[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 86 (Thursday, May 4, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 22079-22081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-11030]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362]
Southern California Edison, et al.; San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station, Units 2 and 3, Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has acted on a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206
received by Ted Dougherty, dated August 10, 1994, for the San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3.
The Petitioner requested that the NRC cause the shutdown and
dismantlement of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station because of
concerns regarding (1) the vulnerability of the San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station to earthquakes because of nearby fault lines and (2)
a newspaper article concerning the threat of vehicle bombs and the
Commission's recent rule requiring nuclear generating plants to install
antiterrorist barriers within 18 months.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
determined that the request should be denied for the reasons stated in
the ``Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-06), the complete
text of which follows this notice, and which is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, and at the local
public document room located at the University of California Main
Library, P.O. Box 19577, Irvine, California 92713.
A copy of this Decision has been filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this
regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on
its own motion, institutes review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of April 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I. Introduction
On August 10, 1994, Mr. Ted Dougherty (the Petitioner) submitted a
letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC)
requesting a shutdown of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
(SONGS). The Commission determined to act on this request pursuant to
10 CFR 2.206. The request was based on concerns regarding the
vulnerability of SONGS to earthquakes because of the existence of
nearby fault lines, and concerns regarding the defensibility of SONGS
to a terrorist threat.
On September 22, 1994, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition
had been referred to this Office for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of
the Commission's regulations. I also informed the Petitioner that the
NRC would take appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding
the Petitioner's request.
My Decision in this matter follows.
II. Background
The Petitioner provided as basis for the request (1) a letter to
the Governor of California wherein the Petitioner expressed concerns
regarding the vulnerability of SONGS to earthquakes and (2) a Los
Angeles Times article concerning the threat of vehicle bombs and the
Commission's recent rule requiring nuclear generating plants to install
antiterrorist barriers within 18 months.
III. Discussion
A. Vulnerability of SONGS to Earthquakes
The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is vulnerable to a deep ocean
quake as well as a magnitude 8 earthquake (or greater) on the Newport-
Inglewood fault. He asserts that human error following an earthquake of
this magnitude could result in failure of the plant's safety systems to
protect the plant, thereby resulting in a meltdown.
Before licensing SONGS (and all nuclear plants), the NRC reviewed
the design of the facility including its ability to withstand the
effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and
hurricanes without loss of capability to perform the safety functions.
Appendix A (Criterion 2) to 10 CFR part 50 states that the design basis
for the nuclear power plant should reflect the most severe of the
natural phenomena that have been historically [[Page 22080]] reported
for the site and surrounding area, the combinations of the effects of
normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural
phenomena, and the importance of the safety functions to be performed.
Appendix A to 10 CFR part 100, ``Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria
for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Section III(C), requires that the nuclear
power plant's design bases for earthquakes be determined through
evaluation of the geologic and seismic history of the nuclear power
plant site and surrounding region. The purpose of this determination is
to estimate the magnitude of the strongest earthquake that might affect
the site of a nuclear power plant during its operating lifetime. the
earthquake postulated for the seismic design of a plant, called the
Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), defines the maximum ground motion for
which certain nuclear power plant structures, systems and components
necessary for safe operation and shutdown are designed to remain
functional (e.g., for decay heat removal after the reactor is
shutdown).
The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) site had
undergone geologic and seismic investigations and reviews prior to
issuance of the construction permits including surveys performed by the
applicant, the United States Geological Survey, the California Division
of Mines and Geology, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. The findings of these investigations were reviewed
extensively by the staff and were litigated extensively in proceedings
concerning the issuance of the construction permits\1\ and operating
licenses\2\ for SONGS Units 2 and 3.
\1\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-73-36, 6 AEC 929 (1973), and
ALAB-248, 8 AEC 957 (1974).
\2\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61 (1982);
ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688 (1982); ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346 (1983); and see
Carstens v NRC, 742 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied 471 U.S.
