99-13042. Complaint Case  

  • [Federal Register Volume 64, Number 99 (Monday, May 24, 1999)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 28015-28022]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 99-13042]
    
    
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    POSTAL RATE COMMISSION
    
    [Docket No. C99-1; Order No. 1239]
    
    
    Complaint Case
    
    AGENCY: Postal Rate Commission.
    
    ACTION: Notice of new complaint docket.
    
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    SUMMARY: This order announces a formal complaint docket related to a 
    pilot program entailing electronic delivery service. It also addresses 
    related procedural matters. These actions allow issues raised by the 
    Service's participation in this program to be addressed.
    
    DATES: See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for dates.
    
    
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    ADDRESSES: Address all communications regarding this notice to the 
    attention of Margaret P. Crenshaw, Secretary of the Commission, 1333 H 
    Street NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20268-0001.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephen L. Sharfman, General Counsel, 
    1333 H Street NW., Suite 300, Washington, DC 20268-0001.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On Oct. 5, 1998, United Parcel Service (UPS) 
    submitted a formal complaint against the United States Postal Service 
    (Postal Service or Service) pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3662, claiming that 
    the Service's introduction of a service offering called Post Electronic 
    Courier Service (Post ECS) violates various procedural and substantive 
    requirements of the Postal Reorganization Act. In response, the Postal 
    Service challenged the merits of each of complainant's claims and moved 
    to dismiss the complaint.1 For the reasons presented herein, 
    the Commission denies the Service's motion and initiates formal 
    proceedings to consider the complaint.
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        \1\ Motion of the United States Postal Service to Dismiss, Nov. 
    5, 1998. As provided in order no. 1221, complainant filed the answer 
    of United Parcel Service in opposition to motion of United States 
    Postal Service motion to dismiss complaint on Dec. 16, 1998.
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    Factual Background
    
        The facts recited in the following summary are not in dispute. They 
    are derived either from assertions in the complaint that the Service 
    has not contested, or from the Service's own filings in this docket to 
    date.2
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        \2\ In addition to its answer to the UPS complaint filed on Nov. 
    5, 1998, the Postal Service has filed responses to most of a series 
    of questions directed to it by the Commission in order no. 1229, 
    issued Feb. 17, 1999. Partial Response of United States Postal 
    Service to Commission Order No. 1229, March 3, 1999. In response to 
    a Postal Service motion for reconsideration of order no. 1229, the 
    Commission has deferred action on documents and other information 
    responsive to question 4(a) in that order, in view of commercially 
    sensitive information the Service claims would be contained in a 
    response. Order No. 1230, Order Denying Motion of United States 
    Postal Service for Reconsideration of Order No. 1229 and Directing 
    Immediate Provision of Responses to Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4(b), 
    March 2, 1999.
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        In May 1998, the Service began its participation in a pilot program 
    to introduce a service under arrangements made with Canada Post 
    Corporation (Canada Post), France's LaPoste (LaPoste), the 
    International Postal Corporation (IPC), and a software supplier. The 
    service offered in the pilot program is called Post ECS and its 
    availability is limited to 3,500 licensees. To date, the Service has 
    licensed between 25 and 100 U.S. companies to use Post ECS; 40 of these 
    companies are dispersed through 15 states.
        Post ECS is an all-electronic service designed to transmit 
    documents securely from a sender to an intended recipient. Licensees 
    access the service from a computer terminal by contacting a Postal 
    Service electronic commerce server through the Internet, entering an 
    assigned password, specifying the intended recipient of the document, 
    and transmitting it electronically to the server. The Postal Service 
    notifies the addressee by e-mail that the document is available at a 
    specified URL address, and states that it can be retrieved using the 
    Internet within a specified amount of time. The addressee--who may be 
    located in the United States or elsewhere--uses a computer terminal to 
    access the Internet site specified in the Postal Service's e-mail 
    message, enters an assigned password, and downloads the document. At 
    present, the Postal Service is providing Post ECS service free of 
    charge to its licensees.
        Post ECS, which is currently being provided in the status of an 
    operations test, has never been the subject of a formal request of the 
    Postal Service lodged with the Commission under 39 U.S.C. 3623 or 3622, 
    nor of a Postal Service proposal to the Commission to make a 
    substantially nationwide change in the nature of postal services under 
    39 U.S.C. 3661. According to the Postal Service, Post ECS is scheduled 
    to continue at least through mid-June 1999, and there are no current 
    plans to request approval from the Board of Governors for an extension, 
    nor does the Service contemplate that any such request would be 
    necessary or appropriate at this juncture.
    
