[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 102 (Thursday, May 28, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29297-29300]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-14010]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory: Determination of Vision Impairment
Among Locomotive Engineers
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 98-1 addressing the vision
standards of certified locomotive engineers in order to reduce the risk
of accidents arising from vision impaired engineers.
[[Page 29298]]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Conklin, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street S.W., Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone: 202-632-
3372); Alan H. Nagler, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-11, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590
(telephone: 202-632-3187); or Mark H. McKeon, Regional Administrator,
55 Broadway, Cambridge, MA 02142 (telephone: 617-494-2243).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: After a tragic 1987 accident and in response
to the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1988, FRA adopted rules
establishing a program for qualifying locomotive engineers to assure
the uniformity and adequacy of the qualifications standards. FRA's
rule, which became effective in 1991, establishes requirements for
testing the visual acuity of individuals who want to be certified as
locomotive engineers. In the ongoing effort to monitor compliance with
and the effectiveness of its existing regulatory program, FRA has been
examining available data concerning administration of this aspect of
the certification program. The data suggest that there is room for
improving the rule's existing provisions concerning the testing and
evaluation of visual acuity.
FRA also has received a number of recommendations for change to the
rules concerning the qualification and certification of locomotive
engineers. The most recent recommendation was received on May 14, 1998,
when FRA was presented with a recommendation from the Railroad Safety
Advisory Committee (RSAC) that FRA consider changes to the current
provisions concerning the testing and evaluation of visual acuity.
RSAC was established to provide recommendations and advice to the
Administrator on development of FRA's railroad safety regulatory
program, including issuance of new regulations, review and revision of
existing regulations, and identification of non-regulatory alternatives
for improvement of railroad safety. RSAC recommendations carry
considerable weight since RSAC is comprised of 48 representatives from
27 member organizations, including railroads, labor groups, equipment
manufacturers, state government groups, public associations, and two
associate non-voting representatives from Canada and Mexico.
The May 14 RSAC recommendation echoes an earlier recommendation
from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) based on the
NTSB's March 25, 1997 report of its investigation into a fatal
collision between two New Jersey transit commuter trains near Secaucus,
New Jersey. See NTSB's Railroad Accident Report--Near Head-On Collision
and Derailment of Two New Jersey Transit Commuter Trains near Secaucus,
New Jersey, February 9, 1996 (NTSB/RAR-97/01).
Explanation of Current Requirements on Testing and Evaluation of
Visual Acuity
FRA rules require each railroad to test the vision of every
locomotive engineer when initially certified and at periodic intervals
of no more than every three years. Each railroad's program must include
criteria and procedures implementing how the railroad will ensure that
each locomotive engineer will have adequate distant visual acuity and
the ability to recognize and distinguish between the colors of signals.
The rule requires that a railroad have written confirmation from a
licensed medical doctor that the person being certified meets the FRA
visual acuity standards. See 49 CFR part 240 at Secs. 240.121, 240.207.
The rule gives railroad's and railroad medical examiners
considerable latitude when conducting visual acuity testing and
evaluation. During the period the rule has been in effect, the latitude
permitted has generated questions about a number of matters. These
include questions about the use of chromatic lenses; accounting for the
variations in railroad signals when a signal is displaying the color
yellow; the duty of engineers who rely on contact lenses to have a pair
of corrective eyeglasses available when on duty; the obligation of
certified locomotive engineers to alert the railroad when the engineer
has reason to believe that his or her vision has deteriorated to the
extent that the person may no longer meet the acuity requirements; the
duty of each medical examiner to have a clearly articulated basis for
his or her decision that a person who lacks the specified level of
acuity can nonetheless safely operate a locomotive; and the ability to
use a variety of testing methods, including whether it is proper to
conduct color vision tests by displaying yarn or other fabrics.
Of these questions, the most vexing involves the issue of employing
appropriate testing of persons to detect color vision impairment. FRA's
expectation was that the physicians who would be designated as railroad
medical examiners would be trained to competently administer color
vision examinations. Thus, FRA did not anticipate that it would be
necessary to specify for the medical examiners the test procedures to
be employed when testing for whether a person meets the standards
specified in this rule.
That assumption has been called into question under tragic
circumstances. It appears that if the current rule had been implemented
as FRA expected, the rule would have been adequate to prevent the NJT
accident. For example, the NTSB report found that the medical history
of the suspect engineer showed that he had been administered an
acceptable test annually by the same NJT contract physician since at
least 1985. For nine straight years, the engineer scored a perfect
score on his color vision test. However, the NTSB report also found
that beginning in 1994, the test results showed a deterioration of the
engineer's ability to distinguish among some colors and, in February
1995, one year prior to the accident, the engineer's test scores caused
him to be classified as having a moderate color vision handicap. As a
consequence of this low test score, the physician said that he gave the
engineer the Dvorine Nomenclature Test to further evaluate the
engineer's color vision. NTSB reported that the testing protocol states
that the nomenclature test is not a test of color discrimination
ability, since many color blind individuals learn to name the colors
correctly by their brightness instead of their hue. Reliance on this
testing methodology suggests the physician failed to understand that
the purpose of the Dvorine Nomenclature Test is to see whether the
patient can identify the names of the colors--not to test color vision.
In fact, the Dvorine Nomenclature Test is merely a preliminary step in
conducting the Dvorine--Second edition color vision test and is often
skipped because most patients are presumed to be able to identify the
names of the colors. Thus, it is likely that this accident was
preventable if the physician had responded differently to the pattern
of deterioration and had used a sound approach to measuring the
person's ability to distinguish colors.
