[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 96 (Tuesday, May 19, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27601-27604]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-13187]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-220]
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Notice of Consideration of
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a
Hearing
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No.
DPR-63, issued to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee), for
operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (NMP1) located
in the town of Scriba, Oswego County, New York.
The proposed amendment would change Technical Specifications (TSs)
3/4.6.2, ``Protective Instrumentation,'' to reflect modifications to
the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room Air Treatment
System. Specifically, TS
[[Page 27602]]
Tables 3.6.2l and 4.6.2l, ``Control Room Air Treatment System
Initiation,'' would be changed to delete the high radiation signal and
substitute the following initiating signals from the Reactor Protection
System: (1) low-low reactor water level in the reactor vessel, (2) high
steam flow in the main steam line, (3) high temperature in the main
steam line tunnel, and (4) high pressure in the reactor drywell. TS
Table 3.6.2l would specify setpoints for each of these four initiating
parameters ([greater than or equal to] 5 inches-indicator scale, [less
than or equal to] 105 psid, [less than or equal to] 200 degrees F, and
[less than or equal to] 3.5 psig, respectively). TS Table 3.6.2l would
indicate for each of the four parameters that the minimum number of
tripped or operable trip systems and the minimum number of operable
instrument channels per operable trip system are two, and that the four
parameters are required to be operable when the reactor mode switch is
in the ``startup'' or ``run'' positions (but not if in the ``shutdown''
or ``refuel'' positions), except that the high drywell pressure signal
may be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting. For three of
the parameters (low-low reactor water level, high steam flow in the
main steam line, and high drywell pressure), TS Table 4.6.2l would
require daily sensor checks, quarterly instrument channel tests, and
quarterly instrument channel calibrations (except that only the trip
circuit need be calibrated and tested at these quarterly frequencies;
the primary sensor would be calibrated and tested each operating
cycle). For the parameter high temperature in the main steam line
tunnel, TS Table 4.6.2l would require an instrument channel test and an
instrument channel calibration each operating cycle, not to exceed 24
months. Associated TS ``Bases for 3.4.5 and 4.4.5 Control Room Air
Treatment System'' would also be changed to update the system
descriptions consistent with these proposed changes to the automatic
initiation circuitry, and to reflect the system's manual start
capability. These changes to the TS Bases would include deletion of the
statements that (1) the Control Room Air Treatment System is designed
``to automatically start upon a receipt of a high radiation signal from
one of the two radiation monitors located on the ventilation intake''
and that (2) ``* * * air intake radiation monitors will be calibrated
and functionally tested each operating cycle, not to exceed 24 months,
to verify system performance.''
During a system design review, the licensee determined that (1)
contrary to a commitment in letters to the NRC dated January 31 and
March 19, 1984, the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not
automatically initiate during an MSLB [main steam line break] or an
LOCA [loss-of-coolant accident], and (2) initiation of the NMP1 Control
Room Air Treatment System at the current radiation monitor setpoint of
[less than or equal to] 1000 CPM, as required by TS Table 3.6.2l, is
not sufficient for compliance with GDC 19 limits for radiological
protection of the control room operators. Consequently, on April 21,
1998, the licensee declared the Control Room Air Treatment System
inoperable and notified the NRC that a 7 day limiting condition for
operation had been entered as specified by TS 3.4.5. On April 27, 1998,
the licensee informed the NRC Project Manager that resolution of the
inoperability condition would involve modifications more extensive than
mere setpoint adjustments, that these modifications should not be
implemented while NMP1 is operating, and that the licensee was
considering filing an application for an emergency license amendment to
allow the modifications to be implemented and the plant restarted after
a 7-day outage. NMP1 was shut down on April 28, 1998, in accordance
with TS 3.4.5. On May 2, 1998, the licensee filed an application
requesting that the NRC amend the NMP1 license by May 8, 1998, on an
Emergency basis because ``resumption of operation cannot occur until
NRC approval of the proposed change.'' However, on May 11, 1998, the
licensee informed the NRC that as a result of the finding by a team of
licensee engineers who reviewed the control room ventilation systems,
modifications to the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not
be completed and NMP1 determined ready for restart for 2 weeks.
Accordingly, the NRC finds that exigent circumstances exist in that the
full 30 days normally provided for public comment with respect to the
proposed action is not available before NMP1 will be ready to resume
power operation.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented
below:
1. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
* * * The proposed modification and associated TS changes involve a
system that is intended to detect the symptoms of certain events or
accidents and initiate mitigative actions (i.e., the Control Room Air
Treatment System). Accordingly, the proposed changes do not affect the
probability of any accident initiators previously evaluated. Therefore,
the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the
probability of any accidents previously evaluated.
Currently, TS Table 3.6.2l, ``Control Room Air Treatment System
Initiation,'' specifies a setpoint of ``1000 CPM'' for
Parameter (1), ``High Radiation Ventilation Intake.'' This requires the
continuous radiation monitors located in the outside air intake duct of
the Control Room Ventilation System to initiate the Control Room Air
Treatment System at a detector count rate of ``[less than or equal to]
1000 CPM.'' The setpoint was established to comply with the radiation
dose limits specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design
Criterion (GDC) 19 and NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan [SRP],''
Section 6.4 for control room habitability during an accident, including
a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). In the event of an accident, timely
initiation and proper operation of the Control Room Air Treatment
System minimizes the amount of airborne radioactivity entering the
control room. However, based on the results of a current study,
initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at this setpoint
does not provide assurance that personnel occupying the control room
under the most limiting Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accident
assumptions would not receive radiation exposures in excess of the GDC
19 and SRP 6.4 limits. It was further determined that, contrary to a
1984 commitment, the Control Room Air Treatment System would not
automatically initiate during a LOCA.