    Substance of the Complaint
    
        The complaint of UPS is grounded in three separate claims. One 
    claim alleges a substantive deficiency in the free rate associated with 
    Post ECS service. The other two claims involve the lack of a regulatory 
    pedigree for Post ECS under the provisions of 39 U.S.C. chapter 36.
        The initial claim is premised on an allegation that Post ECS is a 
    class of mail or type of mail service which may be established by the 
    Governors of the Postal Service only in accordance with the provisions 
    of chapter 36 of the Reorganization Act. Inasmuch as the Postal Service 
    has not requested the Commission to recommend establishment of Post ECS 
    as a classification of mail pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3623, nor to 
    recommend an associated rate or fee for the service pursuant to section 
    3622, UPS claims that there has been no showing that provision of Post 
    ECS is in accordance with the policies of the Reorganization Act and 
    the factors prescribed in sections 3622 and 3623. Accordingly, UPS 
    argues, the Service's provision of Post ECS violates the Postal 
    Reorganization Act. Complaint at 2.
        A separate claim likewise involves the service's lack of regulatory 
    pedigree, and also is premised on an assertion that Post ECS is a 
    postal service. Because Post ECS allegedly is being used by a 
    substantial number of companies to send documents nationwide, UPS 
    claims, providing the service could impact on mailers' use of other 
    mail services such as registered and certified mail. Consequently, UPS 
    argues, the Postal Service's institution and continuing provision of 
    Post ECS constitutes a change in the nature of postal services which 
    will generally affect service on a nationwide or substantially 
    nationwide basis. In light of the Postal Service's failure to submit a 
    proposal to the Commission within a reasonable time prior to making 
    such a change, as 39 U.S.C. 3661 requires, UPS claims that the 
    Service's provision of Post ECS violates section 3661. Id. at 
    3-4.
        The complaint's substantive challenge to Post ECS service relies on 
    the requirement in 39 U.S.C. 3622(b)(3) that each class or type of mail 
    service bear the costs attributable to it plus a reasonably assignable 
    portion of other costs, together with the impact consideration in 
    3622(b)(4). By providing Post ECS at no charge, UPS alleges, the Postal 
    Service violates the prohibition in section 3622(b)(3) against 
    providing a class or type of mail service at no charge, and introduces 
    a cross-subsidy of users of that service by other mail users. Inasmuch 
    as Post ECS competes with a similar service UPS offers, it also argues 
    that the Postal Service's provision of Post ECS at no charge 
    constitutes unfair competition in violation of section 3622(b)(4) of 
    the Act, and may deprive UPS of customers for its similar service, with 
    a consequent loss of revenue. Id. at 3.
    
    Postal Service Answer
    
        The Postal Service filed its answer to the UPS complaint on Nov. 5, 
    1998.3 With respect to the factual allegations made in the 
    complaint, the Service generally does not contest them, with two 
    exceptions. The Service denies that Post ECS is a ``document delivery 
    service,'' in the sense of there being any hard-copy delivery of 
    documents or letters. Additionally, the Service denies that 
    ``substantial numbers'' of
    
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    companies are using Post ECS, or that its usage can be characterized as 
    ``nationwide.'' Id. at 2, 4.
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        \3\ Answer of the United States Postal Service, Nov. 5, 1998.
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        The Postal Service's affirmative allegations include a 
    characterization of Post ECS as a limited test of a totally electronic 
    secure document delivery system under the auspices of IPC. The Service 
    represents that Post ECS does not use the Postal Service's physical 
    retail, mail processing, or delivery networks, and thus is not a 
    ``postal service'' under the statutory provisions invoked by UPS. 
    Therefore, the Service alleges, it was not required to submit a request 
    for a recommended decision or advisory opinion from the Commission 
    prior to offering Post ECS service. Id. at 6-7.
        The Postal Service's answer also claims that the Commission has no 
    subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. Finally, citing the 
    Governors' decision in docket no. C96-1, the Service asserts that the 
    section 3662 complaint procedure does not provide a means for 
    interested persons to challenge the status of products as ``postal'' or 
    ``nonpostal'' services. Id. at 7.
    
    Postal Service Motion To Dismiss
    
        On the same date it filed its answer, the Postal Service submitted 
    a motion to dismiss the complaint.4 As the first ground for 
    dismissal, the Service claims that the Commission lacks statutory 
    authority to resolve a complainant's challenge of a Postal Service 
    determination not to seek a recommended decision before introducing a 
    new service alleged to be ``postal'' in character. According to the 
    Service, complaint proceedings before the Commission were not intended 
    to be, and are not, appropriate for resolving issues as to whether the 
    Postal Service has acted beyond its lawful authority by offering a 
    service. Rather, the Service argues, a United States district court is 
    the appropriate forum for considering any such claims, as has been done 
    in prior controversies. Id. at 1-6.
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        \4\ Motion of the United States Postal Service to Dismiss, Nov. 
    5, 1998.
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        Even assuming that the Commission has authority to address the 
    question of whether Post ECS is a ``postal'' or ``nonpostal'' service, 
    the Service further argues, the complaint should still be dismissed 
    because that service is both nonpostal and non-domestic. Courts, the 
    Commission and the Governors have assessed the ``postal'' character of 
    services by investigating their relationship to the Postal Service's 
    hardcopy delivery network. Inasmuch as Post ECS is a totally electronic 
    service, with no relationship to traditional functions such as 
    collection, acceptance, processing, handling, transportation and 
    delivery afforded hardcopy mail, the Service argues that it is not a 
    ``postal'' service as the term has been defined to date. Moreover, 
    because Post ECS is a global service being tested jointly with the 
    Canadian and French postal administrations, and international 
    electronic document transfers are expected to constitute a significant 
    component of Post ECS transactions, the service is not a domestic 
    postal service within the purview of the Commission's jurisdiction. Id. 
    at 7-16.
    
