96-13793. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing  

  • [Federal Register Volume 61, Number 106 (Friday, May 31, 1996)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 27371-27373]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 96-13793]
    
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    
    [Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318]
    
    
    Baltimore Gas and Electric Company; Notice of Consideration of 
    Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
    Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
    Hearing
    
        The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
    considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. 
    DPR-53 and DPR-69, issued to Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE) 
    for operation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 
    located in Calvert County, Maryland.
        The proposed amendment would replace the mechanical stops in the 
    inlet control valves of the containment air coolers (CACs) with a 
    variable flow controller for the inlet control valve.
        The licensee requests that this proposed amendment be considered as 
    exigent under the criteria of 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6). The licensee states 
    that they could not have foreseen the need for this request prior to 
    this time. This modification is the result of a substantial proactive 
    effort in dealing with the concerns that BGE have with their Service 
    Water (SRW) System. The history of BGE's activities concerning the SRW 
    System is given in Attachment (1) of the proposed amendment. This 
    particular modification was determined to be necessary after BGE 
    obtained data from a site stream monitor that BGE had installed to 
    measure the rate of microfouling in the SRW heat exchangers. The data 
    from the side stream monitor was not analyzed and available to BGE 
    until January 17, 1996. By mid-February, BGE had determined that the 
    installation of flow controllers on the CAC inlet valves was necessary 
    to offset the effects of the larger than expected microfouling. BGE has 
    committed the necessary money and resources to install this 
    modification before the summer. Design and procurement activities were 
    done in parallel. About mid-April, the engineering was to the stage 
    that work could begin on the safety evaluation (SE) required by 10 CFR 
    50.59. Refinements to the engineering continued even as the SE was 
    being developed. On May 24, 1996, the Plant General Manager determined 
    that an unreviewed safety question existed for this modification. This 
    request has been submitted as soon as practical after the determination 
    was made.
        It is important for BGE to perform this modification on the 
    schedule set out a number of months ago. To prevent operational and 
    safety impacts, this modification must be installed before the hot 
    summer weather causes the Chesapeake Bay water temperature to exceed 
    the SRW temperature limit. Historically, the Chesapeake Bay water 
    temperature has approached or exceeded the current limit by the last 
    week in June. As noted above, whenever the SRW heat exchangers are 
    removed from service for cleaning, some safety-related equipment is 
    rendered inoperable. It is important to minimize the amount of time BGE 
    is in these more vulnerable conditions (with some safety-related 
    equipment out-of-service). Additionally, BGE believes that reducing the 
    power output from both units significantly during a time of high demand 
    (high summer temperatures) is not in the best interest of the public.
        Therefore, given the need to act quickly, and the determination 
    that this change does not represent a significant hazard, BGE requests 
    that this amendment be considered under exigent circumstances as 
    described in 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6).
        Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
    will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
    amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
        Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
    exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
    request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
    Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
    the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
    involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
    accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
    or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
    or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
    required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
    the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
    below:
    
        1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability 
    or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
        The proposed modification is the result of our need to reduce 
    the peak post-accident heat load on the service water (SRW) heat 
    exchangers. It will replace the mechanical stops currently on the 
    control valves which admit SRW into the containment air coolers 
    (CACs) with a flow controller loop. By throttling the SRW to the 
    CACs, the heat load on the SRW heat exchangers is reduced during the 
    early phases of an accident. The increased accuracy of throttling 
    would allow the SRW system to perform its safety function during 
    periods of high ultimate heat sink temperatures. During the summer 
    months, the Chesapeake Bay water (the ultimate heat sink for the 
    units) heats up substantially during some parts of the day. At 
    times, these high temperatures could exceed the current expected 
    limits for the heat exchanger operation. With the more accurately 
    throttled valves, the effect of high ultimate heat sink temperatures 
    is reduced. The modification will ensure that the SRW heat 
    exchangers are capable of meeting their intended safety function up 
    to the maximum expected bay water temperature.
        The safety function of the SRW System is to provide cooling to 
    the CACs and the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) following a 
    design basis accident. With this proposed modification in place, the 
    SRW System will continue to meet this safety function. All of the 
    failure mechanisms for this modification have previously been 
    evaluated and were found acceptable. However, because the proposed 
    modification may have a higher probability of malfunction for which 
    compensatory actions may not adequately control the consequence of 
    failure, the probability of a malfunction of systems important to 
    safety may be slightly increased, and this modification has been 
    determined to be an unreviewed safety question.
        The single failure of the flow controllers would not be an 
    initiator to an accident. The system provides cooling to safety-
    related equipment following an accident. It supports accident 
    mitigation functions. Therefore, this proposed modification does not 
    significantly increase the probability of an accident previously 
    evaluated.
        The proposed modification will enhance the ability of the SRW 
    system to respond to accident conditions under a wider range of
    
