[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 102 (Friday, May 26, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27992-27993]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-12970]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-334 and 50-412]
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
In the matter of Duquesne Light Company; Ohio Edison Company;
Pennsylvania Power Company; The Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company; and The Toledo Edison Company.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is
considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its
regulations to Facility Operating Licenses No. DPR-66 and NPF-73,
issued to Duquesne Light Company, et al. (the licensee), for operation
of the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in
Beaver County, Pennsylvania.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's
application dated February 8, 1995, for exemption from certain
requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage.'' The exemption would allow implementation of a hand geometry
biometric system for site access control such that combined picture
badges/keycards for certain non-employees can be taken offsite.
The Need for the Proposed Action
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), the licensee shall
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and
security organization.
Paragraph (1) of 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,''
specifies that ``licensee shall control all points of personnel and
vehicle access into a protected area.'' Paragraph (5) of 10 CFR
73.55(d) specifies that ``A numbered picture badge identification
system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to
protected areas without escort.'' Paragraph (5) of 10 CFR 73.55(d) also
states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e.,
contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort
provided the individual ``receives a picture badge upon entrance into
the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected
area * * *.''
Currently, employee and contractor combined identification badges/
keycards are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and
exit from the protected areas of the Beaver Valley Power Station site.
Station security personnel are required to maintain control of the
badges while the individuals are offsite. This practice has been in
effect at the Beaver Valley Power Station since the operating license
was issued. Security personnel retain each identification badge/
keycard, when not in use by the authorized individual, within
appropriately designed storage receptacles inside a bullet-resistance
enclosure. An individual who meets the access authorization
requirements is issued an individual picture identification card/
keycard which allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station.
While entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized
individual is ``screened'' by the required detection equipment and by
the issuing security officer. Having received the badge/keycard, the
individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts the badge/keycard
into the card reader and passes through the turnstile which unlocks if
the badge/keycard is valid.
This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel
are required to verify badge/keycard issuance, ensure badge/keycard
retrieval, and maintain the badges/keycards in orderly storage until
the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit
employees to remove their badges from the site, but an exemption from
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their
badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
The Commission has completed its evaluation of the licensee's
application. Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to
gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their
hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge/keycard number. Since
the hand geometry is unique to each individual [[Page 27993]] and its
application in the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized
use of a badge/keycard, the requested exemption would allow employees
and contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the
protected area. The process of verifying badge/keycard issuance,
ensuring badge/keycard retrieval, and maintaining badges/keycards,
could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure would
remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment and
provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The security
officer responsible for the last access control function (controlling
admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated within a
bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her ability to
respond or to summon assistance.
Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present
verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's
identity. Unlike the combined photograph identification badge/keycard,
hand geometry is nontransferable. During the initial access
authorization or registration process, hand measurements are recorded
and the template is stored for subsequent use in the identity
verification process required for entry into the protected area.
Authorized individuals insert their badge/keycard into the card reader
and the biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The
unique features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the
template previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately
granted based on the degree to which the characteristics of the image
match those of the ``signature'' template.
Since both the badge/keycard and hand geometry would be necessary
for access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide
for a positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge/keycard
by an individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not
enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.
The access process will continue to be under the observation of
security personnel. The system of identification badges/keycards will
continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access to
protected areas without escorts. Badges/keycards will continue to be
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected area. Addition
of a hand geometry biometrics system will provide a significant
contribution to effective implementation of the security plan at the
site.
The change will not increase the probability or consequences of
accidents, no changes are being made in the types of any effluents that
may be released offsite, and there is no significant increase in the
allowable individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there are no significant
radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed
action does involve features located entirely within the restricted
area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. It does not effect nonradiological
plant effluents and has no other environmental impact. Accordingly, the
Commission concludes that there are no significant nonradiological
environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable
environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any
alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be
evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff
considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application
would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The
environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternative action
are similar.
Alternative Use of Resources
This action does not involve the use of any resources not
previously considered in the Final Environmental Statements for the
Beaver Valley Power Station Units Nos. 1 and 2.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy, on April 18, 1995, the staff
consulted with the Pennsylvania State official, Robert C. Maiers of the
Bureau of Radiation Protection. Department of Environmental Resources,
regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State
official had no comments.
Finding of No Significant Impact
Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes
that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has
determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
For further details with respect to the proposed action, see the
licensee's letter dated February 8, 1995, which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document room located at the B.F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin
Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of May 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John F. Stolz,
Director, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Reactor Projects-I/II,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-12970 Filed 5-25-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