    Responses of Complainant and Intervenor Coalition Against Unfair 
    USPS Competition (CAUUC)
    
        Both UPS and CAUUC 5 filed responses in opposition to 
    the Postal Service's motion to dismiss.6 On the subject of 
    the Commission's jurisdiction to consider the complaint, UPS cites the 
    judicially-established principle that regulatory agencies have 
    authority initially to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. 
    Applying the principle to this controversy, UPS asserts that the 
    Commission clearly has authority to determine whether Post ECS is, or 
    is not, a ``postal'' service that falls within its jurisdiction to 
    render a recommended decision. Furthermore, UPS observes, the 
    Commission has consistently exercised this authority to determine 
    whether a given service offering falls within its jurisdiction in past 
    complaint and other proceedings, most recently in docket no. C96-1. 
    Finally, UPS argues that nothing in the Reorganization Act, nor in a 
    complaining party's ability to seek redress in a federal district 
    court, precludes the Commission from making a determination of its 
    authority over a challenged new service under the section 3662 
    complaint procedure. UPS Answer at 2-6.
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        \5\ Two parties, CAUUC and the Association of Online 
    Professionals, have filed motions to intervene in this case. As the 
    Commission has determined to hear the UPS complaint, the motions 
    will be granted.
        \6\ Answer of United Parcel Service in Opposition to Motion of 
    the United States Postal Service to Dismiss Complaint, Dec. 15, 
    1998. Answer of Intervenor CAUUC in Opposition to Motion of U.S. 
    Postal Service to Dismiss Complaint, Dec. 15, 1998.
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        CAUUC also asserts that the Commission has authority to determine 
    whether Post ECS is a ``postal'' service, arguing that a plain reading 
    of section 3662 clearly demonstrates that the Act specifically 
    contemplates complaints regarding the improper offering of a postal 
    service and its associated rates. CAUUC cites the Commission's 
    determination in order no. 1145 of the same issue with respect to the 
    Pack & Send service in the C96-1 complaint proceeding, and argues that 
    the congressional intent to enable citizens to initiate such complaint 
    procedures before the Commission makes its exercise of statutory 
    authority a duty in this and similar cases. CAUUC Answer at 2-5.
        Regarding the potentially ``postal'' character of Post ECS, UPS 
    asserts that the service clearly meets the tests previously established 
    by courts and the Commission for reaching an affirmative determination. 
    Because Post ECS serves exactly the same function as traditional, 
    hardcopy mail, UPS argues that the service is not only closely related 
    to delivery of mail, it is the delivery of mail. Citing two decisions 
    of U.S. district courts which have equated e-mail services such as Post 
    ECS with traditional forms of mail, UPS asserts that prior judicial and 
    Commission decisions do not suggest that hard copy delivery is 
    necessary for a service to be classified as ``mail,'' or ``postal'' in 
    nature. UPS Answer at 6-9.
        Even assuming the relevance of a linkage to hard copy mail in 
    defining postal services, UPS further argues, Post ECS has an extremely 
    strong structural relationship to such traditional forms of mail 
    because it is both the functional equivalent of written mail and a 
    potential substitute for it. UPS notes that the Postal Service has 
    described Post ECS as an extension of its traditional paper mail 
    services, and equated electronic mail with traditional forms of mail in 
    statements made by Postal Service officials and a witness in docket no. 
    MC98-1. Id. at 9-12.
        UPS also asserts that there are strong policy reasons for 
    concluding that Post ECS is a postal service. Given Congress' paramount 
    concern in adopting the ratemaking provisions of the Reorganization Act 
    that the revenues paid by one class of users--especially First Class 
    letter monopoly mailers--not be used to cross-subsidize other Postal 
    Service customers, and the Postal Service's record of losses in 
    connection with its electronic service offerings to date, UPS argues 
    that excluding Post ECS from the Commission's jurisdictional purview 
    would create a large loophole and defeat the congressional intention 
    that all Postal Service customers be treated fairly. Id. at 11-13.
        CAUUC also asserts that Post ECS is a postal service subject to the 
    Commission's jurisdiction, arguing that it is not fundamentally 
    different from the mailing online service currently
    
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    being considered before the Commission in docket no. MC98-1. CAUUC 
    Answer at 5-6. The Coalition also cites statements made by the 
    Postmaster General and others to the effect that the Postal Service 
    views its entry into electronic services as an extension of its core 
    business, the delivery of traditional mail. Id. at 7-9.
        Finally, UPS challenges the Postal Service's argument that Post ECS 
    is outside the Commission's purview because it is an international 
    service. UPS notes the Service's implicit admission that Post ECS is 
    not entirely an international service, only a ``significant component'' 
    of total Post ECS transactions. To the extent the Postal Service is 
    delivering electronic messages from domestic senders to domestic 
    recipients, UPS argues, the Commission has jurisdiction over those 
    transactions. UPS Answer at 13.
    
    Statutory Authority To Consider Complaint
    
        The challenge of the Commission's authority to consider the UPS 
    complaint made in the Postal Service's motion to dismiss requires 
    consideration of the appropriate ambit and application of the statutory 
    complaint provision, 39 U.S.C. 3662. Following a general exploration of 
    the provision's scope, it will be possible to assess its applicability 
    to the instant complaint.
        By its terms, the complaint procedure provided in section 3662 is 
    available to two categories of persons: (1) Interested parties who 
    believe the Postal Service is charging rates not in conformity with the 
    policies set out in title 39; and (2) interested parties who believe 
    that they are not receiving postal service in conformity with the 
    policies in title 39. The second category is restrictive, in that an 
    interested party's complaint must be directed to a service or services 
    it is receiving (or allegedly should be receiving), rather than some 
    generalized complaint about postal service. However, the first category 
    contains no such restriction; the only implicit qualification is that a 
    party challenging a rate or rates have an ``interest'' in the subject 
    of the complaint.
        Once a qualifying complaint has been lodged, section 3662 commits 
    to the Commission's discretion a choice whether to hold hearings on the 
    complaint, or not. Generally, the Commission has exercised this 
    discretion on a case-by-case basis. However, early in its institutional 
    history the Commission adopted a rule to guide the discretionary 
    exercise, which states:
    
        The Commission shall entertain only those complaints which 
    clearly raise an issue concerning whether or not rates or services 
    contravene the policies of the [Postal Reorganization] Act; thus, 
    complaints raising a question as to whether the Postal Service has 
    properly applied its existing rates and fees or mail classification 
    schedule to a particular mail user or with regard to an individual, 
    localized or temporary service issue not on a substantially 
    nationwide basis shall generally not be considered as properly 
    raising a matter of policy to be considered by the Commission.
    