1136 (1985) (the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's granting
of the operating licenses for SONGS Units 2 and 3, noting the
voluminous record and substantial evidence supporting the seismic
review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is vulnerable to a deep ocean
quake. There are a number of offshore faults in the coastal waters off
of Southern California. Of greatest concern to the San Onofre site is
an offshore structure beginning with the Newport-Inglewood Zone of
Deformation near Long Beach, passing the site about 8 kilometers
offshore and extending south to the San Diego area as the Rose Canyon
Fault Zone.\3\ This entire structure is known as the Offshore Zone of
Deformation (OZD).\4\ The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board determined,
during the 1982 operating license proceeding, that, based on historic
earthquake data, the distinctive geology of the area, and prevailing
stresses in the earth's crust, the controlling feature for San Onofre
is the OZD.\5\
\3\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61, at 68
(1982).
\4\Id.
\5\Id., at 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is vulnerable to a magnitude 8 or
greater earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood Fault. The largest
earthquake known to have occurred on that fault is the 1933 Long Beach
earthquake which was a magnitude 6.3.\6\ Testimony presented during the
operating license proceeding concluded that the features of the OZD,
its geologic strain rate, regional tectonic setting, and absence of
extensive and/or through-going fault rupture in near-surface strata
along much of the OZD, all support earthquakes of less than about a
magnitude 7.\7\ In addition, the NRC staff concluded, based on an
evaluation of historical seismicity of the OZD and an evaluation of the
fault parameters, that a maximum magnitude of 7.0 is based upon a
reasonable and conservative interpretation of all available geological
and seismological information.\8\ The Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board\9\ as well as the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board\10\
concluded that a magnitude 7 earthquake on the OZD is appropriately
conservative.\11\ The Petitioner has not provided any basis to support
the likelihood of magnitude 8 or greater earthquake on the Newport-
Inglewood Fault or call into question the conclusion of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board.
\6\Id., at 104.
\7\Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 709 n. 40 (1982).
\8\NUREG-0712, ``Safety Evaluation Report Related to the
Operation of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3,''
Section 2.5.2.3.4, February 1981.
\9\See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61, at 86
(1982).
\10\Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 364-65
(1983).
\11\The Petitioner also provided a scenario of the effects on
the Los Angeles area of a magnitude 6 earthquake on the Newport-
Inglewood Fault followed by a magnitude 8 earthquake. The Petitioner
has failed to provide any basis to support this scenario. The staff
reviewed this scenario and determined that, based on the
investigations and reviews discussed above, it has no basis in
scientific theory or physical possibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Petitioner expresses concern that panic caused by an earthquake
could result in a meltdown due to human error. The ability of a nuclear
power plant to resist the forces generated by the ground motion during
an earthquake is incorporated in the design and construction of the
plant. Industry codes and practices that govern the design and
construction of nuclear power plant structures and components are far
more stringent than those used for residential and commercial
buildings. As a result, nuclear power plants are able to resist
earthquake ground motions well beyond their design bases and well
beyond the ground motion that would result in damage to commercial
buildings.
As a safety requirement, nuclear power plants have strong ground
motion seismic instruments in and near the sites. If the ground motion
at a site exceeds a specified level, which is one-half or less of the
Safe Shutdown Earthquake, the plant is required to shut down (10 CFR
100, Appendix A, V, (a)(2)). As a defense-in-depth design feature,
SONGS has a automatic seismic scram system to shut down the reactors
when the ground motion exceeds a conservatively selected threshold
value.\12\ Prior to resuming operations following plant shutdown as the
result of an earthquake, the licensee is required to demonstrate to the
Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those plant
features necessary for continued safe operation.
\12\NUREG-0741, ``Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station Unit 2,'' Table 3.3.1 February 1982; and NUREG-
0952, ``Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station Unit 3,'', Table 3.3.1, November 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, based on exhaustive seismic and geologic investigations
performed for the SONGS site, which has been subjected to extensive
litigation, the seismic design basis for the plant is reasonably
conservative.
The Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate basis for his
concern regarding the seismic adequacy of SONGS and, accordingly, has
not raised any substantial health or safety issue that would call into
question the safe operation of SONGS.
