent nuclear fuel at the time of such an
accident. As a result, DOE, after consultation with the Department of
State, concluded that the selection of the title transfer location
could be made solely on programmatic considerations.
Acceptance of title at the foreign research reactor sites could
make the United States Government liable for any accident that might
occur in the country of origin, or on the high seas. DOE has been
unable to identify any advantage to the United States of taking title
outside the United States. Taking title at the limit of United States
territorial waters would make the title transfer depend solely on when
the ship enters United States waters, which could be difficult for DOE
to control in certain circumstances (e.g., during a storm). Acceptance
of title when the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel actually
enters the land mass of the United States (the approach selected)
provides the most certainty for implementation. The approach selected
ensures that liability for accidents during the transportation process
outside the United States will remain with the reactor operators, while
reinforcing in the minds of the public that the United States
Government will be accountable in the unlikely event of an accident
within United States territory.
H. Ports of Entry
The alternative ports of entry considered are discussed in Sections
2.2.1.6 and 3.2 of the Final EIS. The analyses in the EIS demonstrate
that the impacts on either the environment, workers, or the public due
to use of any of the potential ports of entry analyzed would be small
and within applicable regulatory limits.
Although any one or all of the ten ports of entry described in the
Final EIS would be acceptable ports of entry, DOE, in consultation with
the Department of State, concluded that foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel marine shipments to the United States should be made via
the military ports (selected from among those analyzed in the Final EIS
and found acceptable) in closest proximity to the spent nuclear fuel
management sites (i.e., the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the
Concord Naval Weapons Station). DOE will seek to transport multiple
casks per ship to keep the total number of shipments as small as
possible, as well as to reduce risks and costs.
Use of military ports will provide additional confidence in the
safety of the shipments due to the increased security associated with
the military ports. This could also require much of the spent nuclear
fuel to be shipped via chartered ships because commercial ships do not
schedule stops at military ports. Use of chartered ships will increase
the cost of shipping spent nuclear fuel. This additional cost will be
borne by the reactor operators for
[[Page 25103]]
shipments from high-income economy countries, and by the United States
for reactor operators from other countries. The additional cost will be
kept to a minimum by shipping as many casks as possible on each ship
(up to a maximum of eight per ship).
I. Management Sites
The question of which sites should be used for management of all of
DOE's spent nuclear fuel was addressed in the Programmatic SNF&INEL
Final EIS, including consideration of the potential receipt of the
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The initial Record of
Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS (60 FR 28680, June 1,
1995), specifies that any aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel accepted in the United States will be managed at the
Savannah River Site; and that the remaining foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel will be managed at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. This decision was not affected by the second Record of
Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS (61 FR 9441, March 8,
1996). The site for management of the target material was left to be
decided under the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (i.e., the Final EIS). All of the target
material currently in DOE's possession is managed at the Savannah River
Site. The approach selected (i.e., management of target material at the
Savannah River Site) is not inconsistent with the decision specified in
the Records of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS.
The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts to
either the environment or the public through use of any of the sites
for management of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and
target material would be small, and well within applicable regulatory
limits.
J. Financing Arrangement
The alternative financing arrangements are discussed in Sections
2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.3 of the Final EIS. The financing arrangement
selected will have no effect on the physical processes that will take
place, and thus will not have any direct environmental effects.
However, it could affect how many foreign research reactor operators
elect to ship spent nuclear fuel to the United States. For instance, if
DOE and the Department of State were to charge a full cost recovery fee
to all reactors, some of the reactors in high-income countries and
many, if not all, of the reactors in other countries would not have the
financial resources to participate. This would reduce the amount of
spent fuel to be accepted and also reduce the potential environmental
impacts that would be associated with shipment and management of the
spent fuel, but would result in an increased risk of diversion of
highly enriched uranium into a foreign nuclear weapons program. On the
other hand, if the United States subsidized all of the reactors, the
United States would bear the full financial burden, even for reactors
that can afford to pay their fair share.
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that,
to encourage that reactor operators in countries with other-than-high-
income-economies to participate in the program, the United States
should subsidize receipt of their spent nuclear fuel. DOE and the
Department of State also concluded that DOE should strive to recover as
much of the cost of managing the spent nuclear fuel as possible from
high-income economy countries. DOE concluded that it will announce the
fee policy in a Federal Register notice (separate from this Federal
Register notice announcing the Record of Decision), so that the fee
policy may be changed from time to time as necessary to reflect changes
in cost or new information that may be relevant to the policy.
Such an approach will recover as much as possible of the United
States' expenses for management of spent nuclear fuel from high-income
economy countries (without encouraging any of them to resort to
reprocessing of their spent nuclear fuel), will encourage participation
by other countries, and will provide a mechanism through which to
account for changes in cost and future definition of program details.
X. Conclusion
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to
implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material
acceptance policy, as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained
in the Final EIS, subject to the additional stipulations noted in
Section VII and including the mitigation activities identified in
Section VIII. This new policy is effective upon being made public, in
accordance with DOE's NEPA implementation regulations (10 CFR
Sec. 1021.315). The goals of this policy are to support the United
States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy calling for the
reduction, and eventual elimination, of HEU from civil commerce, and to
encourage foreign research reactors to switch from HEU fuels to
alternative LEU fuels developed under the RERTR program. In reaching
this decision, DOE has considered the concerns expressed by the
Department of State, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Council, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the need for such a
policy. A critical result of implementing this policy will be the
continued viability and vitality of the RERTR program because foreign
research reactor operators will have a continued incentive to
participate. Similarly, implementation of programs similar to the RERTR
program in Russia, the other newly-independent states of the former
Soviet Union, China, South Africa, and other countries, and the
establishment of a world-wide norm discouraging the use of HEU depends
on a commitment by the United States to action such as that embodied in
the new foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material
acceptance policy. At the same time, the impacts on the environment,
workers, and the public from implementing the acceptance program are
estimated to be small and well within applicable regulatory limits.
The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321
et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508 and
10 CFR Part 1021.
Issued in Washington, D.C., this 13th day of May, 1996.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy.
[FR Doc. 96-12420 Filed 5-16-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