    39 C.F.R. 3001.82. While the Commission has not used this regulation to 
    bar absolutely any consideration of individual or localized rate and 
    service complaints--especially where the Postal Service allegedly acted 
    in an arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or unreasonable manner--it 
    has served as a basis for declining to conduct hearings on 
    controversies that did not raise questions of general postal 
    policy.7
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        \7\ See, e.g., docket no. C98-1, order no. 1227 (dismissing 
    complaint) at 7-9.
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        If the Commission exercises its discretion to hold hearings on a 
    complaint, section 3662 directs the Commission to proceed down one of 
    two specified paths. If the subject raised by the complaint is ``a 
    matter covered by subchapter II of this chapter''--i.e., the provisions 
    of 39 U.S.C. 3621 through 3628 governing permanent rates and classes of 
    mail--the Commission is directed to conduct formal hearings in 
    conformity with section 3624, as it does in rate and mail 
    classification dockets. If the Commission determines the complaint to 
    be justified, section 3662 instructs it to issue a recommended decision 
    to be acted upon by the Governors of the Postal Service.
        However, if the matter is not covered by subchapter II, section 
    3662 directs the Commission to hold a hearing of an unspecified degree 
    of formality. If after this hearing the Commission finds the complaint 
    to be justified, section 3662 directs it to render a public report to 
    the Postal Service, which shall take such action as it deems 
    appropriate.
        It is clear from this review of the mechanisms prescribed for 
    complaint proceedings in section 3662 that the statute--in addition to 
    investing the Commission with discretionary authority to consider a 
    wide range of rate and service complaints--also obliges the Commission 
    to interpret the Reorganization Act and its applicability as part of 
    the complaint process. The Commission is called upon to identify the 
    rate or service issues presented by a given complaint; to determine its 
    relationship to the policies of title 39 generally; and to determine 
    whether the complaint's linkage to the policies of the Reorganization 
    Act is sufficiently strong to warrant further investigation in the form 
    of hearings.
        Section 3662 also obliges the Commission to interpret whether the 
    substance of a given complaint is ``a matter covered by subchapter 
    II''--a topic governed by the ratemaking and mail classification 
    functions familiarly performed under sections 3622 and 3623--or outside 
    these regulatory mechanisms. Where the subject of a complaint is a new 
    and unreviewed service offering of the Postal Service and its 
    associated rates, as is the case here, it is impossible to conceive how 
    the Commission can perform this required interpretation without 
    considering the ``postal'' character of the service--which would render 
    it a subchapter II matter--or its ``nonpostal'' quality, which would 
    put it outside the subchapter's regulatory regime.
        Where the rate being charged for a new service is the focus of a 
    complaint, as it is here, the Postal Service would have the Commission 
    shirk this interpretive function, under its view that: ``Rate 
    complaints were intended to allow interested parties to challenge the 
    rates being charged, presumably in accord with previous action by the 
    Commission and the Governors, for existing postal services.'' Motion to 
    Dismiss at 2. But there is nothing in the language of section 3662 or 
    its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended any such 
    restriction to rates for services already established under subchapter 
    II. On the contrary, the House Report on H.R. 17070, in which the 
    concept of a rate board independent of the Postal Service (ultimately 
    to become the Postal Rate Commission) originated, included its 
    description of the bill's complaint provision corresponding to section 
    3662 in a section headed Procedures for changes in postal service[,] 
    and contemplated that one possible outcome of finding a complaint to be 
    meritorious would be that ``the Board may recommend litigation of an 
    appropriate change[.]'' H.R. Rep. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 
    (1970).
        The Postal Service characterizes the Commission's review of the 
    ``postal'' or ``nonpostal'' character of services challenged in 
    complaint proceedings as an exercise of ``authority to declare 
    independent actions of the Postal Service to be either lawful or 
    unlawful[,]'' which it argues Congress did not intend to grant the 
    Commission. Motion to dismiss at 3. But this characterization 
    misconstrues the Commission's function in considering a complaint of 
    this type. In determining whether a previously unreviewed
    