B. Threat of Vehicle Bombs
The Petitioner asserts that SONGS is not defensible from
terrorists. The Petitioner bases this assertion on a newspaper article
(Los Angeles Times, August 4, 1994) concerning the threat of vehicle
bombs at nuclear plants and the Commission's recent rule requiring
nuclear plants to install anti-terrorist barriers within 18
months. [[Page 22081]]
The Commission's regulations regarding physical protection of
nuclear plants are set forth in 10 CFR part 73. The regulations require
a physical protection system designed to protect against acts of
radiological sabotage or theft of special nuclear material based on
certain design basis threats. The design basis threats for radiological
sabotage defined in 10 CFR part 73.1(a)(1) include ``a determined,
violent, external assault.'' The potential threat posed by malevolent
use of vehicles as part of a violent external assault and the need to
protect against it, were the subject of detailed analysis before the
NRC published its regulations on design basis threat. However, the use
of a land vehicle bomb was not initially included in the design basis
threat for radiological sabotage.
The newspaper article cited by the Petitioner describes two events
that occurred in February 1993: a forced vehicle entry into the
protected area at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 1, and a van bomb which
was detonated in a public underground parking garage at the World Trade
Center in New York City. As a result of these events, the Commission
directed the NRC staff to reevaluate and, if necessary, update the
design basis threat for vehicle intrusions and the use of vehicle
bombs.
In its subsequent review of the threat environment, the NRC staff
concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat
against the domestic commercial nuclear industry (59 FR 38889, August
1, 1994). Nonetheless, in light of the above recent events, the NRC
staff concluded that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear
power plant could develop without warning in the future. Therefore, on
August 1, 1994, the Commission published in the Federal Register (59 FR
38889), a final regulation to amend its physical protection regulation
for operating nuclear power reactors. The amendments modified the
design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include use of a land
vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel and their hand-
carried equipment to the proximity of vital areas and to include a land
vehicle bomb (see 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i)(E) and (iii)).
All operating commercial nuclear power plants, including SONGS
Units 2 and 3, must comply with the modified design basis threat. This
amended rule requires reactor licensees to install vehicle control
measures, including vehicle barrier systems, to protect against the
malevolent use of a land vehicle by February 29, 1996 (see 10 CFR
73.55(c)(9)). A description of the proposed vehicle control measures
for all operating commercial power reactors was required to be
submitted to the Commission by February 28, 1995, for review. The
licensee for SONGS submitted its proposed measures on February 24,
1995, and they are currently being reviewed by the NRC staff.
The security program at SONGS has consistently demonstrated
superior performance and continues to exceed regulatory requirements.
In addition to the normal NRC inspection activities of the SONGS
security program, and Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE)
was conducted with the assistance of members of the U.S. Army Special
Forces. One objective of the OSRE is to evaluate the licensee's
abilities to respond to an external threat. The OSRE team concluded
that SONGS had an excellent contingency response capability.
The Petitioner has failed to provide an adequate basis for
asserting that the plant is not defensible. The petitioner cited a
newspaper article as basis for his allegation. The article does not
provide any information that is new or different than that already
considered by the Commission. The staff has concluded that the
Petitioner has not raised a significant health or safety issue.
IV. Conclusion
The NRC staff has reviewed the basis and justification stated to
support the Petitioner's request that the NRC take appropriate actions
to cause the shutdown and dismantling of SONGS. This review did not
reveal any substantial safety issues that would call into question the
continued safe operation of SONGS.
The institution of proceedings in response to a request pursuant to
Section 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and safety
issues have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York
(Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, (1975), and
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2),
DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). This standard has been applied to
determine whether any action in response to the Petition is warranted.
For the reasons discussed above, no basis exists for taking any action
in response to the Petition as no substantial health or safety issues
have been raised by the Petition. Accordingly, no action pursuant to
Section 2.206 is being taken in this matter.
A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the
Commission for the Commission to review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c). As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute
the final action of the Commission 25 days after issuance, unless the
Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision
within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 27th day of April 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-11030 Filed 5-3-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