RSAC'S Recommended Changes to FRA'S Rules on Testing and Evaluation
of Visual Acuity
FRA's goal is to prevent train collisions such as the one that
occurred at Secaucus. Amending the existing regulation, so that
railroad medical examiners are limited to the application of prescribed
acceptable tests, will help achieve this goal. While the RSAC has
recommended modification of the
[[Page 29299]]
regulation, issuance of a final rule could take a substantial period of
time during which it is possible that the circumstances surrounding the
medical evaluation process of the Secaucus accident could be
replicated. FRA has decided that the RSAC recommendations for change on
this issue should be widely disseminated since these recommendations
reflect the current best thinking of the regulated community. Broad
sharing of information concerning the views of the advisory committee
can be of assistance to medical examiners who are responsible for
administering the existing regulation.
Based on past practice, FRA anticipates that the agency will accept
the RSAC recommendation that FRA issue a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) to revise the locomotive engineer certification regulation. The
publication of this safety advisory should not be viewed as FRA
endorsement of any particular aspect of the RSAC recommendations nor
prejudging the eventual course of action which FRA may follow after
carefully reviewing the RSAC recommendation. This safety advisory is
intended to encourage all parties to carefully examine their current
practices and, where appropriate, modify those practices to further
reduce the risk of an accident or injury.
FRA anticipates that, when an NPRM may be issued, these and other
RSAC recommendations addressing locomotive engineer certification will
be the subject of public comment. These comments will be considered in
the development of the final rule. As an example, even among members of
the advisory committee who helped shape the consensus recommendations,
FRA understands that some members would prefer to see that locomotive
engineers be banned from wearing chromatic lenses during any color
vision testing and any operation of a train or locomotive. This issue
will be the subject of further discussion following completion of the
public comment period.
Recommendation Details
RSAC Recommended That
a. FRA create an obligation for each certified locomotive engineer
to notify his or her employing railroad's medical department or, if no
such department exists, an appropriate railroad official, if the
person's best correctable vision or hearing has deteriorated to the
extent that the person no longer meets one or more of the prescribed
vision or hearing standards or requirements of 49 CFR part 240;
b. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners
have a current copy of 49 CFR part 240, including all appendices, and
request that their medical examiners review the medical requirements;
c. Each railroad should remind all of their medical examiners who
perform testing pursuant to 49 CFR 240.121 that the visual acuity tests
should be conducted in accordance with the directions supplied by the
manufacturer of the chosen test instruments and any American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) standards that are applicable;
d. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners
know that no person shall be allowed to wear chromatic lenses during an
initial test of the person's color vision; the initial test is one
conducted in accordance with one of the accepted tests. Chromatic
lenses may be worn in accordance with any subsequent testing if
permitted by the medical examiner and the railroad;
e. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners
know that railroad signals do not always occur in the same sequence and
that testing procedures must take that fact into account;
f. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners
know that ``yellow signals'' do not always appear to be the same;
g. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners
know that it is not acceptable to use ``yarn'' or other materials to
conduct a simple test to determine whether the certification candidate
has the requisite vision;
h. Each railroad should require that its medical examiners retest
and further evaluate any locomotive engineer who reports a
deteriorating vision condition or, upon request, an examinee who fails
to meet the rule's articulated vision standards. The railroad's medical
examiner will be expected to review all pertinent information and,
under some circumstances, must condition certification on any special
restrictions the medical examiner determines in writing to be
necessary, e.g., restrict an examinee who does not meet the criteria
from operating a locomotive or train at night, during adverse weather
conditions, or outside of a yard. This decision should not be made
until after consultation with one of the railroad's designated
supervisors of locomotive engineers;
i. Each railroad should ensure that all of their medical examiners
know that engineers who wear contact lenses should have good tolerance
to the lenses and should be instructed to have a pair of corrective
glasses available when on duty; and
j. Each railroad should ensure that when a person is tested
pursuant to 49 CFR 240.121, the person has the ability to recognize and
distinguish between the colors of railroad signals as demonstrated by
successfully completing one of the tests specified in the table below.
Each railroad should clearly explain to the medical examiners
conducting such tests that the key is being able to distinguish among
railroad signals; without such a clarification, medical examiners
unfamiliar with the railroad environment might focus their attention on
colors that do not appear as railroad signals.
k. Each railroad should ensure that medical examiners conducting
tests to determine visual acuity adhere to the following guidance when
administering the vision acuity requirements of 49 CFR 240.121 and
240.207. Select a testing methodology only from the following testing
protocols which are deemed acceptable testing methods for determining
whether a person has the ability to recognize and distinguish among the
colors used as signals in the railroad industry. The acceptable test
methods are shown in the left hand column and the criteria that should
be employed to determine whether a person has failed the particular
testing protocol are shown in the right hand column. Successful
completion of one of these tests should be required, but requiring
successful completion of multiple tests is discouraged since it would
most likely be redundant.
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Accepted tests Failure criteria
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Pseudoisochromatic Plate Tests
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American Optical Company 1965....... 5 or more errors on plates 1-15.
AOC--Hardy-Rand-Ritter plates-- Any error on plates 1-6 (plates 1-4 are for demonstration--test plate 1 is
second edition. actually plate 5 in book).
Dvorine--Second edition............. 3 or more errors on plates 1-15.
[[Page 29300]]
Ishihara (14 plate)................. 2 or more errors on plates 1-11.
Ishihara (16 plate)................. 2 or more errors on plates 1-8.
Ishihara (24 plate)................. 3 or more errors on plates 1-15.
Ishihara (38 plate)................. 4 or more errors on plates 1-21.
Richmond Plates 1983................ 5 or more errors on plates 1-15.
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Multifunction Vision Tester
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Keystone Orthoscope................. Any error.
OPTEC 2000.......................... Any error.
Titmus Vision Tester................ Any error.
Titmus II Vision Tester............. Any error.
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Donald M. Itzkoff,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 98-14010 Filed 5-27-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