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    service challenged by the complaint of an interested party is 
    appropriate for consideration under the regulatory procedures specified 
    in subchapter II, the Commission is engaged essentially in exercising 
    its mail classification authority, under which it is assigned primary 
    responsibility for interpreting the status of services either proposed 
    or offered by the Postal Service.8 This assessment was 
    required by the district court's decision that at least some of the 
    special services offered by the Postal Service were subject to the 
    Commission's ratemaking authority. See Associated Third Class Mail 
    Users v. U.S. Postal Service, 405 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1975), 
    affirmed, 569 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 434 
    U.S. 884 (1977). The statutory function performed by the Commission in 
    this setting is essentially identical to the analyses of the various 
    special services offered by the Service in appendix F to the 
    Commission's opinion and recommended decision in docket no. R76-
    1.9 The lawfulness of the independent actions by which the 
    Postal Service implemented a service is simply not an issue before the 
    Commission, particularly because the Commission has no equitable powers 
    to enjoin or reverse those actions.
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        \8\ See United Parcel Service v. U.S. Postal Service, 604 F.2d 
    1370, 1381 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
        \9\ PRC Op. R76-1, Vol. 2, Appendix F, at 1-5. This assessment 
    was required by the district court's decision that at least some of 
    the special services offered by the Postal Service were subject to 
    the Commission's ratemaking authority. See Associated Third Class 
    Mail Users v. U.S. Postal Service, 405 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1975), 
    affirmed, 569 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 
    434 U.S. 884 (1977).
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        Nor is a potentially aggrieved party's opportunity to pursue an 
    action against the Postal Service in a U.S. district court a basis for 
    concluding that the Commission lacks authority to consider such claims, 
    or should decline to consider them pending judicial action. As UPS 
    points out, while a party may seek redress in federal court in such 
    instances, nothing in the Reorganization Act restricts its right to 
    invoke the Commission's jurisdiction under section 3662.10 
    Especially in view of the Commission's judicially-recognized authority 
    on issues of mail classification, it would be unjustifiable to force 
    aggrieved parties to elect a judicial remedy by declining to consider 
    such complaints.
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        \10\ The Commission agrees with UPS' inference that 39 U.S.C. 
    409--which confers ``original but not exclusive jurisdiction over 
    all actions brought by or against the Postal Service'' on the 
    federal district courts in postal matters--suggests that the 
    Commission and the courts share concurrent jurisdiction over some 
    matters, including potential subjects of complaints under section 
    3662.
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        As noted earlier, the complaint filed by UPS directs three charges 
    against the Postal Service's provision of Post ECS service: (1) That it 
    has not been scrutinized under sections 3623 and 3622; (2) that its 
    zero rate contravenes subsections 3622(b)(3) and (4); and (3) that it 
    has not been scrutinized as a service change under section 3661. For 
    the reasons discussed above, the Commission concludes that it has 
    authority to consider the first claim, as it did in docket no. C96-1 
    with respect to the complaint of CAUUC regarding the Pack & Send 
    service.
        The claim charging that the rate associated with Post ECS service 
    is uncompensatory and a potential cause of competitive harm is also of 
    a type familiar in complaint proceedings, including Docket No. C96-1. 
    There is no question that the Commission is authorized to consider such 
    claims in connection with a service that falls within its ratemaking 
    authority under 39 U.S.C. 3622.
        The last claim, citing the Postal Service's failure to request an 
    advisory opinion on Post E.C.S. pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3661, may be 
    viewed as an alternative theory to be considered if the first claim 
    fails. Under this claim, even if it is not established that Post ECS is 
    a ``postal'' service,11 UPS alleges that introducing and 
    rendering Post ECS could have sufficient impact on mailers' use of 
    hardcopy-related postal services that doing so constitutes ``a change 
    in the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on 
    a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis,'' triggering the 
    requirement of a Postal Service filing of a proposal pursuant to 
    section 3661(b). Because the Service has not submitted a proposal, UPS 
    contends that providing Post ECS violates section 3661. While this 
    claim is novel in the context of a complaint proceeding, there is no 
    apparent reason to conclude that considering it would exceed the scope 
    of the Commission's authority under section 3662. On the contrary, to 
    the extent that the section 3662 complaint mechanism has been viewed as 
    a remedial supplement to the review of substantially nationwide service 
    changes required under section 3661,12 consideration of a 
    Postal Service action purportedly in violation of section 3661 in a 
    complaint proceeding appears compatible with the statutory scheme of 
    the Reorganization Act.
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        \11\ Complainant's first allegation in support of its third 
    claim is that ``Post ECS is a postal service.'' Complaint at 3, 
    para. 19. However, it is not apparent that this allegation is 
    necessary to support a claim based on 39 U.S.C. 3661. If Post ECS is 
    found to be a ``postal'' service, its introduction would signify a 
    change in mail classification, to which the requirements of section 
    3623 would apply, rather than a change in the nature of postal 
    services subject to the requirements of section 3661.
        \12\ See Buchanan v. United States Postal Service, 508 F.2d 259, 
    264 (5th Cir. 1975): ``Section 3662 complements section 3661, and 
    together they form a harmonious scheme * * *. Although section 3662 
    is a more limited remedy, it insures that an unexpansive 
    interpretation of section 3661 will not leave remediless the postal 
    user dissatisfied by changes that do not rise to the level of those 
    covered by section 3661.''
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        For the reasons presented above, the Commission concludes that 
    consideration of the complaint of United Parcel Service is authorized 
    under 39 U.S.C. 3662.
    
    Other Grounds for Dismissal
    
        In addition to its claim that the Commission lacks authority to 
    consider the instant complaint, the Postal Service advances two other 
    arguments intended to demonstrate that particular characteristics of 
    the Post ECS service render it inappropriate for consideration in a 
    section 3662 complaint proceeding. One of these arguments challenges 
    the status of Post ECS as a domestic service. The other portrays Post 
    ECS as a ``nonpostal'' service beyond the purview of the Commission's 
    rate and mail classification scrutiny.
    