[[Page 27603]]
To correct this condition, a modification is proposed that will
automatically initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System on either
a MSLB or LOCA signal. Spare contacts from the RPS logic circuits will
be used to provide the initiation signals. Specifically, MSLB automatic
initiation of the system will be on main steam line high flow or main
steam line tunnel high temperature, and LOCA automatic initiation of
the system will be on high drywell pressure or low-low reactor vessel
water level. Implementation of this modification will provide automatic
initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at the onset of
both a MSLB and a LOCA, as previously committed.
The MSLB accident has been evaluated for full power operating
conditions where radioactive gases released from the turbine building
could be drawn into the Control Room Ventilation System and accumulate
in the control room. Engineering calculations show that the Control
Room Air Treatment System would maintain the dose to the control room
operators below the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits during these releases,
and the addition of an anticipatory automatic initiation on a MSLB
signal (main steam line high flow or main steam line tunnel high
temperature) provides assurance that the consequences of the MSLB
accident are bounded by the analysis.
The LOCA analysis assumes that radioactive gases are released from
the elevated stack and are then drawn back down into the Control Room
Ventilation System intake duct. Analysis shows that for the bounding
condition, the accumulated dose in the control room for a minimum of 30
days would not be detected by the Control Room Air Treatment System
radiation monitors, even at a significantly reduced setpoint.
Consequently, the radiation monitors cannot be relied upon to initiate
the Control Room Air Treatment System in the event of a LOCA. As a
result, an anticipatory automatic initiation of the Control Room Air
Treatment System on a LOCA signal (high drywell pressure or low-low
reactor vessel water level) is proposed to be added to provide
assurance that personnel occupying the control room under the most
limiting LOCA assumptions will not receive radiation exposures in
excess of the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits.
NMPC has also proposed to delete the requirement to have the
Control Room Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high
radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in the ``Refuel''
position. This change is acceptable based on 1) neither a LOCA or MSLB
is assumed to occur in refuel; 2) for accidents assumed to occur during
refueling (fuel handling accident), GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met
without the Control Room Air Treatment System; and 3) the Control Room
Air Treatment System can be manually initiated.
In summary, the proposed changes for the Control Room Air Treatment
System initiation channels will assure that the NMP1 control room
operators will not receive radiation exposures in excess of the limits
delineated in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4. Accordingly, the operators will be
able to respond to and mitigate the consequences of anticipated
accident scenarios. Therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a
significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously
evaluated.
2. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the
proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
* * * The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident
initiators and do not involve any alterations to plant configurations
which could initiate a new or different kind of accident. The actuation
circuit of the Control Room Air Treatment System actuation logic does
not control or interface with any primary reactor processes. Addition
of the MSLB logic and the LOCA logic will ensure that the Control Room
Air Treatment System initiates such that habitability of the control
room is not compromised. No new failure modes to existing systems or
equipment important to safety are created by this change. Post-
installation testing will confirm that the new logic will have no
effect on other safety-related circuits and TS required surveillance
testing will routinely confirm operability of the Control Room Air
Treatment System. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility
of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously
evaluated.
3. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the
proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The proposed changes to Sections 3.6.2 and 4.6.2 incorporate
modifications to the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room
Air Treatment System. * * * As a result of these changes, the
requirement to have the Control Room Air Treatment System automatically
initiate on a high radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in
the ``Refuel'' position has been deleted. * * *
The addition of the trip circuit logic from the MSLB accident as
well as from the LOCA circuits assures that the control room operator
will not be exposed to radiation limits in excess of GDC 19 or SRP 6.4
limits. Additionally, the initiation signal will be automatic at the
onset of both accidents, which improves the response time of the
Control Room Air Treatment System to the MSLB accident and the LOCA.
NMPC has proposed to delete the requirement to have the Control Room
Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high radiation signal
when the reactor mode switch is in the ``Refuel'' position. This change
is acceptable based on (1) neither a LOCA nor MSLB is assumed to occur
in refuel; (2) for accidents assumed to occur during refueling (fuel
handling accident) GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met without the
Control Room Air Treatment System; and (3) the Control Room Air
Treatment System can be manually initiated.
In summary, the proposed changes will assure that the Control Room
dose established in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 will not be exceeded. Therefore,
the proposed activity does not involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed
determination. Any comments received within 14 days after the date of
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final
determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the
expiration of the 14-day notice period. However, should circumstances
change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of
the 14-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that
the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final
determination will consider all public and State comments received.
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal
Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to
take this action will occur very infrequently.
[[Page 27604]]
Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of
this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to
Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of
written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to
intervene is discussed below.
By June 1, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with
respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating
license and any person whose interest may be affected by this
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the Reference and Documents Department,
Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed
by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or
petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy
the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be
permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the
hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance
of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place
before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC,
by the above date.
A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, and to Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & Strawn, 1400
L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20005-3502, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the
application for amendment dated May 2, 1998, which is available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room, located at the Reference and Documents Department,
Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day of May, 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Darl S. Hood,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-13187 Filed 5-18-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