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    environmental conditions (i.e., higher ultimate heat sink 
    temperatures). Malfunctions of the flow controller have been 
    evaluated and determined to result in consequences that are no more 
    severe than those previously approved. A failure of the flow 
    controller could allow the valve to fail in a position that does not 
    allow the SRW System to perform its safety function. Since the SRW 
    System is redundant on each unit, a single failure of one of the 
    flow controllers would not prevent the other redundant portion of 
    the system from performing its safety function. The consequences of 
    a single failure of the SRW System have been previously analyzed and 
    these consequences do not change due to this modification.
        Therefore, this proposed modification does not involve a 
    significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
    accident previously evaluated.
        2. Would not create the possibility of a new or different type 
    of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
        The SRW System provides cooling water to the CACs and EDGs. The 
    purpose of the components which are affected by this modification is 
    to mitigate accidents. The single failure of the flow controllers 
    would not be an initiator to an accident. This modification does not 
    change the equipment's function, or significantly alter the method 
    of operating the equipment to be modified. The system will continue 
    to operate in essentially the same manner as before the modification 
    was done.
        Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
    of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously 
    evaluated.
        3. Would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
    safety.
        The margin of safety is reduced for this proposed modification, 
    but not significantly. If the CAC inlet valve fails to open, the CAC 
    on that train would continue to perform its safety function. 
    However, the EDG on that train would receive cooling water above the 
    design temperature and may fail to perform its safety function. The 
    redundant EDG would provide adequate electricity to continue to 
    perform its safety function. If the CAC inlet valve fails in the 
    closed position, the EDG would continue to function; however, the 
    affected CAC would not rceive adequate cooling water. The other 
    three CACs would provide adequate cooling for the containment. Also, 
    the Containment Spray System provides additional containment cooling 
    as a backup to the CACs. If the CAC inlet valve fails to throttle 
    properly, the consequences are bounded by the other two cases 
    discussed above.
        Adding a more complex component which could fail and result in a 
    failure of the SRW System does reduce the margin of safety, but not 
    significantly because: (1) The proposed flow controller is very 
    reliable and not likely to fail; (2) the other redundant CAC and EDG 
    are available to mitigate the consequence of an accident should 
    there be a single failure of the flow controller.
        Therefore, this modification does not significantly reduce the 
    margin of safety.
    
        The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
    this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
    satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
    amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
        The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
    determination. Any comments received within 15 days after the date of 
    publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
    determination.
        Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
    expiration of the 15-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
    change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely 
    way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
    the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
    the 15-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that 
    the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
    determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
    Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
    Register a notice of issuance. The Commission expects that the need to 
    take this action will occur very infrequently.
        Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules 
    Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and 
    Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear 
    Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the 
    publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. 
    Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint 
    North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 
    4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be 
    examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L 
    Street, NW., Washington, DC.
        The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
    intervene is discussed below.
        By July 1, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with 
    respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating 
    license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
    proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
    must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
    intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
    shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
    for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
    persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
    available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
    Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
    document room located at the Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, 
    Maryland 20678. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to 
    intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic 
    Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the 
    Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on 
    the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic 
    Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an 
    appropriate order.
        As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
    shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
    the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
    the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
    why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
    following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
    Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
    the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
    proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
    entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
    should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
    the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
    who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
    admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
    the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
    scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
    the specificity requirements described above.
        Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
    scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
    the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
    which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
    consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
    raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
    brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
    statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
    contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
    contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
    to those specific sources and documents of which the
    
    [[Page 27373]]
    
    petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to 
    establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide 
    sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the 
    applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be 
    limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under 
    consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would 
    entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a 
    supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least 
    one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
        Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
    subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
    and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
    hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
    examine witnesses.
        If the amendment is issued before the expiration of the 30-day 
    hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the 
    issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is 
    requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the 
    hearing is held.
        If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
    no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
    amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
    request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
    of the amendment.
        If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
    significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
    before the issuance of any amendment.
        A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
    be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
    Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and 
    Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
    Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
    by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of 
    the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so 
    inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 
    1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union 
    operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the 
    following message addressed to Jocelyn A. Mitchell: petitioner's name 
    and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and 
    publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A 
    copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General 
    Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, 
    and to Jay E. Silbert, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 
    2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037, attorney for the licensee.
        Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
    petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
    be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
    officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
    petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
    factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1) (i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
        For further details with respect to this action, see the 
    application for amendment dated May 28, 1996, which is available for 
    public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
    Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
    document room, located at the Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, 
    Maryland 20678.
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29 day of May 1996.
    
        For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Alexander W. Dromerick,
    Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I-1, Division of Reactor 
    Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
    [FR Doc. 96-13793 Filed 5-30-96; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
    
    

Document Information

Published:
05/31/1996
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
96-13793
Pages:
27371-27373 (3 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-318
PDF File:
96-13793.pdf