    Multinational Sponsorship and Operation of Post ECS
    
        The Postal Service seeks to infuse Post ECS with an international 
    character--and thereby support its claim that the service is not 
    domestic--by citing the multinational origins of the service and noting 
    that international electronic document transfers are expected to 
    constitute a significant component of Post ECS transactions. 
    Notwithstanding these aspects of the service, available information 
    does not support a conclusion at this time that Post ECS constitutes a 
    wholly non-domestic service outside the purview of the Commission's 
    mail classification and rate jurisdiction.
        First, the status of Post ECS as a putative international postal 
    service has not been clearly established in the responsive materials 
    provided by the Postal Service to date. Question (1)(b) in order no. 
    1229 asked the Service to describe the status of Post ECS and specify 
    the authority under which it is being provided. In its partial response 
    of March 3, the Service states that Post ECS is being provided, in 
    operations test status, under arrangements between and among itself, 
    LaPoste, Canada Post, the IPC, and a software supplier. However, the 
    Service cites 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(6)--
    
    [[Page 28020]]
    
    which authorizes the Postal Service ``to provide, establish, change, or 
    abolish special nonpostal or similar services''--rather than 39 U.S.C. 
    407(a), which authorizes the Service to negotiate and conclude 
    international postal treaties and conventions, and to establish rates 
    of postal and other charges applicable to mail conveyed between the 
    U.S. and other countries.
        Similarly, question (4)(a) asked the Service to provide a copy of 
    each convention, memorandum of understanding, or other instrument 
    governing the joint provision of Post ECS under the international 
    arrangement cited by the Service. For reasons presented in it motion 
    for reconsideration of order no. 1229, the Service did not submit 
    documents responsive to that part of the question. However, it did 
    summarily describe documents it had identified as being responsive to 
    the request; that description did not include any treaty or convention 
    materials that would appear to constitute a governing instrument 
    executed by the Postal Service pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 407.
        Furthermore, even assuming that the status of Post ECS as an 
    international service were firmly established, there apparently exists 
    a subset of Post ECS transactions that both originate and terminate 
    within the United States, thereby constituting a domestic segment of 
    Post ECS arguably subject to the ratemaking and mail classification 
    provisions of chapter 36. Question (2)(b) in order no. 1229 asked the 
    Service to separate and report the percentages of Post ECS document 
    transmissions originated by U.S. licensees directed to recipients in 
    the U.S., and those directed to recipients in other countries. The 
    Postal Service response did not provide proportions of each kind of 
    transmission, stating that it has no reliable means of determining with 
    certainty where Post ECS transactions originate or destinate 
    geographically. However, the response also stated, on the basis of 
    ``customer feedback and informal interviews with end users, [that] it 
    is known that transactions are originated and directed to recipients 
    within the U.S.'' Postal Service Partial Response of March 3, 1999 at 
    3. This domestic segment of Post ECS transactions apparently would not 
    be within the bounds of the Postal Service's authority to establish and 
    adjust rates for international mail services, and accordingly would be 
    within the purview of the Commission's regulatory authority under 
    chapter 36.13 Consequently, the international origins and 
    operations of Post ECS do not provide a basis for dismissing the entire 
    complaint.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \13\ See Air Courier Conference v. U.S. Postal Service, 959 F.2d 
    1213, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992): ``In giving the Postal Service the 
    authority to `establish' international mail rates, section 407(a) is 
    just as specific about international rates as chapter thirty-six is 
    about domestic rates. Section 407(a) tells us how international 
    postage rates are to be set and who sets them. Chapter thirty-six 
    tell us how domestic postage rates are to be set and who sets 
    them.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Lack of Connection to Hardcopy Postal Network
    
        The Postal Service's primary argument for dismissal of the 
    complaint on the merits is that Post ECS necessarily is a ``nonpostal'' 
    service because it lacks a physical relationship to the network with 
    which the Service transmits hardcopy mail from senders to recipients. 
    The Service observes that the Commission, the Governors, and reviewing 
    courts have evaluated the ``postal'' character of services by reference 
    to functions performed in the hardcopy postal network--i. e., 
    collection, acceptance, processing, handling, transportation and 
    delivery of tangible mail pieces. As an ``unbundled completely 
    electronic service,'' the Service argues, Post ECS lacks a relationship 
    to any of these physical functions. Therefore, the Postal Service 
    concludes, ``Post ECS does not fall within the definition of ``postal 
    services'' as defined by the courts, the Commission, and the 
    Governors.'' Motion to Dismiss at 15.
        The premise of the Postal Service's argument is largely correct, 
    but the conclusion it urges does not necessarily follow. It is true, as 
    the Service claims, that ``[a]bsolutely none of these [judicial and 
    other] authorities has concluded that completely electronic services 
    are ``postal'' in nature[.]'' Id. at 8. However, analogous claims could 
    be made with respect to the legal status of First-Class Mail 
    transported by air prior to 1955,14 or messages received in 
    post offices by telegraph prior to 1970.15 As the decisions 
    described in the footnotes illustrate, the Postal Service's adoption of 
    new technologies into its operations can generate controversies that 
    the body of pre-existing legal authority cannot resolve. This is the 
    current state of the controversy with respect to any end-to-end 
    electronic service offered by the Postal Service, such as Post 
    ECS.16
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \14\ Congress created air mail in the Air Mail Act of 1925, 43 
    Stat. 805 (1925). In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. 
    Summerfield, 229 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1955), several railroads 
    challenged an experimental program wherein the Post Office 
    Department tendered ordinary First-Class Mail to air carriers for 
    transportation. The court held that the Postmaster General had 
    authority to conduct the experimental carriage of First-Class Mail 
    by air without charging the higher airmail rate.
        \15\ Western Union Telegraph Company, in cooperation with the 
    Post Office Department, began to offer Mailgram service on an 
    experimental basis on January 1, 1970. In United Telegraph Workers 
    v. F.C.C., 436 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the union representing 
    Western Union's employees challenged, among other aspects, the Post 
    Office Department's participation in the experiment, wherein postal 
    employees (rather than Western Union employees) scanned and 
    enveloped messages received by teleprinter in post offices. The 
    court, citing the earlier decision in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 
    supra, found the postmaster general had authority to assign postal 
    employees to participate in the experiment.
        \16\ Complainant notes that recent federal court decisions have 
    equated e-mail services such as Post ECS with traditional forms of 
    mail. UPS answer in opposition to motion to dismiss at 8. However, 
    the decisions cited by UPS did not involve any Postal Service e-mail 
    service offering, nor its status in the context of title 39. In 
    Governors of the U.S. Postal Service v. Postal Rate Commission, 654 
    F. 2d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court reviewed one aspect of 
    the Commission's decision in docket no. MC78-3 with respect to a 
    proposed Electronic Computer Originated Mail (E-COM) service. Early 
    in that decision, the court referred to the E-COM request as ``a 
    postal service proposal to enter the field of electronic mail[.]'' 
    However, the electronic components of the E-COM service did not 
    extend to the delivery function, and thus it was a hybrid 
    electronic/hardcopy service. Nor was the ``postal'' or ``non-
    postal'' character of the E-COM service in controversy in that case.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Furthermore, applying the criteria that were used in assessing 
    controversial services in the past does not necessarily compel a 
    conclusion that the all-electronic Post ECS service is ``nonpostal.'' 
    In addressing a similar Postal Service claim with respect to the Pack & 
    Send service in docket no. C96-1, the Commission found:
    
        Determining whether the Pack & Send service is `postal' or `non-
    postal' in character requires the application of legal standards to 
    the available facts. While it has been stated in a variety of ways, 
    the primary standard that has been applied in analyzing different 
    services is: * * * the relationship of the service to the carriage 
    of mail. Those which can fairly be said to be ancillary to the 
    collection, transmission, or delivery of mail are postal services 
    within the meaning of Sec. 3622. PRC Op. R76-1, Vol. 2, Appendix F 
    at 3. Application of this standard looks not only at the intrinsic 
    features and terms of the service, but also considers the extent to 
    which use of the service culminates in use of the mails.
        PRC Op. R76-1, Vol. 2, Appendix F at 3. Application of this 
    standard looks not only at the intrinsic features and terms of the 
    service, but also considers the extent to which use of the service 
    culminates in use of the mails.
    
    Order No. 1128, July 30, 1996, at 10. (Footnotes omitted.) 
    Significantly, while the guiding standard focuses on ``the carriage of 
    mail'' and its functional components, it is not restrictive as to the 
    technological means used to perform any of those functions. Thus, the 
    fact that a given service accomplishes one or
    
    [[Page 28021]]
    
    more functional components of ``the carriage of mail'' by means that do 
    not involve a physical object does not necessarily support a conclusion 
    that the service is ``non-postal.'' The Governors'' submission of 
    requests for decisions recommending establishment of the mailing online 
    service in docket no. MC98-1, and earlier for the electronic computer 
    originated mail (E-COM) service in docket no. MC78-3, is consistent 
    with this observation.
        Despite the Post ECS service's lack of dependence on the hardcopy 
    postal network, complainant has made a colorable claim that it not only 
    is very closely related to the carriage of mail, it is the delivery of 
    mail because it accomplishes by electronic means all the functions that 
    would otherwise be performed by conveying a physical message or 
    document. UPS Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 8-10.
        Furthermore, a number of Postal Service statements concerning Post 
    ECS in particular, and describing its electronic mail initiatives in 
    general, are consistent with this claim. In announcing the operations 
    test of Post ECS, deputy postmaster general Coughlin described the 
    service as ``a logical evolution of our original charter to provide 
    seamless communications to our customers.'' U.S. Postal Service Press 
    Release No. 98044, May 28, 1998 (attached to answer of UPS in 
    opposition to motion to dismiss as exhibit C). The Postal Service 
    promotional material included as exhibit A to the complaint 
    characterizes Post ECS as ``the 21st-century document-delivery system 
    that is superior to current delivery options[,]'' and states that it 
    ``combines the advantages of couriers, fax and the Internet with the 
    protection of the United States Postal Service `` .'' With general 
    regard to the electronic commerce services it is developing, the 
    Service has stated that it is doing so ``through an extension of its 
    traditional paper mail services'' to ``enable and enhance the 
    development of commerce by electronic means.'' It also stated that such 
    services ``will provide security and integrity to electronic 
    correspondence and transactions, giving them attributes usually 
    associated with First-Class Mail.'' [Citation omitted.] Similarly, the 
    recent General Accounting Office report on new postal products states 
    that the Postal Service ``views its entry into the electronic commerce 
    market as an extension of its core business--the delivery of 
    traditional mail. According to service officials, electronic mail has 
    the same attributes as traditional mail.'' Report on New Postal 
    Products, GAO/GGD-99-15 (Nov. 25, 1998) at 36-37.
        These and similar statements the Postal Service has made in other 
    proceedings call into question its position that Post ECS necessarily 
    constitutes a ``non-postal'' service simply because of its all-
    electronic configuration.17 In light of these 
    characterizations of Post ECS, together with the theoretical 
    considerations previously discussed, in the Commission's opinion 
    dismissing the complaint on the basis of the Postal Service's claim of 
    its ``non-postal'' character would not be justified. However, the 
    Commission is not prepared at this time to declare that Post ECS is, or 
    is not, postal in character, or to what extent Post ECS transactions 
    are subject to the Commission's mail classification and ratemaking 
    authority under subchapter II of title 39, chapter 36. This 
    determination is made without prejudice to the Postal Service's 
    position that Post ECS is a ``nonpostal'' service, and is not intended 
    to preclude an ample opportunity for all parties to present additional 
    evidence and argument on this issue during the proceedings in this 
    docket.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \17\ In docket no. MC98-1, when Postal Service witness Garvey 
    was asked whether a portion of his testimony meant that he regarded 
    the bits of electronic data that would ultimately become printed 
    messages as pieces of mail, he replied: ``In my mind I think of them 
    as mail pieces.'' Tr. 
    7/1718.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Proceedings To Consider Complaint
    
        In addition to the somewhat abstract questions the instant 
    complaint poses concerning the postal character of Post ECS, it also 
    raises more concrete questions regarding the potential effects of the 
    service--together with its currently free rate--on the rest of the 
    postal system. The Commission undertook to obtain some general 
    information bearing on these questions in order No. 1229, which asked 
    in question 3 whether Post ECS is being offered as a substitute for 
    Express Mail or any other service currently provided by the Postal 
    Service, and to what extent U.S. companies licensed to use Post ECS 
    have substituted use of the service for Express Mail or other service 
    they previously used.
        The Postal Service response stated that, ``Post ECS lacks certain 
    characteristics to make it a direct substitute of Express Mail or any 
    other hardcopy postal service[,]'' and gave examples of purported 
    deficiencies. It also said the Service has no quantified data regarding 
    substitution. Postal Service Partial Response to Order No. 1229 at 5. 
    The Commission finds this response to be, on the whole, inconclusive, 
    and believes that further inquiry is warranted into the extent to which 
    the provision of an electronic service such as Post ECS could affect 
    Postal Service revenues generally and the volumes of higher-priority 
    subclasses such as Express Mail and Priority Mail in particular.
        For all the above reasons, the Commission has determined under 
    section 86 of the rules of practice that a formal proceeding pursuant 
    to 39 U.S.C. 3624, with an opportunity for hearing, should be held in 
    this docket. This process will enable the complainant and other 
    interested parties to adduce additional facts through discovery and to 
    make evidentiary presentations, as well as providing the Postal Service 
    an opportunity to present its response.
        As noted earlier, the Postal Service has asked the Commission to 
    reconsider whether information responsive to question 4(a) posed in 
    order no. 1229--some of which allegedly is commercially sensitive--
    should be provided at all, or only in redacted form. The Commission 
    took no action with respect to these materials in order No. 1230. 
    Complainant subsequently filed a motion for leave to conduct discovery 
    on the issues raised by the Postal Service's motion to dismiss the 
    complaint, but only ``as a protective matter,'' should the Commission 
    not agree with UPS that available information militates against 
    dismissal. UPS motion for leave to conduct discovery, March 17, 1999. 
    Inasmuch as the ultimate relevance of potentially sensitive documents 
    responsive to question 4(a) to issues to be resolved in this proceeding 
    cannot be assessed at this point, the Commission will not direct 
    production of these materials now. However, this determination is not 
    intended to foreclose any legitimate discovery requests directed toward 
    these materials or related information.
        In order to develop a procedural schedule for this docket, 
    complainant is directed to provide a statement, due 10 days from the 
    issuance of this order, estimating the amount of time it will require 
    to develop and file a case-in-chief. The Commission will thereafter 
    issue a procedural schedule and special rules of practice, if any.
    
    It is ordered:
    
        1. The Postal Service's motion to dismiss, filed Nov. 5, 1998, is 
    denied.
        2. Proceedings in conformity with 39 U.S.C. 3624 shall be held in 
    this matter.
        3. The Commission will sit en banc in this proceeding.
    
    [[Page 28022]]
    
        4. The motion for intervention by CAUUC, filed on Oct. 27, 1998, 
    and the motion of the Association of Online Professionals to intervene 
    as a limited participator, filed Dec. 21, 1998, are granted.
        5. Ted P. Gerarden, director of the Commission's office of the 
    consumer advocate, is designated to represent the interests of the 
    general public in docket no. C99-1.
        6. Complainant shall provide a statement, due May 13, 1999, 
    estimating the amount of time it will require to develop and file a 
    direct case in this proceeding.
        7. The Secretary of the Commission shall arrange for publication of 
    this notice and order in the Federal Register in a manner consistent 
    with applicable requirements.
    
        Authority: 39 U.S.C. 3662.
    
        Dated: May 19, 1999.
    Cyril J. Pittack,
    Acting Secretary.
    [FR Doc. 99-13042 Filed 5-21-99; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7710-FW-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
05/24/1999
Department:
Postal Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Action:
Notice of new complaint docket.
Document Number:
99-13042
Dates:
See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for dates.
Pages:
28015-28022 (8 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. C99-1, Order No. 1239
PDF File:
99-13042.pdf